International Development Committee - UK Aid to RwandaWritten evidence submitted by the UK Rwanda Diaspora Community.

1. In spite of strong protest from Kigali, accusations that Rwanda is fuelling the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been accepted as undeniable fact. Countries once well disposed towards Rwanda have been quick to withdraw their support, allowing Rwanda little or no chance for a right of reply. There is no reason to doubt that these countries genuinely believe that isolating Rwanda in this way will alleviate the DRC’s suffering. However this is to misread, or completely misunderstand the causes of the conflict in the DRC. And it is only with dispassionate analysis of these causes that real solutions will be found. Yet rather than seek a real understanding of the underlying causes, almost all of Rwanda’s critics have tended to satisfy themselves with holding Rwanda responsible for the DRC’s ills. This not only does nothing to advance the cause of peace in the DRC, but, it may conceivably result in destabilising Rwanda, and rolling back, if not all, then at least some of the life and death achievements of the last decade or so.

2. Only with objective analysis of the real causes of conflict in the DRC, can there be any realistic hope of bringing respite to the longsuffering people of that country, and peace to the region. Rwanda has vehemently denied supporting the so called M23 rebel group. However their response and evidential refutation of the report accusing them of supporting this group are covered elsewhere. Our concern is that for a proper understanding of how Rwanda comes to be involved in the DRC, a number of questions need to be considered:

Who or what is M23, and what is their connection to Rwanda?

Why would Rwanda be involved in the DRC at all, given the disapprobation heaped upon it?

Who beside the M23 group is party to conflict in the DRC and why?

3. For better or worse, few, if any of Rwanda’s policies can be understood without considering them in the context of the 1994 genocide. And so it is with any real understanding of whom or what is M23. M23 is a rump of what was CNDP, which was led by Laurent Nkundabatware, better known as Laurent Nkunda. Many, although by no means all of the members of both groups, are Congolese of Rwandan origin, better known as Banyamurenge. They are so called, because they settled in the Murenge region of Congo, as long ago as the Seventeenth Century. Most of them were Batutsi, or as they have come to be known, Tutsis. It is important to note this because had they not been Batutsi, we would be having a different debate.

4. As well as this group there are other Congolese of Rwandan origin, later arrivals, from the 30s, 40s and 50s. Almost all of them settled in Eastern Congo. In late fifties and early sixties the Rwandan monarchy is overthrown, and the first massacres of Batutsi in Rwanda begin. Hundreds of thousands are murdered in what is a precursor to the genocide of 1994. There is an exodus of Batutsi to neighbouring countries to escape these pogroms, including what is now the DRC. In 1994 as RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front) fighters advance against the Habyarimana regime to halt the genocide in progress, French troops create a safe corridor for regime members, army and Interahamwe militias to take refuge into Congo. With this action a microcosm of Rwanda and its communal hatreds is imported ready made into what was then Zaire. With the benefit of hindsight it is now clear that this is the moment the involvement of the new RPF government into Congo becomes almost inevitable.

5. The earlier migrants who had settled peacefully, and become Congolese are soon to be dragged into the very problems they had left behind. Soon the new RPF government would also be obliged to get involved. The former Rwanda regime, complete with its army, and militias begin to plot return to power in Rwanda, and in their oft repeated declarations, finish off where had they left off. They are later to form a unified movement, the somewhat paradoxically named “Democratic Federation for the Liberation of Rwanda”, FDLR. They begin by attacking the Banyamurenge, our fist group of Congolese of Rwandan origin, and other Batutsi who had settled into Congo decades earlier. Crucially, they also begin to cross into Rwanda and murder genocide survivors in particular, because they would bear witness to the crimes of genocide. This is relatively easy for the attackers, since their camps were on the boarder of Rwanda and Congo.

6. The RPF, then still more of a movement with a military arm than a government, has more than it can cope with stabilising Rwanda to defend against this new threat. It calls for the International Community to help. It asks that the militias and the soldiers be separated from ordinary civilians, who were being virtually held hostage by their former rulers. Once the militias and soldiers had been separated from civilians and their families, the former be relocated away from the Rwanda boarder, at a distance stipulated under International law. These calls for help are almost entirely in vain, and the attacks continue. At some point, almost in frustrated desperation, a plan is hatched in Kigali, to go after the attackers. As we now know, the plan is centred on supporting the then President Mobutu’s opponents in Congo to overthrow his regime. In return, it is envisaged, the new Congolese government will work with Rwanda to disarm the forces that would later call themselves the FDLR, and build friendly relations with the RPF government. In due course, with the help of Uganda, and Rwanda, Laurent Kabila finds himself in Kinshasa, as head of state, as the late Julius Nyerere was later to quip, a surprised man. However, there was to be no lasting friendship between the two governments, and Rwanda would soon find itself launching another war in Congo, this time against the very man it had helped install in power.

