Conclusions and recommendations
Conclusions
1. Select
committees should influence policy and have an impact on Government
departments and the agencies to which their functions may be devolved.
This is our first objective. The extent of this influence and
impact is the primary measure of the effectiveness of select committees.
(Paragraph 12)
2. While committees'
primary purpose is to scrutinise Government, it is sometimes in
the public interest for them to extend their scrutiny to other
organisations. (Paragraph 13)
3. Scrutiny committees
are not just involved in scrutinising others but have an active
role to play themselves in putting issues on the agenda and acting
as a forum for public debate. (Paragraph 14)
4. We believe it continues
to be useful to define core tasks for committees, to guide committees
in deciding their programme, but not to constrain their freedom
to decide their own priorities. (Paragraph 16)
5. Activity of itself
is not a measure of effectiveness, and different subject areas
require different levels, and different forms, of scrutiny; but
the overall high level of committee activity this Parliament is
a positive indicator of the commitment made by committees to the
tasks they have been set by the House of Commons. (Paragraph 21)
6. We believe that
the value of these debates would be greatly enhanced if they were
considered on a substantive motion. We note that this is possible
under the Standing Orders substantive motions have recently
been used for debates on e-petitions in Westminster Hall
though any division would need to be taken on the floor of the
House. Where the committee concerned thinks this is appropriate,
and subject to the agreement of the Chairman of Ways and Means,
we intend to use this approach in future. (Paragraph 48)
7. We will continue
to give priority for Estimates Day debates to committee reports
which focus on departmental expenditure and performance. (Paragraph
51)
8. The consensus of
those who gave us evidence is that committees are successful in
influencing Government. (Paragraph 61)
9. While we welcome
the wide consensus that select committees have a significant,
positive impact, we take very seriously the critical feedback
received. (Paragraph 63)
10. Now, two years
into the Parliament, is a very good time for committees to take
stock and agree their objectives for the remainder of the Parliament.
(Paragraph 64)
11. We agree that
committees should be proactive and forward-looking and
devote less effort to raking over the coals of past events unless
there are lessons to be learnt and changes to be recommended.
(Paragraph 70)
12. When considering
how to make an impact with the media, committees have a wider
range of choices than ever before, and this means we need to give
more thought to what we really want to achieve and target resources
effectively. (Paragraph 85)
13. While committees
need to maintain their freedom to respond to their particular
circumstances, we believe there is a case for setting some principles
of good practice. It is our intention to prepare a set of guidelines
for this purpose. (Paragraph 104)
14. If a government
response is inadequate, a committee can and should draw attention
to this when it reports and publishes the response. (Paragraph
108)
15. We stand ready
to work with the Cabinet Office on new guidelines for departments
on producing government responses to reports. (Paragraph 109)
16. We do not accept
that the Osmotherly rules should have any bearing on whom a select
committee should choose to summon as a witness. The Osmotherly
rules are merely internal for Government. They have never been
accepted by Parliament. Where the inquiry relates to departmental
delivery rather than ministerial decision-making, it is vital
that committees should be able to question the responsible official
directly even if they have moved on to another job. It
does of course remain the case that an official can decline to
answer for matters of policy, on the basis that it is for the
minister to answer for the policy, but officials owe a direct
obligation to Parliament to report on matters of fact and implementation.
This does not alter the doctrine of ministerial accountability
in any way. Ministers should never require an official to withhold
information from a select committee. It cannot be a breach of
the principle of ministerial responsibility for an official to
give a truthful answer to a select committee question. No official
should seek to protect his or her minister by refusing to do so.
(Paragraph 113)
17. The way ministerial
accountability operates has on occasion been unacceptable, with
ministers blaming officials for failures in their departments
or in agencies for which they are responsible, but also with officials
then refusing to answer questions which would indicate where responsibility
for failure actually lies. (Paragraph 114)
18. Additional work
arising from such additional committees as the Parliamentary Commission
on Banking Standards could have the effect of reducing availability
for existing committees. We do not regard this as acceptable.
