International Development Committee - Minutes of EvidenceHC 403

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the International Development Committee

on Tuesday 10 July 2012

Members present:

Sir Malcolm Bruce (Chair)

Hugh Bayley

Richard Burden

Mr Sam Gyimah

Jeremy Lefroy

Fiona O'Donnell

Chris White

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Examination of Witness

Witness: Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP, Secretary of State for International Development, gave evidence.

Q51 Chair: Good afternoon, Secretary of State. Thank you very much for coming in to join us on this final evidence session on our report into Afghanistan. Obviously the timing is appropriate, as you have just returned from the conference in Tokyo. I wonder if you could give us an indication of what was agreed there, both in terms of the scale of the commitments to 2017, and indeed anything beyond, and also how specific they were, because I think quite a lot of the press comment, both in advance and subsequently, seemed to be a bit vague. On previous occasions, governments have been quite good at making commitments and quite bad at following them through. What commitments were made, how specific were they, and how sure are you they will be delivered?

Mr Mitchell: Thank you Chairman very much for giving me this opportunity, and I extend my thanks to the Committee for taking the trouble to go and see for yourselves, as you often do, what is happening on the ground. I know that it was an extremely successful visit-or at least that is what I heard when I was in Afghanistan. I was in Afghanistan during the week immediately before the Tokyo conference. I had a chance to see for myself the latest state of play in Afghanistan in the runup to the Tokyo conference.

In respect of the points you make about Tokyo, I would say that the deal that has been agreed there is pretty good. It pretty much met Britain’s requirements from the Tokyo conference, which were first of all that there should be a bargain between the Government of Afghanistan and the international community, with an important role for the Afghan Government to continue to deliver on the governance and economic reforms to which they are committed on the one hand, and a clear set of financial commitments from the international community for a significant period of time. Part of the reason for that is it should not be forgotten that the regime of Najibullah ended as it did with him hanging from a lamppost in Kabul, not because the regime was defeated militarily, but because the Russians stopped paying the bills. It is therefore very important that Tokyo, following as it does the Bonn conference and the Chicago conference, which dealt with the funding of the ANSF, should be pretty specific about the support it will give to the budget of Afghanistan.

Britain made it very clear that we would commit until 2017 to continue funding at the same level as we are today, throughout these five years. A number of other countries, the five Scandinavian countries, made the same commitment. Others made a specific commitment up until 2015, with an indication beyond 2015 to 2017, and many of us made it clear that, while we were being specific that funding would continue in the case of Britain at £178 million per year up until 2017, our commitment would continue throughout the decade of transformation, which goes up to 2024. We have tried to give confidence that the international community will be there to help Afghanistan after the transition is complete and the troop drawdown has taken place, so that the Afghan Government can have confidence in the support of the international community over a lengthy period of time. This is also so that we can know that the very considerable sacrifices that have been made, particularly by British and American armed forces, will be built on in the way that I have described through the processes of Chicago and Tokyo, providing adequate support to ensure continued progress can be made.

On your final point, Chairman, about how can we be sure that people will stick to their commitments, on behalf of the Government I accepted the request from the Government of Afghanistan and the Government of Japan that Britain would host a followup conference in two years’ time, designed to make sure that everyone has stuck to their commitments, and to hold both the international community and the Afghan Government to account for the commitments that have been made.

Q52 Chair: I wish you well with that. We know that both Gleneagles and the previous Tokyo conference did fall short of the pledges. I think we are saying 74% of the pledges of the 2002 conference have been fulfilled. When we were in Afghanistan-I am sure you would have picked up the same thing-there was a febrile atmosphere: the impression is being given that the international community is almost pulling out in 2014. To what extent do you think the Tokyo conference will have had a positive impact in getting through to people-a much wider public in Afghanistan-that 2014 is the beginning of a transition, rather than the end of an era? Clearly that was the general question people were asking us all the time: what happens when you leave? To what extent can you be sure that the impact post 2014 is: "Well, the international community did not leave; the troops may have left, but the international community stayed there very actively"?

Mr Mitchell: That is what Tokyo and, indeed, Chicago are about. It is to give that confidence in the way I described, and also the mutual accountability framework, which is this bargain that I described. I have to say, my own observations would be that although there is some concern-of course, it would clearly be quite wrong to suggest that there was not-about the transition process, there was more concern about the forthcoming elections in 2014. There was quite a strong view that these elections need to be successful, they need to be freer and fairer than the last elections and they need to reflect a growth in stability and security rather than the reverse.

Chair: We will come back to talk about the elections.

Mr Mitchell: That was the larger area of concern I would say, rather than the specific worry about the drawdown, which is proceeding pretty well. Half the country is now transitioned; within the next few months 75% of the people of Afghanistan will have been transitioned. Of course there are setbacks: this is a very difficult situation. While I was in Afghanistan three young soldiers were killed in what I think is known as a "green on blue" incident, which just underlines how difficult it is. In general, I think the transition is going pretty well.

Q53 Chair: Again on that, there were concerns that, once the international community forces leave, women’s rights would go backwards-there was concern that those be protected-that corruption, which is bad now, could get worse, although some say that a reduced amount of military activity and the money that goes with it might have the opposite effect, and that somehow or other the Taliban will start to come back in significant ways. I suppose the question you have to ask is, in a situation where we do not have troops on the ground, at what point does the UK Government conclude that what is happening in Afghanistan is such that we cannot effectively deliver our aid? What would be the tipping point at which we say that there has been too much reversal of progress, that women’s rights are being trashed, that corruption is rife, that the Taliban is regaining control? Does there come a point where our money is being abused and our ability to really turn the country round is being lost?

Mr Mitchell: Everything we are doing is designed to ensure that that is not going to happen; I do not believe that will happen. There is very clear evidence of progress. Two particular points that you make, Sir Malcolm, about the Taliban drifting back and the rights of women: let me address them very directly. One of the things that is most likely to stop the Taliban coming back and trying to implement their repugnant policies towards women is educating girls. By the time you have educated a critical mass of women in Afghanistan, and they take leadership positions in their families and communities, they get elected on shuras, they get elected into government that is the best bulwark against those policies being reimplemented. Nine years ago there were no girls being educated in Afghanistan; today there are more than 2.2 million. That is moving in the right direction. Britain is a very strong supporter. While I was in Afghanistan I saw Minister Wardak, the Minister of Education. He says that by 2014 he will have got the other 4.2 million children who are not in school into school. He is a driving force. I think that is important progress on the first of those two points.

Britain has been a staunch supporter of women’s rights. My Department has worked very well in trying to boost the rights of women, not just in the way I described in terms of education, but in other ways. When I was there last year I launched the Tawanmandi project, which the Committee may have heard about while they were there. This is designed to boost civil society, holding Ministers to account, holding Government to account. I mention this one statistic to the Committee, which I think is stunning: nine years ago there were three female defence lawyers in Afghanistan. Today, thanks to the efforts not least of Britain, there are more than 400. Of course, women having the opportunity to stand up for their rights, to have their rights represented, to achieve security and justice, that move from just three female defence lawyers who could act for women to more than 400 today is very significant. There is other evidence as well that progress is being made in Afghanistan, that we have turned a page and that, with the tremendous support and effectiveness of our own troops in training the Afghan army and police, the success of transition so far is moving to a new place. That is what we will be able to achieve.

Q54 Chair: The Independent Commission on Aid Impact was quite critical of the tiers of subcontracting that DFID funding had to go through. We got quite a bit of the flavour of that when we were there. The mutual accountability framework states that, "The international community aims to limit the practice of subcontracting in all specialised and labourintensive projects to only one vertical level to reduce overhead costs and improve transparency." That is precisely what ICAI were recommending. Will you be able to do that?

Mr Mitchell: The ICAI report-which I think was a very good report-did not identify any corruption in the programme. Indeed, the Committee will be familiar with the way in which we work through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which supports Afghan Government programmes but only pays out on the basis of reimbursable receipts. That is a successful and important approach; it is support for the Afghan budget, but it is not budget support. That is a mechanism we are able to use to ensure we get the results our money is meant to buy.

