International Development Committee - UK Aid to RwandaWritten evidence submitted by Christian Aid

Summary

1. This submission relates to the UK’s aid relationship with Rwanda in the context of recent allegations of Rwandan support to the M23 and other armed groups in Eastern DRC. Following a report by the United Nations Group of Experts (GoE) implicating support by the Rwandan Government for armed groups in DRC, the UK delayed disbursement of £16 million in budget support. This money was subsequently reinstated 6 weeks later.

2. Christian Aid welcomes UK efforts to promote transparency to ensure aid goes to those who need it most and to promote open societies and open economies. In this light we welcome the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) underpinning the principles of Rwanda-UK aid partnership and long term support for the Government of Rwanda (GoR), which has been essential in helping Rwanda rebuild after the genocide.

3. However, Christian Aid is concerned about the recent decision by DFID to disburse previously withheld budgetary support to the Government of Rwanda (GoR). This concern stems from ongoing allegations of the GoR’s support for M23 and insufficient assurances from the GoR that violations of the MoU and UN Arms Embargo on DRC have ceased. Additionally Christian Aid would like to have seen a more exhaustive use of UK diplomatic leverage in the region and the exploration of alternate modalities of aid delivery.

4. This submission makes a number of recommendations for the UK Government:

Withholding aid to Rwanda has and immediate impact on the poorest and risks destabilising Rwanda, therefore we encourage DFID to reallocate their upcoming disbursements to Rwanda to be channelled through (local) NGO’s and civil society, as well as the earmarking of funds disbursed to the Rwandan Government to reach those in need. This will give a clear signal to the Rwandan Government that violations of international commitments and the MoU are unacceptable.

The MoU between the UK and Rwanda should be revitalised and strongly monitored, with both sides living up to principles included in the MoU. The UK Government has an obligation to publicly condemn any violation of the MoU, step up its diplomatic and monitoring efforts over allegations of violations, and to take appropriate and strong steps in case of violations.

Beyond immediate funding decisions, taking into account Rwanda’s role and influence in peace and stability in the region, the UK should use its leverage and influence as a major donor, in the UN and in the EU to take a more active stand on the search for solutions to the current crisis, that takes into account a country specific and regional approach.

This should include a redefined relationship with Rwanda that not only focuses on dealing with Rwanda’s involvement in the current crisis in eastern DRC but also examines the internal political situation in Rwanda where democratic space and respect for human rights are increasingly under pressure.

I. Introduction

1. Christian Aid is a Christian organization that insists the world can and must be swiftly changed to one where everyone can live a full life, free from poverty. We work globally in over 40 countries for profound change that eradicates the causes of poverty, striving to achieve equality, dignity and freedom for all, regardless of faith or nationality. We are part of a wider movement for social justice. We provide urgent, practical and effective assistance where need is great, tackling the effects of poverty as well as its root causes.

2. Christian Aid has programmes in Rwanda, as well as in the DRC and Burundi, adopting a regional approach to addressing the difficulties in the shared difficulties in the Great Lakes. Our work in the “Great Lakes region” began in the 1960s, by supporting churches in Rwanda to meet the needs of rural communities. Today we work in the region supporting our local partners’ efforts to tackle the underlying causes of poverty and instability.

3. Christian Aid’s report It’s Time to Open Up published in2004, described the human rights, governance and accountability situation in Rwanda 10 years after the genocide. The report recognised the important progress made in post-genocide reconstruction in Rwanda, but also the need to start opening political and civil space in Rwanda and for the Rwandan government to promote peace and stability in eastern DRC. Our subsequent experience has convinced us that this remains the case.

4. We welcome this opportunity to provide written evidence on “UK aid to Rwanda”. We have included specific recommendations for UK Government (HMG) action in their bilateral and multilateral aid programmes, and in their diplomatic efforts in Rwanda, as well as in the Great Lakes Region. We are happy to provide further evidence via Barry Johnston, UK Political Advisor, bjohnston@christian-aid.org or 020 7523 2175.

II. Brief Overview of the Current Situation

1. The interim report of the United Nations Group of Experts (GoE) published in June 2012 (and its addendum) found that Rwanda is providing extensive support to armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in particular to the March 23 rebellion (M23).1 The report also includes allegations of support to six other armed groups. The Rwandan government has denied these allegations and provided an official response to the allegations made in the Addendum at the end of July 2012.2

2. Following the publishing of the interim report of the UN GoE, the UK government expressed concerns about the situation in the Kivu provinces of eastern Congo directly with the Rwandan Foreign Minister as well as with the Rwandan President Kagame. In July 2012 the UK decided to delay a payment of £16 million of budgetary support to the G0R. In addition, after Rwanda’s response to the UN GoE report, the Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office said that the UK government did not have any evidence provided by Ministers and others in the Government of Rwanda that convinced them that the allegations were unfounded. However, only six weeks later, budgetary support was reinstated, this time pointing to Rwanda’s internal success story and its constructive engagement with regional peace processes.3

3. Christian Aid is concerned at the reversal of this decision without citing any appreciable change in the circumstance that led to the suspension. Specifically, there has been no evidence of the GoR ceasing support to M23 and other armed groups; regional discussions at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region have failed to provide tangible results; and local reports indicate increasing concerns about the protection of civilians in conflict affected regions.

