International DevelopmentWritten evidence submitted by Christian Aid

1. Introduction

1.1 Christian Aid is a Christian organisation that insists the world can and must be swiftly changed to one where everyone can live a full life, free from poverty. We work globally in over 45 countries for profound change that eradicates the causes of poverty, striving to achieve equality, dignity and freedom for all, regardless of faith or nationality. We are part of a wider movement for social justice. We provide urgent, practical and effective assistance where need is great, tackling the effects of poverty as well as its root causes.

1.2 Christian Aid has been working in Afghanistan for almost three decades and our assistance has reached around 50,000 households with about £20 million as of 2009. Christian Aid’s work in Afghanistan focuses on strengthening sustainable rural livelihoods (by enhancing agricultural productivity and market access); tackling environmental sustainability challenges (through disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation) and strengthening local civil society (through the promotion of gender equality and rights education).

2. The economic consequences of the military draw down and how this can be mitigated

2.1 The international intervention in Afghanistan has made some great achievements in the last 10 years. For example, almost 3 million girls are now in school (compared to 5,000 in 2001); and about 85% of the population lives in districts which now have a basic package of health services—virtually absent in 2001.1 However, these gains could be at stake in the context of the upcoming transition from international to Afghan control. DFID and other aid donors must play a key role to ensure that the improvements achieved in Afghans’ lives are secured going forward.

2.2 The military drawdown is only one aspect of the wider process of transition; it will be key that international actors play a role to ensure a smooth economic transition, so that Afghanistan has greater control of productive natural resources which will in the longer-term make the country less aid dependent.

2.3 In late 2011 the World Bank released a major study of the Afghan economy which was endorsed by international donors at the December 2011 Bonn Conference on Afghanistan.2 The study warned that the Afghan state is unable to take on the operating costs of much of the infrastructure and facilities built or improved by international aid since 2001.3 For example, the study discussed a “second civil service” of high level civil servants whose salaries are directly paid by donors. These salaries are much higher than government-paid civil servants, so there is a significant risk of brain drain in crucial government functions if aid decreases.4 Aid levels must therefore be maintained throughout the military and socio-economic transition.5

2.4 Christian Aid applauds DFID’s commitment to maintain aid levels stable until 2014 at £178 million per year. DFID should also ensure a similar commitment in sources of funding to Afghanistan that fall outside its core budget, eg through multilateral institutions.

2.5 In the lead-up to the July 2012 Tokyo conference on aid to Afghanistan (at which aid commitments for the coming decade will be made), DFID should demonstrate to Parliament and the public that it is conducting a thorough dialogue with the Afghan government to agree predictable aid levels as far ahead as possible—ideally fixing a plan for the whole decade. DFID should strongly push other donors to do the same.

2.6 In terms of Afghanistan’s economic growth estimates, Christian Aid is concerned that economic estimates by both the Afghan government and the international community are based on overly optimistic scenarios which “would require a significant positive change in security and the Afghan business climate”,6 as the Afghan government acknowledged in its economic plan presented at the 2011 Bonn conference. Much of the Afghan state’s admirable economic growth, for example, is associated with the international intervention7—so growth may decline more than expected as the intervention reduces in size. Also, planned natural resource revenues are extremely vulnerable to political and social instability. Given this fragility, planned levels of aid may be insufficient to achieve economic and social stability over the coming years. While appreciating the need for Afghanistan to become less aid dependent, donors must also be aware that they may need to increase or maintain support to Afghanistan, if current economic and security estimates are not borne out.

2.7 DFID should ensure that donor-Afghan government fora in Kabul, such as the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), adequately discusses contingency planning; and that donors and the Afghan government form a consensus on priority areas for increased aid in the event that revenues do not reach expected levels.

3. Co-ordination with other donors and multilateral organisations: rebalancing the focus on poverty reduction

3.1 Coordination between donors and with the Afghan government has greatly improved, with the Afghan government leading a national strategy and donors working to bring a greater proportion of their aid into alignment with government priorities. Increasing on-budget aid (funds directly to the government budget) requires a gradual approach, as most Afghan ministries lack capacity to spend the funds they currently receive. DFID’s work with Afghan ministries successfully emphasises a strong capacity building approach (for example, in the Ministry of Finance) and DFID should ensure that this is always central to all work with the Afghan government.

3.2 At the same time, there are still major imbalances—both between security and development aid, and across the country in aid levels delivered to different areas.8 Firstly, the security aid bill dwarfs the development aid bill (World Bank estimated aid at US$15.4 billion in 2010–11 and international military spending exceeding US$100 billion).9 Secondly, there is strong evidence to suggest that the current security-focused approach is not working. For example, US estimates have acknowledged that the insurgency has not been significantly weakened by security sector support. In spite of this, between 2002 and 2009 security related funding accounted for over 90% of all spending on Afghanistan, with less than 10% going to development aid.10 Thirdly, donors tend to focus on a single province or area, often where their national military forces are deployed, meaning some provinces receive far higher aid levels than others not always on the basis of considerations of most urgent needs. These tend to be conflict- ridden provinces, where international militaries are concentrated and/or the focus of concern for international donors.11 This means that more peaceful areas, among them some of the poorest, are receiving far less assistance.

