4 Enhancing global status and influence |
The potential of the Commonwealth
42. As well as upholding its values in its own member
states, the Commonwealth clearly has the potential to be a highly
influential voice in the wider international community. The diversity
of the Commonwealth, its membership taking in some of the smallest
states in the world as well as some of the largest, and including
both very poor countries and some of the richest, was seen as
a particular strength. In written evidence, the Editorial
Board of The Round Table: the Commonwealth Journal of
International Affairs, talked of the Commonwealth's
"global reach and ... presence in most parts of the world".
It is not surprising then that Senator Hugh Segal should call
the Commonwealth "an organisation that, if properly led,
motivated and resourced, can make a huge difference in almost
every part of the world".
43. In past decades, the Commonwealth has used these
advantages to good effect, making a major impact around the world
on the outcome of key issues. The Editorial Board of The Round
Table identified subjects such as debt relief, climate change,
HIV/Aids and the vulnerabilities of small states on which the
Commonwealth had "ledand helped changethe global
Mr Sharma observed that at the end of the Uruguay round of world
trade negotiations, it was a small ministerial group from the
Commonwealth that "enabled an outcome..."
The Ramphal Institute gave us other examples of the past activism
of the Commonwealth's governments working together, describing
the work of expert groups that between 1975 and 1990 had examined
issues such as promoting successful negotiations for the Law of
the Sea. Richard
Bourne, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth
Studies, identified a more recent example of Commonwealth leadership
on issues with a "global resonance"the Ramphal
Commission on Migration and Development, a Commonwealth group
which published three reports in 2010-2011.
44. As an international organisation, the Commonwealth
currently operates on a more crowded stage than it did in the
past, with more and more global and regional representative bodies
playing similar roles. Politicians and business people in Commonwealth
countries appear increasingly to identify themselves with such
new groupings, like the BRICS countries of leading emerging economies,
rather than with the Commonwealth. Dr Sriskandarajah noted what
he called "the incredible investment that the Indian Government
are making in other forums, not least the G20 and IBSA [India,
Brazil and South Africa]".
He accepted that "when you go to India that there is a lot
of warmth about the Commonwealth," but he said that the new
generation of Indian policy makers and Indian business people
"will know relatively little about the modern Commonwealth
... the Commonwealth is nowhere near the top of their foreign
Some of our visits to Commonwealth countries confirmed this impression;
in several we were told by people in public life that the Commonwealth
was increasingly irrelevant to them. A poll conducted by the political
consultancy Etoile Partners among 100 senior UK "influencers"
from media, parliament, the law and the civil service found that
only 25% of respondents correctly identified the Commonwealth
when its activities were described to them.
45. If elites are sometimes increasingly indifferent
to the Commonwealth, awareness among other groups, especially
young people, appears to be even lower. The public diplomacy of
the Commonwealth needs urgent attention, because, to many in member
countries, the organisation is inactive. Hard evidence of public
indifference is contained in the results of the Commonwealth Conversation,
the largest public consultation on the subject. Carried out in
2009 and 2010 by the Royal Commonwealth Society, and gathering
the opinions of tens of thousands of people, the Conversation
confirmed "what many had feared about the plummeting profile
of the Commonwealth and public cynicism toward the institution".
On average, it found that people in developing countries were
twice as likely as those in developed countries to believe that
the Commonwealth was of value to them. Indians valued the Commonwealth
more than those in America or South Asia. Most worrying of all,
other influences loomed larger than the Commonwealth for many
people in member states. Canadians were four times more likely
to value America higher than the Commonwealth, Australians were
twice as likely to value Asia higher, and, for Britons, the Commonwealth
came a distant third behind Europe and America. The RCS noted
that "In general, of the countries polled, the Commonwealth
was least valued in Great Britain."
Dr Sriskandarajah of the RCS believed that the Commonwealth
was "encumbered by misperception". It was regarded by
some as "just a British colonial club". He said that
"fewer and fewer people know about the Commonwealth, let
alone care about it".
