1 EU training of Somali
|Draft Council Decision amending and extending Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia)
|Legal base||Articles 42 and 43 TEU; unanimity
|Department||Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|Basis of consideration||EM of 13 December 2012
|Previous Committee Report||None; but see (31426) : HC 5-xv (2009-10), chapter 8 (24 March 2010) and (31259) : HC 5-vii (2009-10), chapter 2 (20 January 2010)
|Discussion in Council||20 December 2012 Agriculture and Fisheries Council
|Committee's assessment||Politically important
|Committee's decision||Not cleared; for debate in European Committee B
1.1 On 15 February 2010 the Council decided
that the Union would conduct a military training mission, called
EUTM Somalia, in order to contribute to strengthening the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) as a functioning government serving Somali
citizens. The objective of the EU military mission was to contribute
to a comprehensive and sustainable perspective for the development
of the Somali security sector by strengthening the Somali security
forces through the provision of specific military training, and
support to the training provided by Uganda, of 2,000 Somali recruits
up to and including platoon level, including appropriate modular
and specialised training for officers and non-commissioned officers.
1.2 As our Report under reference explains in detail,
the previous Committee raised a number of questions when this
mission was being planned. Although a further Council Decision
was required in order to launch the Mission following approval
of the Mission plan, they recommended that the Council Decision
(which was then under consideration) should be debated in European
Committee, to give the House an opportunity to pursue them and
other questions that interested Members might wish to raise, and
the then Minister to respond to those of its earlier questions
that remained unanswered.
1.3 That debate took place on 8 March 2010, at the
end of which the European Committee welcomed the Council Decision
as a positive contribution to building peace and stability in
1.4 A further Council Decision authorised the mission
plan that had been developed in the meantime.
1.5 In his accompanying Explanatory Memorandum of
22 March 2010, the then Minister for Europe (Chris Bryant) set
out the legal basis for this EU action, explained why he felt
that the previous Committee's concerns had been satisfactorily
addressed, and why he regarded the mission which had been
renamed, from EUTRA Somalia, to EUTM Somalia as a positive
contribution to the Somali peace process.
1.6 His detailed analysis of the mission
its rationale, objectives, targets, and so on is set out
in our Report under reference. Full Operational Capability (FOC)
would be reached by 1 May 2010, when training would begin. The
then Minister said:
"The mission's end state will be after two 6-month
training periods have been completed and EUTM Somalia personnel
and equipment have been recovered. The final agreed text stated:
'The EU military mission shall terminate in 2011 after two consecutive
six-month training periods'. This means that the mission's objectives
are met whilst ensuring that it has a clear exit strategy.
"The mission is small, designed to support and
enhance existing Ugandan-led training. Uganda is currently carrying
out basic training of Somali Security Sector Forces. The Ugandans,
veterans of Mogadishu, have a clear idea of what will work in
Somali culture and are in an excellent position to work alongside
EU trainers. The Ugandans have welcomed the CSDP mission. The
Mission supports the African Union's peacekeeping mission to Somalia
(AMISOM). By focusing on the need to 'train the trainer' the
benefits of the training are extended beyond the Mission's timeframe
as trainers are given the capability that will endure beyond the
end of the mission. The training will take place outside Somalia,
taking account of the security situation and its impact on the
safety of EU instructors."
1.7 The then Minister expected the final budget to
be "in the vicinity of" 4.978 million; and the
UK share to be around £700,000 for 2010/11.
Our predecessors' assessment
1.8 After thanking the then Minister for explaining
the nature and purpose of this mission, and for endeavouring to
address earlier concerns, so comprehensively, the previous Committee
cleared the draft Council Decision.
The Minister's Explanatory Memorandum of 6 July
1.9 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
said that the Foreign Affairs Council was due to take a decision
in mid-July on the future of EUTM Somalia after its current mandate
expired. He explained that the European External Action Service
(EEAS) had drafted a Crisis Management Concept, setting out a
new mandate, alongside descriptions of the background, situation,
requirements, assumptions, conditions of execution, co-ordination
with others and way ahead. The necessary Council Decision, which
had yet to be drafted, would be based on this Crisis Management
Concept; he anticipated that this would take place in mid-July,
after the House had risen for the summer recess.