7. The falling out between the new government of Laurent Kabila and the RPF government leads to the second stage of Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC. This is messier, and arguably more deadly, as it is less clear cut. Having been heavily dependent on Rwanda and Uganda for military power (the Congo army was trained by Rwanda, and many of its senior officers still maintain close relationships with their former trainers in Kigali), Laurent Kabila now looks around for new allies. Among those allies are members of the former Rwandan army, who together with the Interahamwe militia would form the nucleus of the FDLR. Now close to the Congolese government, these forces are allowed to do in Congo what they had done in Rwanda, massacre Batutsi. For a period, there a is virtual replay of a mini Rwanda genocide in Congo, complete with their version of Radio Mille Colline, the broadcasts which in Rwanda exhorted people to go out and murder their neighbours. The Banyamurenge were a particular target, but, so were many other Congolese of Rwandan origin. Burundi’s own extremist groups, including the FNL (National Forces for Liberation), make common cause with the FDLR.

8. This time although Rwanda does again call for help from the International Community, it does so expecting that no help will come. As Mobutu was replaced with Kabila, there are no shortages of Congolese who are deemed to be better qualified than Laurent Kabila to lead their nation, and most importantly from Rwanda’s point of view, who will honour the original accords. Essentially Rwanda’s objective is to achieve militarily what it had hoped the International Community would have done, through exerting pressure on successive regimes in Congo: separate the Rwanda civilians from the FDLR then push the latter away from the Rwanda boarder area. In effect Rwanda decides to change regime in the DRC. However Kabila, the eternal survivor, calls in other neighbouring countries, almost all of whom answer the call, motivated by Congolese riches. The result is what has been termed Africa’s First World War.

9. By now the International Community had begun to respond to Rwanda’s calls, but, not in the way that Rwanda had hoped, or expected. Rather than recognising its security concerns, Rwanda is pressured to end the conflict. Rwanda argues that of all the countries with armies in Congo, only it has a legitimate reason to be there, for its security. Kabila’s government argues that all other armies, other than Rwanda, are there at his government’s invitation. The International Community focuses pressure on Rwanda to withdraw from Congo. Rwanda argues that it will do so if either Congo or the International Community addresses its legitimate security concerns. By now these include a force estimated at 15,000 strong on Rwanda’s boarder, a shadow government, with schools for civilians, all fed and sustained by the donor Community. The deadlock is eventually broken at the Pretoria, and Lusaka conferences, mediated by Thabo Mbeki. The conferences address a comprehensive list of concerns, which all parties agree to implement:

All foreign armies are to withdraw from the DRC.

The FDLR to be disarmed, all none Congolese Rwandans repatriated, allowing Rwanda to reintegrate them into their respective communities.

All persecution of Congolese of Rwandan origin to cease, allowing them to return to their homes and their lands, their rights as Congolese citizens fully recognised.

All Congolese combatants to be either voluntarily demobilised or integrated into the national army.

A transitional government of national unity to be set up in Congo, succeeded by a new government, following elections.

A UN force is to oversee the implementation of the agreement.

10. Rwanda signs up to this agreement, and even when Laurent Kabila is assassinated, and succeeded by his son, Rwanda hopes that the agreement still holds. Sadly it does not. First the Congolese combatants are not allocated the ranks in the national army as agreed. Congolese of Rwandan origin continue to be persecuted, dispossessed, and driven from their lands, and the FDLR continue to become entrenched within Congo’s administration, and army.

11. In response, CNDP (Congress for the Protection of The People) from which M23 is to emerge, is born. It is led by Laurent Nkundabatware. He is from the Banyamurenge community, and he has a single objective: to protect his community from the FDLR, and his own government and military. And so begins what became a major threat to the Kinshasa government. Again, the pressure is put on Rwanda, which is accused of supporting Nkunda. This pressure is intensified when there are allegations of human rights abuses by Nkunda’s fighters. Rwanda argues that Nkunda is simply a symptom of a deeper problem, chiefly, the failure to implement accords. CNDP is achieving two objectives which arguably suit Rwanda: it is weakening the FDLR, and it is protecting Congolese of Rwandan origin. Rwanda argues that the only way of removing Nkunda and other armed groups, is to ensure implementation of the Pretoria/Lusaka agreements. All this falls on deaf ears. The narrative that Rwanda is fuelling the conflict in Congo is virtually indelibly established.

12. Nevertheless, there is some hope: when Nkunda’s CNDP threatens Goma, Joseph Kabila appeals to Rwanda to mediate a negotiated settlement between Nkunda and his government. Rwanda sends its Minister of Defence, and former head of its army, James Kabarebe, and together with the head of Congo’s army, they begin negotiations with Laurent Nkunda. The meetings take place both in Congo, and Rwanda. We do not know the details of these meetings, but, we do know that an agreement is proposed. The government of Congo would implement all the agreements it had failed to implement, CNDP would be integrated into the Congolese army, the persecution of Congolese of Rwandan origin would cease, and Congo would cooperate with Rwanda to move against the FDLR. However Nkunda’s mistrust of his government is such that he does not believe that Joseph Kabila would honour any of the agreements, and it seems that his intransigence is deemed an obstacle to progress by the two governments.