46. Public indifference and ignorance may be one
reason why the Commonwealth appears to be failing to realise its
diplomatic potential. Another key weakness of the Commonwealth
as an actor on the world stage, according to Dr Sriskandarajah,
was the need to achieve consensus for firm action. He said that
this could easily lead to an impasse. He concluded from this that
"the Commonwealth needs to revisit not only the way that
it makes decisions but the sorts of levers that it has at its
47. One of the key themes of our visits to Commonwealth
countries was that the organisation was missing opportunities
and needed to be much more active in agreeing and promoting common
positions on international issues. Mr Richard Bourne described
the impact of recent diplomatic efforts by the Commonwealth as
"fitful." For instance he expressed disappointment that,
following the adoption of an "important proposal" for
a climate mitigation fund by Heads of Government at the Port of
Spain CHOGM in 2009, just prior to the Copenhagen climate change
conference, "no senior Secretariat figure went to Copenhagen
to assist Commonwealth delegations in the subsequent talks."
He criticised the fact that the Perth CHOGM of 2011 "had
little to say" about the world's economic crisis, although
five of its governments were due to attend the G20 meeting in
Cannes only a few days later. He also observed that there was
little expectation of follow-up for the statement on Food Security
at Perth, and that the Commonwealth Secretariat had had no capacity
to follow through with a leaders' commitment demanding urgent
action to stop the depletion of marine fish stocks.
48. There were also alleged shortcomings in Commonwealth
coordination and leadership in arms trade negotiations in the
summer of 2012. Many Commonwealth states suffer from the effects
of armed violence, and unregulated trade in arms is widely seen
as playing a major part in promoting that violence.
Ms Daisy Cooper, Director of the Commonwealth Advisory Bureau,
observed that individual Commonwealth countries had been well
represented among the states pressing (unsuccessfully) for the
conclusion of a strong arms trade treaty at the Diplomatic Conference
on the issue in New York, but she expressed concern that the seat
reserved for the Commonwealth's delegation at the Conference had
been left empty and that no Commonwealth statement had been delivered.
49. The Royal Commonwealth Society told us that "the
Secretariat struggles to demonstrate results ..." criticising
what it saw as the Commonwealth's "worrying decline into
impotence and irrelevance".
Reforming the Commonwealth Secretariat
50. Our evidence confirms the need for reform of
the Commonwealth Secretariat and other institutions. The Secretariat
can certainly do good work. Alicia Rocha Menocal, a Research Fellow
at the Overseas Development Institute, for example told us that
the Secretariat was valuable and distinctive in some of its interventions,
enjoying a combination of "highest level access, trust and
confidence in its relations with partner countries, as well as
the perception of being devoid of a political agenda".
However the Commonwealth Advisory Bureau told us that the Commonwealth
Secretariat and Commonwealth Foundation must become "fit
The Eminent Persons Group made a number of proposals for reform,
notably a suggestion that the work of the Secretariat should be
"retired" if it "enjoys no specific Commonwealth
advantage" or where the size of the Commonwealth Secretariat's
resources is too small "to make a significant impact".
The EPG also suggested that the operations of the Secretariat
should be reviewed by the Secretary-General to "improve the
integration, cohesion and efficiency of its divisions and their
capacity to deliver the mandates set by member states."
51. The Commonwealth Secretariat told us that it
had responded to the recommendations of the EPG in the preparation
of its next strategic plan. It describes this as "a significant
step forward". Rather than the plan reflecting "the
sum total of ambitions of its 54 member governments' national
priorities" as had been the case in the past, the Secretariat
will develop a "synthesised, narrower, and more focussed
work programme" aimed toward streamlining goals onto fewer
priorities where the organisation has a comparative advantage
and where it can "demonstrate real impact".
Mr Sharma suggested that this strategy would be carried out using
partnership with other organisations, not just UN organisations
but also private ones.