In terms of ICAI’s report, therefore, it was more about when Britain provides taxpayer support for third parties and the monitoring of what happens thereafter. We are making a number of changes as a result of the ICAI report-what the report set out is very helpful-but it is fair to say that in a position such as we face in Afghanistan we take a little more risk in support of the work our armed forces are doing there, in support of Britain’s specific interests in Afghanistan, than we would in a steady state development programme in a country that was not caught up in conflict in the way Afghanistan is. The report was very helpful; we will take specific steps that result from that report. But my officials in Afghanistan do a brilliant job in very difficult circumstances, and I would not want there to be any implication from the ICAI report that that was not the case.

Chair: I think the Committee would concur with that last comment, but I am not sure you gave an answer that said it would be simplified to one level. We will come back to that.

Q55 Mr Gyimah: Secretary of State, thanks for what you have said so far. The question I have on my mind is to do with the transition and your level of confidence. Given so much seems to ride on the outcome of the next election, what is your level of confidence that the progress made to date around development-and you gave two very interesting statistics about the number of women in education and the number of women judges-will not halt post the election if the outcome is not favourable?

Mr Mitchell: No one can foretell the future with 100% precision, and I do not pretend to be able to, but I do think the decisions the international community has made at Chicago-about the support for the Afghan National Security Forces-and the decisions that have been made at Tokyo can give confidence to people who are driving progress in Afghanistan that the international community will not desert them when the transition is complete and the drawdown has taken place. It is not remotely surprising that that will be the case, because long after the last British combat soldier has departed we will still need to be supporting Afghanistan in its development aims and aspirations because this is one of the poorest countries on Earth.

So we are making our plans for what happens after the transition is complete. Along with our colleagues in the international community and the multilateral organisations, we are working out how to take forward the aspirations of the Government, and working in partnership with the Government to develop and secure our common aims and aspirations.

Q56 Chris White: Secretary of State, following your opening remarks, as part of the group that visited Lashkar Gah, may I take this opportunity to pay tribute to our troops and the DFID teams for their extraordinary work under extraordinary circumstances? My question, though, is to ask you how are you ensuring that DFID’s programme is sufficiently flexible to be able to respond to whatever the various scenarios might be post 2014?

Mr Mitchell: Mr White is entirely correct that the situation post 2014, when the troops are withdrawn, will lead to the PRT being dismantled. We will run the programmes and operate from Kabul, which is, after all, the normal model in most countries: you would expect the head office of DFID to be in Kabul and operating from there. I do not know whether you were able to get out on the ground in Lashkar Gah, but we are supporting Mercy Corps in a very significant vocational training programme, which will shortly have trained more than 12,000 men and women, effectively, and graduated them into the local economy with very, very high success rates: something more than 83% have got into jobs as a result. The work of development is carrying on now, and we expect, operating in the normal way through international NGOs, as well as, where possible, through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, to be supporting development in a comprehensive way once the PRT has completed its tasks.

Q57 Chris White: Do you think that any particular projects might be stopped because of the risk of a deteriorating security situation?

Mr Mitchell: We will of course have to take account of that, but I anticipate, as we said at Tokyo, that, from now to 2017 and beyond that, we will deploy British development resources at the rate of £178 million a year. We increased the figure two years ago when the coalition Government came to power by some 40%, and we have confidence that the different parts of our programme, the three key parts of our programme, can be delivered through transition and beyond.

Q58 Hugh Bayley: Given the number of British service personnel who have died or been seriously injured in Helmand, it is likely, I think, that many of the British public would judge the worth of our presence in Afghanistan by the lasting change that is achieved in Helmand province. Do you envisage that funding for DFID’s Helmand programmes will continue at current levels once the ISAF troops leave? If so, how will support be provided in the province for such work?

Mr Mitchell: Mr Bayley is correct that British activity and endeavour in Afghanistan is often seen in Britain through the lens of Helmand. That, after all, as Mr Bayley says, is where our troops are largely deployed. The programmes in Helmand are gearing up for transition in the way I described to Mr White. Once the drawdown is complete we will continue in much the same way as we do now. For example, a lot of the support goes through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. As long as we are happy the money is being spent in the way we are reimbursing, we will be able to continue to do that.

Q59 Hugh Bayley: Will you have staff, perhaps local Afghan staff, on the ground in Helmand after 2014?

Mr Mitchell: It is too early to give you a definite answer to that. However, it is my anticipation that the staff will be based in Kabul; they will move around and operate as the security situation permits thereafter.

Q60 Hugh Bayley: What development gains in Helmand do you think will be sustained after 2014?

Mr Mitchell: I hope all of them will. There has been a tremendous increase in the number of children in school. Governor Mangal, the brilliant Governor in Helmand, is quick to talk about that and the agricultural development he has personally championed as well. He also talks, for example, about the tremendous growth in the number of people who attend shuras-justice shuras too. Mr Bayley will recall that, not so long ago, one of the complaints made was that the Taliban would give you justice quite quickly if you had a complaint, but if you wanted access to the state justice of Afghanistan it took forever, and often money had to pass hands. That position has changed quite radically now. There are justice shuras enacted in the traditional way at local level that are giving people access to justice that they did not have before. Where you have a charismatic leader like Governor Mangal, who is leading his province in that way, great progress can be made.

Q61 Hugh Bayley: Both on this more recent visit and when I have been to Helmand before, it is clear that some services supported by British funds are provided in areas where the Government of Afghanistan’s writ does not apply: in "bad lands" where "bad people", I might say, exercise control. In those areas, it is obviously necessary to strike some kind of deal with local insurgent forces, local Taliban leaders and local community leaders. Mercy Corps, who gave evidence to us last week, explained that they could not do the work you were describing unless they obtained agreement for what they were doing from the Taliban. Is the Government comfortable with that as a practical necessity in a conflict area?

Mr Mitchell: Clearly we do not do anything like that as a Government. The way in which we operate with an organisation like Mercy Corps-which I emphasise is, I think, delivering brilliant results, and is very well led in Lashkar Gah-is that we expect them to be able to deliver results on the ground and we leave them to get on with how they do that. I would expect them to take advice from the lawful authorities in Lashkar Gah about the way in which they operate.

Q62 Chair: Just a point on that, though: the argument from Mercy Corps and others was they could only engage in the community without close protection-which they do not want to have anyway because it creates all the wrong impressions-because they had an accommodation. That included some degree of consent or support from the Taliban.1 Is that not the reality of the way forward: that, frankly, unless you get that kind of consent, you either do it under armed guard-which is really not the way to take the country where it needs to be-or you have to broker an agreement?

Mr Mitchell: If you are running Mercy Corps in Lashkar Gah you could not be criticised for ensuring that your staff and colleagues working in those circumstances were not regarded as wildly antagonistic to any of the communities in the vicinity.

Q63 Mr Gyimah: Secretary of State, we heard from witnesses last week that donor duplication in Afghanistan was still a problem. I guess the question that flows from that is how you would rate the work of the Joint Monitoring and Coordination Board, and how could they improve their activities?

Mr Mitchell: Donor duplication is a problem, but it is one of the reasons why Britain strongly supports the request of the Afghan Government that 50% of the support should be done through the Government-that is the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund for us-and that 80% should coincide with the aims of the Government. The truth is, as the Committee will fully understand, that, in development work, unless you have a partnership, unless you are going with the grain of what a Government is trying to do, development will not be successful. Mr Gyimah mentions a key area of importance: greater donor coordination, particularly as transition completes, is essential and is one of the priorities I have set for my officials to ensure we do everything we can to boost donor coordination and ensure it is effective.

Q64 Mr Gyimah: Thank you for that. Just pursuing that point a little bit further, there was an article in The Sunday Times last week, which was very critical of how Britain and the United States worked together at both military and development level, and I quote: "American marines and British civilian advisers were waging two wars in Helmand… They were fighting the Taliban-and each other". Obviously bearing in mind that this is an extract from a book and the author of the book wants to sell copy, it would be interesting to know your views on how we can improve this situation, because I am sure it reflects in part some truth of what is happening.

