House of Commons
Home Affairs Committee

The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)

Fifth Report of Session 2012–13

Volume II

Additional written evidence

Ordered by the House of Commons
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The Home Affairs Committee

The Home Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Home Office and its associated public bodies.

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Written evidence submitted by TUI Travel (UKBA 03)

Following on from our conversation on Friday, please find attached and below some further information on TUI Travels views on the UK’s border control regime.

As mentioned TUI Travel is the largest tour operator in Europe, operating under a number of well known brands, including Thomson and First Choice in the UK. Thomson Airways is the group’s airline, the third largest in the UK.

Please find attached a letter to the Home Secretary from Chris Browne, Managing Director of Thomson Airways, which was sent at the end of February. This outlines TUI’s belief that the Smart Zone trials in 2011 should be reintroduced to help deliver an efficient border system, especially during the busy summer months and during the Olympics. We thought this would be useful to show to the Committee ahead of the evidence session tomorrow.

TUI firmly believe that it is imperative the Government moves to a more risk-based approach surrounding border security to help ensure that UK airports can manage the number passengers entering and leaving the country both efficiently and safely. For charter carriers such as Thomson Airways, where 95% of their passengers leaving the UK are EEA/EU nationals who are travelling on their holidays and then returning there is a lower risk of carrying passengers who wish to enter the country illegally or with intent to do harm.

As mentioned, I will be in contact to arrange a meeting with yourself and Eddie Redfern (Head of Regulatory Affairs, Aviation at TUI Travel) to help provide an update from a general perspective from the charter sector. Eddie was the main witness for the aviation industry at the Home affairs evidence session on e-borders in 2009 and also met with the Clerk to provide an update on a number of occasions. As you mentioned, there have been some staff changes within the committee and you thought it would be useful to provide a briefing.

TUI Travel
May 2012

Annex

Letter to the Home Secretary, from Chris Browne, Managing Director, Thomson Airways,
27 February 2012

BORDER CONTROLS—JOHN VINE INVESTIGATION REPORT—FEBRUARY 2012

I am writing to you to request a meeting to discuss the implications of the John Vine report and to see whether Smart Zones can continue to play a role in ensuring that we maintain a secure border whilst facilitating legitimate trade and travel.

Thomson Airways is the UK’s third largest airline operating a fleet of 64 Boeing and Airbus aircraft from 19 UK airports to destinations in Europe, North Africa, Indian Ocean, Caribbean and USA. We are part of the TUI Travel PLC group of companies flying holiday passengers on behalf of household name tour operators Thomson and First Choice, flying over 5 million passengers abroad each year.

Thomson Airways fully supports the UKBA business plan for the period 2011–15, in particular the aim “to make legitimate travel and trade easier while securing the border against dangerous goods and harmful people”. My colleagues are in regular contact, at a senior level, with both the UK Border Agency and the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT). Thomson Airways was an early adopter of the e-Borders test-platform “semaphore” plus we are also compliant with e-Borders. Recently we have undertaken trials with OSCT and e-Borders on a manual authority to carry scheme. Additionally, until November of last year, we were taking part in the so called “Smart Zone” trials at a number of UK airports.

In meeting the requirements of the e-Borders project we have invested around £750k in technology and infrastructure with significant annual operating costs in the region of £100k. We see Smart Zones as an essential tool to deliver some of the benefits of e-Borders to UKBA, Airports and Airlines. Back in 2003 one of the original visions and deliverables for eBorders, supported by the Conservative Party in opposition, was the notion of “expedited clearance” for passengers and this was to be the industry benefit for our significant investment. Since then we have seen the introduction of 100% check of passengers via the watch list at ports, yet this check is also carried out as part of our submission to e-Borders prior to the flight arriving in the UK, thus a duplication of effort.

