Political and Constitutional Reform CommitteeWritten evidence submitted jointly by Phil Harris and Conor McGrath

“Good Lobbying is like Growing Asparagus, you wish you had started two years ago”

Michael Shea

1. Please find my submission to the inquiry. I am joint funding editor of the Journal of Public Affairs and have been researching the area internationally for more than a decade. I attach a copy of my doctoral thesis1 on the subject which was submitted in 1999 which covers much of the early origins and processes of the industry and some related theory. I also attach some related articles evidencing the breath of the international industry and critical developments for the committee to consider.2 Lobbying is a critical component part of International Public Affairs Management and thus this submission of a range of articles from the JPA to give international context to the scale and regulatory issues around a viable regulatory process being developed in the UK.

2. Lobbying is an international industry of major significance with key focal points of activity being centred on Brussels, Geneva, London and Washington and more recently Berlin and Hong Kong. Lobbying is seen as being an integral part of Public Affairs Management, which is the strategic international business communication focused on informing legislatures, officials, policy makers and those that influence regulatory frameworks whether they are at a local, national or at an international level.

3. There are increasing amounts of published research in this field and it is an area of professional practice that has seen substantial growth over the past decade. Public Affairs and particularly government relations/lobbying, have evolved from a tactic adopted by organisations to amend occasional legislation to become a managerial strategy to achieve competitive advantage. A well cited example of lobbying is that of particular European vehicle manufacturers to ensure catalytic convertors were installed as standard emissions systems in Europe, ensuring they gained competitive edge.

4. The rapidly increasing strategic role of public affairs has been spurred on by the trend towards privatisation and regulation. This together with the globalisation of business operations and a surge in trans-national government legislation (European Union [EU], North American Free Trade Area [NAFTA], World Trade Organisation [WTO]) has forced organisations of all types to pay greater attention to their relationships with government—at all levels. The formal approval of acquisitions, alliances, mergers, standard-setting and takeovers is increasingly under government scrutiny as it attempts to regulate markets and trade. The regulation of auditing, banking and the large accountancy groups is now much on the world public affairs agenda and exercising leading corporate, political and research minds as they attempt to produce good corporate governance.

5. The increasing role of government as regulator as old corporatist linkages break down under globalisation is a phenomenon that public affairs practitioners and corporations have to deal with on a daily and yet strategic basis. The transfer of publicly owned businesses to the private sector such as energy, telecommunications and water utilities has directly stimulated the increasing importance of the public affairs area.

6. In addition the growth of increasingly powerful and well-organised pressure groups, which are capable of mobilising strong opposition to organisations whose policies they disagree with, has further stimulated public affairs work, stakeholder programs, political campaigning and lobbying activity. Technological advances within the media now allow events in virtually any part of the world to be screened almost instantaneously, subjecting the behaviour of organisations even in the most remote parts of the globe to world-wide media and public scrutiny. The global dialogue on trade, commerce, and investment involves business executives, government officials, and representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Not surprisingly, this dialogue often includes environmental (ecological), social and community issues. Thus the entire business government society relationship is open to discussion, debate, and redefinition throughout the world.

7. Businesses, government agencies, and NGOs have a stake in cultivating a dialogue that is informed, fact driven, and progressive. Population growth, the need for improved quality of life, food and raw material security, human rights, and sustainable economic and ecological practices are among the broad issues shaping the public agenda for nations across the globe. Constructive dialogue depends on accurate information, commitment to human interaction, and the willingness to think long- as well as short-term.

8. The Committee will need to assess the development of a full register to include in-house lobbyists from large corporates, pressure groups and industry associations alongside individual lobbyists, this is where there has been most significant growth in the industry in the UK and worldwide over the last decade. Much attention is now being focused on international public affairs focused on Asian Growth markets and needs and the adoption of soft power techniques are being appreciated and developed.

9. I hope this information and submission is helpful and would be happy to present further information on the scale of the industry internationally or be of advice or provide further evidence if that was deemed of use.

Authors

10. Phil Harris is Executive Dean of the Faculty of Business, Enterprise and Lifelong Learning (and Westminster Chair of Marketing and Public Affairs) at the University of Chester. He was previously Professor of Marketing at the University of Otago in New Zealand, and Co-Director of the Centre for Corporate and Public Affairs at Manchester Metropolitan University Business School. He is joint founding editor of the Journal of Public Affairs and a member of a number of international editorial and advisory boards. He has published over 150 publications in the area of communications, lobbying, political marketing, public affairs, relationship marketing and international trade. His latest books are European Business and Marketing (with Frank Macdonald, 2004), The Handbook of Public Affairs (with Craig Fleisher, 2005), Lobbying and Public Affairs in the UK (2009), and The Penguin Dictionary of Marketing (2009).