Mr Mitchell: All I can say about that is I have looked at the allegations in that article and I have found no evidence whatsoever that they are true.

Q65 Jeremy Lefroy: Secretary of State, you have already mentioned the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. Our experience of a trust fund run by the World Bank in South Sudan was not particularly good. What makes this one different?

Mr Mitchell: They are none of them precisely the same. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund has been a key mechanism that we have used. We have therefore ensured that it operates in a way that works for us. The way in which it works is it only pays out on the basis of verified, reimbursable receipts, which are verified by an external and respected company. That is absolutely essential. When there was the standoff between the IMF and the Afghan Government over the Kabul Bank, when we were not satisfied that it was being tackled correctly, Britain decided not to support the ARTF until that had been sorted out. This is a very important mechanism for us: we watch it like a hawk; we use it to signify our support for the programmes of the Afghan Government, paying teachers and doctors and so forth. In my view it is an effective and successful mechanism of British support for the Afghan Government and for the development of the sinews of that Government as well.

Q66 Jeremy Lefroy: I understand a review of it is currently ongoing. Is DFID involved in that review, and do you have anything to say on it at the moment?

Mr Mitchell: I do not have anything to say on it at the moment. We keep it under review all the time, and of course when there was a standoff with the IMF we were unable to use it until that had been resolved.

Q67 Jeremy Lefroy: Given it is such an important element, not only of the work DFID is doing in Afghanistan but even of the work of the Afghan Government, because it is the single major source of financing for its services, is there a fairly clear protocol setting out the circumstances under which DFID and other donors would not continue to fund it, or would suspend funding as in the case of the Kabul Bank? Clearly if the Afghan Government is relying on this, it could have huge implications for the delivery of those very services we want to see, such as education, particularly for girls. How can we and the Afghan Government ensure this is not done arbitrarily?

Mr Mitchell: You put your finger on a very important point, which is that, when we were dissatisfied with the standards of governance surrounding the Kabul Bank, we made it clear that we would not fund through the ARTF with prospectively very significant effects on the paying of the teachers and the doctors you describe. Of course, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund is used more extensively than that: it funds many of the local programmes at local level that are supported by local government. Its importance is absolute. It is a mechanism by which we are able to give very strong support to the Afghan Government, but we expect them to stick to their commitments as well, if they are to receive that sort of quality of support.

Q68 Jeremy Lefroy: Fully understood, but if I may press you a little bit, because it is so important and the services it delivers are critical to the future of Afghan reconstruction, surely there needs to be a very clear protocol under which funding continues to be provided or is suspended. At what level of corruption would you take the decision not to continue with funding or to suspend funding? If I were the Afghan Government I would want to be sure that something as important to my existence as this was very clearly laid out, because a new Secretary of State could come in and say that any level of corruption is intolerable, and therefore if we have any reports of corruption-far below the level of the Kabul Bank-we will stop our contributions to this trust fund. It becomes a bit of an arbitrary instrument. Clearly, you only did that when gross corruption was revealed. Is there a protocol under which it is operated?

Mr Mitchell: No, there is not. I must maintain the flexibility to be accountable to Parliament for whether we fund through any of the mechanisms we use. It is important to distinguish. Firstly, I am satisfied that the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund is pretty proof against corruption; that is why we use it, because of the nature of the way it pays out taxpayers’ money. It is important we should be clear about that. But I need to retain the flexibility as Secretary of State to be clear that if the Afghan Government does not stand by its commitment, does not meet its obligations, we are able to review the nature and extent of our support as a result.

Q69 Jeremy Lefroy: I just go back to the quotation at the beginning from your article, and the reason why Najibullah’s regime ended with him hanging from a lamppost in Kabul being that the Russians stopped paying the bills. My slight concern there is that the major governments supporting the trust fund need to make it clear to the Afghan Government where their level of tolerance lies so that we are not left in a position where suddenly funding is withdrawn and those consequences result almost without thinking.

Mr Mitchell: I would turn it round and say both sides need to stand by their commitments and then the very difficult situation Mr Lefroy sets out will not arise.

Q70 Richard Burden: Could we talk a little bit about Conflict Pool monies and monies contributing towards prevention, stabilisation and peacekeeping? It is clearly a highly politicised area, with the involvement of the UK, USA and other partners; the relationships there increase that. There have been evaluations of the combined effect of all that; this is a quote from one of them from 2009: political and military pressure to contribute to stabilisation "constrained the choices available to DFID and undermined the coherence of its overall strategy." Former Ambassador Sherard CowperColes himself said that one of the problems here is that DFID quite often appears as the "poor relative" and has to fight for its recognition to get its policies across. What is your feeling about that? Were those criticisms ever right? If they were, have they been addressed?

Mr Mitchell: They are criticisms of circumstances that existed under the last Government. The point I would make to Mr Burden is that we have set up the National Security Council, upon which I sit, so DFID is represented in that body. The National Security Council decides on the use of the Conflict Pool; the Conflict Pool underpins the delivery of the National Security Council’s priorities for Afghanistan and also supports the building overseas stability strategy. This is now quite a well joined up approach. If the Committee were able to visit the PRT, they will have seen in action the seamless way in which the different parts of the Government are represented there and the very effective work they are doing. My answer is that the Conflict Pool is helping deliver Britain’s priorities and doing so very effectively.

Q71 Richard Burden: What you are saying is the thing that has made the difference has been the impact of the National Security Council and the National Security Strategy. What has it done that is different, then?

Mr Mitchell: It is much more highly coordinated-

Q72 Richard Burden: Can give me an example?

Mr Mitchell: If you look, for example, at the work the Conflict Pool is carrying out on infrastructure in Helmand, where there are quite major improvements in infrastructure, including the strategically important highway between Sangin and Kajaki districts, that is overseen by the PRT. The strategy is determined through the NSC; the PRT is the body that carries that out and does so extremely effectively. I cannot really comment on a situation that may have existed before, but I hope I can reassure Mr Burden that that is now being carried out in a seamless, effective way. There are clearly things we can do better; that is not one of the ones I have identified.

Q73 Richard Burden: I am having a little difficulty following this. There are two issues here. One is: was the criticism of DFID being the "poor relative" ever really a valid criticism? That is the first question. The second question is, if the answer is yes, is it still the case and what has made the practical difference? I have to say, Secretary of State, I was a little put out by your saying "that was the last Government."

Mr Mitchell: There has been a change in structure.

Q74 Richard Burden: That is why I am asking you: the PRT was there under the last Government; the National Security Council was not there; Conflict Pool was there. But when you were talking about the road project, it presumably could have happened under the last Government as well. Before, would there have been on that road project a downplaying of the development angle, and if so what do you base that on? If there would have been that problem before and it has now been rectified, what, in practical terms, has the new structure done to change that?

Mr Mitchell: I first visited Afghanistan in 2008. I was certainly aware there had been complaints from different parts of the British Government about the way in which the PRT was working, that all the different parts were not as well joined up as they could or should be. Very shortly after this Government was elected, the Defence Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and I visited Afghanistan-

Richard Burden: I remember it.

Mr Mitchell: We visited Kabul and Helmand. We went to see for ourselves what we could do to ensure that the different parts for which each of us were responsible worked as seamlessly and as well together as possible. That is why I say that the advent of the National Security Council has had a beneficial effect on the machinery of government in delivering this well joined up performance. The answer to your question is-this has nothing to do with a criticism of the last Government-I think the approach that the PRT represents of the seamless working together of government has got much better. When I saw it in 2008 there were plenty of stories about how it had improved in the years before that. I have seen for myself how it has improved since 2008.