1 See attached annex.
It is generally recognised that for our flights where well over 95% of passengers are EEA/EU nationals who departed the UK for their holiday and are returning there is a lower risk of carrying persons wishing to enter the country illegally or with intent to do harm. It was for this reason, that we took part in the Smart Zone Trials in 2011. We saw the benefit of the Smart Zones as:

1. The airline providing 100% accurate advanced passenger data.
2. The passenger data was checked and watch-list checked by UKBA before the passenger arrived at the UK port and the flight was thus eligible for a pre-cleared status.
3. Upon arrival at a UK port the flight was fast tracked through a discrete set of controls (either the domestic lane or Common Travel area lane) through a positive check of the passport photograph matching the person presenting it and thus being allowed entry without further checks.
4. This has the triple beneficial effect of reducing the pressure on the primary line at that airport, where UKBA manning levels have reduced; speeding up the arrivals process for those lower risk passengers in line with the original objectives of eBorders and finally preventing or significantly reducing negative reports about the efficiency of the airport or UKBA.

At Thomson Airways I see the re-introduction of the Smart Zone concept an essential tool to assist UKBA to deliver a robust and efficient border in order to manage the expected peaks during this summer and during the Olympics. This approach also has the dual benefit of meeting the Secretary of State for Transport’s goals of “better not bigger” in relation to managing aviation capacity.

Only this week officials from UKBA have been speaking with our senior managers in relation to the proposed Pre-departure Checking Scheme (PDCS) that will initially be managed as a manual system. You will be aware that a manual system has significant drawbacks and thus our clear preference will be to move forwards quickly to an automated system closely aligned with the US APIS Quick Query (AQQ) system. It is however disappointing to note that this process will only apply to carriage by air and no other modes of international transport.

I would be pleased to meet with you to discuss how we can look to the re-introduction of Smart Zones whilst meeting the challenges faced in maintaining a secure border yet ensuring we make legitimate trade and travel easier. I have copied this letter to the Immigration Minister and Secretary of State for Transport.

Chris Browne
Managing Director
Thomson Airways
February 2012

Written evidence submitted by CBI [UKBA 04]

THE WORK OF THE UK BORDER AGENCY AND BORDER FORCE AT HEATHROW

1. The CBI is the UK’s leading business organisation, speaking for some 240,000 businesses that together employ around a third of the private sector workforce. With offices across the UK as well as representation in Brussels, Washington, Beijing and Delhi the CBI communicates the British business voice around the world.

2. Waiting times at the UK border are now a serious business concern and constitute a threat to perceptions of the UK as a good place to do business. The issue demands an urgent solution given that it has been worsening for months and that the impact has now spread from Heathrow to Stansted and the Channel Tunnel. These are not one-off incidents—instead, long queues for travellers at passport control are occurring on a regular basis—running to more than three hours at worst. Security and customer service are not mutually exclusive, however, and we believe the UK Border Force can meet passenger demand at the same time as securing the border.

3. In this submission we argue:
   — While border security must remain the number one priority, this is not incompatible with ensuring a good passenger experience.
   — Long queues undermine our reputation as a global trading hub.
   — Concerns go beyond peak Olympic traffic—a permanent fix is needed.

WHILE BORDER SECURITY MUST REMAIN THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY, THIS IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH ENSURING A GOOD PASSENGER EXPERIENCE

4. There is no disagreement in the business community that security at the border must remain the number one priority for the UK Border Force (UKBF). But there should be no inconsistency between maintaining appropriate controls and a sufficient degree of rigour while also delivering a competent and efficient service. Service design, staff rostering and active queue management can all be used by managers to optimise customer experience at busy times.
5. Such actions have not been taken at Heathrow. The operators of airports and other border terminals invest huge amounts of money in ensuring that their operations provide both a good passenger experience and successfully manage traffic. This work and investment is undermined by failures in the working model of the Border Agency which lead to excessive queues.

6. BAA figures show that the target for 95% of passengers from outside the European Economic Area to clear passport control with 45 minutes was not achieved by any Heathrow terminal during April. Passengers in all terminals have faced significant delays, with non-EEA passengers at terminal 4 taking three hours to reach passport control on 30 April. Elsewhere EU passengers at Stansted have recently faced excessive queues with delays of up to two hours at passport control and there have been queues of up to an hour at Eurotunnel immigration control booths. This is not a recent or temporary problem—the Independent Chief Inspector’s report on Border Control Operations at Terminal 3, Heathrow Airport during August—November 2011 found Immigration Officers facing “significant pressure of a full arrivals hall, dealing with passengers who had been waiting for long periods of time.”