11. Conor McGrath is an Independent Scholar, and Deputy Editor of the Journal of Public Affairs. He was Lecturer in Political Lobbying and Public Affairs at the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland from 1999 to 2006. His books include Lobbying in Washington, London and Brussels: The Persuasive Communication of Political Issues (2005), Challenge and Response: Essays on Public Affairs and Transparency (2006, co-edited with Tom Spencer), Irish Political Studies Reader: Key Contributions (2008, co-edited with Eoin O’Malley), and The Future of Public Trust: Public Affairs in a Time of Crisis (2008, co-edited with Tom Spencer). He edited a collection of three books published in 2009—Interest Groups and Lobbying in the United States and Comparative Perspectives; Interest Groups and Lobbying in Europe; and Interest Groups and Lobbying in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

Political Marketing and Lobbying: a Neglected Perspective and Research Agenda

12. This paper proposes that political marketing and lobbying have much to learn from each other. Both are essentially persuasive forms of communication; both have some basis in more general marketing theory; both involve exchanges, networks and relationships. However, while much lobbying practice is underpinned or informed by (political) marketing theories, this connection is only rarely made explicit in the literature of either field. Most political marketing writing relates marketing solely to the arena of party political electoral competition, ignoring how it could be developed further into the area of interest groups generally—and, more specifically, into an examination of how organizations attempt to influence public policy. This paper looks briefly at lobbying activities such as grass roots lobbying and lobbying coalitions, and suggests how political marketing can extend its research focus to a wider range of lobbying practices. It seeks to identify the conceptual basis for the beginnings of a marketing perspective on lobbying. Lobbyists can learn from it how to put marketing principles to practice, and academics will gain an understanding of how this analysis can be applied and further developed.

Keywords Lobbying; Political Marketing; Persuasive Communication; Networks; Exchange Theory; Relationship Marketing

Introduction: Political Marketing and Lobbying

13. Political marketing has become an increasingly popular area for academic research over the last decade in both the USA and UK since Butler and Collins noted (1996, 25) that there “appears to be little appreciation of marketing theory” in political science. Several journals have since published special issues on the subject; this Journal of Political Marketing has enjoyed a tremendously successful first decade; specialist conferences and conference panels are now regular events; and a Handbook of Political Marketing (Newman, 1999) and several major texts have appeared. However, the vast majority of political marketing literature to date is limited by its emphasis on political parties—and within that, on electoral campaigning (Butler and Harris, 2009). Indeed, the motivation behind this conceptual article lies in the authors’ frustration that so much work is bounded solely by discussion of party strategies and voter behavior during elections. A review of political marketing literature by Scammell (1999), for instance, makes no direct mention of interest groups. A more recent article outlining the main criticisms made of current political marketing research agrees that the field has been, “overly focused on one aspect of marketing theory (ie communication) as part of an election campaign” (Henneberg, 2004, 235). A similar point has been made by another eminent scholar in the field: “Pure concentration on campaigning or marketing techniques will only take us so far. While such a locus of study is a good place to go, we must be careful not to rest there too long and miss the broader (if longer) journey to apply marketing to all areas of politics” (Lees-Marshment, 2003, 29). We seek here to assert a broader scope for the discipline of political marketing—and in particular, draw attention to the fact that the relationship between political marketing and interest groups/lobbying is a relatively neglected but important sub-set of this general field. We identify specific areas of lobbying practice which are underpinned by marketing theory, in the hope of stimulating future research by others.

14. Not only is the impact of corporate lobbying as a form of marketing communication largely unresearched, but it is rarely mentioned in the political marketing literature except in passing. Yet, the number of interest groups and social movements, as well as the degree of their influence over policy, has expanded inexorably. This has occurred in large part at the expense of political parties which may be regarded as incapable of maximizing their share of the political participation marketplace (Bauer et al., 1996). Moreover, even the small amount of political marketing literature on lobbying tends to focus on the recruitment and retention of members and the provision of benefits to members by interest groups. Very little research has been undertaken to date on how (political) marketing theory can explain or illustrate the representation of interests by lobbyists, or their policy-influencing activities. These functions form the core area of political lobbying and associated marketing activity, which is explored in this article. They predominantly cover external relationships and avenues for exerting policy influence. Yet, the attention paid thus far by political marketing specialists to lobbying has tended to downplay or ignore many of these key lobbying functions.

