9 EU Counter-terrorism Action Plan
for the Horn of Africa and Yemen
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13388/12
JOIN(12) 24
| Joint Communication: EU Counter-Terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen
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| Legal base | —
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 25 January 2013
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| Previous Committee Reports | HC 86-xxiii (2012-13), chapter 4 (12 December 2012) and HC 86-xiii (2012-13), chapter 6 (17 October 2012); also see (33288) —: HC 428-xl (2010-12), chapter 11 (2 November 2011)
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| Discussion in Council | January 2013 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
9.1 In December 2009, under the Swedish EU Presidency, the
EU adopted "An EU policy on the Horn of Africa — towards
a comprehensive strategy". Following its adoption, Member
States called on the EU to build on this and ensure that its responses
to the various threats from the region (particularly piracy) were
coherent, cohesive and tackled the root causes of the issues.
9.2 For present purposes, the Horn of Africa
is defined as the countries belonging to the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD)[45]
— Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South
Sudan and Uganda.
9.3 Subsequent developments, and the Committee's
consideration thereof, are set out in our Report of 2 November
2011,[46] culminating
in the adoption in November 2011, via Council Conclusions, of
the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. It focuses
on five key areas:
— building
robust and accountable political structures;
— contributing to conflict resolution and
prevention;
— mitigating security threats emanating
from the region;
— promoting economic growth; and
— supporting regional economic cooperation.
The Joint Communication
9.4 This Joint Commission/High Representative
(COM/HR) Action Plan will implement the counter-terrorism strand
of this Framework, taking advantage of (as they put it) the current
window of opportunity to seek to identify counter-terrorism efforts
that can contribute to achieving tangible progress towards several
of these goals, while emphasising the crucial nexus between development
and security and the critical connection between the Horn of Africa
and Yemen.
9.5 The COM/HR say that their Action Plan also
recognises the importance of the overarching relationship between
the EU and the African Union, the EU's support for the African
Union's continent-wide activities in counter-terrorism and the
specific support given by the EU to AU led actions to restore
security to the Horn of Africa, in particular the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Their aim is:
"to promote local ownership and security by
linking counterterrorism efforts to regional development, while
strengthening social and political institutions in partnership
with national governments in the Horn and in Yemen and regional
institutions, as well as in coordination with other international
actors such as the UN (implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy)."[47]
9.6 Their detailed proposals are set out in our
Report of 17 October 2012.[48]
The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) said that international
concern over instability in the region, as highlighted by the
series of international conferences on Somalia, begun in London
in February 2012, demonstrated the need for the EU to have a comprehensive
and cohesive CT policy for the region. He thought that, in practice,
the action plan should help to support and "de-conflict the
activity of the EU and Member States in developing CT capability
and strengthening human rights and the rule of law in the region",
and also be a useful tool for communicating with other multilateral
organisations, such as the United Nations, Global Counter-Terrorism
Forum and Financial Action Taskforce, in order to direct funding
towards agreed priorities. He also said that the Commission had
not yet consulted Member States collectively on the Action Plan,
although it was originally proposed by the Danes with UK support
in late 2011 and the substance remained largely unchanged. He
was keen to see the Plan implemented, "as it outlines EU
activity in areas where we believe the EU can play an important
role in supporting reform, in particular: delivering support to
wider law enforcement reform; improving border controls; and driving
forward wider security sector reform in the region." He would
also welcome the proposed activity on countering terrorist financing
and violent extremism. Implementation of the plan would, he said,
complement targeted work by the UK and others to help bring security
and stability to the wider region in support of broader regional
EU objectives.
9.7 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister said that the European Commission had set aside €8
million of funding for implementation of the action plan under
its Instrument for Stability.[49]
Our assessment
9.8 The background suggested that an
Action Plan as proposed by the Commission and the High Representative
was desirable. However, whether or not it would be seen in the
same light by the prospective partners was less clear, since there
was no mention of any consultation with them, either individually
or collectively, which we found surprising, given the emphasis
correctly placed on local ownership. We were also unclear as to
what the Minister meant when he said that the Commission had "not
yet consulted Member States collectively on the Action Plan".