7. A more intelligent and responsive approach to staffing, service approach and technology would pay dividends. Adequate and flexible staffing is needed throughout the year and not just to deal with peaks in traffic. Airlines provide up to date passenger data to UKBF a week in advance but border staff are scheduled a month in advance meaning that key data on demand is not fully utilised. At the same time, there should be a renewed focus on embracing the opportunities afforded by new and existing technology and queue management. It is for UKBF to decide what measure of risk-based checking is appropriate but we believe that greater use of this may have a role to play as part of a solution. Finally, sifting the queues earlier and managing them effectively will ensure citizens are not held up by huge non-EEA queues that are not split out until people enter the hall itself.

LONG QUEUES UNDERMINE OUR REPUTATION AS A GLOBAL TRADING HUB

8. The longest of the recent queues at Heathrow terminal 5 occurred in a week in which the CBI and UKTI ran the first ever trade mission designed especially for mid-sized businesses. While this mission was in Turkey paving the way for mid-sized business deals in a key market, potential investors in the UK from Turkey would face being held up at passport control for long periods, giving a very different picture of the UK from the one the visit was trying to establish. The Government has rightly set targets of doubling our annual exports by 2020 to £1trn and getting an additional 100,000 UK firms exporting. With domestic demand subdued this is crucial to our recovery. If we are to achieve these targets however, we need to create the right impression. An effectively functioning border system is a key part of the essential infrastructure supporting and attracting this trade and investment which is vital to delivering a sustained economic recovery.

9. Airlines now report that the immigration queue is now the biggest area of dissatisfaction for customers. This does not sit with an image of UK as an ambitious, successful country equipped to capture global trade and investment opportunities. With UK nationals also facing these ever-longer queues, our business people and entrepreneurs also face loss of productive time when they travel abroad.

10. While chaos at the border represents a current threat to UK competitiveness we are also facing longer-term challenges. The UK faces severe capacity constraints with our hub airport running at 99% capacity, preventing airlines from meeting demand for flights to key growth markets while at the same time competitor airports in Europe are building the direct links to serve key emerging destinations. This challenge to the position of the UK as a global hub for trade—which must be addressed by an aviation strategy which delivers in the short, medium and long term—must not be added to by an inefficient and ineffective immigration service acting as a further structural impediment to our growth potential.

CONCERNS GO BEYOND PEAK OLYMPIC TRAFFIC—A PERMANENT FIX IS NEEDED

11. The Olympic Games offer the UK significant economic benefits and an opportunity to showcase its strengths in front of the world—we must not squander this opportunity by making a poor first impression. Although processes are in place to deal with increased passenger numbers recent experience of delays shows how vulnerable UKBF is to any shock.

12. The Olympics are an opportunity we cannot afford to miss—but business believes a better service at Heathrow in the long-term is essential for the UK economy. One-off increased staffing ahead of the Olympics is not enough. Real change is required on a permanent basis if we are to avoid the costs of poor service damaging the UK economy.

Employment and skills directorate
CBI

May 2012
Written evidence submitted by Eurotunnel [UKBA 05]

INTRODUCTION

Eurotunnel is the concession holder for the Channel Tunnel. It operates truck and passenger vehicle carrying shuttles between the UK and France and gives passage to high speed passenger and rail freight trains from other operators. 20 million people pass through the Channel Tunnel annually, with some 85% of them being of UK origin.

Article 27.7 of the Concession Agreement, signed between the British and French governments sets out that the two States must provide “…the measures appropriate to facilitate the execution of the Concession.”

Over recent years, the pre-departure UK Border Controls at the French terminal in Coquelles, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, have constituted a major, and increasing, element of delay for customers seeking to enter the UK in vehicles via the Channel Tunnel. Despite significant investment by Eurotunnel to enlarge and improve the facilities available for the UKBA on site, the number of open/manned booths and the speed of passport processing often fail to achieve the targets set out in the Service Level Agreement.

Delays at the UK Border controls (experienced at both peak and non-peak travel times) cause a bottleneck of traffic that can block the access to French Border Controls, the Eurotunnel check-in booths and ultimately the motorway exit leading to Eurotunnel’s check-in plaza. At extremes this has resulted in the A16 motorway in France being blocked and caused a significant risk of road traffic accidents, which subsequently required the direct intervention of the French Police in order to ensure that motorway safety was maintained.