3.3 DFID has re-balanced its aid and now delivers only 20% of the total in Helmand province. However, Helmand is still a disproportionate recipient of aid despite the fact that it is one of the richest provinces.12 Gradually and predictably, DFID should further rebalance its division of aid to include poorer areas.

3.4 At the Bonn conference in December 2011, DFID and other donors committed to fund the next decade of development. However they have not yet articulated how they will allocate the promised aid. There is a risk that the problems outlined above will not be addressed and that the current imbalances between provinces and between security and development aid will remain.

3.5 DFID should coordinate with other donors to ensure that reductions in aid are carried out at similar speeds and levels across Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, as much as possible. Ethnic and regional tensions in Afghanistan are once more on the increase, with ethnic bloc political parties re- emerging and Afghans fearing ethnic warfare once international troops depart. If donors are seen to balance aid reductions equally across provinces, this would help preventing ethnic leaders and warlords from using aid disparities to fuel ethnic rivalry.

3.6 In addition to re-balancing aid across provinces, aid needs to be re-balanced so that it focuses on reducing poverty and inequality. In 2011 The World Bank published evidence that most aid since 2001 has been focused on security and governance rather than poverty reduction—and so little aid currently reaches the poor that a reduction in aid will have a minimal effect on Afghanistan’s poorest.13

3.7 DFID should also coordinate with other donors to synthesise a detailed picture of comparative poverty levels across Afghanistan, and then use this to allocate aid more equitably, including currently under-served poorer areas. The next National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) of Afghanistan will be published in 2012, and this could be a good basis for such an exercise. DFID should also use NRVA and other data to produce an assessment of changes in income levels and development indicators in Helmand province since the last NRVA (2007–08), in order to assess its impact. These assessments should inform the development of a new framework for DFID’s work in Afghanistan that focuses on equitable, sustainable livelihoods and re-focuses on poverty.

3.8 Priority areas which should receive more attention include: community disaster preparedness and resources for drought resilience (water shortage could be a major driver of conflict, as a DFID-funded study acknowledged in 2008);14 rural livelihoods including subsistence farming; and local level peace building (see section 5).

3.9 These points on re-balancing aid should be championed by DFID in the lead-up to the Tokyo conference on aid to Afghanistan, which will be held in July 2012. Christian Aid appreciates that there is not sufficient time before the conference to carry out poverty assessment and re-balance aid, but this should become a stated aim of donors at the conference.

4. Where DFID can best add value

4.1 As stated above (3.5) DFID can become a leader among donors in Afghanistan by championing a renewed approach to aid that prioritises equitable poverty reduction rather than a focus only on security, or politically important or conflicted areas.

4.2 DFID has a strong culture of monitoring and evaluation and should become a leader in supporting the Afghan government to institutionalise stronger M&E, oversight and learning. The Afghan government is developing an Aid Management Policy, and several members of a consultative working group on the policy have encouraged the Afghan government to incorporate robust M&E systems into this document.15 DFID should assist them to do this—with systems focusing on quality and impact as well as financial oversight. Recent research has suggested that much development work has focused too much on quantity, rather than quality of services.16 The new Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) set up by donors and the Afghan government, although it deals with corruption rather than quality and impact, could be a good model.

4.3 Both of the above measures are important in increasing government legitimacy. By supporting the legitimacy of the Afghan government, DFID will add further value to its development work by increasing the likelihood of a smooth transition to Afghan ownership and greater self-reliance.

5. Governance and security: Whether DFID can “tackle the root causes of instability and the effects of insecurity” and the scope for building bridges with opposition and insurgent groups to do this

5.1 Without a just and accountable peace settlement including all Afghans and all parties to the conflict, and whose signatories are accountable to the Afghan people, development work will not be able to tackle the root causes of instability. DFID must ensure that its policy, programming and public statements support the FCO and the Afghan government to pursue an inclusive, accountable peace settlement—a “peace settlement for all Afghans”.

5.2 But development is a vital factor achieving peace and security, particularly its role in promoting local peace building and including opposition groups and former insurgents in local development.

5.3 There is currently no national peace building programme to ensure that any high level peace settlement is accepted and implemented at local level and benefits ordinary Afghans. Some NGOs—including Christian Aid’s local partners—are pursuing local peace building programming.17 But this is not integrated into any national framework.18

5.4 DFID should support moves by Afghan civil society and the Afghan government to work together to transform current efforts into a national programme of discussion, focusing on how to create local peace and integrate insurgents at all levels. This may include transitional justice or other reconciliation mechanisms. A National Action Plan on Peace and Reconciliation was adopted by President Karzai in 2005, but never implemented; DFID should consider supporting civil society and the Afghan government to update and implement a new action plan.

