WRITTEN EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED BY
JOHN G KELCEY
[OS 10]
I watched the appearance and listened to the evidence
that the Chief Executive of G4S gave to the House of Commons Select
Committee with increasing incredulity. It
seemed to me that he had simply turned up
to plead guilty, was totally unprepared for the questioning and
probably did not want to criticize the Home Office in order to
jeopardize existing and bids for future contracts—in short,
we will take the rap.
It is not for me to defend G4S but I do question
whether the evidence was heard in the correct sequence. It
seems to me that the fundamental issues relate
to the preparation of the contract documents in the first place
and the management of the contract in the second. Putting the
CEO of G4S on first was putting the cart before the horse. The
Select Committee would be better informed and much wiser had it
first examined the terms and conditions of the contract by questioning
the Home Office officials who prepared and managed it. The contract
is likely to have a named person as the "contract manager".
If the contract had been properly
prepared and managed G4S would never have
been in the position it was. My experience of contracts awarded
by Government Departments and their Agencies is that they are
generally badly prepared and even more badly managed. The latter
results from, amongst other things, inadequacies in the terms
and conditions and poor management (including bad financial management)
by the nominated officer and, as I understand it, a total lack
of interest by Ministers. My experience of private sector contracts
indicates that they are much tighter and much better managed.
Because the Government awards contracts to the lowest
bidder, Government officials know only too well that contractors
seek to make their profit by one or a combination of two means.
First, cutting corners and second claims resulting from contract
variations. It is not uncommon for Government Departments to award
contracts that are well under the estimated cost.
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also seemed to me that the contract was too
big for a single contractor and should have been divided into
say five to 10 smaller contracts. The contract sum may be satisfactory
for certain types of Government work such as defence procurement
and some road schemes but common sense suggests it was much too
big and complex for the particular purpose. Notwithstanding that,
there is a propensity (as frequently shown in television programmes
that a large number of people do not want to work and will seek
to blame the conduct of employers in preventing them doing so.
So, it appears to me that G4S should have appeared
at the end of the process and not the beginning. I reiterate that
I am not seeking to defend G4S, "contractors are contractors"
who seek to make money via bad contracts and bad contract managers.
That is what contractors do.
Fundamental responsibility for the failure MUST lie
with the Home Secretary and her officials. I strongly suspect
that the failure "blew up" because the Home Office could
not keep the lid on tightly enough. Put in other terms, the Home
Secretary and her officials should have been on top of the contract
and interrogated G4S frequently as to progress, fulfilment of
the terms of the contract and have dealt with the failures as
soon as there was the slightest hint of something going wrong.
There needs to be personal accountability. The Select
Committee roasted the Chief Executive of G4S, it should do so
in terms of the Home Secretary and her officials who prepared
and managed the contract. There was gross professional negligence
(if not worse) in the Home Office, it needs to be flushed out.
July 2012
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