The change would be accompanied by what Senator Segal saw as a
"tough reorganisation" of the Secretariat to match new
priorities. Mr Sharma
indicated that the Secretariat would in future be concentrating,
among other things, on work to help countries build institutions
of governance, support for natural resource management and work
with young people.
On development, Senator Segal, speaking about another EPG recommendation,
told us the Secretariat could play a distinctive role, helping
provide the right environment for effective development programmes
by promoting good governance rather than delivering programmes
52. The Commonwealth
has in the past often launched influential initiatives on key
global issues. However, it has appeared less active and less publicly
visible in recent years and there is disturbing evidence that
it is missing opportunities to influence events. The Commonwealth
Secretariat must sharpen, strengthen and promote its diplomatic
performancealong the lines proposed by the Eminent Persons
Groupif the Commonwealth is to realise its full potential
as a major player on the world stage.
53. Mr Sharma reassured us that implementation of
the Eminent Persons Group recommendations was now "moving
However, Senator Segal warned of the danger of some of the EPG
recommendations being consigned to the "long grass".
He demanded "a focus on implementation, because nothing is
worse than an approved recommendation about which nothing is done".
Senator Segal called for "lawnmower committees across the
Commonwealth" to cut through the long grass and ensure implementation.
54. It is now
nearly a year since the acceptance of many Eminent Persons Group
recommendations at the 2011 CHOGM. The lengthy period of consultation
and discussion over the EPG since October 2011 must not cause
a loss of momentum in the process of implementing those recommendations.
The FCO should monitor implementation closely, and should continue
to press for action on all key recommendations, reporting back
to this Committee on progress every six months.
Promoting UK interests and influence
A CORNERSTONE OF FOREIGN POLICY?
55. During the inquiry we assessed the Government's
progress towards achieving its ambitions for the Commonwealth.
The Foreign Secretary has described the Commonwealth as "a
cornerstone of our foreign policy".
Lord Howell told us that the Government recognised that "more
activity and dialogue is necessary" and that its aim was
to "reinvigorate the whole organisation".
In June 2011 Lord Howell epitomised the Government's stated ambitions
for the Commonwealth, describing it as "the soft power network
of the future".
Sir Malcolm Rifkind told us "The present Government have
been more committed to the Commonwealth, not just in rhetoric
but in policy, than any Government I can remember, Tory or Labour,
for the last 25 or 30 years."
56. The ministerial role played by Lord Howell when
he was Minister of State was seen by a number of our witnesses
as particularly constructive. Professor Philip Murphy said that
Lord Howell had made "a remarkable impact", and that
it was difficult to think of a Minister over the past 40 years
in the Foreign Office who had been "so very committed to
the Commonwealth and making it work".
Mr Mark Robinson endorsed this view, saying that the present Foreign
Secretary and Lord Howell had made "tremendous efforts to
promote soft power". He observed that at the Perth CHOGM
Lord Howell was "everywhere". He added that "these
things are both noticed and appreciated".
On 4 September 2012, Lord Howell stepped down as Minister
of State at the FCO.
57. As Minister
of State, Lord Howell worked very effectively to raise the profile
of the Commonwealth in the UK and overseas, and he deserves considerable
credit for his contribution.
58. However, the success or failure of UK diplomatic
efforts on Commonwealth issues will not be assured by the work
of a single Minister. Some witnesses suggested that fulfilment
of the UK's ambitions for the Commonwealth could be hampered by
history, and that the experience of the acquisition and loss of
Empire has inevitably sapped the confidence of the UK in
its dealings with the Commonwealth. Professor Philip Murphy, for
instance, saw the UK as reluctant to exert its influence in the
Commonwealth, because it risked "being accused of some kind
of post-imperial plot".
Some of our witnesses urged the Government to accept that
the UK should no longer be held back by post-imperial guilt and
could now play a stronger leadership role in the Commonwealth.
Mr Mark Robinson told us that "colonialism is a long way
behind us" and that Britain could afford to be more proactive
in initiatives in the Commonwealth.