1.10 The Minister said that, thus far, EUTM Somalia
had conducted the training of just under 2,000 troops in two tranches
of roughly 1,000 troops each; in each training period, around
670 trainees were given basic training and about 330 NCO basic
training, with a number of NCOs selected for further training
as junior officers; training had been held in Bihanga Camp, Uganda;
up to 150 staff from between 10 and 14 Member States had provide
specialist training, supporting the Ugandan Army. The Mission
had worked in close collaboration with the US. Troops were vetted
by AMISOM, with support from the US, before training began, to
ensure that they represented "Somalia" rather than a
particular area or clan. The first trainees had returned to Mogadishu
in February and had recently been deployed; the second tranche
was still being trained in Uganda and likely to return to Mogadishu
in August, marking the end of the current EUTM Somalia mandate.
In order to avoid a gap in the training should the Council
decide that it should be continued a decision was required
in mid-July to allow for operational planning for the next stage.
1.11 The Minister included a copy of the Crisis Management
Concept, and noted that the information in it was confidential.
In his EM, the Minister said that the political objective of
extending EUTM Somalia was to continue to contribute to strengthening
the TFG as a functioning government serving Somali citizens; and
the military objective, to contribute to strengthening the Somali
National Security Forces through the provision of military training
to commanders and specialists up to company level, and through
training trainers, with a view to transferring basic and specialist
training expertise up to platoon level under African ownership
back to Somalia. The main training would focus on the development
of Somali Command and Control capabilities up to company level,
and of a self-training capacity; it was envisaged that it would
take five to six months to complete this phase; a second training
period, whose parameters would be further defined taking into
account identified lessons, would then follow. EUTM Somalia would
continue operating in close cooperation and coordination with
other actors in the international community, in particular, the
UN, AMISOM, Uganda and the US and in line with TFG requirements.
The Minister's letter of 6 July 2011
1.12 The Minister noted that the current mandate
would formally end when the second tranche of troops trained under
the Mission returns to Mogadishu, which he said was likely to
be in late August. He said that the Mission had been successful
in contributing to the development of the Somali security sector
by strengthening the Somali security forces. It was an important
part of the EU's comprehensive engagement in support of Somalia,
with a view to responding to the priority needs of the Somali
people and stabilizing Somalia to begin rebuilding security, and
was consistent with the Union's external action as a whole, including
the Union's development programmes.
1.13 He then said:
"My officials have raised the problem of national
parliamentary scrutiny and asked if a decision might be postponed
until after Recess. However, if a decision is delayed, there
will not be sufficient time to carry out the necessary operational
planning to avoid an operational gap should the Council decide
that the Mission should be continued. This would result in unnecessary
costs such as maintaining empty training facilities.
"If a decision is adopted by Council in mid
July, this will unfortunately mean that there is not enough time
for your Committee to scrutinise the Decision. In light of the
need to begin operational planning, I hope the Committee will
accept the Crisis Management Concept for the extension of the
mandate as sufficient basis for scrutiny."
1.14 In its response of 13 July 2011, the Committee
said that, while it appreciated the Minister's endeavours to keep
it informed of issues that were likely to jeopardize the scrutiny
reserve, it had already been pointed out to FCO officials that:
first sentence of his EM said: "This information is provided
to the Committee in confidence as the document is classified Limité";
this contravened the arrangement agreed
in 2010 between the Committees of both Houses and the Government
on the treatment of limité documents, which plainly says
(in bold): "They cannot be deposited and subject to
an Explanatory Memorandum as this makes their content public";
the Committee therefore could not deal
there would be little point in a further
letter, since no other prior information could be used as a substitute
for scrutiny of a document that was not yet able to be scrutinised;
all the Committee can deal with is an
EM covering a text, official or unofficial, that can be deposited
without any caveat;
if that is then deposited at a time when
a scrutiny breach is unavoidable, that is how it has to be;
if there were good reasons, as the FCO
knew from experience, the Committee was always reasonable in its
approach to such breaches;
the FCO had accordingly been advised
to withdraw the EM and then arrange for the draft Council Decision
to be deposited when it was ready, along with the usual EM. The
Committee considered this the right course of action.