Any substantial extra committee work, beyond the normal work of
existing committees including joint committees, which is undertaken
at the initiative of Government should be fully funded by a transfer
from the Treasury to the House of Commons. (Paragraph 121)
19. Now may not be
the best time to argue for increased resources, but it should
be the long term goal of the House to build up the capacity of
select committees, to improve their effectiveness and status,
to increase their powers and influence, and to improve their efficiency
by providing chairs and staffs with accommodation and infrastructure
to enable them to hold Government to account. (Paragraph 128)
20. We are persuaded
that the disadvantages of enshrining parliamentary privilege in
statute would outweigh the benefits. (Paragraph 133)
21. We conclude that,
at the very least Parliament should set out a clear, and realistic,
statement of its powers and perhaps also its responsibilities
in a resolution of the House and set out in more detail
in Standing Orders how those powers are to be exercised. (Paragraph
134)
Recommendations
For Committees
22. Our
Committee has asked the Procedure Committee to consider whether
members wishing to leave a committee could be counted as discharged,
even if it means that the lack of an applicant leaves a vacancy
on the committee. We reiterate the concern we expressed in the
last Parliament about the size of select committees and support
the Wright Committee's recommendation that the size of departmental
committees should not normally be more than 11 members. (Paragraph
29)
23. We encourage other
committees to make use of the support of the Scrutiny Unit and
to discuss with the National Audit Office how its programme of
work might help support the work of the committee. (Paragraph
42)
24. As a model of
"best practice", we recommend that committees:
- have a candid discussion amongst
themselves about how they see their purpose, and what they wish
to achieve over the length of the Parliament;
- identify what are the most important functions
of their department's responsibilities and design a programme
of scrutiny to assess whether the department's objectives have
been fulfilled;
- clearly record their conclusions and remind themselves
of them when considering proposals for inquiry and programme planning;
- review this at least annually, with an "awayday"
or at least a longer, less formal discussion than is possible
at a regular deliberative meeting; and
- canvass opinion among the key players in their
subject area about their performance. (Paragraph 65)
25. We
expect Government departments to be transparent about their objectives,
and we ought to practise what we preach. We commend to other committees
the practice of publishing strategic objectives, and of consulting
their department and other stakeholders on them. (Paragraph 66)
26. We recommend that,
before they launch an inquiry, committees agree a comprehensive
minute setting out what they hope to achieve, and the likelihood
of success. (Paragraph 69)
27. We recommend that
in future inquiries, as a matter of routine, committees include
consideration of the financial aspects and implications of the
policies being examined. This could include for instance, what
the justification for spending public money is, what evidence
there is that it will offer, or is offering, good value for money
to the taxpayer, what alternatives have been considered and whether
they would be likely to be more effective, and the outcomes expected
to be added to or improved upon by the spending. (Paragraph 72)
28. We encourage committees
to hold evidence sessions at least annually with ministers and
departmental accounting officers, and include within these sessions
consideration of how departments evaluate and take decisions on
spending, and how they assess the effectiveness of the spending
they undertake. (Paragraph 73)
29. We encourage committees
to review departments' Mid-Year Reports when published, using
them to identify relevant issues and questions relating to finance
and performance. (Paragraph 74)
30. We recommend that
committees experiment with different approaches, such as appointing
a rapporteur to lead on a particular inquiry, or choosing "lead
questioners" for an evidence session. (Paragraph 76)
31. We recommend that
committees make every effort to broaden their range of witnesses,
and to take into account the principles of diversity and inclusion
in planning their inquiries and committee programme. (Paragraph
77)
32. Committees should
bear in mind the option of commissioning research when planning
their long-term strategies, and, if necessary, the House authorities
should increase the money available for this purpose. (Paragraph
78)
33. We encourage committees
to keep their reports short and accessible, and to avoid too many
recommendations. A clear indication of which recommendations are
most important will help the committee achieve impact and make
follow-up easier. We recommend that the usual template for committee
reports be changed to distinguish clearly the recommendations
targeted at the Government. We suggest that conclusions should
be in bold, with recommendations in bold italics, and that it
should be clearly stated to whom the recommendation is addressed.
(Paragraph 79)
34. We recommend that
each committee should appoint a member of staff, or an adviser,
or an outside body, who will monitor follow-up to recommendations
in respect of each report. The committee should report to the
House at least once in each parliamentary Session upon how many
of its recommendations the Government has acted, and what follow-up
is proposed on outstanding recommendations. (Paragraph 83)
35. It is sensible
for departmental select committees to be able to cross departmental
boundaries when this is in the interest of effective scrutiny
of matters which go beyond a single department, but they should
do so in ways which respect the role of other departmental select
committees and in full consultation with the chairs of those committees.
(Paragraph 84)
36. We recommend that
the introductory briefings offered to new committee members be
given more formality, and include a meeting with the chair or
another experienced committee member. When there is significant
turnover following a reshuffle, for example, a programme of collective
briefings for new committee members should be arranged. (Paragraph
96)
37. We recommend that
committees consider the benefits of using professional trainers
to help them refresh and develop their questioning skills. (Paragraph
97)
38. We recommend that
chairs discuss with their committee how they see their role, and
seek their endorsement for it. At this stage in the Parliament,
there may be benefit in chairs asking their committees for individual
feedback on their chairmanship, as an aid to the chair's professional
development and to encourage committee engagement. (Paragraph
100)
For the House
39. The
timing rule should be relaxed to provide that a statement on a
select committee report should be within a reasonable period of
the publication of the report: say, within 10 sitting days (so
that reports launched when the House is not sitting are not precluded).
Finally, we recommend that it should be for the Speaker, in consultation
with the Chair of the Liaison Committee, to decide whether a select
committee report is sufficiently topical and significant to merit
a statement on the floor of the House on any sitting day. It would
remain the responsibility of the Backbench Business Committee
to decide what select committee reports merit debate in backbench
time. (Paragraph 50)
40. We recommend that
the funding of the Committee Office Media and Communications team
be increased to allow the employment of one or two additional
media officers. (Paragraph 120)
41. We recommend that
committee clerks, and in some cases other key staff, should normally
remain in post for at least four years. (Paragraph 122)
42. We recommend that,
if a committee wishes this and the Liaison Committee agrees, it
should be possible to recruit a committee clerk directly to post
by open competition, and that there should be greater flexibility
in bringing in outside experts to support committees in their
work. (Paragraph 125)
For Government
43. We
recommend that the Government engage with us in a review of the
relationship between Government and select committees with the
aim of producing joint guidelines for departments and committees,
which recognise ministerial accountability, the proper role of
the Civil Service and the legitimate wish of Parliament for more
effective accountability. (Paragraph 115)
For others
44. Now
that select committees are elected by the House and taking a higher
profile, we urge editors and broadcasters to introduce reports
of parliamentary committees in such a way as to indicate their
official status, with words such as "the House of Commons
Education Committee" or "the Parliamentary Education
Committee", rather than somewhat absurdly saying a report
has been produced by "a group of MPs" (which the broadcasters
seem to use regularly) suggesting that such a group is self-selecting
at random and has no official status (rather like referring to
the BBC as "a group of broadcasters"). (Paragraph
91)
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