The Ramphal Institute urged the FCO and other government departments
to put more effort into coordinating positions with a wider range
of Commonwealth partners in Commonwealth and international negotiations.
The FCO told us that the UK "will need to maintain and build
on partnerships based on shared interests and values in order
to deal with global issues," and that a revitalised Commonwealth
"offers the UK a ready-made network" to do this. The
Department claimed to see "a rise in the influence of a largely
Commonwealth-focussed small states grouping who look to the UK
and the other four Commonwealth members of the G20 to champion
59. However some witnesses questioned whether, when
it came to Commonwealth issues, the reality of the Government's
efforts matched the rhetoric. There were for instance varying
views on the effectiveness of UK diplomacy. When there is an urgent
demand for a concerted diplomatic effort on a Commonwealth issue,
as was the case with the preparation for publication of the Eminent
Persons Group report in 2011, the FCO is certainly capable of
delivering. The efforts of the FCO to promote the EPG's findings
and recommendations were appreciated by the Group, Senator Segal
telling us that in all the activities that the EPG undertook,
including visits to Africa and elsewhere, the FCO and the British
Council had gone "out of their way to be constructive and
to facilitate broad public discussion and public diplomacy".
He said he had no complaints about the UK's diplomatic support
over that period.
60. Mark Robinson argued that Commonwealth membership
was important to the success of many bilateral visits.
The Ramphal Institute was, on the other hand, sceptical of the
diplomatic value of Commonwealth connections, observing that "Other
governments do not look first to the Commonwealth in seeking to
The Commonwealth Advisory Bureau more generally expressed concern
that "the UK continues to have an uneasy relationship with
the Commonwealth," and was still sometimes seen by other
Commonwealth governments and commentators, as "'clumsy' or
worse, as a 'bully'".
Tellingly, we did not hear, for instance, on any of our visits
to Commonwealth countries or from our witnesses, of any occasion
on which the fact of shared Commonwealth membership had proved
crucial in achieving any of the United Kingdom's key diplomatic
goals in, for instance, the United Nations Security Council.
61. There are also questions over the Government's
long-term strategy for the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Advisory
Bureau was highly critical, saying that currently, the UK Government
was full of "warm words for the Commonwealth", but that
it lacked any sort of engagement strategy.
Richard Bourne pointed to the range of Government departments
with an interest in Commonwealth matters, and called for a joined-up
Government strategy to focus on long-term diplomatic and political
goals where the Commonwealth adds value.
Lord Howell's enthusiastic advocacy, we are concerned that the
UK Government as a whole has not had a clear and co-ordinated
strategy for its relations with the Commonwealth. The several
Government departments with an interest in Commonwealth matters
should work together to develop a strategy for engagement with
the Commonwealth, aimed at ensuring that the UK makes the most
of the opportunities presented by the Commonwealth. The FCO needs
to ensure its 'warm words' are substantiated by its actions.
63. Confidence in the ability of the UK and other
member states to influence key Commonwealth decisions was shaken
by suggestions that the Eminent Persons Group report had been
suppressed at the Perth CHOGM. Sir Malcolm Rifkind described the
delay to publication of the EPG report as "certainly a mistake".
He noted that the EPG report was a report that the Group had been
asked to provide for the Heads of Government. The Group did not
itself have the authority at that stage to publish it, but they
had sent it to the Heads of Government some time before the conference.
He said that the Group had "strongly recommended" that
the whole report should be published at an early date so that
there could be a wider debate among Commonwealth organisations.
They had wanted to make it as wide a debate as possible, "not
simply a private debate between ourselves and the Heads of Government."
64. Sir Malcolm said that:
To our disappointment, some countries blocked the
advance publication of our report. When the Heads of Government
went into their private retreat on the second day, it had still
not been published and we believed that that was grossly improper
... We called a press conference, and handed the press copies
of the report. We said that it was not the private property of
the Heads of Government, and that it should be available to the
Commonwealth as a whole. Within an hour of our doing that, the
Heads of Government decided, after all, that it was timely to
publish the reportso crisis resolved.
