2 Global drugs policy
History of international drugs
control
15. The first international drugs control treaty
was the 1912 International Opium Convention, which gained widespread
adherence after the First World War after it was incorporated
into the Treaty of Versailles and connected treaties. Other international
agreements aimed at limiting the international supply of narcotics
were concluded between the wars and in 1946, ownership of these
agreements passed from the League of Nations to the newly-created
United Nations. In 1961, the first UN Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs (later amended by the 1972 protocol) was agreed. It covered
opiates, cannabis and drugs derived from the coca plant. The 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances expanded the coverage to
include psychoactive drugs such as amphetamines, barbiturates,
benzodiazepines, and psychedelics. The 1988 United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
established legal mechanisms to support the earlier conventions
such as restrictions upon precursor chemicals and asset seizure
and extradition relating to drugs offences.
16. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)
is the independent and quasi-judicial monitoring body for the
implementation of the United Nations international drug control
conventions. It was established in 1968 in accordance with the
1961 Convention. Its role is to ensure that adequate supplies
of drugs are available for medical and scientific uses and that
the diversion of drugs to illicit channels does not occur. It
also identifies weaknesses in national and international control
systems and contributes to correcting such situations and is responsible
for assessing chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs,
in order to determine whether they should be placed under international
control.[28]
17. Established in 1997, the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the lead United Nations entity for
delivering legal and technical assistance to prevent terrorism,
the illicit trade in drugs and international crime. Based in Vienna,
UNODC operates 54 field offices around the world, covering more
than 150 countries, including an office in Bogota, which we visited
while we were there. UNODC relies on Member States to fund efforts
to tackle crime, drugs and terrorism worldwide. They also receive
financial support from multi-donor trust funds, other United Nations
entities, international financial institutions, private foundations
and other organizations. Their 2010 annual report notes that "in
2009, as a consequence of the global financial crisis, UNODC experienced
a sharp decline of 26% in general purpose income."[29]
Their budget for 2009 (the latest year for which data is available)
was US$243 billion.[30]
The unintended consequences of
drugs policy
18. In 2008, the then-executive director of the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa, described
the five unintended consequences of the international drug control
system:[31]
a) The development of a huge, highly profitable,
criminal black market, in which hundredfold increases in price
from production to retail are not uncommon.
b) Policy displacement, specifically the redirection
of public resources from public health programmes to law enforcement.
c) Geographical displacementalso known
as the "balloon effect"whereby tough measures
to tackle the production and supply of drugs in one area result
in increased production and supply elsewhere (even if the overall
result is a net decrease). Mr Costa cited the shift in Andean
coca production from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia in the 1990s
as an example, but during our visit to Bogota (four years after
Mr Costa gave his speech), we saw evidence that tough enforcement
measures in Colombia were pushing production and supply back in
the opposite direction.
d) Substance displacement,[32]
which occurs when effective measures to combat the supply of or
demand for one drug results in increased supply of or demand for
another. We saw examples of this in Florida, where a stepping-up
of law-enforcement action against the supply and use of cannabis
had been followed by a growth in so-called "pill mills",
medical clinics operating at or beyond the border of legality
to supply excessive quantities of psychoactive drugs, such as
oxycodone.
e) The exclusion and marginalisation from the
social mainstream of those who use illicit drugs. This fifth unintended
consequence is the way we perceive and deal with the users of
illicit drugs. A system appears to have been created in which
those who fall into the web of addiction find themselves excluded
and marginalized from the social mainstream, tainted with a moral
stigma, and often unable to find treatment even when they may
be motivated to want it.
Current international drugs policy
19. Drug Policy is an issue which affects almost
every country in the world, whether as source, transit or consumer
countries. According to the UNODC, the largest consumer region
is North America (44% of total retail sales), followed by Europe
(33%), although no region is spared. Patterns of consumption are
constantly changing. In recent years, cocaine use has declined
in North America and grown in Europe, whereas heroin use has stabilised
or fallen in Europe but has increased in some transit countries.
