International DevelopmentWritten evidence submitted by Save the Children

A. Summary

1. Save the Children is the world’s independent children’s rights organisation. Save the Children works in more than 120 countries. We save children’s lives. We fight for their rights. We help them fulfil their potential.

2. Save the Children has worked in Afghanistan since 1976. We work closely with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), local partners and communities on all levels to deliver life-changing programmes to 700,000 children. These programmes cover child protection, health, nutrition, education, child rights and emergency response.

3. Save the Children co-leads the UN Inter Agency Standing Committee Education Cluster and we have a strong and successful record of delivering education programmes in Afghanistan, with a strong impact on girls’ access to and completion of primary education in remote and insecure districts, and delivering Accelerated Learning Programmes. For this reason this submission specifically focuses on two of the areas outlined in the Committee’s inquiry: the progress that has been made in education and how to ensure Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 2 is met in Afghanistan by the government’s deadline of 2020; and how DFID will ensure progress towards MDGs is resourced, accelerated and sustained.

4. Over the past decade significant progress has been made in a number of areas of human development, including education and health. There has been a 26% reduction in child mortality. Additionally, while the maternal mortality ratio in Afghanistan remains high, the tally has dropped from 1,600 deaths per 100,000 live births in 20001 to 1,400 live births per 100,000 today.2 Today 85% of the population has access to primary health care, compared to 9% in 20013 and the number of Community Health Workers has increased to 20,000 (by the end of 2008), compared to 2,500 in 2004.4 In 10 years primary school access rates have dramatically increased from 1 million to 7 million. A decade ago not a single formal girls’ school was functioning; now over 2.5 million girls are in school.5 The promotion and protection of child rights has also improved; Afghanistan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1994 and submitted its first report in 2008. These impressive achievements serve to demonstrate that real progress is possible in even the most challenging of contexts such as Afghanistan.

5. For the two areas of education and maternal and child health, we have outlined clear recommendations for DFID and the international community more broadly to ensure gains made over the last decade are not lost as military forces withdraw and the global political attention on Afghanistan diminishes. These recommendations are as follows:

Access to Education and Enrolment:

DFID should ensure that new investments on education, including through the Girls’ Education Challenge Fund, complement multilateral funding (via the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund) by directly targeting community-driven projects which evidence shows work and focus more on quality outcomes (see learning outcomes below).

By supporting the Ministry of Education (MoE) to invest in and strengthen systems that disaggregate data beyond gender, DFID would help to insure the inclusion of other excluded minority groups such as children with disabilities in the education system.

School Retention:

DFID should increase its support for programmes that build democratic and good governance structures at community levels, to emphasize community participation and empowerment.

Learning Outcomes:

DFID should ensure its indicators of success in Afghanistan6 also include support to improve learning outcomes and ensure the system responds to children’s learning needs.

Moreover, by linking job creation for youth to its existing plans on wealth creation, DFID would help ensure a stronger more educated youth have greater employment opportunities after school.

Girls’ Education:

DFID has an important role to play in ensuring the priority focus on girls’ education in Afghanistan tackles the most significant barriers that affect girls, concentrating on initiative both inside and outside of school.

Humanitarian Agenda and Education:

DFID should match its development funding for education with humanitarian funding. This could be achieved by funding education in emergencies interventions through the Education Cluster and Afghanistan’s UN Humanitarian Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP).

Maintaining Progress on Education:

We recommend that DFID’s Strategic Plan 2015–20 maintains education funding at current levels and well into transition in order for these gains to have meaningful impact on completion and learning outcomes for boys and girls. Moreover, as with other sectors, it should be ready to fill gaps created by other donors’ withdrawal that will have an impact on education progress.

Maintaining Progress on Maternal and Child Health:

DFID has the opportunity to play a key role in strengthening the health system and building the capacity of the GIRoA to take on greater responsibility for delivering basic services.