65. Lord Howell denied that there was a deliberate
attempt to suppress the report, but he believed that there had
been "an administrative mistake." The Group had argued
that the Report should be published early on, but the Commonwealth
Secretariat, "advised by a whole range of Commonwealth members",
had argued that, as it was a report to the heads of Government,
it should be delayed until it was produced at Perth, by which
time, predictably, it had leaked to several papers anyway. Lord
Howell's view was that "it was the wrong decision".
66. Mr Sharma admitted that there was "possibly
an issue at Perth", when it was decided by the member states
that this report should be first seen by the Heads, "because
the Heads had asked for the report before it was publicly released".
However, Mr Sharma said that "It was not, by any stretch
of the imagination, an effort to suppress the report."
67. We conclude
that the treatment of the Eminent Persons Group report by a number
of Heads of Government at Perth has damaged the Commonwealth's
The role of Ministers
68. British diplomacy will only be effective in Commonwealth
circles if Ministers, and not just Ministers from the FCO, take
it seriously. Mr Mark Robinson urged the FCO to do more to make
sure that Departments are "properly represented"
at Commonwealth ministerial meetings. He gave the example of a
Commonwealth Education Ministers' meeting, at which he was struck
by the expression on "the High Commissioner's face when he
heard that there was not even going to be a Minister from Britain."
Luckily, Mr Robinson said, that was corrected, and although the
Whips would only allow the Minister, David Lammy, to come for
a day, "his presence during that day was enormously appreciated".
69. Professor Murphy noted the benefits of allowing
MinistersFinance Ministers, Foreign Ministers, Defence
Ministers to attend Commonwealth meetings, warning that
if UK Ministers at a senior level are not using that facility,
"they are missing something very important in the Commonwealth."
Stuart Mole was concerned that the Commonwealth is just seen as
"the briefest of stops on the Ministerial itinerary."
He said that there had to be "genuine, sustained engagement".
70. Mr Robinson urged a more concerted approach
to ministerial attendance at Commonwealth meetings, with the Foreign
Office taking responsibility for making sure that other Departments
of State "connect when Commonwealth meetings come up".
The Commonwealth Advisory Bureau also called for a more organised
approach to diplomatic contacts with the Commonwealth, complaining
that governmentsincluding the UK Governmentdid not
have a comprehensive strategy for maximising the opportunities
that these meetings affordsuch as advancing bilateral relations,
and advancing foreign policy objectives. The Bureau suggested
that "If the UK is about to enter into tricky negotiations
on any global issue, it could work with other key and influential
Commonwealth governments to call a meeting of Commonwealth Ambassadors/High
Commissioners in the relevant capital to hear all the major arguments
and build consensus."
71. The Foreign
and Commonwealth Office should be much more proactive across Whitehall
in ensuring that Ministers participate in Commonwealth meetings
where there is a clear UK interest in the outcome.
Resources for the diplomatic effort
72. Some witnesses questioned whether the Government
was devoting enough human and financial resources to support work
on Commonwealth issues. Stuart Mole said that he did not believe
the amounts spent by the FCO on Commonwealth diplomacy were adequate,
describing the money spent by the FCO on the Commonwealth as "a
Comparing expenditure on the Commonwealth with the amounts spent
by the UK on some other international organisations is instructive.
In 2011-12, the FCO subscription for the Commonwealth Secretariat
was £5.74 million, against equivalent figures of £98.14
million for the United Nations, £26.53 million for the Council
of Europe and £12.45 million for the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development.
73. Dr Danny Sriskandarajah saw the situation positively,
viewing the Commonwealth as "incredible value for money"
The size of the UK publicly-funded commitment to Commonwealth
institutions, he said, was "tiny", but the value that
Britain derived from the Commonwealth was "immense".
The FCO told us that the Government had "demonstrated [its]
renewed commitment [to the Commonwealth]" in May 2010 partly
by increasing the size of the FCO Commonwealth Unit from two to
This number is still, however, smaller than the seven which was
the complement of the Commonwealth Co-ordination Department of
the FCO when our predecessor Committee carried out an inquiry
into the issue in 1996.