Q75 Richard Burden: There was another report published in 2011 that said that, in relation to research carried out in Helmand on Conflict Pool stabilisation, aid used in the form of stabilisation operations "may have as many negative, unintended effects as positive ones and, at the very least, is not a panacea." To what extent do you think stabilisation efforts have contributed to stability?

Mr Mitchell: I am quite clear in terms of the work that we have been doing supporting stronger governance, the rule of law, better security, counter-narcotics efforts, and, indeed, creating more widely the general conditions for an enduring political settlement: all those things are hallmarks of stabilisation. We are engaged with all of them and progress is being made.

Q76 Richard Burden: For the record, that was Stuart Gordon’s "Winning Hearts and Minds?" 2011 report. Perhaps we can come back to that, thank you.

Q77 Jeremy Lefroy: The focus of DFID has been on the "viable state" pillar of the UK Government’s strategy on Afghanistan. What do you believe has been the major achievement of DFID’s work on this so far?

Mr Mitchell: The programme that we have divides into three parts: encouraging better governance on the one hand; promoting economic stability, growth and jobs-we have talked about some of that, not least in the Mercy Corps example-and helping the State to deliver improved services. Progress has been made on all those. On economic activity, the vocational training I described is a good example. In terms of governance, the work we have done that has led to the promotion of women’s rights and the very significant increase in female defence lawyers is an example of that. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund has been able to deliver the stability you were asking me about, Mr Lefroy, in respect of paying teachers and doctors. That is part of the reason why, in the recent past, the number of girls in school has risen from zero to 2.2 million. In very difficult circumstances, those three areas under the pillar of National Security Council strategy that you mentioned have made progress.

Q78 Jeremy Lefroy: Just moving on, developing that a little bit, it appears Afghanistan is the only country I am aware of where DFID seems to have a dual mandate. The one mandate is DFID’s own of reducing and eliminating poverty, and the second is the National Security Council’s mandate of building an effective state. Do you see a conflict between those two?

Mr Mitchell: No, not at all. Of course, the National Security Council agreed that 30% of the development budget would be spent in conflict areas. There are other countries as well now where that would be so. I would not wish there to be any confusion over the fact that the humanitarian relief we provide is needsbased, and is not used in a way that, as it were, specifically advantages the security position. In general, the reason our troops are deployed is to ensure that, in future, Afghanistan is not a safe haven for terrorist activity and Britain’s development budget, whether in Afghanistan or anywhere else, pursues Britain’s national interests.

Q79 Jeremy Lefroy: I hear that, but one of the statements one sometimes hears is that because the UK Government, through DFID, is so concentrating on devoting a considerable amount of time to developing the central state Government, it is perhaps not doing as much on developing, or helping the Afghan Government develop, those services that are the things that will win over hearts and minds and bring about peace and stability in the long term.

Mr Mitchell: I do not recognise that distinction. To give one example, we are heavily engaged in working with the Ministry of Mines in trying to ensure that this enormous mineral wealth just under the surface in Afghanistan is developed for the benefit of the Afghan people. We work extensively with the Ministry of Finance but also with the Ministry of Mines to try to ensure the governance systems are properly developed and are transparent, open and work effectively. The work we have done with the Ministry of Mines has helped contribute to a number of contracts being awarded in a transparent and open way. I think I mentioned to the Committee when we last discussed Afghanistan that Minister Shahrani had put 108 contracts on the internet to emphasise the fact these would be awarded in a transparent and open way. That sort of work helps build the sinews of the Government, but it also directly contributes to the development of Afghanistan. In recent months, two big iron ore contracts have been let. It is calculated by the World Bank that by 2016 the revenue to the state if these are let and developed in a transparent and open way would be a significant part of the annual budget. So it is a very important way of doing both the things you described.

Q80 Jeremy Lefroy: Thank you very much. We met the Minister of Mines, and I think all of us were impressed with him. His figures seem to be slightly optimistic, compared with the figures of the World Bank, but at least that showed he was confident about the future. Turning for a moment to the Kabul Bank scandal, how satisfied are you with the action that in particular the Minister of Finance has taken and the Government as a whole?

Mr Mitchell: The key point there is that the President made a speech some weeks ago in which he made it perfectly clear that the money that had been taken from the Bank should be returned; if the money was not returned, he would take action against those who had been identified through this audit report we and the Canadians funded, and he would take action against those who had failed to comply. When I saw President Karzai last week, I welcomed his speech and said we looked forward to his delivering on those commitments. He assured me that he would be doing so.

Q81 Richard Burden: Perhaps, Secretary of State, I could come back, partly to the line of questioning I was exploring before. It relates to the questions Jeremy Lefroy was asking about national governance, subnational governance and so on. There was an article in The Independent on Sunday this week. You mentioned the roads as being an example of development objectives being pursued in a much more effective way. According to that article by Brian Brady and Jonathan Owen, there is a secret report flying around British Government Departments at the moment that is quite critical of the Highway 1 project. It is "largely bankrolled by American and Saudi millions, was seen as a symbol of Afghanistan’s emergence as a modern democratic nation after decades of oppressive rule"-this is what the report says-but then, according to this paper that is apparently under discussion, the road, "is not completely ‘metalled’ with a durable surface, and has a layer of tarmac too thin to last an Afghan winter, leaving lengthy stretches in danger of disintegration. The document also complained that the highway was ‘of no value at all’ to the vast majority of Afghans, who need better local roads to help them travel to towns closer to home."

This is kind of what I was getting at. I can absolutely see, as a statement about the new Afghanistan, that this road may make a great deal of sense, but if it is not going to work much as a road, and it is not going from the right places to the right places, it is not following a development agenda. It may be following another agenda. When we were in Afghanistan in 2007, we saw some examples of that same kind of problem. Have you seen the report, and is there something in it?

Mr Mitchell: The building of roads is extremely important. I opened a new road when I was in Helmand last year, and of course a tarmac road gives people confidence in going about their business, getting goods to market and knowing they can travel in reasonable safety. The building of roads is an important development priority. I know of no secret report on Highway 1, but I did see the article that was written by The Independent on Sunday and I would be happy to write to the Committee if that would be helpful, Mr Chairman, on any views we have on it.

Q82 Chair: If there is a secret report, can we see it?

Mr Mitchell: If there is a report that is in secret you can certainly see it, Mr Chairman, but I would be happy to write on the essence of the point Mr Burden is raising anyway.

Q83 Fiona O'Donnell: Good afternoon, Secretary of State. As a newbie to the Committee, is it okay if I call you Andrew and you can call me Fiona? Is that all right?

Mr Mitchell: I suppose so, Sir Malcolm.

Fiona O'Donnell: Thank you; thanks Andrew.

Hugh Bayley: "Malc".

Chair: This is not the Treasury Committee.

Q84 Fiona O'Donnell: Your Government is committed to localism, but evidence submitted to the Committee states that that approach is maybe not so evident in DFID’s state building work in Afghanistan. Indeed, they described it as "overly centralised" and "inappropriate given the current realities of Afghanistan." How would you respond to that accusation?

Mr Mitchell: I think it is not a fair criticism. The point I would make is that we are supporting a myriad local programmes. We supported development programmes locally through the District Development Program-DDP-for example, which is designed to go right to grassroots level, to ensure that local people elect representatives for what they want to do, and then make assessments and judgments of what in their community they would like to see developed. In one community I visited not far from Kabul, a decision had been made to rebuild the school; in another, a decision was made that they wanted a clinic. This is localism at work. It is asking people at grassroots level what they want to do and then ensuring the Government shows its ability to support that sort of local development. We are very much involved in that: we cofunded the Performance Based Governance Fund, which helps to build more accountable local government institutions across 34 provinces, and is managed by a reputable international NGO, The Asia Foundation. If Fiona has a look at the work of The Asia Foundation in this respect she may well be reassured, Mr Chairman.

Q85 Fiona O'Donnell: Thank you. In part you have answered my next question: the Committee heard last week in evidence that there is concern that, without DFID oversight, donor money may not be appropriately channelled down to local level, but instead may be used to reward local patronage. Do you think that is a risk?