DFID should review its decision not to support the health sector in Afghanistan. It should commit bilateral resources to help fill existing funding gaps and support the implementation of national health policies and strategies over the longer term. DFID should also encourage other donors to maintain their support.

Two areas where DFID’s support could have a considerable impact on maternal and child health are strengthening health workforces and tackling malnutrition.

B. Progress made on Education

6. DFID support to the education sector in Afghanistan is made indirectly through an annual contribution to the World Bank managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). 26% of DFID’s annual ARTF contribution of £85 million goes to education.7 In addition, DFID’s financial contribution to the Global Partnership on Education8 will help support Afghanistan’s grant of $55.7 million to improve access for girls in 40 isolated and impoverished districts, as well as programmes to increase the number of female teachers.9 To date, DFID has played a key role in supporting education progress, including by paying the salaries of 160,000 teachers, building national planning systems and reaching communities in insecure regions via NGOs.10

7. Evaluating Afghanistan’s progress on education requires examining the MDG targets and commitments made to implement the Education for All goals.11 Afghanistan’s Education Interim Plan (EIP) from 2011–13 aims to target 8.7 million boys and girls; increase student enrolment by 1.8 million; and build 2,600 new schools.12 Based on current projections, the Ministry of Education (MoE) will have to reach 8.8 million children who will require access to primary education by 2020.

Access and Enrolment

8. The GIRoA-UNICEF “Back to School” campaign launched in 2002 has seen impressive results in increasing access to schools. In 10 years primary school access rates have dramatically increased from 1 million to 7 million. A decade ago not a single formal girls’ school was functioning; now over 2.5 million girls are in school.13 Over 9,000 new schools have been established to facilitate easy access to education. Currently over 12,500 public and Islamic schools are operational in all parts of the country. To cater for enrolment of new students, over 200,000 new teaching and support staff have been recruited and deployed to schools over the past nine years.14

9. Despite 10 years of investment, with education a focus for several key donors, the UN still talks of a “silent crisis for 5 million children (42% of all children) not in school due to poverty and vulnerability and an acute shortage of funding due to a very low response to education projects…”15 In 2009, enrolment rates for grades 1–14 stood at 63% (4.3 million) for boys and 37% (2.5 million girls) for girls. An education sector analysis carried out in 2010 suggests that this is a gross underestimation of the number of children who are actually out-of-school.16

10. In Afghanistan, both the GIRoA and donors have focused their attention on increasing girls’ access—as the most excluded group. Enrolment rates have increased significantly for girls. In some major urban centres there are now more girls than boys in school; in Badakshan and Herat provinces, the ratio of girls to boys in school are almost 9:10.17 However, analysis shows that girl’s enrolment is generally still lagging behind in most areas, for example in Zabul and Uruzgan the ratio of girls to boys in school is still only 1:10.18

The graph below shows the provincial variation in enrolment by gender:19

11. The focus by donors and the GIRoA on girls’ education is commendable but it is important to note that the most vulnerable and marginalised children continue to be left out of school, in remote, conflict-affected and poor urban areas. The Ministry of Education has pledged to reach the “most unprivileged” through the introduction of multiple pathways to education and community-negotiated programs and introduce similar efforts to reach other marginalized populations such as children with disabilities and Kuchis (Pashtun nomadic pastoralists).20

12. Despite these efforts, discrimination remains endemic. Discrimination against minorities in mainstream education prevents many children’s access to school. For example, religious tolerance and the education of religious minorities is a key concern for access. Although a number of minorities are catered for in policy, gaps in the implementation of such policies continue to keep children belonging to religious minorities isolated from mainstream education.21

13. One way to tackle the problem of discrimination against minorities if for DFID to encourage the MoE to invest in systems that disaggregate data beyond gender, to include other excluded groups, such as children with disabilities. This will provide it with a clearer pattern of children who are consistently left out by the system.

Retention

14. Drop-out rates are a clear indicator of students’ and parents’ own verdict on school, and in Afghanistan they are too high. In a survey of children’s views carried out in 2009 by a consortium of NGOs,22 children outlined key issues:

School timings were not suitable for children who have to work.