Richard Bourne observed that in practice the FCO interest in the
Commonwealth was narrowly-focussed, largely concentrated on the
biennial CHOGMs and on interaction with the Commonwealth Secretariat.
74. While there has been a modest increase in FCO-based
resources dedicated to Commonwealth matters, closures of diplomatic
posts and other reductions in British influence have occurred
in Commonwealth countries, as elsewhere. Stuart Mole in particular
lamented the loss of High Commissions and other missions in the
Pacific which, he said, had saved "a relatively small amount
of money" but was "hugely noticed in the Pacific"
and damaged British interests.
The Commonwealth Advisory Bureau also voiced concern at the closure
of a number of diplomatic posts in smaller Commonwealth countries,
especially in the Pacific, and Lord Howell expressed regret that
such closures had taken place.
Other countries were said to be ready to fill any vacuums that
arose across the Commonwealth. On our visit to the Caribbean we
heard a great deal about reductions in British support for defence
force training and increasing Canadian involvement; it was observed,
for instance, that Canada had four permanent staff at the Caribbean
military training college, while there was only one UK staff member.
75. Quality as well as quantity of diplomatic effort
concerned Dr Sriskandarajah, who urged the Government to be more
imaginative and Commonwealth-minded in its approach in individual
countries. He praised the work of Diane Corner, the British High
Commissioner to Tanzania, who "thought it odd that she never
really got together with her Commonwealth colleagues who were
based in Dar es Salaam". He said that for the past year or
so, informally, many of the Commonwealth High Commissioners in
Dar es Salaam now "get together to talk about issues and
start to act like a community." He welcomed the fact that
such initiatives were now happening in many other parts of the
76. We believe
that the Government already makes a good return on its modest
investment in relations with the Commonwealth. Given the unrealised
potential of the Commonwealth, the UK could usefully invest more.
In its programme of reopening posts across the world, and in the
plans for the staffing of Whitehall departments, the Government
should maintain and strengthen links with the Commonwealth. The
Committee praises the recent announcement by the Foreign Secretary
that the UK and Canada will share premises and services at missions
77. The virtues of the unofficial Commonwealth were
emphasised to us by Dr Sriskandarajah. He suggested that
by going beyond formal diplomacy the Government could achieve
better value for money, using more of its very limited funds to
"pump-prime the people's Commonwealth." He said that
with proper funding a "robust and independent civil society
... can be an incredibly effective way of pursuing soft power
objectives" In this way, strengthening informal networks
could help the Foreign Secretary "perhaps almost hedge [his]
bets against failure of reform at the intergovernmental level".
The value of sporting links was mentioned by several of our witnesses,
and Richard Bourne argued that the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow
in 2014 could provide the opportunity for the Government to launch
a strategy for youth involvement which he saw as "as crucial
for the long-term health of the Commonwealth."
78. We urge
the Government to make the fullest possible use of the Commonwealth's
informal networks. Although formal diplomatic processes will always
be important, the highly developed and well-established networks
of "the people's Commonwealth" offer excellent opportunities
for the exercise of "soft power", which can also be
more cost-effective than the work of the official institutions
of the Commonwealth. We would welcome a clear statement of the
UK Government strategy for engagement with the informal Commonwealth.
Accountability to Parliament
79. We were urged by Richard Bourne to strengthen
the accountability of the FCO to Parliament for progress on Commonwealth
issues, and especially to arrange more regular evidence sessions
with the Foreign Secretary on the outcomes of key meetings.
and especially this Committee, can play a part in a more serious
and sustained UK approach to Commonwealth issues. After every
CHOGM and other major Commonwealth meeting, we will invite the
Foreign Secretary and FCO Permanent Under Secretary to report
on the outcome of that meeting and to report on what governments,
the Secretariat and other Commonwealth agencies have done to implement
previous Commonwealth decisions.