13. At a meeting in Kigali, which included Joseph Kabila, Nkunda is detained by Rwanda security forces, and to this day remains under house arrest in Rwanda. The two governments then work with Bosco Ntaganda, then Nkunda’s deputy in the leadership of CNDP. James Kabarebe continues to mediate in the negotiations. On 23 March, an agreement is reached. All agreements would be implemented, including the integration of CNDP into the Congolese army, with appropriate ranks. Among them is Bosco Ntaganda, who takes the rank of general. As part of the new agreement, a joint Rwanda/Congo force is deployed against the FDLR, dealing it a serious blow, and greatly weakening it. Sadly, Nkunda is soon to be proved right, as this agreement too begins to unravel, again, over none implementation of the accord.

14. CNDP personnel complain that they are routinely discriminated against. Most never received their ranks, no pay, and are barely recognised as members of the national army. To make matters worse, a decision is taken to redeploy them to different parts of the country, away from their families. They fear that attacks against their families will resume, while they are too scattered to defend them. They also argued that without any pay, they remain dependent on their families. How would they live if they are to be deployed so far away from their families? And their fears seem justified. An estimated fifty of their number who had been deployed to the West of the country are all killed, reportedly by their colleagues from the national army. No one is held responsible, and no investigation is carried out. Inevitably, others refuse to be redeployed. Once again, Kabila turns to Rwanda requesting that Rwanda uses its leverage to bring the restive soldiers to heel. Once again, Rwanda dispatches James Kabarebe to work with his Congolese counterpart.

15. There have been suggestions that Bosco Ntaganda reported to Kabarebe, and that Ntaganda was in and out of Kigali at will. This is mostly likely confusing the nature of Kabarebe’s relationship with many in the Congolese army. At the time of the overthrow of Mobutu, Kabarebe, then a young soldier was the de facto head of the Congolese military. Many of the senior officers in the Congolese army, including Joseph Kabila himself were trained by Rwanda, and they remained close to Kabarebe and his staff. It was therefore natural that Kabarebe would be sent to mediate between a section of the army, and the government. He knew them all well, as they did him. However, the suggestion that Ntaganda frequented Kigali is certainly incorrect. Ntaganda was wary of travelling to Kigali, and preferred to send his deputies. He well remembered what had happened to his boss, Laurent Nkunda when he went to Kigali for just such a meeting.

16. In any case, all Rwanda’s efforts were to be nullified, when in the midst of negotiations, in a speech in Goma, Joseph Kabila announced that he was to arrest all the former CNDP soldiers who refused redeployedment. Some were arrested, many escaped, including Ntaganda, who had apparently been tipped off. Ntaganda also believed that he was about to be arrested and handed over to the ICC. Within a couple of months, those who were at large, had found each other, and “M23” was born. By now their grievances had multiplied. And this is how things now stand, with Rwanda being held responsible for their attacks against their government.

17. We have tried to summarise the background to the current narrative which holds Rwanda responsible for the conflict in Congo. It is a tragedy that the International Community seems to blithely ignore the real causes of conflict, and chooses to condemn the one country in the region which is actually in a position to make a significant contribution to efforts to bring about peace in Congo. Today, a number of EU countries, including the World Bank, and the African Development Bank, have withdrawn financial support from Rwanda. None of these countries or institutions truly believes that aid to Rwanda is used for anything other than poverty reduction. The laudable use to which Rwanda puts aid money is widely acknowledged, and we shall not take up the committee’s time outlining what it already knows. The Rwanda government has a policy of inviting third party auditors to verify that aid money is spent on education, agriculture, health, and similar policies. It has been said that for every pound given to Rwanda, one pound fifty of work is produced. None is allocated to M23, as is being claimed.

18. More importantly, impoverishing and stigmatising Rwanda will do nothing to bring peace to Congo. As the Rwanda government has consistently argued, the causes of the conflict emanate from within Congo, and so must the solutions. Rwanda does indeed bear a responsibility, not for “fuelling conflict in Congo”, but, as an important regional player, which must do its part to bring peace to its long suffering neighbour. However, rather than put undue pressure on Rwanda, the Congo government should be pushed to work with Rwanda to implement all accords up to which it has signed. It is the failure to do so that is prolonging the conflict. For instance, Rwanda has proposed a regional force to rid Congo of all armed groups, including M23. Only Congo has refused to even discuss it. Our concern is not just for Rwanda. It is for the region, it is for the Congolese children who dread walking to school for fear of being raped. It is for a country betrayed by its supposed leadership. Holding Rwanda responsible or all this is a red herring, and a tragic one at that.

November 2012

Prepared 30th November 2012