Sources of drugs are spread around the worldcannabis is
cultivated widely, but with concentrations in Africa and the Americas;
Asia is the largest source of opiates; cocaine is produced almost
exclusively in South America and synthetics are produced in Europe,
Asia and North America.[33]
20. The supply and transit of drugs is a major threat
to the governance structures of the countries concerned. The Mexican
drug wars, which have resulted in more than 50,000 deaths since
the mid-2000s, are an extreme example of the toxic mix of armed
conflict and political corruption that affects several countries
in South and Central America, Africa and Asia.[34]
21. In 1998, the UN held a General Assembly Special
Session (UNGASS) on drugs at which they agreed a number of ten-year
targets. None of these targets was successful. In a response to
the 2008 UNODC World Drugs Report, the Transnational Institute
said
The world today is not any closer to achieving the
ten-year targets set by the 1998 UN General Assembly Special Session
(UNGASS) on drugs. These goals were "eliminating or significantly
reducing the illicit cultivation of coca bush, the cannabis plant
and the opium poppy by the year 2008." Instead global production
of opiates and cocaine has significantly increased over the last
ten years. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) global illicit opium production doubled from 4,346
tons in 1998 to 8,800 tons in 2007. This is mainly due to the
massive increase in opium production in Afghanistan. The estimated
global cocaine production increased from 825 tons in 1998 to 994
tons in 2007, an increase of 20%.[35]
22. The continuing illegal trade in drugs is leading
some world leaders to question the viability of the criminalisation
of users. In 2009, three former Latin American presidentsFernando
Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, César Gaviria of Colombia (whom
we met informally during our visit to Colombia), and Mexico's
Ernesto Zedilloannounced that the war on drugs had failed
and that it was time to discuss alternative approaches. This was
followed by a 2011 Report which called for the decriminalisation
of drugs. The Report was produced by the Global Commission on
Drug Policy, an independent body funded by a number of private
sources, including George Soros's Open Society Foundations, the
Drug Policy Alliance (an organisation which campaigns for drug-law
reform in the USA) and Richard Branson's Virgin Unite. The Report
was signed by those same former presidents, as well as Ruth Dreifuss,
former President of Switzerland; George Papandreou, former Prime
Minister of Greece; Kofi Annan, former secretary-general of the
United Nations; George P. Shultz, former US Secretary of State,
and Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve. Since
then, a number of current Latin American Presidents have called
for reform. It is important, however, to put this campaign in
perspective as despite continued debate on the potential benefits
and disbenefits of decriminalisation over the last decade and
more, in the majority of countries it is the settled policy of
governments that illicit drug use will remain criminalised for
the foreseeable future.
23. In March 2012, we travelled to Bogotá,
Colombia, to meet President Juan Manuel Santos, Minister of the
Interior Germán Vargas Lleras, and National Defence Minister
Juan Carlos Pinzón Bueno. President Santos told us that
in his opinion the war on drugs was the source of many of Colombia's
problemsterrorism, corruption and criminal violence. He
also stated that after a period of collective denial, the Colombian
people had woken up to the problem and, with international support,
had managed to make progress. However, they had paid a high price.
The country had lost many of its best judges, police officers,
journalists and politicians but had made progress by any standards.
He advocated an international debate about the best way to tackle
the drugs problem. He was open to the possibility that the status
quo, or something like it, might eventually emerge as the
best way forwards, but the possibility of a different approach
to the war on drugs had to be considered. He was of the view that
whatever the outcome, only a co-ordinated, global drugs policy
would be successful. The drugs trade only thrived because it was
profitabletargeting the profits of organised crime, much
of which was in North American and European financial institutions,
should be a central part of international efforts to tackle the
drugs trade.
24. The President stressed throughout our discussion
that he was not advocating the legalisation of drugs, but the
establishment of a new international consensus around the best
way to tackle the problem. He was, however, keen to emphasise
that legalisation should not automatically be ruled out as a possible
part of a global solution. He pointed out that whereas in consumer
countries such as the UK, the problems created by the consumption
of illegal drugs were predominantly associated with health and
crime, in supplier countries such as Colombia, they were problems
of national security. It was brought home to us by several of
those we met in Colombia how close the country had come to falling
entirely under the control of the drugs cartels; this is clearly
a world away from the problems of addiction and acquisitive street
crime which are associated with the drugs trade in the UK.
25. The Committee
saw for itself during its visit to Colombia the effect of the
drugs trade on producer and transit countriesthe lives
lost, the destruction of the environment and the significant damage
caused to governance structures by corruption and conflicts.