Disabled and older children were not able to go to school.

There were not enough schools in remote areas and existing ones had poor infrastructure.

Teachers’ behaviour, punishment,23 humiliation, discrimination against girls.

Lack of professional and experienced teachers.

15. In a society as diverse as Afghanistan, education structures need maximum flexibility at the local level to ensure the participation of all sections of each local community.24 This is recognized by the Ministry of Education (MoE) that aims at “communities taking ownership of education and coming to the forefront of expanding, protecting and defending it.”25

16. The use of community structures and working with mullahs and religious leaders is a key factor in establishing and maintaining successful community schools. Parents are more willing to trust these male teachers with educating their daughters than other male teachers in formal schools. The lack of female teachers, a problem in rural areas, is also alleviated in community-based classes, where there are a higher proportion of female teachers that in the country at large.

17. Establishing and supporting Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) and Parent Teacher Student Associations (PTSAs) enhances student retention when members are also trained in key areas.26 Our evaluations also show that that Student Councils play a vital role in making sure school attendance rates are high by following up absent school children who are at high risk of dropping out.27 They are also active in addressing other barriers and lobbying the PTSAs for improvements to school infrastructure and staffing.

18. The MoE plans to expand enrolment through a number of community based initiatives. To tackle the challenges in enrolment and completion and ensure community structures are adequately equipped, DFID should increase support for programmes that emphasize empowerment and community participation in local decision-making, by supporting investment in local democratic and good governance structures. Such initiatives have proven to be one of the most successful ways of tackling barriers and inequality in access and retention.

Learning outcomes

19. Supporting the GIRoA to achieve education goals requires taking a closer look at learning outcomes and learning indicators. Our evaluation found that, for those children who do access education in Afghanistan, the quality is often poor; in a sample school, for example, only 43% of children in grade 3 could read with comprehension.28

20. According to the government’s latest report on progress towards MDGs, outcome level figures on literacy are not yet progressing adequately to meet national development targets.29 Only Kabul has a youth (15–24 old) literacy of more than 60%. Ghazni, Parwan, Kapisa and Balkh provinces have between 40–60% youth literacy. 15 provinces have a youth literacy rate of between 20–40% and in the remaining 12 provinces it is less than 20%. In Helmand, Paktik, Uruzgan and Zabul youth literacy rates are less than 6%.30

The table below exemplifies literacy levels, focusing on female literacy for girls over 16 years old:31

21. DFID should ensure its indicators of success in Afghanistan32 also include support to improve learning outcomes and ensure the system responds to children’s learning needs. This will require multiple interventions to support the MoE, including: enhancing teachers’ literacy instruction skills; enhancing literacy habits at the community level by involving parents in their children’s learning; and increasing the print environment with local print.

22. Additionally, efforts on completion of a full cycle of quality education should be complemented with long-term thinking on opportunities for Afghan youth, particularly to ensure youth are not further affected by the conflict. Moreover, by linking job creation for youth to its existing plans on wealth creation, DFID would help ensure a stronger more educated youth have greater employment opportunities after school.33

C. Girls’ Education

23. Levels of enrollment and retention for girls reflect a more nuanced measure of progress. Girls only account for 35.5% of primary school enrollment and only 4% of girls are in grades 10–12.34 The MoE monitors the gender parity between the rural and urban areas; at primary level, the disparity between boys and girls is still 60% in favour of boys whereas in urban areas the gap is closing down to a current Gender Parity Index of 0.73.35

Key issues affecting girls’ enrolment and retention in school include:

Community acceptance and awareness of girls’ right to education.

Transition into formal schools and lack of early childhood interventions.

Harassment and attacks on girls, families and female teachers on their way to school or in school.

Lack of/absence of qualified female teachers, especially in rural areas.