The Minister's letter of 7 December 2011
1.15 The Minister wrote to inform the Committee that
the 25 July FAC had adopted a Council Decision to amend and extend
Decision 2010/96/CFSP on EUTM Somalia.
1.16 He recalled his letter of 6 July 2011, and that
the Committee had asked for an EM to be deposited when the Decision
was ready, and continued as follows:
"However, as the Decision is classified Limité,
this letter and update is being provided in place of an EM to
inform the Committees of events relating to the EUTM. I apologise
for the earlier confusion about the deposit of the document referred
to in your 13 July letter. Although I provided information in
confidence to the Committee in the form of an EM template, the
document itself was not deposited. I'm sure you appreciate that
the mistake sprung from officials' desire to keep the Committee
informed about progress on this important mission.
"The first tranche of EUTM trainees returned
to Mogadishu in February and was deployed during the summer.
The second tranche has recently returned to Mogadishu and is undergoing
reintegration training. Whilst it is too early to make a comprehensive
assessment of the performance of the first tranche of troops,
we have had positive feedback about the performance of the EUTM
trained troops. The third tranche has recently arrived in Mogadishu
and has begun its training.
"In spite of
some recent improvements, the situation in Somalia has not stabilised
since the launch of EUTM Somalia. The Somali NSF are not yet
capable of fulfilling their mission without external support,
and it was therefore agreed that EUTM Somalia will continue.
The decision was required in mid July in order to avoid a gap
in the training and to allow for operational planning for the
"This extension to EUTM Somalia's mandate will
continue to be funded under the EU's ATHENA shared costs mechanism.
The budget for the extended and revised EUTM Somalia mandate
has initially been set at 4.8 million. On this basis, and
given the current agreed UK contribution of 14.36% toward shared
costs, the new EUTM Somalia may incur an overall additional cost
to UK of 689,280. The EU have so far issued two call-forward
notices requesting member state fund 2.20 million of the
proposed 4.8 million cost of the extended mission. The
UK's share of this funding is 316,274. However, 206,815
of proposed UK funding has been covered by a surplus in the overall
ATHENA budget for 2010. This leaves the UK with a payment of
109,458 to make at this stage. This payment will be made,
in accordance with established procedures, by MOD. MOD will then
be reimbursed from the Peacekeeping budget."
The Minister's letter of 3 December 2012
1.17 The Minister for Europe wrote to advise the
Committee that a fresh Council Decision was likely to be adopted
between 18-20 December 2012.
1.18 The Minister went on to say that: in late September,
a review of EUTM Somalia was concluded, evaluating the effectiveness
of the mission in achieving its stated aims and, given the changes
in the political and security situation, identifying recommendations
for any future of the mission; based on this, a fresh Crisis Management
Concept was now being drafted, with costs, aims and structure
over the next two years; and that all he could say at that point
was that he expected the proposal to be for a two-year mandate
extension; for the mission to relocate to Mogadishu;, and to build
on previous junior officer training by shifting the focus to more
senior levels of the Somali National Security Forces. This, the
Minister for Europe said, "is consistent with the UK's Somalia
policy to work with the new Somali government to strengthen their
security forces in order to stabilise the security situation in
the country". The Minister undertook to write again once
the Council Decision became available for scrutiny.
1.19 The Minister then said that this new mandate
would need to be proposed and agreed before the end of December;
and that "due to the process by which the documents are agreed
in advance of the drafting of the Council Decision", he does
not expect to receive this before 13 December. Conscious no doubt
that the Committee would meet on 19 December and then not until
9 January, he said that "this will provide a particularly
short window for the Scrutiny Committee to consider these proposals".
1.20 In its response of 5 December 2012, the Committee
said that it found it difficult to understand why this had arisen.
