International DevelopmentWritten evidence submitted by Mercy Corps
The Mercy Corps Memorandum gives a brief introduction to the organisation and its activity in Afghanistan since 1986. It then discusses the foreseen consequences of the military draw down and how these can be mitigated.
Mercy Corps foresees two significant likely economic consequences to the military drawdown: A significant reduction in Afghanistan’s GNI from the fall in the spending power of NATO-led forces and the fact that security is likely to become a more urgent issue.
In addition co-ordination with other donors and multilateral organisations, where DFID can best add value through its bilateral programme, will be of importance; especially International NGOs who have the trust of the population and can work unmolested, even in high risk conflict environments.
Furthermore Wealth creation is also needed and the development of vocational skills and the enabling of Afghans to start businesses and be entrepreneurial. Finally reducing dependency on the Kabul government as opposed to community ownership will also be key to Afghanistan’s development.
1. Mercy Corps
(1) Mercy Corps works in; failing states, conflict zones, countries recovering from natural disaster. Mercy Corps also works in places where a child’s life is often at risk, where a woman’s education is usually ignored, and where a family’s livelihood is never a sure thing. Since 1979, we have helped people grappling with the toughest hardships survive—and then thrive. That’s the heart of our approach: we help communities turn crisis into opportunity. Today Mercy Corps works in over 40 countries and has been active in Afghanistan since 1986.
(2) Afghanistan is struggling to emerge from decades of conflict, political instability, drought and economic chaos. With 85% of the population relying on agriculture and natural resource-based livelihoods, Mercy Corps’ primary goal is to enable Afghans to improve their quality of life by strengthening sustainable, legitimate livelihoods. Our programs are aimed at improving agricultural production and market linkages, community and agricultural infrastructure, livestock health, natural resource management and access to financial services, with an emphasis on linking government, communities and the private sector.
Written evidence submitted by David Haines
2. The economic consequences of the military draw down and how this can be mitigated
(1) Mercy Corps foresees two significant likely economic consequences to the military drawdown:
The first is that a large percentage of the construction and related industries in Helmand that are significantly bolstered by contracts currently awarded from the PRT are likely to experience a sharp downturn. At present, many contracts both within and outside of the PRT are coordinated by the UK in Helmand. These range from the building of police checkpoints, road repair and school construction to repairs and maintenance of generators and electrical apparatus. Without an international presence overseeing the awarding of these contracts, it is likely that the number and value will decrease sharply, and that those which remain, will be awarded to a small number of companies, often based outside of Helmand and even Afghanistan, that have political support at a higher level. This means that the construction boom that Helmand has experienced of late is likely to stall and previously working men of fighting age will be faced with fresh economic challenges. Mitigation: Diverse skills training needs to be offered to the population of Helmand to reduce dependence on construction as a sector, and offer increased opportunities to start micro-businesses. In addition, investment in agriculture remains crucial as the bulk of the economy is agrarian. Water supply, sustainable land use and value added processing are all important areas that will allow farmers to maximise yield and income, as well as contributing to food security in the province.
The second is that as increased geographical areas are handed over to ANSF, and the ISAF presence is reduced, security is likely to become a more urgent issue. Without a relatively secure environment, it is unlikely that economic prosperity can be achieved or maintained. If fighting and conflict re-emerges in places such as Nahr-e-Sarraj or even Lashkar Gah, the economy will almost certainly suffer. Mitigation: Given that HMG are committed to the reduction of ISAF troop numbers, enabling the people of Helmand to achieve transferable skills will provide significant benefit in mitigating economic impact of reduced stability. There is a significant drive for people to join the public sector, which makes sense if long term security can be guaranteed, however in the absence of such guarantees; transferable skills can increase the economic resilience of Helmandis even in the context of future displacement with Afghanistan or to Pakistan or Iran.”
(2) In the case of IDPs, a rapid return to their home is much more likely if there are economic opportunities due to a skill set that they already have. In addition, this type of programming that impacts on a wide swathe of the population is a clear sign of commitment from the international community, repairs otherwise strained relationships between Afghans in Helmand and the reputation of the UK, and can be delivered at significantly lower cost than many other types of initiative. Mercy Corps’ INVEST and DASTGAH programmes, funded by DFID, demonstrate that these principles work in a cost effective and successful manner.
3. Co-ordination with other donors and multilateral organisations, and where DFID can best add value through its bilateral programme which focuses on: Governance and security: Whether DFID can “tackle the root causes of instability and the effects of insecurity” and the scope for building bridges with opposition and insurgent groups to do this
(1) There are a number of examples at present, where donors are running competitive programmes in Helmand. For example, in the Mercy Corps INVEST programme, funded by DFID, which currently has 5,200 vocational training students, with a post-graduation employment rate of 80%, students are not paid or compensated for the time spent training. As a result, the programme attracts only those students that genuinely wish to learn a trade, rather than those who join the programme for economic reasons and have no intention of starting a business afterwards. There are USAID funded programmes that do compensate students and this causes a lot of unnecessary friction. Paying students is not sustainable in the long term as, by definition, it means that the Government of Afghanistan will never be able to adopt the programme into its own strategy as the costs of running such an initiative are prohibitively high. Mitigation: Closer donor coordination and collaboration with best practice is highly recommended, including building on models that work well, rather than using the expensive models that are designed to attract people in order to reach target numbers. The Mercy Corps approach is proven and has worked with male and female students alike.
(2) In addition, facilitating female education in Helmand, which is very conservative and remains under considerable influence from insurgent groups, is a delicate process. This process is much easier for non-government organisations that have close links and long histories with communities, and are therefore able to negotiate from an impartial perspective. To facilitate real change, will essentially require HMG to devolve much of its development plan and investment to International NGOs who have the trust of the population and can work unmolested, even in high risk conflict environments. It is highly unlikely that organisations with armed security or with little or no history in the Province would be able to win the trust and achieve effective programming that yields sustainable results.
4. Wealth creation: DFID’s role in creating sustainable jobs, increasing investment and tax revenues and contributing to poverty reduction and economic stability
(1) The most effective route to achieving poverty reduction and building tax revenue and investment is by diversifying and developing the economy through the provision of skills, increasing the quantity and quality of produce and facilitating access to external markets, both domestic and international.
(2) In practical terms this means the development of vocational skills and the enabling of Afghans to start businesses and be entrepreneurial. A significant step would be to establish a revolving credit fund that could lend money and/or give grants to new businesses that demonstrate success at a small scale. This would best be served without business plans and administration which makes it very difficult for illiterate people to access these tools.
(3) Reducing dependency on the Kabul government as opposed to community ownership is also key. At present all steps taken by the international community are predicated on the notion that the Government in Kabul will remain in situ in one form or another, either through power sharing or peace achieved otherwise. In Helmand however, there is significant resistance to this with a preference in many areas for the former Taliban regime to resume its role, with a more enlightened stance towards key areas including education for women. As the Taliban attempt to transition from an insurgency to a recognised political power, they will be keen to deliver public services, the absence of which left them criticised and unpopular prior to 2001. The Government of Afghanistan is widely viewed by Afghans as being inherently and endemically corrupt at all levels, and so for this, plus other reasons, there is little real support for them. If development and security responsibilities rest entirely with Kabul, it is unlikely that normal Afghans will see any real benefit and the hostility towards both the Government and the west will increase. Development has to change people’s lives and this can only be achieved through transparency and access to communities.
May 2012