International Development CommitteeWritten evidence submitted by International Alert
Summary
(S1) Experience in conflict-affected and fragile countries, where over 1.5 billion people live and where there are the greatest levels of poverty and least progress towards the MDGs, suggests that the post-2015 development framework must meet the following principles:
Development, not aid: concerned with sustainable development progress, not just aid.
Comprehensive: covering all the issues that, taken together, comprise development progress.
Universality and subsidiarity: applying to all countries equally, but with strategies defined, goals and indicators set, and progress measured by the least centralised authority able to do so.
Democracy-enhancing: enhancing accountability by governments to their citizens, and international organisations to their member states.
Overarching values: explicitly restating a commitment to the fulfilment of equal human rights.
Politically aware: getting a viable balance between technical and political sides of development.
Context as the starting point: with goals and strategies based on a full analysis of the context, and priorities devised to suit the national, regional or local realities.
Conflict-sensitivity: recognising that development processes have an impact on conflicts, and designing them to minimise the risk of violence and maximise progress towards peace.
(S2) A framework that we think can express these principles would work as follows:
1.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
2.
3.
(S3) This framework is radically different from the approach based on targets and indicators that are neither comprehensive nor universal in the current MDGs. If the post-2015 framework is to deliver for the poorest and most vulnerable people in the world, radically different is what it must be.
Response
Lessons learned from the Millennium Development Goals and effectiveness of the MDG process
1. The MDGs created momentum, galvanised debate and focussed attention on development. They provided a framework for donor and recipient countries to work together. They provided a simple, non-political framework within which development issues could be discussed by a diverse constituency without political or ideological differences getting in the way. They probably helped increase and maintain the level of aid funding by donor countries and philanthropists.
2. However, these positives were undermined by five inherent flaws.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
3. These flaws have limited the utility of the MDGs as a guide to alleviating poverty especially in fragile countries. No conflict-affected country has achieved a single MDG.
4. The general commitment to the MDGs highlights the specific commitment to increase ODA as a percentage of GNI at the expense of a proper focus on the particular issues driving conflict and poverty. It unintentionally encourages the error of measuring success by the volume of aid.
5. Much development progress can only be achieved by engaging local communities in addressing local needs. Global targets tend to occlude local particularities. A post-2015 international development framework will do better if it provides global support to local action; the experience of the MDGs framework suggests global targets and indicators are ineffective means to that end.
Relationship between “Sustainable Development Goals” and the goals considered by the High-Level Panel
6. Although sustainable Development Goals were not agreed at Rio+20 and are unlikely to emerge hereafter, the debate on the SDGs is relevant to the post-2015 development framework. The effects of climate change are already being seen and “planetary boundaries” for sustainability are being crossed or approached, at the same time as an unprecedented demographic shift is under way in the form of urbanisation.2
7. The post-2015 framework should take into account key sustainability concepts discussed at the Rio+20 conference, such as the “social floor/environmental ceiling” approach to stimulating equitable growth,3 understood to include human rights, human security and environmental concerns, beyond the simple measure of GDP.
Coverage: should future goals be for developing countries only or for all countries?
8. The future framework needs to be universal in the sense that it applies to all nations for four main reasons:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Process: are the right voices being heard? What are opportunities and constraints for global consensus?
9. The international community has set itself a herculean task—to design a single framework that responds to diverse political perspectives and national realities. For the sake of both legitimacy and effectiveness, the discussion must embrace a very wide range of views and approaches, while producing a framework that is simple and coherent. We probably need to accept that there won’t be global consensus on some critical issues, so the process needs to be designed with this in mind.
10. The task will be easier if it is decided not to have global targets and indicators, which are ineffective for reasons outlined above. The more these are included into the discussion, the more complicated an already complex debate would become, and the more likely it is that technical disputes over the content and level of targets will mask underlying political disagreements. This debate would be incomprehensible, tedious and exclusionary for the vast majority of the world’s citizens. Aiming for a simpler framework—a clear and comprehensive vision unencumbered by global targets and indicators—will aid transparency.
11. The consultation process needs to be as wide, deep and transparent as possible, and to take full account of lessons learned about the merits and weaknesses of different approaches. Governments do not necessarily represent the views and interests of their citizens effectively; hence the UN needs to ensure adequate citizen involvement. Nor should the process be limited to politicians, development experts and diplomats: effectively the usual suspects. The net should be cast widely to include others such as businesspeople, historians, scientists, anthropologists, indigenous people, men and women of different ages and backgrounds.