4. Taking into account that concerns remain over Rwandan involvement with the M23 rebellion and taking into account that the final UN GoE report will inform the next UK disbursement of GBS scheduled for December 2012, Christian Aid recommends a revision of current the UK-Rwanda aid funding. Such a revision needs to take into account that simply withholding aid will have an immediate impact on the poorest and risks destabilising Rwanda. Therefore we encourage DFID to reprogram aid through different (local) NGO’s and civil society channels and earmarking funds to the GoR to reach those most in need. This is an essential step in giving a clear signal to the Rwandan Government that any violations of international commitments and the non-fulfilment of the MoU will not be accepted.

5. We further recommend that that while deciding over upcoming disbursements of aid to Rwanda, it is of the utmost importance the UK government takes into account Rwanda’s role and influence in peace and stability in the region. Aid should come along with the UK using its leverage and influence as a major donor, in the UN and in the EU to take a more active stand on the search for solutions to the current crisis, which takes into account a country specific and regional approach.

III. The Rwanda-UK Memorandum of Understanding and Other Agreements

6. The development partnership between the UK and Rwanda is framed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 1999 and updated in 2006, and underpins the aid partnership for Direct Budgetary Support between the two countries. While the MoU is not a legally-binding document, the MoU can be seen as a public expression of the intentions, goals and principles of the aid partnership. The MoU sets out that the Government of Rwanda commits to elements of conflict prevention, includes promoting peace and security in the Great Lakes Region and compliance with relevant international obligations, as well as supporting conflict prevention activities.

7. Rwanda has also signed various international commitments relating to peace in the region. These include the 2006 “Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region” , a legally binding document that obliges states “to abstain from sending or supporting armed opposition forces or armed groups or insurgents onto the territory of other Member States”, as well as the 2007 Nairobi Joint Communiqué committing the Government of Rwanda to: “Take all necessary measures to seal its border to prevent the entry into or exit from its territory of members of any armed group, renegade militia leaders ….. and prevent any form of support—military, material or human—being provided to any armed group in the DRC”.

8. In 2003, with the adoption of Resolution 1493, the United Nations Security Council imposed an arms embargo on all foreign and Congolese armed groups operating in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. The Resolution demanded “that all States and in particular those in the region, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ensure that no direct or indirect assistance, especially military or financial assistance, is given to the movements and armed groups present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”. Taking into account that the arms embargo was modified over the years, the embargo on non-governmental forces remains in place and has been extended until 30 November 2012.

9. The MoU also sets out terms with regard to steps the UK Government can take following the non-fulfilment of commitments. Assistance can be interrupted or reduced when, among other things, “the Government of Rwanda is in significant violation of human rights or other international obligations, especially those relating to regional peace and security”.4

10. The allegations in the interim UN GoE report suggest a violation of both international commitments and the MoU between Rwanda and the UK. These allegations are of such strength that the UK should take a more proactive stance on publicly condemning any non-fulfilment of the MoU, should step up its diplomatic and monitoring efforts over these allegations, and should develop follow-up steps in case of violations.

IV. The UK’s Wider Relationship with Rwanda

11. Since the Rwandan genocide, the UK has become Rwanda’s largest bilateral aid donor, spending an average total budget of £83 million per year. The UK government also plays a key role in the European Union (also a major donor to Rwanda) and invests significant amounts of aid in the DRC and neighbouring Burundi, either bilaterally or multilaterally. This places the UK government in a position to influence policies in Rwanda bilaterally, via the European Union and regionally.

12. Rwanda has made remarkable progress towards reconstruction and consolidating internal security after the devastation of the civil war and 1994 genocide, especially with regard to economic growth and the Millennium Development Goals. Laudable efforts were made to promote national reconciliation. However, these efforts have not comprehensively addressed realities of Rwandan society and politics which contributed to the genocide in the first place; tensions around ethnic identity and power, coupled with the tendency for top-down authoritarian rule. These realities perpetuate the disempowerment of citizens who do not dare question authority.

13. The UK government has continuously referred to Rwanda as a success story, speaking about the country “being a role model for development and lifting people out of poverty in Africa”.5 Despite the fact that in its Operational Plan for Rwanda (2011–2015) DFID mentions that “Rwanda’s development progress is impressive, but it is also fragile” in terms of state-building, concerns about state-building elements have rarely been revealed or referred to in public. While the FCO has sometimes been more critical of Rwanda’s role in the region and its internal developments, the UK government has sometimes appeared less responsive to these challenges.

14. In the context of UK aid to Rwanda, the UK government needs to redefine its relation with Rwanda by prioritizing increased attention to the countries internal political situation. A more proactive stance on the fragility of development in Rwanda by addressing democratic space, human rights and strengthening civil society in Rwanda is key to long term stability, development and accountable governance.

November 2012