We recognise and sympathise
with the immense suffering and slaying of innocent people which
tragically has taken place over the years in Colombia and other
Latin American countries, as a result of the murderous rivalry
between drug gangs.
26. Bolivia has already in effect withdrawn from
the 1961 Single Convention.[36]
The country intends to re-accede the treaty in January 2013, with
a new reservation that gives legal protection for the traditional
use of the coca leaf (which, in its unprocessed form, is chewed
and made into tea) but this will only happen if two thirds of
all parties to the Convention do not express objections. Whether
Bolivia would still decide to re-accede if that reservation were
not accepted, remains to be seen.[37]
The International Narcotics Control Board was critical of the
move in its 2011 annual report, arguing that if other state parties
were to follow the mechanism of denunciation and reaccession,
"the integrity of the international drug control system would
be undermined and the achievements of the past 100 years in drug
control would be compromised".[38]
27. We believe
it is important that countries remain inside the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, rather than entirely outside it. We
therefore believe that Bolivia should be allowed to re-accede
to the Convention, with the reservation they require for traditional
practices. We recommend that the UK Government support this position
and encourage other countries to do likewise.
28. The UN General Assembly has recently approved
a resolution to hold a General Assembly Special Session to review
current policies and strategies to confront the global drug problem.
The session will take place at the beginning of 2016 after an
intense preparatory process which will begin next year. The draft
resolution, which was presented by Mexico, was co-sponsored by
ninety-five United Nations member countries including various
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and in the European
Union, as well as Japan, China, Australia, and the United States.[39]
The impact of globalisation on
the drugs trade
29. In 1999, the then-Secretary General of Interpol
was quoted by UNESCO as saying
Globalization and its many manifestations mean that
borders of all sorts are becoming increasingly difficult for governments
to define, let alone maintain. International drug trafficking
has been aided by the explosion in computer and telecommunications
technology and by world-wide transport systems. These same facilities,
as well as advances in the banking and services sectors also benefit
money launderers. There is no doubt that the illegal trade in
narcotics is being regular economy on a national as well as an
international level. This situation makes combating of the drug
trade on a financial front all the more difficult.[40]
In 2007, trade in illegal drugs was estimated at
five to six percent of overall world trade, which is slightly
larger than the combined global trade in agricultural products
and cars.[41]
30. Between 80% and 90% of globally traded goods
are transported by sea. Maritime transport of goods has quadrupled
in the past 40 years. The global shipping network is the dominant
method of transporting illicit goods, including drugs.[42]
Part of the reason for this is the growth in the use of containerised
shippingcontainers conceal their cargo, they have few distinguishing
features and thousands go through the world's busiest container
ports each day. Despite this, the UNODC estimates that only 2%
of containers are inspected.[43]
A recent report in to trends in maritime trafficking stated
The growth in container shipping has been exploited
by drug trafficking organizations whose own cargo ships were increasingly
targeted by air and sea operations involving the US Coast Guard,
the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and European law
enforcement agencies. In 1999 a US intelligence study noted that
the rapid growth in containerized sea transport offered narcotics
traffickers 'simplicity and convenience', stating that containers
were the most 'cost effective' method.[44]
31. Also in 1999, the World Customs Organization
reported that 64% of the cocaine seized globally was intercepted
in maritime containers. By 2010 more than 80% of the cocaine seized
on its way into Spain was in shipping containers. In 2010, the
US State Department assessed it as the most cost-effective and
lowest risk method of transporting cocaine to distribution centres
in Europe and the USA.[45]
The containers are often transported on ships which are owned
by mainstream shipping companies based in EU, NATO or OECD member
states and without the knowledge of the ship's owner, operator
or officers.[46]
32. As a result of the prevalence in maritime transport
in the trafficking of drugs, there are several joint operations
involving a number of countries which cover the Atlantic, the
Caribbean and the eastern Pacific. The Joint Interagency Taskforce
South (JIATF-South) is based in Florida and is thought to have
been responsible for more than 40 %of global cocaine interdiction
in 2009.[47] JIATF-South
includes personnel from the US armed forces, law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, as well as representatives from Argentina,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, France, the Netherlands, Peru, Spain and the UK.
