10 The EU and the Maghreb
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5118/13
JOIN(12) 36
| Joint Communication: supporting closer cooperation and regional integration in the Maghreb: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia
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| Legal base | —
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| Document originated | 17 December 2012
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| Deposited in Parliament | 14 January 2013
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 28 January 2013
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| Previous Committee Report | None
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| Discussion in Council | 31 January 2013 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
10.1 The Arab Maghreb Union/Union Du Maghreb Arabe (AMU/UMA)
was created on 17 February 1989 at a meeting in Marrakesh of Heads
of State of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The
main institutions are:
— the
Council of Heads of State (last session in 1994);
— the Council of Foreign Ministers;
— the Steering Committee;
— the Justice Court: two members per country,
to settle disputes between parties from member countries;
— Maghreb Advisory Chamber: with 30 MPs
per country;
— Council of Ministers of Interior, Human
Resources, Infrastructure, Economy and Finances, and Food Security;
— General Secretariat: established permanently
in Rabat in 1992; Member States contribute on equal terms to its
budget; the current Secretary General is
Mr Habib Ben Yahia.
10.2 The fact that the AMU last met at Head of
State level nearly 20 years ago hints at the political disputes
that have hindered its development, particularly over the issue
of Western Sahara[55]
and during the Qadaffi regime in Libya.
The Joint Communication
10.3 In its introduction, the Commission notes
that the peoples of the Maghreb have been at the forefront of
the historic events of 2011 and, more than in any other region
within the Arab world, have embarked on a long process of change
and reform. The European Union has, the Commission says, a major
interest in the success of such democratisation and modernisation
processes.
10.4 In the course of the past year, the Commission
says that there has been renewed impetus from the countries of
the Maghreb towards closer cooperation between them. This movement
— which the Commission describes as still tentative and
yet to translate into comprehensive steps — is "based
on the recognition that the objectives of promoting prosperity,
stability and democratic transformation at the national level
cannot be fully realised in the absence of deeper relations between
the countries of the Maghreb."
10.5 The Commission says that the main purpose
of this Communication is to set out ways in which the European
Union might support closer cooperation between the countries of
the Maghreb, drawing on its own extensive experience of integration
and given its interest in the region as a neighbour and key partner
for the five countries concerned. By doing so the Commission and
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy (High Representative) seek to encourage on-going efforts
by Maghreb partners to deepen cooperation at the level of the
Maghreb and accompany them in this process. A stronger and more
united Maghreb will, the Commission says, help address common
challenges, such as instability in the Sahel, energy security,
the need to create jobs and fight climate change: "These
represent historic opportunities to deepen our partnership".
10.6 More broadly, the Communication is seen
as part of the overall EU response to the changes in the southern
neighbourhood, and is intended to complement, not replace, the
range of measures that the EU developed in the 2011 Communications
that established a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity
and set out a renewed approach to the European Neighbourhood Policy
— both of which highlighted the importance of greater south-south
(and sub-regional) integration as complementary to other bilateral
and regional initiatives. The present Communication is also said
to build on the Commission Communication, "Increasing the
impact of EU development policies: an Agenda for Change",
described as "the Commission's revised policy for a results-oriented
use of external assistance funding".
10.7 The Commission stresses that the impetus
for change and the decisions as to how integration might best
be achieved lie solely with the countries of the Maghreb themselves;
and that, consequently, the offer set out in the Communication:
"is made in a spirit of solidarity and partnership
at a critical moment in the on-going debate within the Maghreb
concerning the pace and depth of integration at the sub-regional
level. Nonetheless, while the proposals here could bring benefits
to the people of the Maghreb region as a whole, they could also
be beneficial if developed on a more limited bilateral basis or
in an asymmetric manner across the region."
10.8 The Commission then reviews the various
challenges facing the Maghreb, their implications and how the
EU might develop existing relations and thereby help the Maghreb
countries address those challenges, for example:
— all
are undergoing democratic reforms;
— all suffer from weak growth, poverty
and unemployment; there is an estimated need to create 1.8 million
jobs by 2015 and 7.8 million by 2030; the agriculture sector needs
to produce more and better; none of the Maghreb economies is genuinely
diversified and based on a vibrant private sector;
— terrorism and international crime issues
are of paramount concern in the region and beyond into the wider
southern neighbourhood as well as the Sahel; Al Qaida in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQMI) has brought together a network of terrorism notably
in the Maghreb and in Mali;
— there are many challenges in the environmental
sphere and in the exploitation of natural resources, and a vulnerability
to man-made and natural disasters;
— migration and mobility play a key role
in the EU's relations with the Maghreb countries;
— stronger regional trade integration among
the Maghreb countries, coupled with the establishment of deep
and comprehensive free trade areas between Maghreb partners and
the EU, would be mutually beneficial; and
— deepening the long-standing energy partnership
(oil and gas trade, pipelines, the development of hydrocarbons,
electricity interconnection), starting with renewable energy,
enhanced energy efficiency and the development of an integrated
electricity market, benefitting both parties.