The Minister was commendably keen to see implementation begin.
But there was a disquieting lack of clarity not only about local
and regional "buy-in" but also as to whether other Member
States shared what appeared to be a COM/HR and Danish/UK vision.
9.9 We therefore asked the Minister to clarify
these ambiguities, and to tell us how he saw the Action Plan being
taken forward before the December Foreign Affairs Council meeting
at which he expected relevant Conclusions to be adopted.
9.10 In the meantime, we retained the document
under scrutiny.[50]
Minister's letter of 29 October 2012
9.11 In his letter of 29 October 2012 to us,
the Minister agreed that the questions raised about the procedure
for taking forward the Action Plan and for achieving local and
regional buy-in were important. He noted that, at the External
Counter-Terrorism Working Group, COTER, his officials, supported
by other Member State representatives, had already voiced concerns
both about the delay in presenting the draft text to COTER but
more importantly about its publication on the Commission's website
before consultation with the Horn of Africa states included in
the Plan. EU scoping studies in the Horn of Africa region were
underway, with experts (including from the UK) meeting local and
regional organisations; their findings and Member States' views
would be incorporated in the next draft of the Action Plan, ahead
of discussion in November by the Political and Security Committee
(PSC)[51] and endorsement
at November's Foreign Affairs Council. The EAS planned to begin
informal consultations with the Horn of Africa states included
in the Plan immediately; the PSC would determine how the Horn
of Africa states were to be formally approached. It remained
the Minister's view that the buy-in of these states was crucial
if the Plan was to be successful.
9.12 Our counterparts in the Lords' EU Committee
had also raised some questions, in response to which the Minister
explained that the first output from each study would be a mapping
exercise of other donor activity. As the EU was in the earliest
stages of designing its future counter-terrorism programmes in
the Horn of Africa, it was too early to say at present what form
the coordination with other donors would take. The Minister was
very keen to see the EU step up its counter-terrorism activity
in the region: but any activity resulting from the Plan must be
complementary to, and not duplicate, ongoing or planned activity
by Member States or other actors.
9.13 The Minister also wrote about the role of
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), noting the Government's
full support for its efforts to create secure space in Mogadishu
and southern Somalia and welcoming the advance of AMISOM and Somali
forces, increasing the area recovered from Al Shabaab control.
AMISOM had played a key role in helping to create the space and
stability that had enabled political progress in Mogadishu, including
the end of the transitional period. AMISOM was authorised through
UN Security Council Resolution 2036 for up to 17,731 uniformed
personnel to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed
opposition groups in four sectors of south central Somalia in
order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance
across Somalia. AMISOM received funding through the UN logistical
support package, the EU Africa Peace Facility, the UN Trust Fund
for AMISOM and through bilateral support. In 2011,
the UK had contributed approximately £16 million in bilateral
support to AMISOM, on top of its support through the UN and the
EU; and had also played a leading role in ensuring that the Mission
had the means to operate effectively by leading UN Security Council
Resolution negotiations on AMISOM in the UN. In addition,
the UK provided some support to pre-deployment training for AMISOM
troops and a small advisory team providing in-country support
and mentoring to AMISOM in areas such as stabilisation, strategic
communications and medical advice.
Our assessment
9.14 We shared the Minister's concern that the
Commission had posted this Action Plan on the internet before
consulting those Horn of Africa states who were supposedly at
its centre, and without whose commitment it would fail, and endorsed
his view that their "buy-in" was crucial.
9.15 We also noted that it was plain that this
Action Plan is but the first of several. While there might be
many good reasons for the EU stepping-up its counter-terrorism
activity outside the EU, doing so — in an area where such
activity by nation states raises many controversial issues —
required proper scrutiny. We hoped that the use of the verb "invite",
with reference to the Commission obtaining Member States' views,
was diplomatic politesse, though given the way it had acted thus
far, we could not be sure: along with the countries concerned,
Member States should likewise be at the centre and as of right,
not by invitation. And the information made available to national
parliaments should reflect this. As well as a further update
after the November Foreign Affairs Council, we asked for the Minister's
thoughts on how this can be ensured. At the very least, we presumed
that he would agree with us that all such Action Plans should,
like this one, be in the form of depositable documents, so as
to enable proper prior parliamentary scrutiny.