We were, however, informed that UK practical assistance by the
Royal Navy had been dramatically reduced following the strategic
defence spending review.
33. In Europe, the Maritime Analysis and Operations
Centre (Narcotics) (MAOC(N)) performs a similar function and works
closely with the US Joint Interagency Taskforce (which has observer
status in MAOC). We visited MAOC's Lisbon headquarters in March
2012. The Centre was established in 2007, and its focus is on
using intelligence to guide the interception of vessels carrying
cocaine and cannabis. Much of this cargo comes across the Atlantic
from South America to West Africa, where it is processed and packaged
for onward shipment to Europe and elsewhere. The number of maritime
seizures attributable to MAOC's work had fallen, following its
early success which owed much to the Serious and Organised Crime
Agency (SOCA) and its historically successful bilateral co-operation
with Spanish and Portuguese authorities, and changes to smugglers'
methods. This is despite the number of "vessels of interest"
rising significantly from around 10 in 2007 to over 100 in 2010.
34. Data about maritime trafficking, maritime pollution,
ship safety, vessel traffic and fisheries protection data can
be combined to build a more accurate picture of trafficking flows.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has argued
that EU Member States and institutions should create an information-sharing
mechanism for lists of suspect ships and shipments that could
be integrated into other EU systems as part of a wider holistic
approach to maritime security and the enforcement of EU arms embargoes.[48]
35. We were
concerned to discover that the Maritime Analysis and Operations
Centre (Narcotics) has
seen a sharp fall in its rate of drug interdiction and now faces
an uncertain future over its funding, 95% of which is currently
provided by the European Commission. Gathering reliable intelligence
about the maritime trafficking of illegal drugs is a crucial part
of the international fight against the drugs trade. While recognising
that this is not a matter for the UK Government alone, we urge
the Government to work with both EU countries and other key international
partners to ensure more effective drug interdiction in the future.
36. Policies governing trade, such as import duty
and inspection regimes, regulations placed on shipped goods, and
the ease of travel and contact between citizens of different countries,
will have an impact on illicit trade as well as on legitimate
trade.[49] Although it
has less of an effect, the increasing ease of international migration
has also affected the drugs trade, especially within the EU. SOCA,
which conducts operations against British criminals involved in
the drugs trade in other EU countries, told us that
organised criminals are entrepreneurial, agile and
resilient. They operate like businesses and do not respect regional,
national or international boundaries, managing the risk they face
from other criminals and law enforcement, including by changing
commodity, location, changing supply routings and modus operandi
according to opportunity and risk.[50]
37. The outcome of law enforcement action against
such organisations, rather than dismantling them, can sometimes
result in them simply transferring their base of operations. The
Agency cautions that criminal organisations will change their
operating methods or physical location in response to police intervention,
citing the example of successful SOCA operations against British
gangs abroad.
operational activity does not cease when arrests
have been made. Such displacement often forces organised crime
groups to alter their operating methods or change their physical
location, therefore making themselves more vulnerable to law enforcement
intervention. For example, it is known that law enforcement activity,
targeting Class A drugs and associated criminal finances in Spain
and the Netherlands has resulted in some British criminals relocating
from these countries. SOCA-led activity continues to put pressure
on organised crime groups through a number of approaches ranging
from financial investigation through to more non-traditional techniques.
[51]
This is one example of the displacement, or 'balloon'
effect.
The balloon effect
38. Black markets do not respect borders, so in an
era characterized by globalisation the development of a global
drug policy might be the most effective way to combat drug production,
trafficking and consumption. The issue often faced by national
counter-narcotics operations is that when one area of production
or route of trafficking is disrupted, production simply shifts
to other locations, and trade to other routes. The United Nations
Development Programme in Colombia described the balloon effect
this way:
The economic mechanism underlying the global effect
is quite simple: the success of eradication in one area temporarily
reduces the supply, and that translates into a price rise. Then,
given that the supply function is fairly [price] elastic, higher
prices stimulate people to plant crops in other places. The costs
to start planting are quite low given that the majority of property
rights on land planted with illicit crops are ill defined.[52]
39. One example of this is the evolution of cocaine
production and trafficking routes over time, largely in response
to crop eradication policies, interdiction efforts, competition
among actors and shifts in demand. We discussed this extensively
with senior politicians, academics, journalists and police officers
during our visit to Bogotá. Coca leaf production increased
considerably in the 1980s, mainly in Peru, followed by Bolivia.