With crossing times of just 35 minutes from platform to platform, the Channel Tunnel was built, following the signing of the Treaty of Canterbury between the British and French governments, to provide a rapid transport fixed link between the two countries.

Currently, delays at UK Border controls can exceed that 35 minute crossing time, thus negating the Tunnel’s inherent competitive advantage, damaging the perception of service quality and ultimately damaging the commercial success of the business.

At the Channel Tunnel the consequence for customers of long delays before border controls is that they miss their booked departure and Eurotunnel is left to manage the problem of shuttles departing under-loaded and then has to cope with over-demand when customers present themselves late for boarding. This is a different impact to that seen at airports where border control delays take place on arrival at destination only impacting the customer transiting through the airport, but not causing them to miss their flight nor departures to leave without booked passengers, nor presenting airports with the issue of needing to create extra capacity to manage the backlog.

In the lead up to the Olympic Games in London 2012, Eurotunnel is extremely concerned that sufficient resources will not be available to process, in a timely manner, the increased numbers of customers travelling from the continent to the UK over the summer.

OUR EXPERIENCE OF CHAOS

On 2 January 2012 (New Year returns) Eurotunnel operated 76 shuttles from France to UK and carried 7,619 cars and 56 coaches. This equated to c21,000 passengers needing to be processed through border controls during the day, with up to 1,492 per hour at peak travel times (based on 2011 averages of: 2.5 people per car and 39.5 people per coach).
Due to a bottleneck at UK Border Controls, severe traffic queues formed. Between 11.00 CET and 01.45 CET (following day), a period of almost 15 hours, customers experienced queues of up to four hours. For several hours the queues extended up to 6km from the Eurotunnel terminal check in, which meant that cars and their passengers were stretched out on to the French motorway system for approximately 3km of this queue. There were no other external or internal operational problems that day. French roads were fluid and Eurotunnel’s rolling stock was fully deployed.

**Proof that It Can Be Managed Without Chaos**

18 February 2012 (half term returns) Eurotunnel operated 71 shuttles from France to UK and carried 8,139 cars and 177 coaches. This equated to c27, 000 passengers needing to be processed through border controls during the day, with up to 1,722 per hour at peak travel times (230 more per hour than on 2 January).
As a result of an increase in the number of UKBA booths opened and the timely deployment of UKBA resources there were no bottlenecks and no delays.

It is our observation that the most significant difference is in the number of control points open and that this is therefore an issue relating to the quantity of resources available, not the quality.

**Our Concerns for the Future**

100 days of summer traffic

Eurotunnel forecasts that there will be 100 days of heavy traffic entering the UK from France starting on 1 June (spring half-term) until 9 September (end of the Paralympic Games)

The next big peak traffic test of UK Border Controls in Coquelles will be on Saturday 9 June and Sunday 10 June.
On both days Eurotunnel will be operating up to five departures per hour, with forecasted 7,500 cars and 100 coaches per day. This equates to 22,500 passengers needing to be processed through border controls on two consecutive days with up to 1,500 per hour at peak travel times.

To manage the quality of service for our travelling customers, we have already—reluctantly—had to take the decision not to sell all of our planned capacity so that we can maintain some flexibility if customer flow through the terminal is impacted by delays at UK Border Controls. This represents a lost revenue opportunity of over £100,000. We are also incurring additional cost through the need to draft in additional staff to manage potential queues. The Channel Tunnel travel concept is wholly dependent on the timely flow of cars and trucks through border controls to ensure that customers catch their booked departure. At the above levels of traffic we will need all booths (including those recently installed) to be open and operating to maximum efficiency.

Every following weekend in June will be busy. Current bookings are 20% above the same period last year. The Summer school holidays start in mid July. Bookings during the Olympic period are currently 18% above the same period last year whilst the four week period post-Olympics is up by 30%. The biggest summer peak is around the August Bank Holiday weekend returns (26/27/28 August) when we anticipate record breaking traffic levels.

On peak Summer return days (mainly Sundays & Mondays) Eurotunnel will be operating up to five departures per hour, and is forecasting over 9,500 cars and 100 coaches per day travelling from France to the UK. This equates to 26,500 passengers needing to be processed through border controls during the day with up to 1,900 per hour at peak travel times. This requires +10% more border control checks per hour than provided during February Half Term (our only benchmarked success) and needs to be sustained over an eight week period, with the biggest traffic peak occurring at the end of this period.