24. Our research on access barriers found that brothers were often the most active family member in preventing girls from going to school.36 One way that this has been overcome is to advocate the value of education from an Islamic perspective as well as setting up community classes for easier access to education.

25. Transition of girls from Alternative Learning Centres (ALCs) and community based classes into formal schools remains a major challenge as parents do not want girls to travel outside of their communities or be taught by men who are strangers.37 Almost a quarter (23.7%) of people interviewed for the “2011 High Stakes report on Girls’ Education in Afghanistan” saw distance as a major obstacle to girls’ access to education.”38

26. Poor retention rates for girls result, in part, from a severe lack of female teachers: almost 48% of rural areas do not have a qualified female teacher.39 Around 29% of female teachers are female, but they are concentrated in urban areas.40 90% of the 364 districts have no female high school, and 13% (48 of 364) have no female teachers at all.41 Dropout rates for girls at secondary level are particularly high due to this shortage of female teachers.

27. The MoE plans to “recruit qualified female teachers who are willing to work in remote and insecure areas, pay them attractive incentive wages, and deploy them to districts with acute shortage of female teachers.”42 Under a new arrangement with the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), in part supported by DFID’s funding, the MoE plans to focus on educating more secondary school female graduates, who will qualify in two years to teach in their own communities.

28. In a study carried out by a consortium of NGOs, 41.2% of parents, teachers and girls interviewed cited income as the main reason girls were not in school; making poverty the single biggest barrier to girls’ access to education and completion.43 This exposes girls to child marriages. Beyond tradition, research shows there are various types of child marriages: most child marriages are arranged by parents; some are made subsequent to an exchange; other types of marriages are due to an exchange for money or to pay for family debts. Additionally, girls may be given away in Baad to settle disputes.44 Most of these girls will not have an opportunity to stay in school and will be forced to drop-out unless social protection programmes and livelihoods are implemented in the regions with the highest drop-outs or incidence of child marriages.

29. Only 19% of schools in Afghanistan are girls’ schools, yet they suffer 40% of the attacks.45 UNICEF and the MoE database indicates an increase in the total number of attacks in 2008 to 670, more than double the previous year.46 In the three-year period from April 2006 to March 2009, 238 schools were burned down, over 650 schools were closed due to threats, and 290 students and teachers were killed.47

30. Moreover, there have also been incidents of acid attacks on girls en route to school; poison gas attacks at several girls’ schools; use of night letters to intimidate teachers; and communities and occupation of school buildings by armed groups and international military forces.48 Many of the attacks on education in Afghanistan since 2001 have been attributed to anti-government elements, such as the Taliban.49 For these groups, any school that is “owned” by the government or built by armed forces becomes a potential target for attack; teachers, students and particularly girls are regarded as legitimate targets in the conflict.

31. The barriers affecting girls’ education outlined above serve to highlight the point that tackling girls’ education requires tackling the multiple barriers equally. DFID should therefore ensure its priority focus on girls’ education in Afghanistan tackles the most significant barriers that affect girls, concentrating on initiatives both inside and outside of school.

32. This will require it to support—through its contributions to partners and as a key bilateral donor—MoE and other relevant Ministries’ strategies to raise awareness of girls’ rights and the importance of girls education; increase investment in programmes to increase the number of trained and well remunerated teachers, especially female teachers, in both rural and urban settings; and provide assistance in implementing preventive measures to reduce the incidence of attacks on education.50

D. Key Challenges for Education in Emergency Contexts

33. In addition to conflict, Afghanistan suffers from chronic vulnerability to droughts, floods and other natural disasters that affect children’s daily lives. In August 2011, the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) population of Afghanistan reached 472,601 IDPs.51 More than 54% of IDPs registered since 2009 are children; and children also account for 60% of forced displacement victims.52 Education opportunities suffer as a result, particularly where no provision is made for education in emergencies, either within the government’s planning or the overall humanitarian response.