Production in the mid-1990s shifted to Colombia, with a corresponding
decline in the other Andean countries and the total area under
coca bush cultivation thus stabilized, at a high level, in the
1990s.
40. In the 2000s, cultivation was successfully reduced
by a massive eradication programme undertaken by the authorities
in Colombia, which has been successful in reducing the area of
cultivation within the country by almost a third.[53]
This success has come at a high human cost. The use of crop spraying
is effective against larger areas of cultivation, but much of
the eradication work is carried out on the ground by officers
of the Counter-Narcotics Directorate of the Colombian National
Police (DIRAN). The Counter-Narcotics Jungle Company, whose training
base we visited during our stay in Bogotá, trains men and
women to venture into hostile territory by helicopter to dig up
coca plants by hand. This is the only effective way of destroying
small plantations of the bushes, which are very resilient. Officers
are vulnerable to attack from cartels and guerrillas. Plantations
are sometimes mined. We were told that, for every 30 officers
attacking a crop, around 100 others were needed to defend them.
Although Colombia's success in crop eradication has been partially
offset by an increase in Bolivia and Peru, it has still let to
an overall reduction in potential production of around one sixth
between 2007 and 2010.[54]
In effect, for every two bushes that are destroyed in Colombia,
another one is planted elsewhere in the Andes.
41. A similar effect has been observed in the shifting
of supply routes in response to effective interdiction. In the
1970s and early 1980s, cocaine was smuggled into the USA primarily
using air shipments from Colombia to Florida and other destinations
along the eastern seaboard. In response to increased law enforcement
efforts during the 1980s and 1990s, traffickers switched to using
boats crossing the Caribbean. In recent years, the route has switched
to the Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico, with semi-submersibles
carrying cocaine between Colombia and Mexico for onward transport
overland into the US.[55]
The calamitous impact on Mexico of this shift in trade routes
is well documented: 12,903 people were killed in drug-related
violence in the first nine months of 2011, bringing the total
number of dead since 2006 to 47,515. Targeting
supply at an early stage is the most effective way of reducing
supply, as larger amounts can be intercepted higher up the supply
chain. Even so, we do not believe that it will be possible to
reduce the overall volume of the international drugs trade dramatically
only by tackling supply it is too easy for narco-criminals
to respond by diversifying their supply routes.
42. The global
nature of the drugs trade, and the potential for displacement
of drug cultivation and supply routes in response to law enforcement
measures, means that the international drug trade can only ever
be tackled effectively by co-operative, co-ordinated international
efforts. We must recognise that no one nation can do this on its
own.
43. As well as geographical displacement, the drug
trade is susceptible to substance displacement, where targeting
the supply of one type of drug leads to increase in use of another.
In 2011, a survey carried out by DrugScope highlighted the rapid
rise in the use of ketamine since it was banned in 2006, as well
as the rise of benzodiazepines. It was suggested that this might
reflect a shortage of good-quality heroin from late 2010.[56]
When we discussed the prevalence of prescription drug abuse with
law enforcement officials in Miami, some argued that the growth
of 'pill mills' in Florida has been due in part to tough law-enforcement
action against other drugs such as cannabis.
44. The potential
for "substance displacement", where users switch from
one drug to another in response to changes in supply, has clear
implications for public policy. In particular, the Government
must be mindful of the fact that tougher measures against one
drug can lead to increased consumption of another. Where the drug
that is being targeted is less harmful than its substitutesand
all recreational drugs are harmful to a greater or lesser extentthere
is the clear potential for measures which are intended to tackle
the supply and consumption of drugs to result in an overall increase
in the harm they cause. We recommend that, where decisions about
the classification of drugs are concerned, the opinion of the
Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs should be sought on the
potential for substance displacement, and the comparative risk
associated with the likely substitutes.
The environmental impact of drugs
45. The environmental impact of drugs production
is rarely discussed, but it is far from negligible. Significant
ecological damage is caused both by those producing the drug and
those attempting to halt its production. Not all drug production
is environmentally harmful, but the fact that such production
is carried out clandestinely means that it is entirely unaffected
by the environmental protection measures by which legitimate industry
must abide.