CONCLUSION

The current focus of attention on issues at Heathrow, with promises from the Home Office to move resources from other ports of entry and from back office locations to deal with them, leads us to be concerned that sufficient resources may not be available for the Channel Tunnel.

Looking to the future, we would also like to be assured that the UKBA is aware of and implements new technologies and processes used for efficient and effective border controls elsewhere.

We would be happy to provide the committee with further written or oral evidence.

Eurotunnel

May 2012

Written evidence submitted by the National Crime Agency [UKBA 06]

Letter from Keith Bristow QPM, Director General, Director General, National Crime Agency, to the Chair of the Committee, 1 May 2012

NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY: PROGRESS

Thank you for your letter dated 2 April in which you ask for an update on the work being done to set up the National Crime Agency. Specifically you raise three issues which I shall address in turn.

In relation to the job description and salary details of the Head of the Border Policing Command, please find attached full details at Annex A. This appointment was advertised nationally and I am pleased to confirm that interviews for this position are being scheduled to conclude in the next month or so.

In terms of the differing roles and the interaction of the Head of the Border Policing Command and the Head of the Border Force, the Home Secretary explained that whilst both individuals will work closely and collaboratively with each other their roles are unique and have intrinsically distinct responsibilities. In brief:

HEAD OF THE BORDER POLICING COMMAND

As head of one of the NCA’s four operational commands and accountable to me, he/she will take the lead for border security—gaining commitment from partners to deliver better more joined up enforcement activity against those who seek to exploit or evade the UK border. The role will:

— Oversee the delivery of a single, comprehensive picture of the threats to public safety and security that manifest at the border to expose opportunities and previously unknown threats.

— Drive all partner agencies operating in and around the border, including the Border Force, to work together to tackle those threats by prioritising action and tasking and co-ordinating the NCA’s resources and wider law enforcement’s assets to have the greatest impact.

— Work with overseas partners enabling early intervention against criminals and terrorists who target the UK.
HEAD OF BORDER FORCE

Brian Moore, as interim Director General of Border Force will be responsible for entry controls and customs functions at the border. Border Force, a new directorate of the Home Office is a major law enforcement body with key connections to other government and security communities.

The role will:

— Lead the current management and future development of UK Border Force.
— Work with the new Head of the Border Policing Command and other partners in order to ensure the security of the UK’s borders.
— Manage the legitimate passage of people and goods.

I am pleased to say that early working arrangements between the two operations have already proved to be positive. As we move forward, I envisage that Border Force and the NCA will act collaboratively to tackle threats at the border through the new improved tasking arrangements and by better intelligence gathering and sharing. I am confident that both organisations will work hand in hand to build upon the work already done to secure the border more effectively.

Turning finally to your request for a list of the National Crime Agency Programme Board, I attach a full list of members at Annex B.

Keith Bristow QPM
Director General
National Crime Agency

May 2012

Annex A

HEAD OF BORDER POLICING COMMAND, NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY

Grade: SCS Pay Band 2.

Appointment Term: This post is offered as a fixed term appointment for a period of three years, with the possibility of extension.

Salary: This post is set within Senior Civil Service Pay Band 2 (£82,900—£162,500). Starting salary will be dependent on your qualifications, knowledge and the relevant experience you are able to offer but is expected to be between £120,000 and £139,119. No allowances will be payable and you will not be eligible for a non-consolidated annual bonus payment.

BACKGROUND ON THE NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY

Organised crime costs the UK between £20 billion and £40 billion a year. It threatens national security and manifests itself in daily criminality, which damages the economy, local communities and individual lives. The UK’s response has lagged behind and the challenge is to improve our capability to deal with this threat. The creation of a National Crime Agency is central to the Government’s response to that challenge and a key part of a wider programme of radical reform of UK policing.

The government commitment to introduce the NCA was made in the “Policing in the 21st Century” consultation in July 2010. Following on from this, the NCA plan was published in June 2011, setting out the aims and objectives of the NCA. The plan committed to introducing the NCA in 2013, although some key elements, including the Shadow Border Command, will become operational sooner.