9.16 In the meantime, we continued to retain
the Action Plan under scrutiny.[52]
9.17 On 29 November 2012, the Minister responded
to further separate but related questions from our counterparts
in the Lords' EU Committee about the findings of the "scoping
visits". He explained that, to set the scoping studies into
context, the overall objective of the exercise was the identification
and formulation of future EU CT programmes in the region. These
programmes would focus on two themes: countering violent extremism;
and, regional law enforcement and countering terrorist financing.
The scoping studies for the two programmes would be carried out
over five and ten months respectively. The final reports, which
would be delivered to the European Commission, would include a
comprehensive and detailed outline of potential activities, together
with draft Terms of Reference for the future EU programmes. The
Minister was engaging closely with the experts taking part in
the studies, both in London and through UK Posts overseas, to
ensure that UK views were understood and reflected.
Minister's letter of 6 December 2012
9.18 In his letter to us of 6 December 2012,
the Minister said that the timetable had slipped to enable "a
more comprehensive PSC discussion of a number of issues relating
to the Horn of Africa region", and that his officials continued
"to seek clarity on the process going forwards and urge speed."
Despite his earlier concerns, he was now confident that UK views,
together with those of other Member States, were being taken into
account; with the Plan itself still in draft form, there would
be further opportunities to comment.
9.19 Regarding parliamentary scrutiny, the Minister
said:
"Action Plans aren't defined in the Treaties.
As a result, it is a term that can be used for a working document
which would not usually be subject to scrutiny, or a more strategic
document that would be more likely to be caught by the scrutiny
process. The type of document that is appropriate is therefore
likely to vary depending on its objective, and the subject area.
However, we are aware of the Committee's interest in this issue,
and are committed to ensuring that Parliament has oversight of
EU activities."
9.20 The Minister concluded by expressing the
hope that he had answered the Committee's questions "to the
best of my ability at this stage in the process".
Our assessment
9.21 The answer was: "up to a point".
For example, the Minister still had nothing to say about how
and when local partners were to be brought into the discussions.
9.22 Also, whether or not Action Plans are defined
in the Treaties was, we considered, a red herring — any
Minister may deposit whatever he or she wishes to. The only practical
problem would be if the document were to be limité;
even then, the Minister can provide a summary to the Committee,
rather than depositing the document. In short, such Action Plans
(whether in a clearly depositable document, like this one, or
in some other form) could be scrutinised if the Government was
genuinely "committed to ensuring that Parliament has oversight
of EU activities", as the Minister said he was in his letter.
9.23 The fact that there were to be further EU
counter-terrorism programmes in the region, aimed at countering
violent extremism and building regional law enforcement capacity
and countering terrorist financing, underlined all the more the
need for proper, prior parliamentary scrutiny before decisions
were taken, and of the subsequent outcomes. We therefore looked
forward to further information in due course about the scoping
studies.
9.24 In the meantime, we looked forward to hearing
further from the Minister about the outcome of the PSC discussions
and on the involvement of partner countries, before the Action
Plan was endorsed; and continued to retain it under scrutiny.[53]
The Minister's further letter of 25 January 2013
9.25 The Minister says that the PSC approved
the EU's Counter Terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa
on 15 January, which he expects "to be wrapped up in wider
Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, to be endorsed by the
Foreign Affairs Council on 31 January." He explains that
the Restreint security classification prevents him from
formally depositing the text of the Action Plan, but says that
its content "is virtually identical to the Commission and
High Representative's Joint Communication to the Council"
that he deposited along with his Explanatory Memorandum of 27
September 2011. As the substance remains largely unchanged
from the original draft Plan proposed by Denmark, with UK support,
the Minister professes himself delighted with the outcome, and
hopes that the Committee will now feel able to clear it from scrutiny.