Cocaine
46. According to the Ecologist Magazine, by 2009
cocaine production had been responsible for the destruction of
two million hectaresan area the size of Walesof
Amazonian rainforest. Police officers in Colombia told us that
a hectare of coca plant produces about a tonne of leaf, which
produces a kilogram of cocaine base. It has also been estimated
that for every gramme of cocaine produced, four square metres
of rainforest are required, taking into account additional clearance
for habitation, processing and supply routes. Further damage is
inflicted by the introduction of precursor chemicalsincluding
kerosene, sulphuric acid, acetone, petrol, urea and cementinto
the sensitive Amazonian ecosystem. The chemical agents used in
crop eradication are no less harmful to the environment, and the
aerial spraying of herbicides such as glyphosate kills plants
indiscriminately, potentially leaving the soil barren and contaminating
the water supply.
Ecstasy
47. One of the precursor chemicals, used to make
ecstasy comes from safrole, made from the roots of the endangered
selasian wood tree found in the Cardamom Mountains in Cambodia.
Traders illegally harvest their roots to stew in vats for up to
12 hours in order to make the oil. As well as illegally hunting
local endangered animals for food and profit, the traders often
cut down other trees to build fires to stew their oil, endangering
the supply of cardamom which impacts negatively on the businesses
of the local spice merchants. Leaks of oil into water courses
can have a negative impact on aquatic life.
Cannabis
48. So-called "wild grow" sites are especially
common in the USAnearly 50,000 cannabis plants are found
each year in Sequoia and Kings Canyon national parks in California.
Growers routinely clear the area of its natural wildlife and treat
the sites with herbicides and pesticides many of which will run
off and damage local plant, aquatic and wild life. Where cannabis
is grown indoors, many producers use chemicals such as hormones
which are then simply poured or flushed away into the waste water
system. In Miami, we saw evidence of underground grow houses which
had resulted in hugely increased use of, often illegally diverted,
electricity.
Methamphetamine
49. By-products of methamphetamine production which
include red phosphorus and iodine, both harmful at low doses,
have been found dumped into domestic water wells, mine shafts
and on to farmland, contaminating water supply and soil.
50. We asked Russell Brand, a former drug user, if
he thought the environmental consequences of drug production could
be used to deter drug use:
No more than the industrial consequences of oil production
affect people using their cars. People don't care about industry.
People care about getting the resource that they require. The
illegality makes no difference, the consequences in the nation
of origin make no difference. [...] Of course, any illegal industry,
or the cocaine manufacture in South American nations, or wherever,
has a negative consequence for their nations but I don't think
that that is something that individual drug addicts are going
to be affected by, to be honest, because they are normally on
drugs.[57]
Links between drugs, organised
crime and terrorism
51. According to the UNODC, the illicit drugs trade
accounts for half of all transnational organized crime proceeds
and is the most profitable sector. It estimates that around $2
trillion was laundered in 2009 and that probably around 0.2% of
illicit financial flows are currently being seized and frozen.[58]
The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) told us that around
50% of all organised crime groups were involved in drugs, including
80% of the most dangerous groups, most of whom are involved in
the supply of Class A substances.[59]
52. In 2011, the Child Exploitation and Online Protection
Centre published a report on people trafficking in which the largest
identified trend was the trafficking of Vietnamese children into
the UK37 of the 58 children identified were trafficked
into the UK to work in cannabis farms.[60]
53. The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD)
estimates that 25 to 30 tonnes of adulterated and unadulterated
cocaine is needed each year to meet UK demand. A tonne of cocaine
at import could, depending on purity, equate to between seven
and 14 million street deals of cocaine at £20 to £40
per deal. Between 18 and 23 tonnes of adulterated and unadulterated
heroin are imported annually to supply the UK market. A tonne
of heroin at import could, depending on purity equate to between
3 and 6 million street deals of heroin at £10 to £20
per deal. This equates to a total street value of heroin and cocaine
which is already somewhere between £4 billion and £20
billion. But that is before further cutting agentswhich
may be anything from cheaper drugs which mimic the effect of the
drug in question (e.g. cocaine cut with local anaesthetics) to
wholly inert diluents such as talcum powderare introduced
to increase profit margins.[61]
In 2005, the UNODC calculated that in Europe, heroin and cocaine
cost six times more per unit weight than gold.[62]
54. The Home Office told us that the links between
the drugs trade and terrorism are most apparent in Afghanistan,
where the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that
the insurgency derives approximately $150 million per annum from
Afghan narcotics, and in Colombia, where criminal groups continue
to support terrorist and paramilitary groups such as the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). There is also evidence of the
profits from the transit of drugs in the West African region being
used to fund terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM).[63]
55. We are concerned
that despite significant international efforts to disrupt supply
of illegal drugs and bear down on demand, the illegal drugs trade
remains a hugely profitable enterprise for organised criminals
and narco-terrorists. In part this is due to the highly inflated
prices of the drugs in question, inevitable in a high demand underground
market, and in part due to very low production costs, arising
from cheap labour costs where many workers are exploited and the
fact that most illicit drugs are very simple and inexpensive to
make. This ultimately causes massive harm and deaths around the
world. We urge the Government to continue to factor this unintended
consequence into considerations on drugs policy.