The NCA will set the overall operational agenda for tackling serious and organised and complex crime, resulting in a coherent and collaborative national response. The value of the NCA will be defined through the positioning of the Agency in the wider law enforcement landscape; its unique operational contribution; how it will influence the operational activity of its partners; and, how its own activity will be influenced by them.

The NCA will have significant multi-agency capability, drawing on existing national intelligence capabilities. It will build and maintain a comprehensive picture of threats, harms and risks to the UK from organised criminals and it will be responsible for ensuring that those criminals are subject to a prioritised level of operational response. It will have the authority to undertake tasking and coordination of the police and other law enforcement agencies to ensure networks of organised criminals are disrupted and prevented from operating.

The NCA will harness and exploit the existing operational, investigative and intelligence capabilities of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, CEOP and other law enforcement agencies such as UKBA and the police. The NCA will significantly contribute to the UK’s ability to respond to national threats including at and through the border.

In terms of organisational structure, the NCA Plan set out that:

— the NCA would comprise four distinct operational commands, operating as part of one single organisation (not in silos);
— the crime-fighting commands would be underpinned by centralised capabilities for intelligence, prioritisation, tasking and a dedicated cyber crime unit; and
— the NCA would also have its own specialist operational and technological capabilities (including for surveillance, fraud and threat to life situations), which would be available to the police and other agencies.

The plan also highlighted that each Operational Command will be led by a senior experienced individual and manage its own priorities and risks, although there will be flexibility across the commands. The key objectives of each command are highlighted below:

— *Organised Crime*: ensuring a prioritised national operational response is made against identified organised crime groups, whether they operate locally, across the country or across our international borders.

— *Border Policing*: ensuring that all law enforcement agencies operating in and around the border work to clear, mutually-agreed priorities, strengthening our borders, addressing national security threats such as terrorism, disrupting and deterring criminality and bringing offenders to justice.

— *Economic Crime*: ensuring an innovative and improved capability to deal with economic crimes, including those carried out by organised criminals and meeting the coalition government commitment.

— *Child Exploitation and Online Protection*: recognising the significant contribution made by CEOP, ensuring that our efforts to protect and safeguard children from the serious criminality of child exploitation and abuse are maintained and strengthened where child exploitation and abuse links to other forms of serious organised criminality.

— At the heart of the NCA will be an intelligence hub which will build and maintain a comprehensive picture of the threats, harms and risks to the UK from organised crime. There will also be a central cyber crime unit to support and drive the tactical operational activity of the four commands. It will also act as a national centre of expertise on cyber crime.

The Plan underlined that capability, expertise, assets and intelligence would be shared across the entire Agency, and that the NCA's structures and governance would be designed to ensure flexibility and rapid responsiveness to shifts in the national threat picture. The Director General of the NCA will have the authority to deploy resources between commands and to mount joint operations flexibly, taking full account of the individual command priorities.

The NCA will take a broad approach in its ambition to deliver a step change in law enforcement and in partnership working to reduce the harm caused by serious, organised and complex crime—to individuals, families and communities; to businesses, the public purse and the wider economy; across borders; and online.
The NCA programme has been established to introduce the NCA. It is making significant progress on the design and build of the agency—this covers work on the four operational commands, the intelligence hub, tasking and co-ordination and work to develop the legislation. The programme team includes a number of secondees from key partner organisations to ensure that relevant operational expertise is present throughout the design of the NCA.

ROLE DESCRIPTION

The Government is seeking an experienced and dynamic individual with the leadership and vision to oversee the establishment of the NCA’s Border Policing Command (BPC), turning the Home Secretary’s vision into an operational reality. Accountable to the recently appointed NCA Director General, the Head of the Border Policing Command will perform a complex operational role and become an integral part of the NCA’s executive management team. As an Executive Director of the NCA (once vested) the Head of the BPC may, in due course, be asked to take on additional duties in order to maximise operational flexibility.