Mr Mitchell: Again, the Performance Based Governance Fund, which I have just mentioned, has recently been evaluated. The evaluation said it has significantly improved the way in which provincial governors manage funds to communicate better with their citizens to run their operations. Good progress has been made in that respect.

Q86 Fiona O'Donnell: How will you oversee the ways in which that money is spent?

Mr Mitchell: The example I have given of the work that the highly respected Asia Foundation does is one such mechanism. We employ a whole series of ways in which we oversee the way funding is spent, not least I have explained the governance structure around the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which is of course a significant disburser of British taxpayers’ money.

Q87 Hugh Bayley: I, like you, Secretary of State, have visited Afghanistan five times over the last 10 years. I respect enormously the work our staff do, but I think because the stakes are so high for Afghan people and for us in this country there is a danger of not looking at the downside. I see some difficulties we face: the decreasing ratio between staff and funding; the relative inexperience of many staff; the fact there is a high staff turnover; the fact that because it is such a difficult posting people go in and out of the country frequently, so they are not there for as many weeks in the year as they would be in a less conflict affected place. These factors must have a negative impact on DFID’s programming and the degree of oversight.

One thing struck me very forcefully. We were sitting with key staff round the table. The institutional memory you would expect just did not seem to be there. I remember on previous visits being told that saffron could be used to replace poppy, and then being told that mint would be used to replace poppy, and going to a factory where women were being employed processing mint. Then wheat was the answer; indeed, there is quite a successful wheat programme in Helmand, but there is still quite a successful poppy crop in Helmand. It strikes me that we need to address these deficiencies. Perhaps by employing more local staff you would build up that institutional memory. What does the Department do to look at the downside, as well as the very real successes we have had, and to improve effectiveness?

Mr Mitchell: It is an important point that we wrestle with all the time. First, when I was there this time there were, I think, three people who were there when I first visited in 2008, when I was with all the staff. They were on their second, and in one case, third tour of Afghanistan. It should be pointed out that my staff there does 18-month tours on average; the military do six-month tours. The fact that it is much longer helps with the institutional memory. There has also been a big change in the number of locally engaged staff. There are far more now than there were in 2008. That is a good sign as well, because they are obviously not limited in the amount of time they can spend. The fact that we do 18 months, that people return, that we now have a higher percentage of locally engaged staff-and there are more staff as well, because we need more to administer the programme for the reasons you alluded to-show we are making progress in that area as well.

I do not want to disguise at all from Mr Bayley the fact that this is a difficult and important area: maintaining institutional memory and knowledge; being able to look after our staff properly; ensuring that when they are there it is a worthwhile and satisfactory experience and not one that is endured. These are very important matters, and our duty of care very much covers those things.

Q88 Hugh Bayley: We commit large sums of British taxpayers’ money to Afghanistan, and the ability to exercise oversight, particularly in the south of country in Helmand, depends at the moment on our military presence being there. When the troops leave you said our office is likely to leave. What tools and mechanisms will DFID use in more remote parts of the country after 2014 to continue to monitor how our money is used and whether it is still used well enough to maintain the spend?

Mr Mitchell: It will always be an overriding concern, to ensure that the money is well spent. I dwelt at some length earlier on our reaction to the ICAI report and the changes we are making as a result. The security situation, our ability to ensure that money is being well spent, will always be a paramount consideration. We are able to operate through a series of different mechanisms. We have discussed on several occasions this afternoon the precise workings of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund; that is one set of mechanisms. We work through credible partners, through international NGOs, through other local organisations-we have discussed the way in which, for example, we work through Mercy Corps in Lashkar Gah-and we will continue to deploy our expertise in staffing and working a development programme to maximum possible effect. Clearly, the state of the security on the ground is a key factor in what we can and cannot do.

Q89 Hugh Bayley: We had criticism from a BritishAfghan citizen who ran a number of businesses in Afghanistan, when we met the Chamber of Commerce in Kabul, that donor partners "inflate figures"-I am quoting his words-"to make themselves look like they are achieving more than they really are." We were told in evidence last week about ghost students in the enrolment numbers. I know the World Bank has an online mapping system where citizens text in information about whether the school is open and such matters. Certainly, to date, DFID does not match that in terms of its reporting on outcomes achieved for spending in Afghanistan. To what extent can you use these new social media-local citizen reporters, if you like-to give the public in this country confidence that our money does improve lives for men and women in difficult situations in Afghanistan?

Mr Mitchell: We are in the vanguard of countries that are using modern methods to do development. For example, the police in Afghanistan are paid through mobile phone payments, in part. The ARTF gives us the ability to ensure we do not pay ghost teachers; that we pay for the services we are receiving. A huge amount of effort is put by us in validating that payments are correct and using modern methods, the development of which DFID and Vodafone started. Of course, setting up the Independent Commission on Aid Impact is absolutely a way of independently verifying that British aid money is well spent. There were many people who said we should not do it, and that it was not necessary. I think it is absolutely essential that we have this ingredient of independent evaluation, which reports to you, Sir Malcolm, and not to me as Secretary of State, and the public can have some trust in the fact that, because it is reporting to the legislature and not to the executive, to Parliament and not to Ministers, they are getting an impartial, professional, expert and independent view.

Q90 Hugh Bayley: We were told by the head of the WHO mission to Afghanistan, Peter Graff, that the claim we hear from DFID that 85% of the population now live within one hour of basic healthcare "does not mean"-again, I am quoting his words-"that 85% of Afghans have access, or easy access, or avail themselves of health facilities." I support the Government strongly in its endeavour to raise the quality of life and livelihoods and incomes for people in Afghanistan. I think real progress has been made, but do you, Secretary of State, agree with me that it is important to state the facts, and not overstate them, so that these reports from Government and others who wish progress in Afghanistan to happen are not undermined by overselling the achievements?

Mr Mitchell: I completely agree with Mr Bayley on this point, because you then undermine trust in all the different evaluations that take place. The position on healthcare is that some eight years ago, 9% of the country had access to healthcare. I think the 85% figure is too high, but I have certainly seen credible evidence that the figure is now in the 60s, so there has been an enormous shift, enormous progress. It is important not to understate that, because moving from 9% to mid60s is a very substantial achievement.

Q91 Chair: I posed three issues that were points of concern. One was corruption, the second was security, and the third was political instability. The word is that what Afghanistan needs for 2014 and thereafter is a political settlement. That is a bit of a euphemism for "to come to some kind of arrangement that persuades the Taliban to be included rather than excluded, presumably to stop trying to blow all the participants to any subsequent Government to smithereens." What hope is there of achieving that, and what role can DFID specifically play?

Mr Mitchell: The Chairman is entirely right that a political settlement is required, and the clear message of the Government of Afghanistan is that the Taliban should lay down their arms, stop attacking in Afghanistan and talk. Obviously efforts are made to try to promote a political settlement, and President Karzai has spoken frequently and eloquently on this point. It is equally essential for everyone to know the resolve of the international community to support the Government of Afghanistan, to ensure that during the drawdown, we are able to help contribute to security, that after the drawdown has taken place, we will fund the Afghan National Security Forces, that training work continues-Britain has made it clear that we will support what I think is called "Sandhurst in the Sand"-and that the international community will continue to be engaged. It is that clear position of the international community that should encourage the Taliban to lay down their arms and cease fighting.

Q92 Chair: You will know that the Committee is planning to visit Pakistan later in the year, not least, and quite explicitly, because it will be the largest recipient of UK Overseas Development Assistance, so we want to look at it in its own right on those terms. However, we consistently received complaints-quite often bitter complaints-that the ability of the Taliban to maintain its insurgency in the south has a lot to do with complicity by Pakistan. The strongest allegation is that Pakistan is actively supporting the Taliban. The milder accusation is that they are providing a safe haven for them to retreat into that disputed border territory. To what extent is that a legitimate concern? Is that not part and parcel of why we have to regard Afghanistan and Pakistan, in terms of the stability of the region, as part of a joint problem rather than two separate ones?