Human rights abuses
56. A number of organisations have called attention
to the abuses of human rights which are committed through the
implementation on international drugs policy. The International
Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy told us that human rights
abuses associated with drug enforcement include extra-judicial
killing, the death penalty, corporal punishment, arbitrary detention,
denial of healthcare, discrimination, and violations of multiple
other rights including for specific groups such as children and
indigenous peoples. They argue that
While some of the most egregious human rights abuses
in the context of drug control occur overseas, the UK cannot divorce
itself from the international context for a number of reasons.
First, the UK funds drug enforcement efforts in countries with
poor human rights records; second, developments in the UK are
looked to in other parts of the world; and third, almost all UN
Member States have agreed to be bound by the same law enforcement
based approach to drug control.[64]
57. There are currently thirty-two countries or territories
in the world that have laws prescribing the death penalty for
drug offences but it is estimated that executions for drugs have
taken place in just 12 to 14 countries over the past five years
and that only 5 %of nations actually enforce mandatory death sentences
for drugs in practice.[65]
Those states that regularly enforce the death penalty in drugs
cases are China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office estimates that there were
590 executions for drugs offences worldwide in 2010.[66]
58. Human rights abuses by the military and police
officers in attempts to eradicate drug production have been widely
reported. In 2011, Human Rights Watch found evidence that strongly
suggests the participation of the Mexican security forces in more
than 170 cases of torture, 39 disappearances, and 24 extrajudicial
killings since December 2006.[67]
An earlier report into extrajudicial killings in the war on drugs
focused on Thailand. In February 2003, the Thai government, under
then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, launched a 'war on drugs',
aimed at the suppression of drug trafficking and the prevention
of drug use. In the first three months of the campaign there were
allegedly some 2,800 extrajudicial killings of suspected drug
dealers. In 2007, an official investigation found that more than
half of those killed had no connection whatsoever to drugs.[68]
59. According to Human Rights Watch, compulsory drug
treatment centres where users are detained (often without trial
and sometimes for indefinite periods of time) exist in Thailand,
Malaysia, Myanmar, China, Indonesia, Singapore Cambodia, Vietnam,
and Lao PDR. People detained in drug detention centres have reported
beatings, rape, denial of meals, isolation and forced labour.[69]
A number of these centres are funded by international donors.[70]
60. It is important, however, not to imply that it
is in pursuit of such state-sanctioned drugs policies that the
most egregious human rights abuses associated with the drugs trade
occur. In fact the most widespread human rights abuses associated
with the drugs trade are perpetrated by the organized crime gangs
who profit from exploiting vulnerable communities and individuals.
In Colombia, we were told that the activities of the cartels and
criminal gangs (known as "BACRIM") had been responsible
for numerous murders of police officers, judges, journalists and
politicians over several decades. Hostage-taking had been for
many years a standard tactic. As we have already noted, drugs
gangs are involved in the trafficking of children into the UK
as slave labour (see paragraph 52). In Chihuahua, Mexico, the
authorities recently announced the discovery of mass graves of
bodies showing evidence of torture.