15. Political marketing has been developed to a tremendous extent over the last 15 years, and yet the gaps in this research have been described as, “like a newly discovered gold mine just waiting to be exploited” (Lees-Marshment, 2003, 3). The fundamental contention here is that one of the most potentially valuable seams of this mine is future research into lobbying. Lobbying shares several key characteristics with both general marketing and political marketing theories; as this article will suggest, marketing specialists could find a great deal to explore in lobbying activity.

16. Although it is true that this potential has been relatively neglected to date, it would be unfair to suggest that it has gone entirely unrecognized by academics. One definition asserts that lobbying is, “The marketing communication of information and pressure on government or public bodies to bring about commercial gain or competitive advantage” (Harris, 2009, 12). An American writer described lobbying in terms of its relationship to marketing thus:

Organizing support for a position on an issue is similar to planning a marketing campaign. Selling the policy issue in the government marketplace is parallel to selling a product or service. It is essential to plan, package, and present the issue to convince the decision maker, often a legislator or a government policymaker. The most cost-effective technique is to show the numbers of supporters (and voters) on your side (Fraser, 1982, 195).

17. In a similar vein, and in a seminal article, a British lobbyist (now an elected politician) pointed out the similarities between marketing and lobbying:

… lobbying can sometimes be seen as a specialist form of marketing communications, often engaged with similar concerns, measurements and promotional campaigns, contributing directly to business performance. Knowledge of the political market, understanding the relevance of one’s product or service, determining how to promote the product or service as meeting the needs of government or helping to meet its needs, demonstrating value for money and ability to meet targets for availability (product, promotion, pricing and place) are directly relevant skills (Andrews, 1996, 79).

18. Some lobbyists themselves recognize the connection here—for instance, David Rehr, then President of the National Beer Wholesalers Association in America, has said that he sees a direct connection between marketing and lobbying: “We are marketing and selling a product … a Bill or a regulation, or something that we want from the government, or something that we want the government not to do to us” (cited in McGrath, 2003, 215).

19. A number of studies offer clear and convincing evidence of the ways in which campaigning techniques can be adapted from the political electoral arena and used to influence the policy environment for strategic corporate advantage. Andrews (1996), for example, details the campaign by the Devonport dockyard to win a contract for the refitting of Trident nuclear submarines in the UK in the early 1990s. He demonstrates many parallels between an advocacy effort and the marketing process. Similarly, in her study of lobbying around the issue of resale price maintenance, Shirley Harrison (2000) deals with a case in which political lobbying was explicitly seen by a major company as an element of its wider marketing communications. Noting that we “still have a lot to learn about the use of political marketing by interest groups”, Alexander and Nownes (2008, 187) use a large-scale survey to identify various techniques employed by organized interests at state level in the US and thus offer relatively rare empirical evidence of their prevalence.

20. This article proposes that lobbying and political marketing have much to learn from each other. Both are essentially persuasive forms of communication; both have some basis in more general marketing theory; both involve exchanges, networks and relationships. However, while much lobbying practice is underpinned or informed by (political) marketing theories, this connection is only rarely made explicit in the literature of either field. Most political marketing writing relates marketing solely to the arena of party political electoral competition, ignoring how it could be further developed into the area of interest groups generally—and, more specifically, into an examination of how organizations attempt to influence public policy. This article looks briefly at lobbying activities such as grass roots lobbying and lobbying coalitions, and concludes by suggesting how political marketing could extend its research focus to a wider range of lobbying practices.

Exchange Theory

21. Political exchanges are certainly different from commercial exchanges (Brennan and Henneberg, 2008), but there are parallels. Lock and Harris have defined political marketing in terms of a philosophy of marketing exchange theory (which can be applied to specialist lobbying exchanges, and buyer-seller interactions in political networks): “[Political marketing is] the processes of exchanges between political entities and their environment and amongst themselves, with particular reference to the positioning of those entities and their communications” (1996, 28). This definition strengthened how the term “political marketing” was then understood by allowing it to take credence of modern developments such as the emergence of environmental, political cause and pressure group campaigning, political lobbying, the impact of referenda and aspects of cause and social marketing. This definition fits well the phenomena examined in this article, and suggests that modern marketing theory and practice encompass much of what we regard as public affairs and especially strategic lobbying. Moreover, the concept of exchanges in the lobbying process is already well recognized by political scientists, in significant work around the provision of information by lobbyists in exchange for access to policy makers (Ainsworth, 1993; Austen-Smith, 1995; Bouwen, 2002).