Mr Mitchell: The stability of the region involves all the countries of it in different ways. I am delighted to hear that the Committee is going to Pakistan later this year. I hope the Committee will have the chance to look at the work we are doing to ensure that 4 million children in Pakistan go to school. I think it is the key intervention that can make a real difference to Pakistan’s society in the medium term. No doubt the Committee will then be able to draw some conclusion on what they think is happening, in answer to the points that Sir Malcolm makes. The only point I would make is that the people of Pakistan have suffered grievously from terrorism, and we are united in a common endeavour to crack down and diminish it.

Q93 Chair: Whoever were the perpetrators of the assassinations of the leaders of the Peace and Reintegration Programme, it brought it to a halt. That presumably is precisely because there are forces active who do not want peace and reintegration. Is that really a failed project that should be abandoned, or does it have any prospective future activity? What we have been told is, "Forget all that: what will really bind people in is the knowledge that there is economic improvement and access to jobs, and that is much more important than grand gestures on peace, when people’s daily lives do not really impinge on that."

Mr Mitchell: That is a good point, but equally, a political settlement is essential for peace to take root and endure.

Q94 Chris White: Last week we heard about the importance of voter registration in elections, but we have also heard from the Finance Minister that outcomes are perhaps more important than the process. What is the UK doing to ensure the elections will be safe, free and fair?

Mr Mitchell: It is a most important aspect of our work. We are now looking specifically at how Britain and the international community can support the elections in 2014. There were numerous allegations made about the last elections, about what the international community did and did not do. I believe it is essential that the elections in 2014 are seen as freer and fairer than before, at the very least. I am conscious that, for President Karzai, this is his legacy. What sort of an Afghanistan is he going to hand over at those elections? He is clear, as he has said, that there need to be several credible candidates who are contestants in those elections. As I said earlier, Sir Malcolm, the emphasis that I got during my visit was that there was more concern about the elections being a driver of greater stability than there was about fear of instability resulting from the drawdown of the troops. This is an extremely important area, where the international community will need to work together in a creative and effective way to help the Afghan authorities deliver elections that are credible and carry both local and international support. This was a point that was touched upon in Tokyo, and we will be working to do just that.

Q95 Chris White: I think I am right in saying that £28 million was put into the election in DRC to make that a free and fair election. I do not think anybody takes that view now. What lessons do you think we have picked up from that exercise?

Mr Mitchell: We are engaged in assisting to "promote freer and fairer elections" in a significant number of countries, and we learn lessons from each of those experiences. It is extraordinarily difficult to deliver elections in the DRC. That is not in any way a plea of mitigation for the failure to do so, and there are a lot of lessons to be learned by the international community from the last set of elections in the DRC. We accumulate knowledge, and we must ensure that, when we look to see how we can support and help the Afghan authorities in the runup to the next election, particularly in view of the singular difficulties there, we are as effective as we can possibly be.

Q96 Chris White: Finally, with regards to Tokyo, a commitment was made to put together a timeline from 2013 to 2015, specifically towards the elections. How will you be working on that particular commitment?

Mr Mitchell: The elections will take place in 2014 and 2015. We anticipate there will be a conference, cochaired by Britain and Afghanistan, in 2014 to review progress. That is certainly one of the aspects that it will be reviewing.

Q97 Richard Burden: There was a concern that was expressed quite a lot, and it was expressed to us in our last evidence session, that the progress being made towards transfer of responsibility to the Afghan army is fine, but once the international forces move out, the chances are the army itself will fragment, it will come under the control of different warlords and so on. Do you think those fears are well founded, and if so, what can be done to reduce the risk?

Mr Mitchell: I do not think those fears are well founded. All the evidence is that the training of the Afghan national security forces, the army and the police, is going well. I say that in the full knowledge of the "green on blue" incident to which we referred at the beginning of this evidence session. I think it is going well. There is evidence now that the Afghan national security forces are taking the lead in quite a number of operations, and are being effective in taking the lead, so I think that that is not a satisfactory analysis of what is transpiring on the ground.

Q98 Richard Burden: One thing that was put to us is that in a sense the ethnic makeup of the Afghan army may be another problem. There are essentially two views. One is that the reason the army may stay together, particularly in areas like Helmand and the South, will be that it is not necessary to be Pashtundominated; there are Tajiks and others who dominate it. The other view is that, precisely for that same reason, it is lining up a problem for itself, if it potentially does not have the support of the Pashtuns in the area. What would your view be on that?

Mr Mitchell: Part of the training that an army has is designed to ensure that its forces are properly meshed together. I am certain it is a factor, but it is something that training can greatly mitigate.

Q99 Richard Burden: We also heard last week a view that in a sense the international community did have the chance early on to get in there and seriously try to reform the formal justice system in Afghanistan, and that, in a way, that was a big mistake: we missed a trick there. Do you think that is true? Do you think there are ways now for us to do that, or is it too late?

Mr Mitchell: The delivery of justice?

Richard Burden: Justice, that’s right.

Mr Mitchell: I think that good progress has been made. We touched on the very significant increase in female defence lawyers, and I mentioned earlier the fact that, in the past, justice from the state was extremely slow and very difficult to secure, whereas by contrast justice administered by, or sought from, the Taliban was much quicker. That has changed very significantly. I gave the example of the old system of shurabased justice growing up and becoming much more accessible. Certainly I asked about this when I was in Afghanistan, and received very encouraging evidence of the fact that shurabased justice had taken root and was reemerging. That is an encouraging factor in an area of work that looked as though it was extremely challenged on my previous visits.

Q100 Jeremy Lefroy: In earlier exchanges we have referred to the minerals sector, or extractive industries, including oil and gas, and the potential that Afghanistan has for that. The Minister of Mines, as I said, thought that Afghanistan could fill its fiscal gap almost entirely through the extractive industries by about 2025. Do you share his confidence?

Mr Mitchell: I mentioned earlier the importance of the work that we are supporting in the minerals sector. I believe that the team of technical experts in the Ministry of Mines that DFID has embedded, and the advice from Michael Wareing, the former CEO of KPMG International, on investment promotion, are ways in which we are supporting precisely that. I am very clear that, one of the key ways Afghanistan can lift itself, or help lift itself, out of poverty is by exploiting the somewhere between one and three trillion dollars in mineral and oil and gas reserves that they have in the open and transparent and accountable way I described a little earlier. That is why I have put such emphasis on the work we are doing with the Ministry of Mines, and why we are giving it such strong support: because it has the capacity to make an extraordinary difference to the whole nature and success of the Afghan economy.

Q101 Jeremy Lefroy: It was encouraging to see that Afghanistan is intending, if it has not already done so, to sign up to the EITI.

Mr Mitchell: Yes.

Q102 Jeremy Lefroy: Given that extractive industries tend to produce, if not jobless growth, certainly growth without vast numbers of jobs being created, and employment is clearly absolutely vital, what is your evaluation of the work DFID is currently doing on agriculture, which clearly has much more impact on the creation of employment and livelihoods?

Mr Mitchell: The work on employment and livelihoods is enormously important. In the mining industry there are very few jobs at the moment. There will clearly be many more, although, as Mr Lefroy makes clear, it is not an area of enormous labour intensity. We talked earlier about vocational training going on in Lashkar Gah, where shortly there will be 15,000 graduates from that. I gave the figures earlier of the very large number who are engaged in successful economic activity as a result. Afghanistan is a land where things grow and grow easily. The ability to promote agriculture-and we do a certain amount of that, not only in helping inform farmers of how to maximise what they produce, but in assisting with access to markets and so forth-is a very important part of what we do.

Q103 Jeremy Lefroy: When we were there, we heard that a lot of Afghan primary products go over the border to Pakistan, where they are processed and come back in processed form for sale. Do you see more that the UK Government, through DFID, could do to help develop that kind of secondary processing industry in Afghanistan? It seemed to us that that was one way in which one could both add value and create jobs and, of course, promote food security locally.