5.5 Reintegration of insurgents is being done on a local level through the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP). Problems with the implementation of the APRP have been well documented, including human rights concerns and failure to provide insurgents with jobs and assistance, meaning some return to the insurgency. However, the programme has more fundamental gaps in that it seeks only to reintegrate individual fighters and makes no attempt at local level reconciliation in a wider sense. Reintegration is being pursued through this programme independently of any progress in high level peace talks.

5.6 The lack of any wider framework for accepting former insurgent fighters, and the lack of any other local level demonstration of government or other groups’ commitment to peace, means communities have no faith in the value of reintegration and little hope for peace.

5.7 DFID should therefore consider that its aim to “tackle the root causes of instability” in Afghanistan, is linked to the need for a wider peace building process that all Afghans—including reconciling insurgents who need to be accepted and to take on new roles in communities—feel confident and including in. DFID should encourage, and fund, initiatives towards a national programme that integrates reintegration into a wider peace and reconciliation strategy, possibly working through the structures of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) which reaches down to community level.

5.8 DFID should ensure that, consistent with its current programme principles, women are included in every stage of peace building. Afghan women’s groups at the Bonn conference in December 2011 asked the international community to make women’s security a measurable indicator of transition monitoring and evaluation.19 DFID should ensure that all its programming, especially any work in peace building and building bridges with insurgents, includes this as a mandatory key indicator.

6. Wealth creation: DFID’s role in creating sustainable jobs, increasing investment and tax revenues and contributing to poverty reduction and economic stability

6.1 In section 2 above, we outlined some possible broad economic impacts of the transition away from international control and military presence in Afghanistan; and in section 3 we proposed a re-balancing of aid levels across Afghanistan with a new focus on poverty reduction as a guiding principle. We now want to make more specific points regarding the most widespread and basic livelihood needs of the Afghan population.

6.2 Over 80% of Afghanistan’s population is already dependent primarily on agriculture for their livelihoods. However these people often supplement incomes with remittances from family members engaged in work abroad in Iran or Pakistan (particularly common in Herat province on the Iranian border where Christian Aid works, where many families have members working in Iran,20 or in urban areas. Urban in-migration has been a key feature of the economic landscape in Afghanistan in the last decade, with the population of the capital Kabul alone having tripled since 2001.21

6.3 These supplementary forms of income will be hit hard by decreasing economic growth and international aid (as much of the urban economy comes from jobs and services associated with international assistance) and declining security (as borders close and neighbouring countries become less accommodating as a result of refugee inflows). Therefore, if current economic predictions are not fulfilled, many Afghans will come to rely even more on agriculture.

6.4 Donors such as DFID should redouble their efforts and their focus on locally sustainable agriculture, local trade, and supporting small producers and businesses. They should also acknowledge the importance of subsistence agriculture in the livelihoods of many Afghans, and ensure that this is given as much attention as market development in aid programmes.

6.5 In the event of security and economic growth not standing up to expected levels, Afghanistan may revert to an overwhelmingly agricultural economy.22 This makes it all the more important that donors focus on supporting agricultural livelihoods in the coming years.

7. Humanitarian assistance: the role of donors and of the UN as co-ordinator and lead on humanitarian assistance

7.1 Ten years after the international intervention, many of the Afghan population are still extremely vulnerable to chronic hunger and poverty and unable to meet their basic needs. Afghanistan has seen major food crises and droughts in eight of the past 10 years—these are not unexpected, but are predictable and are due to unaddressed development deficits.

7.2 DFID should ensure that, firstly, it meets UN calls for emergency funding. The 2011 drought appeal suffered from slow donor responses to UN calls for funds, despite being a very small amount relative to demands on funding in other areas. Secondly, DFID should use the suggested re-focus on rural livelihoods, to increase its commitment to disaster risk reduction on the community level. It should also work with provincial governments to develop stronger disaster planning mechanisms and institutions.

7.3 Christian Aid is preparing a paper highlighting the role of local organisations in emergency humanitarian responses, and recommending that INGOs and international donors develop ways to prioritise existing local organisations in deploying emergency assistance. We encourage DFID to look at ways to increase the proportion of emergency humanitarian assistance that is delivered through local organisations in the affected areas, in dialogue with civil society organisations.

8. How effective DFID has been and what lessons should be learned in relation to its work in fragile and conflict affected states

8.1 A broad lesson that can be learned from DFID’s engagement in Afghanistan is that development efforts in post-conflict countries should be broader than any military stabilisation operations going on at the same time. DFID has expanded its engagement in Afghanistan beyond Helmand where British troops are concentrated, and carried out some good work at central government level; but DFID, in concert with other donors, should take a more holistic approach at the needs of the Afghan population in terms of poverty rather than only state stability. A more equitable approach along these lines will help to minimise the conflicts that international stabilisation interventions can cause.

8.2 Finally, an important lesson is that sustainability needs to be planned from the start in post-conflict development interventions. Assistance should remain at levels which are realistic for national beneficiary governments to continue, even if this means a longer and smaller scale international stabilisation effort.

May 2012