Targets: should the MDGs’ “target-based” approach be retained? How should progress be measured?
12. Learning from the past, and in keeping with our analysis above, we argue that targets and indicators should be specific not global and should reflect a global framework of values and ambition.
13. The post-2015 framework should follow these principles:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
14. In line with these principles, a post-2015 framework for development would work as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
15. It is in relation to national governments, regional organisations, local authorities, MNCs and IGOs (sub-paragraphs 14 b) and c) above) that targets and indicators would be set and monitored.
16. In practice, whatever international agreements and declarations are made, this framework would be essentially voluntary. However, an objective, international monitoring and reporting system under the aegis of the UN would incentivise, monitor and review progress. This would help hold governments and the international community accountable for the commitments they have made.
The role of the private sector and other non-state organisations
17. The private sector is fundamental to development. The flow of resources into developing countries from the private sector dwarfs ODA and every citizen participates in the private sector, which therefore has a major influence on his or her life and opportunities.
18. Relations between the private sector and government tend to reflect and influence the state of governance. Thus, private sector actors can either foster equitable growth and democratic politics, or contribute to injustice and inequality and so exacerbate conflict and poverty.
19. Private sector representatives are accordingly critical participants in the global consultation process and essential interlocutors in preparing national development strategies as well as stakeholders in implementing them.
20. Companies need to be “conflict sensitive”—ie operate in a manner which does not provoke or exacerbate conflict, supports rather than undermines progress towards peace, and which contributes to inclusive economic growth.
21. The private sector is also a means by which international collaboration can proceed despite differences between governments. For example, the Sustainable Energy for All initiative4 has to date received pledges of $50 billion to stimulate green economic growth through access to sustainable sources of energy. This kind of international collaboration model is likely to play a part in any post-2015 framework, due to its potential to overcome political logjams.
22. Other non-state organisations—NGOs and other forms of civil society collaboration—have a fundamental role to play in understanding the context, framing the debate, designing policies and delivering services, while holding government and businesses accountable to evolving norms and standards of behaviour. Civil society organisations are often critics of governments but without their involvement there is unlikely to be equitable progress or any degree of meaningful accountability by which citizens are able to monitor how their authorities are performing.
Timescale: what period should the new framework cover? Was the 15-year horizon for the MDGs right?
23. We suggest a long-lasting global framework, which would be reviewed and improved from time to time, doing away with timebound global goals and targets. There are two reasons:
(a)
(b)
The content of future goals
24. The post-2015 global vision for development should establish human rights, representative government, gender equality and freedom of association as eventual goals for all nations. The Millennium Declaration provides a basis for this articulation of a clear idea of what is needed to enable peace and prosperity. At its core, this high-level vision would highlight the need for citizens in all countries to be able to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
25. The role of the global vision is to inspire, inform and incentivise national and local plans, as well as those made by IGOs, MNCs and others. These obviously need to be designed according to each specific context. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States agreed at Busan in 2011 contains clues as to what these plans might address, under the headings of Legitimate Politics, Security, Justice, Public Services, Taxation and Livelihoods.6
26. One problem with the MDGs is that they confuse strategies goals; for example, wider access to justice does not result only or even mainly from investing in the “justice sector”—it may just as likely derive more from a wider citizen involvement in commerce, which in turn creates a demand for better (and eventually fairer) legal systems to settle land and commercial disputes. So national planners must beware of using generic headings and goals, and devise specific plans based on a careful assessment of opportunity.
27. With this in mind, we suggest that national development plans should consider how they might make progress on the following kinds of development processes:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
28. These are of course not prescriptions, and the task of leaders in any given context will be to ascertain the pertinence and realism of each, and to figure out a strategic approach.
October 2012
1 OECD-DAC Principles for fragile states and situations: Fragile States Principles: Principle 1 http://www.oecd.org/dacfragilestates/fragilestatesprinciplesprinciple1.htm
2 UN System Task Team on the post-2015 UN Development Agenda, May 2012
3 http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/blog/2011/10/can-we-live-inside-the-doughnut
4 http://www.uncsd2012.org/index.php?page=view&nr=1292&type=230&menu=39
5 World development Report 2011: Conflict, security and development. World Bank 2011: http://wdronline.worldbank.org//includes/imp_images/book_pdf/WDR_2011.pdf
6 http://www.oecd.org/international%20dialogue/anewdealforengagementinfragilestates.htm
