International DevelopmentWritten evidence submitted by David Page, Chair of Trustees, Afghanaid

Thank you for the opportunity to comment further on issues which came up during the IDC session on DFID’s role in Afghanistan and on more general aspects of DFID’s relationship with NGOs working in that country.

1. Humanitarian Funding

Afghanaid welcomes DFID’s decision to restart humanitarian emergency response funding to NGOs, which has strengthened our own work in this field. There is a general consensus that in the coming two to three years, during the transition period and after the withdrawal of international military forces, Afghanistan is likely to see a substantial increase in the humanitarian needs of ordinary Afghans. In these circumstances, we would recommend that DFID should strengthen its dedicated humanitarian capacity in-country to be able to play a larger role in this field. We would like to see DFID joining the Emergency Response Fund, the multi-donor humanitarian funding mechanism set up at country level, which provides funds for both rapid and slow onset emergencies and addresses critical gaps in assistance to humanitarian needs. We believe that DFID is well placed to take a leadership role in the humanitarian coordination structure in Afghanistan to enable the international community to meet these needs. At the moment, the CAP/HAP in Afghanistan is only 30% funded and this needs to be a key focus for international engagement in future.

2. Agriculture

Agriculture is now beginning to receive the sort of attention it has long deserved with the establishment of a number of initiatives under the National Priority Programmes (NPPs) dedicated to different agricultural and allied sectors. However, many of these programmes are being drawn up by the Afghan government without the sort of consultation process, with NGOs and other sources of expertise in this sector, which would undoubtedly strengthen their effectiveness.

There have been a number of examples recently where NGOs have been asked to tender for donor-funded contracts with the Ministry of Agriculture, which have failed to take adequate account of local conditions or the need to build national human capacity. One such example is the DFID- financed Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development Facility (CARD-F). It has been made mandatory for those bidding for contracts under this facility to employ a high number of international experts at grassroots level in technical areas, which has the effect of undermining well-recognised national capacities in horticulture, water and irrigation and apiculture. Moreover, CARD-F procurement policies tend to suit private sector organisations more than those in the voluntary sector, for instance by requiring pre-financing arrangements. This carries the risk that the implementation of grassroots development initiatives will be outsourced to those with financial capital but lacking essential and relevant knowledge and experience, which Afghanaid and other NGOs offer. We are concerned that the lessons from other large national programmes, notably the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), also financed by DFID, have not been taken on board in setting up procurement modalities for CARD-F.

In the post Tokyo period, particularly in the next six months, while operational plans are being developed for National Priority Programme (NPPs) and the national Aid Management Policy is being finalised, we would like to see DFID, together with other donors, particularly the Nordic countries and Japan, play an active role in negotiating with key stakeholders, including with the Government of Afghanistan, to set up a structured and genuine dialogue and consultation with NGOs during this process.

A number of British NGOs recently wrote to the Secretary of State on this subject and I am attaching a copy of that letter for your information.

Given the importance of agriculture in the Afghan economy, we hope that DFID will dedicate more resources to this sector, both through the government of Afghanistan by means of direct budget support to the NPPs, and through NGOs like Afghanaid which have a proven track record of providing assistance to the agriculture sector over the past twenty years.

3. In-country Dialogue with NGOs

DFID maintains a regular dialogue in the UK with representatives of British and Irish INGOs operating in Afghanistan, which proves useful to both sides in keeping NGOs abreast of government policy and briefing government on NGO activities. However, most operational decisions are taken in country—both by DFID and by NGOs—and a similar forum for dialogue and exchange between DFID’s country office in Kabul and NGOs working in Afghanistan would be of great value. NGOs in Kabul would benefit from regular briefings on DFID’s policies and activities, while the NGO community would be able to brief DFID on the challenges of development at different levels of Afghan society which would assist in grounding DFID’s own policies and operational decision. Owing to the strict security regime, the mobility of DFID staff is highly restricted, which limits their opportunities to see socio-economic realities at first hand. A regular and genuine dialogue and exchange between DFID and NGOs at Kabul level could help to bridge this gap, as most NGOs work at grassroots and will be able to contribute perceptions and knowledge based on their own experiences.

4. DFID-NGO Relations in Afghanistan: The Case for a New Funding Mechanism

In recent years, DFID has always maintained publicly that NGOs have an important role to play in Afghanistan but in practice it has done very little to encourage or support them. If they were not able to work in Helmand, it has tended to see them principally as service delivery agents for the Afghan government. There have been some welcome signs of change in programme priorities recently—in particular a new emphasis on humanitarian relief and rehabilitation, for which DFID is providing direct funding to the NGO community, and a leading role in setting up Tawanmandi, a multi-donor funding mechanism to support Afghan civil society initiatives. But these changes, while important in themselves, only go some way to address the systemic challenges faced by British NGOs and others in the present situation.

Afghanistan is not only one of the poorest countries in the world; it is also one of the most unstable. Though DFID and other donors have been treating Afghanistan as a post-conflict country, over the past two or three years, conflict and instability have spread from the south and east to the north as well. For example, Afghanaid’s work in Ghor and Badakhshan provinces, which were previously relatively peaceful, has been seriously affected by the growing influence of armed opposition groups, the spread of instability and increased interference in the development process. Moreover, as disillusionment with the Afghan government has grown on account of its poor performance and corruption, NGOs working as partners of government have become more vulnerable to the charge that they have taken sides themselves.

Working in a conflict situation puts particular strains on NGOs, whose staff are exposed to great danger and risk, and whose protection becomes a key concern. The costs of providing security for staff are rising all the time, though donors have so far proved reluctant to underwrite these costs. There has been a tendency for donors to think in terms of one or two year contracts rather than the multi-year funding which is desirable for sustainable development and more effective in bring a peace dividend to a society wounded by decades of conflict. Very few donors are willing to pay for the professional, financial and other services which are required to ensure high quality supervision and control, though most donors require more detailed reporting and more quantitative evidence of impact. The result is constant pressure on staff (who are increasingly difficult to recruit and retain) and on budgets.

In common with other British NGOs working in Afghanistan, Afghanaid would argue that there is a powerful case for the British government to make a longer term investment in the NGO sector. Afghanaid has been working in Afghanistan since 1983. It has a history of commitment to the country, a well-developed pool of national professional staff, and has built up relationships of trust with the communities with which it works. This is a valuable long term asset not only for the country but also for the international community. We would argue that it is an asset worth underwriting with some core support.

For the past few years, Afghanaid has been advocating with DFID in Kabul for a longer term relationship based on shared priorities and approaches to key development issues. But despite encouragement from two heads of the DFID country office, the discussions have so far come to nothing for lack of a viable funding mechanism.

Given these factors, we would argue that there is a strong case for DFID to look again at funding mechanisms for Afghanistan and similar states, where the NGO sector arguably requires greater support and stability to play its role.

The Global PPA system plays a valuable role in supporting the work of large charities working in a variety of countries. The development of a parallel system of PPAs to meet the circumstances of fragile states like Afghanistan would enable DFID to play a similar longer term role in supporting NGOs working in such difficult environments.

There is also arguably a case for the establishment of an NGO security fund for Afghanistan, which would provide direct assistance to NGOs to meet the rising costs of operating in a rapidly changing security landscape.

5 September 2012