It pointed out that, for several years now, both it and its predecessor
had made it clear that it relied upon the FCO both to alert it
at the earliest possible moment of this sort of development and
to avoid wherever possible situations such as this where, in reality,
proper prior scrutiny would now be impossible even if
he were able to provide an Explanatory Memorandum in time for
the Committee's 19 December meeting, there would be no opportunity
to pursue any questions that might arise prior to adoption by
1.21 The Committee went on to say that, so far it
could see, it had not heard from the Minister on EUTM Somalia
since December 2011. The Committee pointed out that it had acknowledged
the difficulties inherent in prior scrutiny of sanctions regimes.
On this mission, however, it could not see why it was not possible
for the Committee to have been provided with an update on the
review process and its outcome; and nor could it see why
his representations to the High Representative and the EEAS notwithstanding
about the need for proper scrutiny to be built into EEAS timelines
the draft could not have been provided until a couple
of weeks before the mandate was due to expire. It seemed to us
that once again, professed commitments to scrutiny rang hollow.
1.22 The Committee asked for an explanation within
the next ten working days.
The draft Council Decision
1.23 The draft Council Decision would further amend
and extend Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP of 15 February 2010 on
EUTM Somalia, from 1 January 2013 to 31 March 2015.
1.24 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 13 December
2012, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) notes that,
after evaluation of progress made in July 2011, the Council decided
to extend and refocus the EUTM Somalia. 
1.25 The Minister recalls his letter to the Committee
on 7 December 2011 concerning the previous amendment and extension
of the mandate, noting that this Council Decision could not be
submitted for scrutiny "due to the classification of the
1.26 The Minister continues as follows:
"It would now focus on command and control and
specialised capabilities and on the self training capabilities
of the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF), with the intention
of transferring EU training expertise to local actors. This was
to be achieved through the provision of military training to commanders
and specialists up to company level, and through training trainers,
with a view to transferring basic and specialist training expertise
up to platoon level under African ownership back to Somalia.
"In terms of training delivered, in its two
consecutive mandates, EUTM Somalia has trained or contributed
to training four Captains, 76 Junior Officer, 576 NCOs (INF and
specialised), 20 COY Staff NCOs, 60 trainers and 1643 soldiers).
In addition, EUTM Somalia supported the Uganda People's Defence
Force (UPDF)-led cohesion training in which coherent platoons
and companies were formed.
"A final contingent of 550 individuals is currently
undertaking training in Bihanga with the aim of returning to Somalia,
before the end of the year, four newly formed companies with their
own commanders and specialists, and 60 trainers.
"Beyond these direct results in terms of training
delivered, EUTM Somalia has contributed to enhancing the infrastructure
of the UPDF training school and the living conditions of Somali
recruits in Uganda (upgrade of Bihanga Training Camp (BTC) accommodation
capacity, improved training facilities, construction of a camp
for EU trainers, an airstrip and a clinic). The mutual confidence
built between EU and UPDF trainers continues to improve and provides
"These results have contributed significantly
to the security situation in Somalia which has changed dramatically
in the last two years. AMISOM and Somali forces now control Mogadishu,
Kismayo and most key towns in southern Somalia. They continue
to push against an embattled Al Shabaab. Increasing the capability
and capacity of the SNSF to provide security is essential and
will allow for an exit strategy for AMISOM. The EU's strategic
review of the Mission
conducted in September 2012 concluded that EUTM Somalia has significantly
contributed to improving security and living conditions in Somalia
and that the effects of the Mission go far beyond training, delivering
a positive impact in setting the basis for the future SNSF the
development of the security sector. The impact of EUTM Somalia's
training has also been corroborated by General Dini, Chief of
the Somali Defence Forces, who has said that they would never
have recovered control of Mogadishu without the contribution of
the forces trained by EUTM Somalia.
"Alongside this, significant political progress
has been made. A new Council of Ministers was approved by the
Somali Parliament on 13 November. This follows the election by
Parliament of a new President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on 10 September,
concluding the transitional period, and the appointment of a Prime
Minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, on 6 October.