34. In the UN’s 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan, education in emergencies was only 2% funded, with a gap of USD 32.5 million. Such consistent underfunding of education needs across Afghanistan’s diverse humanitarian contexts is an example of a failed focus on children and community needs. In those locations where humanitarian crises are occurring, children’s education is being interrupted, leading to a permanent exclusion from education unless dealt with quickly. The approach also fails to acknowledge education’s key role in building children’s resilience to future disasters and implementing key disaster risk reduction (DRR) curricula that benefit the whole community.

35. Unless education in emergencies is a key component of DFID’s agenda, the gains it makes through development funding will not be maintained in fragile and conflict affected states. DFID should match its development funding for education with humanitarian funding. This could be achieved by funding education in emergencies interventions through the Education Cluster and Afghanistan’s UN Humanitarian Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP).

E. How DFID will Ensure Progress towards Development Goals is Maintained and Monitored

Education

36. As previously stated, bilateral investment in Afghanistan’s education goals has had visible results on education in a number of areas, particularly on access. We recommend that DFID’s Strategic Plan 2015–2020 maintains education funding at current levels and well into transition in order for these gains to have meaningful impact on completion and learning outcomes for boys and girls. Such a long-term approach, expressed in long-term funding commitments, will enable DFID to demonstrate the meaningful impact of its bilateral and multilateral education aid to Afghanistan and, more broadly, support global agendas to ensure children living in conflict-affected countries have access to educational opportunities.

Maternal and Child Health

37. It is not possible to discuss maintaining progress on the MDGs in Afghanistan without reference to maternal and child health. Donor investment in public health in Afghanistan has had significant impact; since 2003, around 20,000 community health workers and 2,500 midwives have been trained. As a result of this and other community-level activities, the number of children under five dying has fallen from one in five to one in 10 since 200653 and the number of women dying from pregnancy-related causes has fallen from 1 in 11 to 1 in 50.54 In addition Vaccine coverage for children against the childhood diseases of diphtheria, tetanus and whooping cough is at 83%, compared to just 31% in 2000.55

38. Despite improvements, much remains to be done. Every day 265 children die of preventable diseases, the worst rate in Asia, and newborn mortality rates remain unacceptably high.56 Nutrition indicators have barely changed in recent years: stunting affects 59% of Afghan children, the highest rate in the world, and 33% of children are underweight.57 The lack of access to health care for women and girls remains one of many pervasive inequities in Afghanistan.58

39. Similar to education, a key question for development partners such as DFID is how to ensure that the gains made in the health sector are not reversed after military troops withdraw and global political attention wanes.

40. Health was de-prioritised by DFID in Afghanistan in 2002, on the basis that sufficient support had been committed from other donors, such as the World Bank, EC and USAID. Despite health being an overarching priority for DFID, no bilateral support for health has been committed to Afghanistan in DFID’s recent country operational plan.

41. During transition, there is an important role for DFID to play in strengthening Afghanistan’s health system and building the capacity of the GIRoA to take on greater responsibility for delivering basic services at the community level. Lack of funding remains a major barrier to the implementation of national health policies. For example, the GIRoA faces a $28 million funding gap to implement its Child and Adolescent Health Policy and Strategy. A key element of this strategy is the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), which remains underfunded in some areas with concerning signals coming from major donors that financial support will reduce in coming years.

42. Support from additional actors, such as DFID, will be essential for bridging these gaps and sustaining support for successful initiatives like the BPHS. DFID also has an important role to play in discouraging other donors from reducing their support. Two areas where DFID could have a considerable impact are health workers and nutrition:

(i)A further 10,000 community health workers (CHWs)59 and 3,650 midwives60 are required to meet the objective of providing community-based health care services to 90% of the population by 2013.61 Investing in recruiting and training CHWs and midwives is an example of how relatively small volumes of funding could have a dramatic impact on key indicators like child and maternal mortality.62

(ii)Child malnutrition has not seen the level of attention or funding it requires. The nutrition elements of BPHS (such as Community Management of Acute Malnutrition) remain underfunded, and the Public Nutrition Policy and Strategy 2009–2013 is yet to be put into action. Implementing this strategy requires building the capacity of the Ministry of Public Health and health service providers with increased domestic and external funding.