BBC World Service cuts
81. Another recent development which risks undermining
the Government's profession of support for a stronger Commonwealth
was the decision to close some sections of the BBC World Service.
In our April 2011 report on the issue we were especially critical
of the planned closure of the BBC Hindi shortwave service, describing
a matter of deep concern ... We note that India is
a major rising economic power and that the Government has professed
its wish to improve bilateral relations as a priority. We further
note that the estimated savings from reducing World Service operations
in India, at £680,000, are small in relation to the nearly
11 million listeners that will be lost.
In the event, after publication of our report, money
was found to pay for the continuation of the Hindi shortwave service.
82. Other BBC World Service cuts to affect Commonwealth
countries were the complete closure of the Caribbean service and
the Portuguese for Africa service and the reduction in the Urdu
service. During this inquiry we heard some criticism that the
cuts would seriously diminish the UK's ability to exert 'soft
power' across large parts of the Commonwealth.
However, Lord Howell did not agree, restating the Government's
belief that "these cuts could be consolidated and managed
without damaging the momentum and effectiveness of the BBC World
Service." He told us that when the World Service went under
the direct management of the BBC after 2014, would be "more
83. In our report on the BBC World Service we concluded
that the Service had suffered "a disproportionate reduction
in its future Grant-in-Aid under the Spending Review settlement,
by comparison with that of the 'core FCO'" and warned that
"the relatively small monetary savings to be achieved through
this ... reduction in spending ... are disproportionate to the
World Service's actual worth to the UK".
84. We stand
by the conclusions of our previous report on the BBC World Service.
The Government needs to see the big picture when considering the
funding of the BBC World Service, not least the fact that the
vacuum left by departing services could quickly be filled by others.
Modest savings achieved through ill-thought-out cuts could lead
to a damaging loss of influence in highly important countries,
including a number of Commonwealth countries.
49 Ev 64 Back
Q 2 Back
Ev 65 Back
Q 193 Back
Ev 149 Back
Ev 112 Back
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Back
Q 142 Back
Q 142 Back
Ev 128 Back
Ev 79 Back
Ev 80-1 Back
Q 120 Back
Q 134 Back
Ev 149 Back
Royal Commonwealth Society, Report of the Roundtable on the
'Arms Trade Treaty and the Commonwealth', 28 May 2012,
p 2 Back
Ev 83 Back
Ev 143 Back
Ev 61 Back
EPG Report, 2011, p 107 Back
EPG Report, 2011, p 107 Back
Ev 99 Back
Q 196 Back
Q 9 Back
Q 197 Back
Q 9 Back
Q 205 Back
Q 22 Back
Foreign Secretary, Speech to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association,
27 July 2011 Back
Lord Howell, Speech to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association,
26 July 2011 Back
Q 222 Back
Q 31 Back
Q 105 Back
Q 44 Back
Q 104 Back
Ev 149 Back
Ev 91 Back
Q 14 Back
Ev 157 Back
Ev 149 Back
Ev 63 Back
Ev 112 Back
Q 213 Back
Q 163 Back
Q 207 Back
Q 104 Back
Q 29 Back
Q 64 Back
Q 105 Back
Ev 62 Back
Q 54 Back
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Annual Report and Accounts
2011-12, HC 59, p.94 Back
Q 119 Back
Ev 84. On 31 March 2012 the FCO had 4,581 UK based civil service
staff. FCO, Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12, p 53 Back
Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report of Session 1995-96, The
Future Role of the Commonwealth, HC 45, para 38 Back
Ev 114 Back
Q 56 Back
Ev 63, Q 150 Back
Q 140 Back
Q 139 Back
Ev 112 Back
Ev 112 Back
Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-11, The
Implications of Cuts to the BBC World Service, HC 849,
13 April 2011, para 39 Back
HC Deb, 22 June 2011, col 15W Back
Q 44 Back
Q 150 Back
Foreign Affairs Committee, The Implications of Cuts to the
BBC World Service, para 15 Back