The new President has highlighted security
as his top priority.
"In September 2012 the EEAS again reviewed the
progress of the EUTM Somalia and concluded that given the significant
shift in the political and security situation in Somalia, the
EU needed to consolidate EUTM Somalia's success by remaining engaged,
but with a new approach focused on fostering Somali ownership
and development of security sector capabilities. This is consistent
with the Governments' policy towards Somalia.
"Based on this evaluation, the EU Political
and Security Committee decided to ask the Crisis Management Planning
Directorate (CMPD) to develop a draft crisis management concept
on which to base a decision to amend and extend EUTM Somalia.
The revised EUTM Somalia will have a two-year mandate. During
this time, it will provide: strategic mentoring and advice to
Somali authorities within the Security Institutions (Ministry
of Defence and General Staff); support and advice on security
sector development; mentoring and training support to consolidate
the development of the Somali self-training capacity; and specialist
and leadership training in accordance with the needs and priorities
established by Somali authorities. EUTM Somalia will also provide
support to other EU actors, outlined in more detail below, on
the implementation of their respective mandates in security and
defence in Somalia.
"The new mandate will launch activities in Mogadishu
and intends to follow a phased approach, implementing activities
in Mogadishu when the security conditions allow. The implementation
of the new mandate will be synchronised with the evolution of
political and security conditions.
"On 10 December 2012 the Council approved the
revised crisis management concept for EUTM Somalia. The attached
document is the Council Decision to extend EUTM Somalia's mandate
as set out in the crisis management concept."
The Government's view
1.27 The Minister continues to rank Somalia as a
top foreign policy priority for the Government, noting concerns
about terrorism, piracy and migration and "a large Somali
diaspora living in the UK." He also notes that the Government
"has taken a lead in coordinating efforts in
the international community to support Somalia, including by holding
the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February 2012 and is the
lead country on drafting UN Security Council resolutions on Somalia."
1.28 The Minister continues as follows:
"Somalia has made significant political progress
in the last few months with the political transition ending on
10 September. The Government has engaged closely with the new
Somali authorities to ensure UK and international support reinforces
"President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has made security
his top priority, emphasising its importance to establishing greater
stability and further development in Somalia. This is in line
with the Government's policy; a stable and prosperous Somalia
which is not a threat to the international community or UK interests.
Developing the SNSF is the first step in enabling the Somali
authorities to control the security situation independently and
will ultimately provide an exit strategy for African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM). The security gains in Somalia to date have
been largely due to AMISOM, which the EU contributes towards significantly.
However, the SNSF is playing an increasingly important role working
in support of AMISOM. For the SNSF to become an effective force
able to operate without AMISOM support, continued investment and
support from the international community will be required.
"Instability in Somalia is also a severe threat
to regional and international peace, security and development.
The EU is playing an increasing role in addressing these threats
under a Comprehensive Approach that includes three Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, enhanced political support,
including appointment of an EU Special Representative for the
Horn of Africa, and financial support through a number of Commission
led programmes. In addition to EUTM Somalia, the CSDP activity
includes EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, the operation to tackle
piracy off the coast of Somalia (of which the UK provides the
Operational Headquarters and the Operation Commander), and EU
CAP NESTOR aimed at increasing the capacity of the region to tackle
piracy themselves (for which the UK provides a number of secondees).
The renewed EUTM Somalia will complement the work of these other
EU operations towards improving security in Somalia, with a particular
focus on developing the security sector.
"During previous scrutiny by both Houses, pre-requisites
for this mission were set out. A commitment was made to the House
of Lords Scrutiny Committee to ensure that these were fully addressed
before the final decision to launch:
- "A force structure to
incorporate newly trained Platoons, and a mentoring process to
develop TFG security forces;
- "A structure, process and funds to ensure
regular payment to returning trainees for at least one year; and
- "Logistical arrangements to house, feed
and supply such forces.