43. The lack of an effective and efficient health system in Afghanistan has led to a tendency for donors to allocate funding for vertical programmes or contracting-out to NGOs rather than funding the health sector on-budget. Whilst there is an evident need to decrease Afghanistan’s dependency on donors and NGOs, one challenge for international donors will be to ensure the necessary capacity is in place before fully transferring management of funding and implementation to the GIRoA. Donors should be sensitive to the impact of rapidly transitioning to on-budget funding and be ready to fill gaps created by other donors that may reduce assistance on different timescales.

May 2012

1 bouZahr, Carla and Tessa Wardlaw. Maternal Mortality in 2000: Estimates Developed by WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA. Geneva: Department of Reproductive Health and Research World Health Organization, 2004.

2 GIRoA, Health and Nutrition Sector Strategy 2007–08 to 2012–13 in the “Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387–1391 (2008–13)”.

3 The Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the MOPH of GIRoA and John Hopkins University. The Afghanistan Health Survey (AHS). Kabul: GIRoA, 2006.

4 MoPH, GIRoA, Community Based Health Care (CBHC) Policy and Strategy 2009–2013, Afghanistan, December 2009.

5 Ayobi, Shamshad, “Where we Are Now” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Education, 12 January 2010.

6 DFID Afghanistan, Operational Plan 2011–15.

7 DFID Afghanistan, Support to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 2011-2014, Business Case (2011).

8 Amounting to £50 million for three years and an additional results-based contribution of £70 million;
http://www.globalpartnership.org/media/Replenishment/UK.pdf

9 http://www.globalpartnership.org/news/311/61/Global-Partnership-for-Education-Announces-168-Million-to-Provide-Quality-Education-to-Children-in-Seven-Countries/

10 Box 3.11: Increasing aid to conflict-affected states—the UK’s aid commitments, EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011, p. 182-183, UNESCO (2011).

11 Dakar Framework of Action, Education For All goals (2000); see link for more information on implementation of MDG and EFA agenda
http://english.moe.gov.af/attachments/076_The%20Interim%20Plan%20-%20Final%20version%2001.pdf

12 Statement from His Excellency Farooq Wardak, ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, at the GPE Pledging Conference, Copenhagen, 8 November 2011.

13 Ayobi, Shamshad, “Where we Are Now” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Education, 12 January 2010.

14 Ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the 2011 EFA Global Monitoring Report (2011).

15 United Nations Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary General, 2011.

16 Education Sector Analysis 2011, Adam Smith International.

17 Oxfam International, High Stakes: Girls’ Education in Afghanistan (2011).

18 Ministry of Education, Education Interim Plan, 2011–13, p 16.

19 Save the Children Child Rights Situation Analysis (CRSA) in Afghanistan (2011).

20 Statement from His Excellency Farooq Wardak, Minister of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, at the GPE Pledging Conference, Copenhagen, 8 November 2011.

21 Save the Children Rewrite the Future Afghanistan final evaluation (2010).

22 Save the Children, Cooperation for Humanitarian Assistance (CHA) and War Child Netherlands. This research was carried out with children to promote collaboration and learning to accelerate achievement on the MDGs (Schokland Project) (2009).

23 100% of boys in one assessment reporting that they had encountered physical and humiliating punishment - Save the Children, Violence Free School—Mazar i Sharif Baseline Survey (2008).

24 Save the Children Afghanistan, Building Bridges Through Education: Stories from Afghanistan (2010).

25 Statement from His Excellency Farooq Wardak, ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, at the GPE Pledging Conference, Copenhagen, 8 November 2011.

26 Including child rights, life skills and advocating for the reduction of physical and humiliating punishment in schools.

27 Our evaluation showed that attendance rates are higher in project schools with PTSAs than in other comparison schools.

