Conclusions and recommendations
The case for reform
1. Nevertheless,
however critical our witnesses were of the failings of successive
Pakistan governments to deliver development, all agreed that the
UK should maintain a development assistance programme. We agree
that DFID should have a bilateral programme in Pakistan which
has an important strategic position in the world, strong ties
with the UK and its stability and prosperity is currently in question.
(Paragraph 39)
2. It
is for the Pakistan federal and provincial governments to shape
reform programmes and institutions to improve public services
and alleviate poverty. DFID has a role to play working alongside
the federal and provincial governments. (Paragraph 40)
3. DFID's
development assistance should be conditional on the Pakistan authorities
committing to and implementing economic reforms and policy changes
that will foster inclusive economic and social development. (Paragraph
41)
DFID's current governance and security
projects
4. We
commend DFID's anti-corruption aspirations but recommend that
in its response to us DFID should:
confirm that:
o the Pakistan Government remains
committed to an anti-corruption strategy and programme led by
the National Accountability Bureau
o once appointed, the Bureau's principal
officers cannot be dismissed by the President, Government, Parliament
or the armed forces of Pakistan,
o the Bureau has the budget and
power to investigate, charge and prosecute people without seeking
approval from the President, Government, Parliament or armed forces
of Pakistan;
set out measurable targets to see
if its investment in anti-corruption is having the desired, positive
effect;
indicate at what point monitoring
and evaluation will take place to determine whether DFID and the
Government of Pakistan's investment in anti-corruption is being
achieved.
hold discussions with the Commonwealth
Secretary General about what further steps the Commonwealth can
take to help all Commonwealth Governments to reduce corruption.
(Paragraph 53)?
5. We
are concerned that DFID's anti-corruption targets do not include
bringing public officials accused of corruption to court and securing
convictions and sentences against those found guilty. (Paragraph
54)
Tax reform
6. We
recommend that DFID work with other donors to encourage Pakistan
to make progress on tax policy and revenue collection and seek
to ensure this is a high priority for all donors. We further
recommend that the UK Government use its influence in the IMF
to ensure this institution presses for reforms to Pakistan's tax
system. The UK Government also should be ready to support the
new Pakistan government in implementing a nationwide, strategic
communication plan to explain the need and benefits of the desired
tax policy changes so as to help the authorities to build political
momentum for reform within Pakistan. (Paragraph 60)
The 'Golden Thread'
7. Pakistan
is a country where the Golden Thread is lacking - there is corruption,
a frequent absence of the rule of law and low tax collection.
We were surprised that addressing these important failings does
not seem to be the main focus of DFID's governance work. We recommend
DFID review and re-design the DFID Governance programme to support
key Pakistani reformers to design and deliver a credible reform
programme, involving increases in revenue collection, applying
the rule of law and reducing corruption. (Paragraph 63)
DFID's education projects
8. The
connections between education and extremism are unclear. The UK
Government believes that education will counter extremism, but
others are sceptical. Nevertheless, recruitment into a jihadist
movement would seem likely to be easier where there is hardship,
poverty and unemployment. (Paragraph 83)
9. All
are agreed that it is vital that the quality and coverage of education
is dramatically improved in Pakistan. The Punjab Road Map looks
to be a good project, but DFID will need to be able to adapt
it should there be a change in Chief Minister with a successor
less enthusiastic about the programme. A similar US programme
in Sindh failed once the US withdrew funding. To help ensure
this does not happen in Punjab and that the programme is sustainable,
DFID should continue to help the Government of Punjab build widespread
public support for an improved education policy and programme.
The aim is to build informed demand from parents and an accountable
response from education managers and the teaching profession that
continues from one political administration to the next. (Paragraph
84)
10. We
are concerned by the quality of education provided by the schools
we visited in Punjab, but are pleased that DFID's Punjab education
programme has planned improvements to teacher quality and action
against corruption of the examination system. DFID should report
regularly on progress in improving the quality of education. (Paragraph
85)
DFID's health projects
11. DFID
needs to look carefully at its health programme following the
ICAI criticism. We have not seen enough of a change in the design
of the Maternal and Newborn Health programme to be reassured that
the problems identified by ICAI at the national level will not
just be replicated at the provincial level - mainly the interaction
and relationship between the Community Midwives and Lady Health
Workers. We support the basis of both programmes so are not asking
for the funding to be stopped for either but that the remuneration
packages and way of working are made complementary not competitive.
(Paragraph 95)
12. We
welcome DFID's recognition of the need to improve the nutrition
of mothers and new born children in Pakistan. However we are unconvinced
that 'scaling up' the Lady Health Worker interventions is the
solution until we see evidence of the redesign of the health programmes
as suggested by ICAI. We ask DFID in its response to explain what
has been done to date to rectify the issues. In addition we would
like to receive information on the progress towards a food fortification
intervention programme. (Paragraph 96)
UK Pakistani Diaspora
13. We
recommend that DFID explore innovative ways of working with the
UK Pakistani diaspora:
? to improve the effectiveness of
the development assistance programme, in particular by involving
the diaspora in monitoring projects; and
? to align, where appropriate,
diaspora funding and remittance flows to Pakistan with DFID supported
programmes. (Paragraph 102)
Flexibility to respond to political
events
14. We
recommend that DFID ensures that its programmes have sufficient
flexibility to respond to future political events especially following
the elections due to be held in May this year. (Paragraph 105)
15. We
are concerned that DFID funding for the Benazir Income Support
Programme and the Punjab Education programmes may lead some in
Pakistan to believe that DFID is working unwittingly for selected
Pakistan political parties, albeit these major programmes support
different parties. In its response to this report, DFID should
state how it will dispel such perceptions before Pakistan's forthcoming
elections. (Paragraph 110)
Gender and Violence against women
16. It
is essential that DFID makes the position of women and girls central
to its work and that gender analysis and action is at the core
of its Pakistan programme. As noted in our 2012 report on development
in Afghanistan, the position of women is a key development indicator.
We recommend that DFID establish a gender advisory group made
up of Pakistani women . We believe it should include women like
Mariam Bibi. The group would advise on the impact of development
work on women and explore where DFID could do more. We will continue
to monitor the progress of women's role and inclusion in development
in Pakistan. (Paragraph 115)
The Pakistan government and its progress
on reform
17. If
the political system in Pakistan continues to be characterised
by corruption, insufficient tax collection, poor human rights
and a failure to protect minorities, the effectiveness of donor
supported programmes will always be undermined. We recommend that:
the UK use its influence with the
IMF to ensure that any additional loans are contingent upon prior
commitments and action by the Government of Pakistan to meet clear
conditions and targets;
the UK Government communicate
clearly to the Pakistan authorities the conditions under which
UK development assistance will either increase or be reduced;
DFID only increase official development
assistance expenditure to the planned £464 million per annum
if there is clear evidence that the newly elected Pakistan administration
will increase tax revenues in general and income tax, in particular,
and if it subsequently succeeds in increasing the amount of tax
taken; and
If the Pakistan Government is unwilling
to take action to increase its revenues and improve services for
its people, it cannot expect the British people to do so in the
long run. We cannot expect the citizens of the UK to pay taxes
to improve education and health in Pakistan if the Pakistan elite
is not paying income tax. (Paragraph 119)
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