"Our assessment of the pre-requisites is as
"Force structure and mentoring process
The Command and Control structure of the SNSF is not well
developed, but progress is being made. The President has now
appointed a Minister of Defence and we expect junior Ministers
to be appointed soon. Over the last six months, EUTM Somalia
has focussed on the training of junior officers and non-commissioned
ranks, which we expect to have a positive impact (although it
is too early to make an assessment of the impact of this). The
proposals for this mandate shift the emphasis of the Mission to
focus on the provision of support in developing institutional
level capacity and the Somali training capacity.
"Other partners are also providing support in
developing a clear force structure and the SNSF are implementing
a concept for the integration of all Somali forces under national
command. We will continue to emphasise the importance of effective
coordination in this area.
"The Government views the refocusing of the
Mission as necessary to making further progress in strengthening
Command and Control. The planned addition to the mandate of political
and strategic level mentoring and advice to the Somali security
institutions will allow a transition towards increased Somali
ownership of the development of their security forces. Ultimately
this will support moves towards an exit strategy for EUTM Somalia
and wider international security sector support. However we judge
it will take time for the Command and Control and top level governance
structures to fully develop. In the meantime, we are encouraging
AMISOM to continue to play a role. EUTM Somalia trainees currently
undergo AMISOM reintegration training on return to Mogadishu.
After reintegration, and in accordance with its mandate, AMISOM
continue to exercise a monitoring role in order to ensure that
these forces are properly commanded and supported. We are satisfied
that this provides appropriate Command and Control structures
and mentoring and believe that the extension of EUTM Somalia is
essential to further developing these structures.
"Payment of trainees A proper
mechanism to conduct and control the payments is in place using
a biometric database, and is working well. $600 is paid at the
end of the training period and a monthly salary of $100 is paid
once they are back in Somalia. This has been judged to be a successful
mechanism and an important factor in the retention of SNSF troops.
The first tranche of EUTM Somalia trainees continue to be paid
regularly as part of the SNSF force with payments done regularly
by Somali paymasters under the supervision of IGAD and AMISOM.
Whilst the funding for the payment of stipends (funded by the
US and Italy) is, we believe, sufficient for 2013, an enduring
solution has yet to be identified.
"In the long-term, international efforts to
build Somali institutional capacity aim to ensure that the Somali
Government is able sustain its instruments of state, including
the security forces. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has emphasised
his Government's desire to pay for the Somali security forces.
However, they do not currently have sufficient resources to assume
these payments, so in the short to medium term they will continue
to need international support. Under the new mandate, the current
funding and payment mechanisms will remain in place. In recent
discussion with the EEAS, US Officials have confirmed that they
will continue payments to EUTM Somalia trained until February
2014. Italy have confirmed that they will continue until the
end of 2013.
"Logistical arrangements -Al Jazeera
Camp in Mogadishu is now complete and has been housing EUTM Somalia
trained troops successfully over the course of the last mandate.
AMISOM retain overarching control of the camp and in the last
year, the AU has extended the camp to provide a further 1,000
bed spaces and associated training facilities, using EU funds.
This is sufficient for the troops that have been trained to date.
"The proposals for the new mandate will be training
fewer troops in total, but propose moving activity to Mogadishu,
conditions permitting. This will allow the training to be delivered
directly, eliminating the need for troops to be sent to Uganda
for training and therefore reducing reintegration problems. However
this poses different questions related to the logistical arrangements.
We have sought to ensure that activities will only move to Somalia
when certain security criteria have been met, under the political
guidance of the PSC. This has been included in the political
and military advice and subsequent planning will have to provide
clear conditions based criteria for the phased deployment of mission
personnel in Mogadishu, to be used by the Mission Commander.
"The crisis management concept states that EUTM
Somalia will be implementing its new mandate within Mogadishu
International Airport. This is secured by AMISOM troops, is where
all international missions are deployed, and provides security
to government facilities. The Special Representative of the African
Union Commission for Somalia and AMISOM Force Commander confirmed
that AMISOM support will be made available to EUTM Somalia in
Mogadishu. We are satisfied that the conditions based approach
to moving to Mogadishu and the reassurances that the AU and AMISOM
have provided , provide sufficient reassurances on the security
arrangements for the mandate's proposals.