61. The Government
should not turn a blind eye to capital punishment and other human
rights abuses affecting those involved in the drugs trade. In
particular, we recommend that the Government ensure that no British
or European funding is used to support practices that could lead
to capital punishment, torture, or other violations.
28 http://www.incb.org/incb/en/about/mandate-functions.html Back
29
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Annual report 2010, p
63 Back
30
Ibid, p 64 Back
31
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Making drug control
fit for purpose: Building on the UNGASS decade (2008), p 10-11 Back
32
The term, "balloon effect" is also sometimes used to
describe substance displacement. Back
33
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report
(2012), p 66 Back
34
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Maritime
Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows (January 2012),
p 1 Back
35
The Transnational Institute, Rewriting history: A response
to the 2008 World Drug Report,(June 2008), p 1 (http://www.tni.org/briefing/rewriting-history) Back
36
Babor et al, Drug Policy and the public good, (Oxford University
Press, 2010), p 16 Back
37
The Transnational Institute, Fact Sheet: Coca leaf and the
UN Drugs Conventions (October 2012) (http://www.tni.org/briefing/fact-sheet-coca-leaf-and-un-drugs-conventions?context=595) Back
38
International Narcotics Control Board Annual Report 2011 (February
2012) Back
39
Press Notice form Mexican Government, La Asamblea General
de la ONU aprueba resolución presentada por México
sobre cooperación internacional contra las drogas, (November
2012) Accessed November 2012: http://saladeprensa.sre.gob.mx/index.php/es/comunicados/2149-351 Back
40
http://www.unesco.org/most/sourdren.pdf Back
41
Yale Centre for the Study of Globalisation (YaleGlobal), Globalization
and the Corrupt States, (November 2007) Accessed November
2012: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/globalization-and-corrupt-states Back
42
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Maritime
Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows, (January 2012),
p 1 Back
43
UNODC, Countering the world of smuggling through container
control, (May 2011) Accessed November 2012: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/May/countering-the-world-of-smuggling-through-container-control.html Back
44
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Maritime
Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows, (January 2012),
p 37 Back
45
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Maritime
Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows, (January 2012),
p 37 Back
46
Ibid, p 49 Back
47
Munsing, E. and Lamb, C. J., 'Joint Interagency Taskforce-South:
The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success', Center
for Strategic Research Strategic Perspectives 5 (National Defense
University Press: Washington, DC, June 2011), p 3 Back
48
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Maritime
Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows, (January 2012),
p 49 Back
49
Babor et al, Drug Policy and the public good (Oxford University
Press, 2010), p 253 Back
50
Ev 129, para 4 Back
51
Ev 129, para 2 Back
52
United Nations Development Programme Colombia, National Human
Development Report, Chapter 13: Taking Narcotics Out of the Conflict:
The War on Drugs, (2003). Back
53
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report
(2012), p 76 Back
54
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report
(2011), p 20 Back
55
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime , World Drug Report
(2012), p 78-79 Back
56
The Economist, The fire next time, (November 2011) Accessed
November 2012: http://www.economist.com/node/21538765 Back
57
Q250 Back
58
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Estimating the illicit
financial flow resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational
organised crimes, (October 2011), p 7 Back
59
Ev 181 Back
60
The Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre, The trafficking
of women and children from Vietnam, (2011), p 3 Back
61
Ev 187 Back
62
Babor et al, Drug Policy and the Public Good, (Oxford University
Press, 2012), p 69 Back
63
Ev 175, para 50 Back
64
Ev w107 Back
65
P. Gallahue, 'The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: Global Overview
2011', Harm Reduction International, (September 2011) Back
66
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights and Democracy:
The 2010 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report (March 2011),
p 204 Back
67
Human Rights Watch, Neither Rights Nor Security Killings, Torture,
and Disappearances in Mexico's War on Drugs (November 2011) Back
68
Human Rights Watch, Thailand's 'War on Drugs' (March
2008) Accessed November 2012: http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/12/thailand-s-war-drugs Back
69
Ev w108 Back
70
Human Rights Watch, Torture In The Name Of Treatment: Human
Rights Abuses In Vietnam, China, Cambodia, and Lao PDR (July
2012), p 16 Back
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