9.26 The Minister also says that, now that the
Plan has been approved by the PSC, EU delegations in country will
begin informal consultations with their host governments; and
the EEAS will use the next meeting of the Global Counter Terrorism
Forum's[54] Horn of Africa
Working Group in Addis Ababa on 5-6 March to begin formal consultations.
9.27 The Minister concludes thus:
"In the meantime, we continue to engage closely
with the experts taking part in the scoping studies, whose main
output will be draft Terms of Reference for the future EU programmes
in the Horn of Africa on countering violent extremism, terrorist
financing and regional law enforcement. I appreciate the interest
that your Committee has taken in this issue and would be happy
to update you again, as part of any further correspondence, when
I have more information."
Conclusion
9.28 We now clear the draft Action Plan.
9.29 In so doing, we make the following observations:
- we continue to find it extraordinary
that given its aim — "to promote local ownership and
security" — it is only after the Action Plan has been
first published on the internet and subsequently approved that
even informal consultations will begin with prospective partner
countries;
- the "scoping studies" are presumably
at least in part a recognition that the way forward from now on
is to engage with those prospective partner countries at the outset;
- the outcome of these studies and the programmes
that they are intended to establish — countering violent
extremism, terrorist financing and regional law enforcement —
are now of even greater political interest, not only in view
of the adoption of the EU Sahel Strategy but also of recent developments
in Mali and Algeria;
- that being so, we welcome the Minister's offer
of further updates about these future programmes; and
- we rely upon him to ensure that all such future
Action Plans are likewise produced as Joint Communications, and
thus subject to the prior parliamentary scrutiny that their political
importance requires.
45 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
in Eastern Africa was created in 1996, to assist and complement
the efforts of the Member States to achieve, through increased
cooperation: food security and environmental protection; promotion
and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs;
and economic cooperation and integration. Back
46
See headnote: HC 428-xl (2010-12), chapter 11 (2 November 2011). Back
47
In 2006, for the first time, all Member States of the United Nations
agreed on a global strategy to coordinate their counter-terrorism
efforts. The Strategy contains recommendations in four key areas:
tackling the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;
preventing and combating terrorism; building countries' capacity
to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of
the United Nations system in that regard; and ensuring respect
for human rights for all and the rule of law while countering
terrorism. For full information, see http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/action.html
and www.un.org/terrorism. Back
48
See headnote: HC 86-xiii (2012-13), chapter 6 (17 October 2012). Back
49
The Instrument for Stability (IfS) is the financial instrument
designed to address a number of global security and development challenges
in complement to geographic instruments. In force since 1 January
2007, it replaced several instruments in the fields of drugs,
mines, uprooted people, crisis management, rehabilitation and
reconstruction. See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/ifs_en.htm
for full information on the IfS. Back
50
See headnote: HC 86-xiii (2012-13), chapter 6 (17 October 2012). Back
51
The committee of ambassador-level officials from national delegations
who, by virtue of article 38 TEU, under the authority of the High
Representative and the Council, monitor the international situation
in areas covered by the CFSP and exercise political control and
strategic direction of crisis management operations, as set out
in article 43 TEU. Back
52
See headnote: HC 86-xx (2012-13), chapter 8 (21 November 2012). Back
53
See headnote: HC 86-xxiii (2012-13), chapter 4 (12 December 2012). Back
54
The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) was launched officially
in New York at the level of foreign ministers on 22 September
2011. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and U.S. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton chaired the event. The 30 founding members
of the GCTF are: Algeria, Australia, Canada, China, Colombia,
Denmark, Egypt, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. See http://www.thegctf.org/web/guest/home.
According to the US State Department,
the GCTF will provide a unique platform for senior counterterrorism
policymakers and experts from around the world to work together
to identify urgent needs, devise solutions and mobilize resources
for addressing key counterterrorism challenges; and aims to increase
the number of countries capable of dealing with the terrorist
threats within their borders and regions. In addition to the
adoption of the GCTF's founding political declaration and remarks
from GCTF Foreign Ministers, the launch included the announcement
of two deliverables - one on the rule of law and one on countering
violent extremism - thus highlighting the GCTF's action-oriented
focus from the outset. See http://www.state.gov/j/ct/gctf/index.htm. Back
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