Mr Mitchell: Yes, having the added value in Afghanistan would clearly be advantageous. Economies need to move to a position where they can do that. We have given very strong support, close to Lashkar Gah, to the Bost Development Park. At the moment it is a shell with little in it, but there is an airport there now, and we are intent on making progress on that.

Q104 Jeremy Lefroy: There was some slight disappointment expressed that CDC-or British investors, I should say-were not going to attend a conference held, I think, in the last part of June in India about investment in Afghanistan. We raised that as a Committee with CDC and encouraged them to send a representative along. Unfortunately they were not able to. Do you detect a lack of enthusiasm on the part of British investors for investing in Afghanistan, which perhaps could be contrasted with the enthusiasm of Indian and Chinese investors? What is your reaction to that? Would you be as disappointed as we felt?

Mr Mitchell: Certainly there is evidence of considerable Chinese investment, and indeed Indian investment. One of the two iron ore concessions to which I referred was awarded to an Indian company. I would refer the Committee to the Department for Business to enquire whether perhaps there is more that we could do to promote business more generally. Certainly in my Department we do everything we can in to promote business as best we can.

CDC is in considerable transition at the moment. We are changing it from a fund of funds-the Committee will be familiar with the highlevel strategic plan for CDC. These are big and significant changes, which over the years will result in them being much more heavily engaged in direct investment, coinvestment, other forms of investment instrument, in developing countries. We are already seeing that start. I went with the new CEO of CDC to Malawi. I expect that to intensify, but it will take time. This is a very big change for CDC, and there are very significant staffing requirements that need to be met. I am confident that in due time they will be doing exactly what Mr Lefroy described.

Q105 Jeremy Lefroy: You do see a role for CDC in Afghanistan in the future?

Mr Mitchell: I profoundly hope that in 10 years’ time the situation in Afghanistan will be such that CDC is an important investment force on the landscape.

Q106 Chair: That is quite a long time away. You do not see it in the nearer future?

Mr Mitchell: That is right, Sir Malcolm, but equally CDC will take time to restaff itself. It needs to accumulate expertise. Inevitably, once you have got to the first base on that it is easier to get to the second and so on. It will take time, but I believe that in future, if the position in Afghanistan continues to develop as we all hope, it will be a very good opportunity for CDC, not least because of the huge potential for investment in Afghanistan’s mineral sector.

Q107 Fiona O'Donnell: Secretary of State, you have spoken about the UK’s record in promoting the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan. The National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan has not been implemented, and the Elimination of Violence against Women law remains largely unenforced. How will the UK’s aid contribute to making sure that these are fully implemented?

Mr Mitchell: The British Government does provide funding to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, which works to address issues such as domestic violence through education, as well as representation, case work, and national advocacy. We also support training for the Afghan national police, which covers domestic violence, issues of gender and the prevention of violence against women. I launched, as I mentioned earlier, the Tawanmandi programme in Kabul last year, which is specifically designed to fund Afghan civil society, and already funds a number of women’s groups. When I was there last week, I was able to meet some of the recipients of Tawanmandi funding, and hear about the progress that was being made to support women and women’s rights in Afghanistan, which was certainly encouraging.

British aid has increased the incomes of more than 2,000 women entrepreneurs by something over 100% by linking them to local markets for their goods. So there is clear progress being made. It is a challenging environment and there is much more to be done, but I would not want you to think that this was not a very high priority for the Government: it certainly is, and we intend to do as much as we can to help and assist.

Q108 Fiona O'Donnell: Eighty-seven per cent. of women in Afghanistan report they experience at least one form of domestic violence, so it is right that that is a priority. How much of our aid will go to improving protecting women against violence?

Mr Mitchell: I set out some of the ways in which we do it. I believe that the Tawanmandi project offers huge scope for taking forward this important agenda. If we discover that more funding could be used effectively to deliver on those objectives through the Tawanmandi project or similar projects, I would look very seriously at doing exactly that.

Q109 Fiona O'Donnell: Are you able to quantify how much of our aid is going into services to protect women?

Mr Mitchell: I cannot give you an exact figure, but that is because much of what we do contributes directly or indirectly to that important aim. Therefore disaggregating particular spending lines would not be easy to do.

Q110 Fiona O'Donnell: Do you not think we would be better funding directly projects that deal with domestic violence?

Mr Mitchell: We do; that is exactly what the Tawanmandi setup and programme enables us to do. It is one of the reasons why I set it up.

Q111 Fiona O'Donnell: How will you ensure that we have transparency from the Afghan Government to show how EVAW and NAPWA are being implemented and financed?

Mr Mitchell: What was the first programme?

Q112 Fiona O'Donnell: The Elimination of Violence against Women, and the National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan. How will you ensure that these are being properly implemented and financed?

Mr Mitchell: Again, part of the reason for the Tawanmandi programme is to enable civil society to monitor the work of these programmes effectively, and report on them. I think the more of that we do, the better.

Q113 Fiona O'Donnell: Finally, Secretary of State-I appreciate the time you have taken to answer these questions-the European Union has publicly said they will find it hard to maintain funding in Afghanistan if women’s rights are not respected. How will DFID respond if the situation of women continues to deteriorate? We were talking earlier about social media and mobile networks, and I was wondering if you saw any potential there to monitor. It is very difficult for women to come forward in any country, never mind a state with the record Afghanistan has on women’s rights.

Mr Mitchell: I do not agree that the position of women is getting worse in Afghanistan. In extraordinarily difficult circumstances, where there is a long history of lack of rights for women, progress is being made. At all levels you can see this progress being made. Is it enough? No; but we must respect the facts on this, that progress is being made, and commit ourselves to making more progress as well.

Q114 Fiona O'Donnell: We have heard reported that there were 17 cases of honour killings just in March and April, which compares with 20 cases last year. Reuter’s news agency has been saying there has been a sharp rise in violent attacks in Afghanistan. What evidence do you have to support that?

Mr Mitchell: I think any analysis of the position of women in Afghanistan, starting from the fact that no girls went to school in Afghanistan nine years ago, and the very large number who are going today, looking at the work that Tawanmandi is supporting to ensure that female defence lawyers are available to protest and prosecute the rights of women against issues like domestic violence, shows very clear evidence of programmes supported by Britain that are making a real difference to women on the ground.

Q115 Jeremy Lefroy: As a supplementary, we heard from two women Members of Parliament who were quite clear that they believed the situation had deteriorated in the last two or three years. Clearly, there has been a huge improvement since 2001, but would you recognise that? They particularly pointed out that women do not seem to be involved in the peace process at all. There may be some who are there, but they are nominal figures; they do not have any real influence in it.

Mr Mitchell: President Karzai makes it clear that he wants to see more women involved, and I think he is sincere in that. There are all the problems Fiona O’Donnell set out, which afflict women and make life for women in Afghanistan extraordinarily difficult. That is one of the reasons we put such emphasis on supporting programmes that help women, whether it is economically, combating domestic violence, or in many other ways. We will continue to do that. Equally, I think it is important to recognise that, over the last 10 years, there has been a tremendous shift in both appreciations of these issues within Afghan society, and the determination at the top and of the international community to try and tackle them.

Q116 Chair: Two further anecdotes: one very educated young Afghan woman said she would expect to marry whoever her family selected, without any choice, and when asked about the possibility of domestic violence said, "I can take a certain amount of violence; I am used to it." That is concerning. Also, asking some of the women we met, "Are there any men in Afghanistan who speak up for the rights of women?" they could think of no one.

Mr Mitchell: A very depressing picture, Sir Malcolm. It underlines the very essence of British development policies, which is that we put girls and women right at the centre of everything we do. I think it gives added impetus to the key international development event this year for Britain, which is the family planning summit tomorrow, being cohosted by the British Government and the Gates Foundation. If this is successful, it will reduce by half the number of women in the poor world who want access to contraception but are unable to receive it. Our commitment tomorrow is to try to enable women in the poorest parts of the world to make decisions for themselves over whether and when they have children, and the spacing of it. The rather depressing picture you paint, Sir Malcolm, I think should invigorate all of us to pursue this British development aim and aspiration with the maximal amount of vigour and passion.