"EUTM Somalia has been effective and well received.
This has, in part, been because it has been able to respond to
the changing needs of the SNSF. On 27 November 2012 the Prime
Minister of the Federal Republic of Somalia wrote to the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
welcoming the Union's ongoing support to the training of the SNSF.
"The stated aims of this EUTM Somalia mandate
are that a Somali-owned military training system will be designed
and initially established, basic and specialised training for
troops will be conducted inside Somalia, and basic structures
of the Ministry of Defence and General Staff will have an initial
capacity to command and run the organization still counting on
external support and financial assistance. The UK Government
agrees that these are important areas to develop an effective
1.29 Then, under the heading of Subsidiarity,
the Minister says:
"The EU, working with the wider international
community, is seeking to contribute to the strengthening of the
Somali authorities as a functioning government able to deliver
basic services to the population. The EU provides support to
Somalia through AMISOM, humanitarian aid, and its three
CSDP Missions and continues to discuss further ways to
promote peace and stability in Somalia. EU Member States, particularly
those with a significant Somali Diaspora, are increasingly interested
in Somalia and are looking for ways in which to positively engage
with the peace process.
"EUTM Somalia provides EU Member States with
the opportunity to share costs and to work together to create
a mission which provides better results than if each country were
working towards the same goal individually.
"For the UK, the ability to leverage international
resources for an area we are interested in has benefits for our
foreign and security policy. Within the EU, we are seen as a
leading voice for focussing attentions and resources on Somalia.
We have worked with the international community and regional
partners to influence and shape this mission, ensuring that it
is a well organised initiative delivering positive results.
"This approach is fully in line with the intentions
behind the European External Action Service to have a foreign
policy structure which is more coherent and able to develop policy
on a more consistent basis getting the collective voice
of the EU heard throughout the world."
1.30 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister says:
"The budget for this Mission from its launch
until August 2011 was 4.8 million, and for the period from
9 August 2011 until 31 December 2012, the budget was also 4.8
million. For the next 27-month period for 2013-15, the reference
amount is 11.6million. This was agreed in the RELEX committee
on Monday 10 December and therefore does not yet appear in the
draft Council Decision document. This figure represents a maximum
amount and will be subject to further detailed budget negotiations.
The increase in cost is predominantly as a result of the proposed
move to Mogadishu in order to cover the more complex nature of
the activities and set up costs, including force protection costs,
investment costs and running costs (including medical costs).
The proposal represents a significant broadening of the Mission,
for which the UK only pays 14% of the common costs. The maximum
overall UK contribution for this period would therefore be 1.75million
or c.£700,000 per year compared to the
£259,808 in 2012."
1.31 Finally, the Minister says that he expects the
draft Council Decision to be agreed at the 20 December 2012 Agriculture
and Fisheries Council; this being the final Council meeting before
the mission mandate expires.
The Minister's letter of 13 December 2012
1.32 The Minister begins his response to the Committee'
s representations by saying that:
"The FCO recognises that scrutiny is an important
part of open and transparent government and realises that it is
the way of connecting British voters to EU decision-making."
1.33 He once again insists that: "As the Committee
knows, I am committed to an effective scrutiny process".
1.34 He continues as follows:
"The FCO has made a genuine and concerted effort
to bring this matter to the committee's attention at the earliest
opportunity. There are a number of factors which have unfortunately
resulted in the short timeline available for Scrutiny.
"The situation in Somalia has been in flux,
with a new President elected in September and a Cabinet appointed
in November. The European External Action Service have told us
this has made their planning difficult. Throughout the autumn,
there have been continued and detailed negotiations amongst Member
States on the proposed changes to the Mission's mandate. This
included the Government seeking further detail from the EU on
issues such as the cost implications of the mandate changes (detail
essential for Parliamentary Scrutiny and UK agreement). Only
in the last week or so have we received sufficient detail from
the EU and reached provisional agreement on the way ahead for
the mission. The Council Decision could not have been drafted
until this point.