28 Save the Children Rewrite the Future Afghanistan final evaluation (2010).

29 Vision 2020, Afghanistan MDG Annual Progress Report 2008, p 10.

30 Save the Children, CRSA Afghanistan (2011).

31 Save the Children, CRSA Afghanistan (2011).

32 DFID Afghanistan, Operational Plan 2011–15.

33 DFID Afghanistan, Operational Plan 2011–15.

34 Human Rights Watch, We have the promises of the world: Women’s rights in Afghanistan, (2009).

35 A GPI of 1.0 indicates that an equal proportion of boys and girls are enrolled in a given level of schooling. If the GPI is less than 1.0 this indicates there are proportionally fewer girls than boys enrolled. Save the Children Afghanistan Child Rights Situation Analysis.

36 Barriers to Accessing Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile State, Case Study: Afghanistan. Save the Children, London (2009).

37 Alternative Learning Centres (ALCs) are used in Afghanistan and a number of other conflict-affected countries as an effective intervention to secure children’s access to local, community endorsed schooling. Save the Children’s evaluation shows these centres have had a very significant impact on girl’s access to education.

38 Oxfam International, High Stakes: Girls’ Education in Afghanistan (2011).

39 MoE GIROA Education Interim Plan 2011–13, p 15.

40 MoE, GIROA National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 2010–14, p 28.

41 Wardak S and Hirth M “Defining the Gaps: The case of Afghanistan.” Paper for INEE Global Consultation, Istanbul, Turkey.

42 Statement from His Excellency Farooq Wardak, ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, at the GPE Pledging Conference, Copenhagen, 8 November 2011.

43 Oxfam International, High Stakes: Girl’s Education in Afghanistan (2011).

44 Baad refers to a traditional practice of settling disputes among Pashtun tribes. Early Marriage in Afghanistan, Women and Children’s Legal Research Foundation (WCLRF) (2008); Save the Children Child Rights Situation Analysis (2011).

45 Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack (2011).

46 GCPEA (2011).

47 GCPEA (2011).

48 GCPEA (2011).

49 The motives of the attacks are an attempt to weaken support for the GIRoA, undermine counter-insurgency and international military efforts, create instability, intimidate, oppose all perceived Western education, and stop girls’ participation in schooling GCPEA (2011).

50 Greater detail on existing preventive and responsive measures can be found in GCPEA Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack (2011).

51 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for International peace and security. A/65/873-S/2011/381 (2011).

52 Ref 77 Mark.

53 Comparing Afghanistan National Mortality Survey 2010 (under-five mortality 97 deaths per 1,000 births) and Afghanistan Health Survey 2006 (under-five mortality as 191 per 1,000 births).

54 Comparing Afghanistan National Mortality Survey 2010 (1 in 50 lifetime risk of maternal death) and State of the World’s Mothers 2011 (1 in 11 lifetime risk of maternal death) [data from WHO. Trends in Maternal Mortality:1990 to 2008. (Geneva: 2010).

55 Dalil, Dr Suraya. “Afghan health minister seeks backing for vaccines.”MSNBC, 17 May 2011.

56 Comparing Afghanistan National Mortality Survey 2010 (neonatal mortality 40 per 1000 births) and Lawn, J E, et.al 2005. “4 million neonatal deaths: When? Where? Why?” Lancet: 365 pp 891–900 (neonatal mortality 60 per 1000 births).

57 WHO World Health Statistics 2011.

58 Mojumdar, Aunohita. “An inflated claim of health success in Afghanistan exposed.” The Christian Science Monitor, 8 December 2010.

59 MoPH, GIRoA, Child and Adolescent Health Department, 8 March 2011, p 7.

60 MoPH, GIRoA, Child and Adolescent Health Department, 8 March 2011, p 7.

61 MoPH, GIRoA, Community-Based Health Care Policy and Strategy 2009–13.

62 The average cost for training a community health worker in community case management is $300.

Prepared 24th October 2012