Chair: I think our report on maternal health in the last Parliament showed how vital it was to the survival of women and indeed their children that they have that choice. I think we take that as a given around this table.

Q117 Mr Gyimah: Secretary of State, changing the tack to education, you touched on the steady progress that has been made since 2005 in some educational indicators. The question is, what can be done to ensure that a Ministry of Education in Afghanistan can carry out and continue to deliver the educational projects that have been hitherto delivered by NGOs?

Mr Mitchell: I described a meeting with the Minister of Education, Mr Wardak, earlier in this evidence session. Britain has made a huge investment in improving education provision in Afghanistan over the last decade: well over £100 million of UK aid funding through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund since 2002 has taken place. We are very committed to doing that. We will be supporting education in Afghanistan through the GPE, which is a big contributor. Indeed, Afghanistan will be eligible for support through the Girls Education Challenge Fund, which we set up last year, which is designed overall to get up to a million girls into school in some of the most difficult parts of the world. It is not, of course, a funding mechanism that goes through the state, but it is a very important contribution to getting children into school potentially in Afghanistan, working alongside the state, which can help deliver on Minister Wardak’s aspiration, which is to get all 4.2 million children who are not in school into school by the end of 2014. We will give him very strong support, as we have done in the past, to achieve that.

Q118 Mr Gyimah: How much of that effort will be going through the Ministry of Education?

Mr Mitchell: A very large amount of it we fund through the ARTF. The ARTF funds through the Ministry systems. That is the way in which the ARTF is designed.

Q119 Mr Gyimah: A lot of the focus, obviously, is on improving the number of people who go into education. What about the quality of education that is delivered? What can be done to improve that?

Mr Mitchell: That is extremely important. We are ratcheting up the quality of education in all our programmes. A report published by the Independent Commission on Aid Impact last month about education in East Africa drew our attention to the fact that, although we have been successful in terms of the quantity of children educated, we needed to keep a sharp eye on quality. A number of resultsbased aid pilots are taking place, not least in Ethiopia, to try to ensure we keep a very sharp eye on driving up the quality of education, and indeed incentivising governments to deliver more girls in school, more children in school in difficult places, more children in secondary school, and more children sitting and then passing exams. It is a key part of our programme to drive up the quality of education, and we will be doing everything we can to assist the Afghan authorities in doing that as well.

Q120 Fiona O'Donnell: I am sure, Chair, we all want to praise the children in our own constituencies who are joining the "Send My Friend to School" campaign. I just wondered if you could comment, Secretary of State, on the reports that there have been attacks on some schools, especially in the east and southeast of Afghanistan, and that there is some evidence that there has now been a decline in the number of girls attending school.

Mr Mitchell: The number of girls attending school is increasing. There have indeed been attacks on schools, allegedly by the Taliban. That is absolutely disgraceful, but nevertheless the trend is very clear, that more children are going to school, more schools are opening, and that we strongly support.

Q121 Fiona O'Donnell: On the issue of girls then moving into secondary education, we know that the vast majority, twothirds, drop out before they complete secondary school. Do you have any plans to try to sustain girls in education through secondary?

Mr Mitchell: We know-not just in Afghanistan, but across the work that is being done on development and education-that there are some things that incentivise girls to stay in school and stay in secondary school: having proper washing facilities and loos and so forth is very important indeed. There are other incentives as well. Secondary school can often be more difficult because of the distance that children have to travel. It is why boarding secondary schools are a feature that you see quite often in Africa. We understand what is required to keep girls in school, and all those things are developing, and we give them priority.

Q122 Jeremy Lefroy: Just a very short followup: clearly we welcome what has happened with education over the past 10 or 12 years, but millions and millions of people have in effect been left behind because they did not receive that education, hence the very high levels of illiteracy amongst adults-particularly women, but also men, and particularly in rural areas. Do you see any role for DFID, or any work DFID can do or maybe is already doing, to try to tackle that backlog of education that has not taken place?

Mr Mitchell: That is exactly right, and that is why we made it clear, when we reviewed the programme in Afghanistan, that vocational education was incredibly important, to try to capture some of those who had missed out on primary and secondary education. The Mercy Corps example, which I have given and which the Committee has heard about, in Lashkar Gah: the very high number of people who are now going through that programme, graduating from it and getting into work, is an encouraging example of what can be done to give priority to vocational education, for the reasons that Mr Lefroy set out.

Q123 Chair: Secretary of State, the whole history of Afghanistan-conflict moving around the state, moving across the borders-has led to a huge amount of displacement of people. That is still going on, and on top of that, it is subjected to every conceivable natural disaster, from drought to floods, to snow, to earthquakes. Yet humanitarian support is not high on the DFID programme. Is there a reason for that? If so, do you feel that humanitarian priorities are adequately assessed? If that is the case, where is the leadership coming from?

Mr Mitchell: We have systems that allow for emergency humanitarian situations to be addressed quite quickly, and we have developed special funding arrangements for working with the ICRC, the International Red Cross, who remain our core humanitarian partner in Afghanistan. Again, when we reviewed the operational plan for our work between 2011 and 2015 we specifically acknowledged the requirement to do more on humanitarian support in Afghanistan. I think I am right in saying that two specialist staff have been recruited in the last year, who monitor what we do on this quite closely, and in the last year UK humanitarian support has assisted more than 1.5 million Afghanis. We recognise the need to do more of this; we have recruited two further people to support that stream of our work, and we are very heavily engaged with the International Red Cross.

Q124 Chair: Has that involved a reprioritisation? You have a commitment of £178 million over the next five years. If you are putting more into humanitarian, has it come out of somewhere else?

Mr Mitchell: It is part of the plan. When we carried out the Bilateral Aid Review and we looked at Afghanistan, we acknowledged the force of the argument that you, Sir Malcolm, have just put, and we embedded that into our plan for the results that we would secure between 2011 and 2015.

Q125 Chair: Thank you very much. As you know, Secretary of State, we produced a report in the last Parliament five years ago, and obviously it was really important for us to have an opportunity to update that and, in the process, to visit Afghanistan. I echo what everybody else has said. We appreciate that all the UK civilian staff work in pretty difficult environments, and living on an armed guard compound is restrictive and can be a little tedious at times. We realise that. We did have an emergency drill, which we found out was a drill afterwards. I think it probably was not an accident that we were there, but nevertheless it gave us some flavour of the genuine security situation, and the frustration of not being able to operate development projects in the way we would like. Unlike our normal visits, where we were able to go out into the countryside or into the suburbs of a town, and talk to people at will, that is not really possible. It is very restrictive. I think that is very frustrating.

First, we would like to record our appreciation of the people who do it, and volunteer to do it, and the commitment they have. We hope that the time will come when, one way or another, there will be more freedom and flexibility to follow the money to the people without having to have such tight security, even if that is through local partners, which may be a better way of doing it. We intend to produce a report as quickly as we can; given the recess, it will be a few weeks, but I hope that your Department will find it useful. We all hope that Afghanistan can get through 2014 to 2017 and beyond without a return to the nightmares of the past, even if whatever happens is likely to be patchy and unpredictable, but is moving in the right direction. I think that is what we would all hope to see achieved, and to the extent that your Department can make a contribution to that, we wish you well. We think it is really important that we succeed, and that the people of Afghanistan know that 2014 is just a change, not an end. That is really important. Thank you very much for coming to give us evidence.

Mr Mitchell: Thank you very much, Sir Malcolm. We look forward to seeing the Committee’s report, as we always do with the Committee’s reports. Thank you also very much for your remarks about my officials, who do a brilliant job in extremely difficult circumstances. We are indebted to them for their support, loyalty and devotion to the work of Britain in Afghanistan, and I will make sure that your very kind comments are passed on to them.

Chair: Thank you very much indeed.