"Furthermore, the Committee will remember our
correspondence of July 2011 and December 2011 regarding this Mission
and the difficulties in providing classified documents to Parliament
for scrutiny. The September review of EUTM and the subsequent
Crisis Management Concept were once again classified documents,
so as per scrutiny procedures, they could not be submitted to
Parliament. We have therefore been unable to share a document
with the committee until we received the draft Council Decision
"FCO officials in Brussels have made representations
at all levels since September to push for an earlier receipt of
appropriate documentation as we were conscious of the timelines
for Parliamentary Scrutiny.
"Unfortunately we were still provided with the
documents at short notice, but we have nevertheless endeavoured
to provide the Committee with as much detail as we are able in
order for the scrutiny process to take place.
"It is regrettable that the Committee feels
that they may now not be able to satisfactorily scrutinise this
document. However, I would like to assure the Committee that
in this case the FCO did everything within our power to ensure
that these documents were provided to you with sufficient time
to allow the Committee to represent its views. We will again
make strong representations on this point to the European External
"Given the importance the Government attaches
to ensuring the continued success of this mission, which plays
a critical role in supporting the fragile security situation in
Somalia, I hope the Committee will give this matter its full and
urgent consideration. Whilst the outcome is far from ideal, we
have ensured that at a minimum, the Committee has sight of this
Decision in advance of agreement."
1.35 We find the Minister's response disappointing.
Nor do we need to be reminded of our responsibilities. The matter
is urgent only because the process hitherto has made it so; and
that process also limits the effectiveness of any consideration
that could be given to it. This is more than academic: a mission
that began with a short life in mind has now morphed into one
that will be, at least, nearly five years long, and which
as it branches into security sector reform, and political and
strategic level mentoring that "ultimately" may "support
moves towards an exit strategy" already has at least
some of the hallmarks of other such missions that have expanded
their original, limited role and proved costly (this one will
now cost at least 20 million), lengthy and (c.f. those in
the Democratic Republic of Congo) of doubtful effectiveness (here,
the Minister asserts that EUTM Somalia has been effective, but
provides no evidence). There may well be a compelling case for
this expansion, but the House is not being given the opportunity
to examine it properly.
1.36 The Minister still does not explain why we
have not heard from him for over a year. We have never asked
for confidential documents to be deposited: on the contrary (c.f.
paragraph 0.14 above). What we have requested, for several years
now, is to be kept in the picture: to be alerted when such a mandate
extension is in prospect, and to be given a broad outline of what
its future shape is likely to be. We cannot see why the Minister
could not have provided this in September, nor how whatever the
confidential aspects of the review are, would have been thus compromised.
We do not regard "sight of this Decision in advance of agreement"
as something for which, as the Minister implies, the Committee
should be grateful.
1.37 It is too late to ask the Minister further
questions before this Council Decision is to be adopted. Nevertheless,
we think that the House should be given the opportunity to hear
more from him, as to why he was able to provide no information
prior to his letter of 3 December; what he expects the mission
to have achieved in 27 months' time (there should be benchmarks
and review points); if he believes that it will then be wound
up; and, if not, what he then expects to happen.
1.38 We accordingly recommend that the draft Council
Decision be debated in European Committee B.
1 Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP of 15 February 2010
on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training
of Somali security forces. Back
See headnote: (31259) - : HC 5-vii (2009-10), chapter 2 (20
January 2010). Back
The record of the debate is available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmgeneral/euro/100308/100308s01.htm
((Gen Co Deb, European Committee B, 8 March 2010, cols.
See headnote: (31426) - : HC 5xv (2009-10), chapter 8 (24 March
Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP established a mechanism, called
Athena, to administer the financing of the common costs of European
Union operations having military or defence implications. Participating
Member States' contributions to ATHENA are based on the size of
their economy. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/financing-of-csdp-military-operations?lang=en
for full information. Back
Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011 amending and extending
Decision 2010/96 CFSP for another period of one year. Back
EU Training Mission Somalia Strategic Review - 10 October 2012
- Limite. Back