The NCA’s drive to tackle organised crime and protect our borders is fundamental to national security and the UK’s economic well-being. As one of the NCA’s four operational commands, the BPC will take the lead in identifying and tackling threats to the UK border in the widest sense: overseas, at the physical border and in country. It will provide new lead and impetus to knit together the many agencies operating at the border, delivering joined up enforcement activity against those who seek to exploit loopholes in or evade our border controls. With a strong focus on stopping the threat at the earliest opportunity, the BPC will utilise current and emerging capabilities to intervene at our border to stop those intent on doing harm. The post holder will work closely with UKBA and the Border Force.

This is a new post. The BPC will be led by an individual who has a proven track record in both strategic leadership and in protecting the public from serious, organised and complex criminality. He or she will secure commitment from multiple partners to work together to agreed collective objectives, with the purpose of maximising the opportunities that the border presents in tackling organised criminals and those who threaten our national security.

As Head of the BPC, you will be responsible for all operational activity undertaken by that command and will be accountable to the NCA Director General. Close working with UKBA and the Head of the Border Force will be essential.

Initially, the post holder will:

- As an integral part of the NCA’s top team, contribute to delivering the Home Secretary’s vision for the NCA and building the NCA’s reputation in the UK and overseas, taking on a challenging and diverse portfolio of responsibilities as the NCA evolves.
- Inspire and lead the law enforcement community and other key partners in the detailed design and implementation of the BPC, making a difference to how we tackle border related crime by developing and delivering its operating model, capabilities and responsibilities.
- Drive the operation of the BPC shadow command, ensuring early operational progress by co-ordinating multi-agency operations against identified threats to border security. We anticipate focussed operational activity taking place from Autumn 2012 onwards. This will inform the shape of the Command in 2013 as well as impacting on those who abuse our borders.

Once the NCA becomes operational, the post holder will:

- Provide strategic direction for the Command, overseeing the collection of multiple strands of intelligence from partners to provide a comprehensive assessment of the threats to the border; galvanising the efforts of law enforcement partners, and the wider NCA, to tackle those threats; and ensuring that effective operational action is taken—locally, nationally and internationally.
- Motivate and energise staff across the Command to drive performance and deliver significant improvements to operational outcomes.

PERSON SPECIFICATION

In your application you should provide examples of your experience in meeting the appointment criteria listed below. These will be the key criteria for selection:

- Ideally possessing recent operational experience at a senior level in policing, law enforcement or a national security related field, your detailed knowledge of the issues will be complemented by the credibility and integrity to command the confidence of Ministers and a wide range of partners within law enforcement and beyond.
- Your communication skills will be first class and you will have the breadth of vision, innovation and credibility to see what the BPC can achieve—both on its own and with partners—and be able to make it happen.
You will also have:

— Significant experience in change management and strategic leadership—rapidly leading new teams to deliver substantial improvements in operational effectiveness.
— A proven track record of delivery in a multi-agency environment.
— A sound understanding of the international context in order to liaise effectively with your counterparts from other countries.
— Proven capabilities in delivering “better for less”. Your understanding of how to generate efficiencies, reduce overheads and ensure real value for money will be practical and led by example.

ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE

Desirable: Knowledge or experience of border security issues.

Annex B

MEMBERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY PROGRAMME BOARD AS OF 27 APRIL 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Crime Agency (NCA)—Programme Board Membership</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dame Helen Ghosh (Chair) Permanent Secretary, Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith Bristow NCA Director General (Deputy Chair)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevor Pearce Director General, Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Davies Chief Executive, Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jon Murphy Head of Crime Business Area, Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Rowley Assistant Commissioner, Specialist Crime &amp; Operations, Metropolitan Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Toon Director of Criminal Investigation, HM Revenue &amp; Customs (HMRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Moore Director General, Border Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Duckworth Representative, Association of Police Authorities (APA) and New Interim Association of Police Governance Bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon King Cabinet Office Senior Policy Advisor, Number 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Farr Director General, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rob Whiteman Chief Executive, UK Border Agency (UKBA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Rimmer Director General, Crime and Policing Group, Home Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helen Kilpatrick Director General, Financial and Commercial Group, Home Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lewis Benjamin National Coordinator, Organised Crime Partnership Board (OCPB)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gareth Hills NCA Programme Director, Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingrid Clifford-Jones NCA Deputy Programme Director, Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim Hull Deputy Director for Intelligence, Tasking and Coordination, NCA Programme, Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Hill NCA Programme Manager, Home Office (Secretariat)</td>
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