10.9 Against this background, the Commission
suggests a large number and wide range of measures of cooperation
in all these areas. It also argues that there is a need for the
various regional organisations and structures to be re-energised
in order to meet common challenges, highlighting the proposed
forthcoming Arab Maghreb Union Summit; the Union for the Mediterranean;
and the so called "5+5" grouping (Algeria, France, Italy,
Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia).
10.10 In conclusion, the Commission says that
its proposals demonstrate the EU's support for and direct interest
in closer integration in the Maghreb. Strengthening bilateral
relations between the EU and countries of the Maghreb can support
this objective — albeit indirectly — through greater
convergence of norms, regulations and policies: but progress in
integration will depend first and foremost on the domestic efforts
of partner countries; efforts at a Maghreb-wide level are needed
to create real impetus in this field.
10.11 The Commission and the High Representative
propose to launch a high level dialogue between the EU and the
Arab Maghreb Union on these proposals. They also look forward
to discussing these proposals with EU Member States and other
EU institutions in order to ensure a joined-up approach. They
will also consult European and Maghreb stakeholders, including
civil society representatives and business, on them. They also
propose to ensure that these issues are addressed in the regular
political dialogues which take place with the countries of the
Maghreb. Through such exchanges, the Commission and the High
Representative "hope to make a valuable continuing contribution
to the developing debate concerning integration in the Maghreb".
The Government's view
10.12 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 28 January
2013, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) describes the
Maghreb region as poorly integrated, noting that the estimated
cost of this lack of integration is 1-2% of the region's GDP,
and describing the closed border between Algeria and Morocco,
which together account for approximately 66% of Maghreb GDP and
77% of the region's population, as a key factor.
10.13 More recently, the Minister says, focus
on internal reform priorities in the Maghreb countries, such as
constitutional change, has left little capacity for countries
to pursue this initiative more fully.
10.14 Meanwhile:
"the UK has long viewed regional cooperation
as beneficial for the region. The growing economies in the region
and improved security would support the UK's objectives on the
Arab Spring and further our security, migration and prosperity
agendas in the region in line with our Foreign Policy Priorities.
More recently, events in Algeria demonstrate the need for a regional
focus on security cooperation.
"UK engagement in support of Maghreb integration
has so far focused on the economic elements, but this communication
also supports the development of Maghreb cooperation in the areas
of security and of managed migration. One of the initiatives involved
a UK-hosted Wilton Park conference on the Maghreb Economy which
brought together Ministers, senior officials and economic experts
from the five Maghreb states (July 2012).
"Maghreb countries have publicly communicated
a will to further this initiative and the EU is a key partner
in our engagement to provide effective support. There has been
small progress on organising the next Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
summit in Tunisia to bring together leaders from the Maghreb states.
Recent high level engagement with Maghreb countries established
their priorities to be building stability and security within
their borders before securing movement on Maghreb integration.
But we judge that Maghreb integration could build stability in
the region.
"The UK believes the EU can play an important
role in cementing cooperation by building on the focus on supporting
democratic reforms in the countries. Priority areas for the UK
include security and prosperity — with regard to prosperity
this is in an area where the UK's G8 Presidency could play a valuable
role, including through the Deauville Partnership."[56]
Conclusion
10.15 This is a non-legislative proposal that
raises no other questions in and of itself. However, we consider
that it should nonetheless be drawn to the attention of the House.
10.16 The Commission and High Representative's
proposals are wide-ranging and arguably over-ambitious, especially
given the central need for the Maghreb countries to want to move
in this direction and the history of AMU cooperation thus far.
But as recent events in Mali and Algeria have served to illustrate,
there can be little doubt that it is in the UK's as well as the
EU's interests for the effort to be made, particularly at this
time of flux. We can but wish the exercise well.
10.17 We now clear the document.
55 Western Sahara, formerly the Spanish colony of Spanish
Sahara, is a disputed territory claimed by both the Kingdom of
Morocco and the Polisario Front. Its legal status is, according
to the United Nations, a non-decolonized territory and is included
in the United Nations List of Non-Self-Governing Territories.
Since the Madrid Accords of 1975, part of Western Sahara has
been administered by Morocco as the Southern Provinces; another
section, the Liberated Territories, is administered by the Polisario
Front as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). A UN-monitored
cease-fire has been in effect since September 1991. Back
56
The Deauville Partnership, announced at the G8 meeting under the
French Presidency in May 2011, supports the transition process
in the Middle East and North Africa. The Deauville Partnership
involves the G8 countries and Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco,
Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE and international
financial institutions. Back
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