22. One of the key lobbying techniques now widely employed is known as grass roots lobbying, whereby organizations seek to persuade their members and supporters at large to contact policy makers themselves in an effort to persuade them to favor the group’s policy position. The connection between grass roots lobbying and marketing has been noted thus by one journalist:

Every lawmaker’s chief interest is getting elected. So lobbyists see it as their job to persuade lawmakers that voters are on the lobbyists’ side. To that end, Washington has become a major marketing center, in which issues are created by interest groups and then sold like toothpaste from Portland, Maine, to Portland, Oregon. Thanks to Washington–based direct–mail and telemarketing wizardry, corporations can solicit letters and phone calls from voters in any district in the nation. And clever Washington–based lobbyists know that the best way to guarantee that their point of view will be heard is to take constituents with them when they go to speak to members of Congress (Birnbaum, 1992, 6).

23. While there is a multitude of academic definitions of political marketing, they tend to be focused on political marketing by parties rather than more generically, and thus are of little relevance to lobbying. One exception is offered by Henneberg (2002, 103): “Political marketing seeks to establish, maintain and enhance long-term political relationships at a profit for society, so that the objectives of the individual political actors and organizations involved are met. This is done by mutual exchange and fulfilment of promises.” Grass roots lobbying campaigns fit easily into this notion of mutual exchange—grass roots activists can exchange their future voting behavior in return for support for their policy position from legislators. Exchange theory is prevalent in much political marketing literature (although it usually relates to exchanges between political parties and the electorate). So, for instance, according to Scammell (1999, 722): “The political market, as the commercial market, contains sellers and customers who exchange ‘something of value’: the parties/candidates offer representation to customers who in turn offer support (votes).” Applying exchange theory to grass roots lobbying, an interest group asks its supporters and members to exchange their views/potential votes in return for the prospect of their position being represented by the politicians targeted. Grass roots efforts are therefore intended to be mutually beneficial to both parties involved in the exchange. As in marketing theory, whereby high levels of consumer satisfaction ought to ensure continued sales, politicians often need to maximize voter satisfaction in order to receive electoral approval.

24. In an article which undoubtedly helped to stimulate the academic thinking which later developed as political marketing, Kotler and Levy (1969) observed that marketing involves more than simple, direct, transactions of goods or services; rather, it is concerned with the more general (even sometimes indirect and intangible) exchange of commodities (including ideas). As is widely noted, this was followed—albeit not for 16 years—by the decision of the American Marketing Association to redefine marketing such that both exchanges and ideas were central. Any exchange implies that participants have something the other wants, that they are willing to give something in order to gain that which is desired, and that there is some form of interaction between the participants to enable the transfer to take place. These conditions are certainly satisfied in grass roots lobbying—indeed, they are at its heart.

25. Much marketing theory tends to emphasize the buyer rather than the seller. It is clear that the same is true of grass roots campaigns if voters are thought of as the customers of both interest groups and politicians (both of whom rely on continued support from voters). Margaret Scammell (1999, 725) has suggested that marketing is, “broadly a philosophy of business which says that companies can best achieve their objectives through customer satisfaction, and that customer satisfaction is best achieved by attending to customer wants and needs at the start, as well as the end, of the production process.” It is certainly possible here to draw an analogy with grass roots campaigns, in which interest groups place the concerns of members early in the policy making process, and politicians seek to ensure policy outcomes which respond to those concerns, so as to achieve voter satisfaction. As in marketing, interest groups (producers) use grass roots efforts to satisfy member/supporter (customers) demand, but if the activity is successful then it will fundamentally meet the interests and needs of the interest group itself—achieving customer satisfaction is done less for its own sake than as a means of achieving producer satisfaction.

26. One grass roots technique commonly used by American interest groups is to bring some of their members to Washington once a year to meet with legislators. These “Lobby Days” are organized in a highly professional manner, as illustrated by the National Beer Wholesalers Association (headed by David Rehr):

Each Spring since 1991, NBWA and the two brewers’ organizations have held a Joint Legislative Conference (JLC) in Washington DC, with wholesalers and brewers from across the nation. The NBWA/BREWERS JLC provides a key opportunity for beer wholesalers to demonstrate the grass roots base of their government relations campaigns, and raises the association’s visibility on Capitol Hill. At the JLC, beer wholesalers personally lobby their Representatives and Senators about NBWA’s three or four key legislative and policy issues. Attendance at the JLC has increased from 562 in 1991 to 1,020 in 2001. Rehr (and Beer Institute President Jeff Becker) teach beer wholesalers and brewers to regard their meetings with Representatives and Senators as “Making the Capitol Hill Sales Call”. He reminds wholesalers that meeting a Member of Congress to ask for support on policy issues involves a number of things:

“Sales Kit”—NBWA and the two brewers’ organizations supply this: a packet of information outlining the beer industry’s position on key pieces of legislation, along with background data on the three associations and the economic contribution made by the industry. It also includes a “Capitol Hill Worksheet” on which wholesalers record the responses given by their Members of Congress to each request to support or oppose particular Bills;

“Know Your Product”—Rehr runs through the main points on each legislative issue, so that wholesalers know exactly which messages to deliver during meetings;

“Respond to Rebuttals”—wholesalers are provided with appropriate responses to a number of questions commonly asked about each issue;

“Ask for the Order”—at each meeting, the beer wholesaler should ask the legislator whether he or she supports NBWA’s stance on each piece of legislation, and record the responses on their Capitol Hill Worksheet; and

“Follow Up to Complete the Sale”—the Member of Congress should be invited to visit the wholesaler’s facility in the constituency. All Capitol Hill Worksheets should be returned to NBWA staff, and finally, the wholesaler should send a note of thanks to the Member on company notepaper (McGrath, 2003, 219–220).

27. This example also serves very clearly to show the explicit relationship between grass roots lobbying and (political) marketing—the language here is all about sales, product, orders.

28. Lees-Marshment argues (2003, 12) that, “Political marketing is about political organizations adapting techniques (such as market research) and concepts (such as the desire to satisfy voter demands) originally used in the business world to help them achieve their goals.” In terms of grass roots lobbying efforts, it is clear that an interest group is a political organization; and that it employs techniques (eg, direct mail, market research) and concepts (eg, segmentation, exchanges) from marketing in a strategic way to achieve goals. In other words, grass roots lobbying is certainly a political marketing phenomenon.

Relationship Marketing

29. Originating from a services marketing perspective in the 1980s, relationship marketing is a paradigm which some see as helping to connect (electoral party) politics with marketing (Johansen, 2005; Henneberg, 2008; Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy, 2009). More specifically, from our perspective it also offers valuable conceptual insights into political lobbying. As one text puts it, “In its earliest guise, relationship marketing focused simply on the development and cultivation of longer-term profitable and mutually beneficial relationships between an organization and a defined customer group” (Peck et al, 1999, 3–4). An illustration of how this can apply to lobbying is given by a Washington consultant who specializes in grass roots programs, who told one of the authors (in a 2005 non-attributable interview):

The most effective method is to find one person with a strong interest in the issue from a Member of Congress’ own district. Now you are into grass roots based on developing relationships between the Members and the constituents, rather than based on how many people deliver a message. The number one tension in relationship based grass roots is ensuring that the central message is consistent in every congressional office while allowing each person the freedom to tell their personal story and local statistics, but always ending up asking for the same thing. But this approach is more long-term, allows messages to be crafted to maximum effect with each individual legislator, and makes the most effective use of the people who are the key strength of the grass roots campaign.

30. Evert Gummesson argues that, “the prime focus of [relationship marketing] is on the individual, on the segment of one. It’s one-to-one marketing” (1999, 6). Again, this fits neatly with lobbying, in which most direct advocacy is characterized by personal and individual approaches between a lobbyist and a policy maker. Relationship marketing holds that a personal relationship between a seller and a customer is of key importance. In order to achieve that, the seller must have direct access to the customer, just as a lobbyist prizes personal access to a policy maker above almost all else. As Moloney expresses it: “It is a sine qua non of all lobbying that there be contact with public decision-makers…. The provision of access results in the ability of the group for whom the lobbyist works to make its case to a decision-maker” (2000, 175).

31. It is imperative to the lobbyist not only that he or she can establish a direct and personal relationship with a policy maker, but that this relationship can then be maintained over time—expressed by Hillman and Hitt (1999) as relational political activity, by which companies seek to build long-term relationships with government across a range of public policy issues. While much historical work on marketing tended to view marketing as involving an immediate sale or satisfaction, relationship marketing goes far beyond a “one-shot deal”: it is concerned with protecting and nurturing the personal seller-customer relationship on a sustained and ongoing basis (Bannon, 2005; Stromback et al, 2010). From a marketing perspective, commitment and trust are crucial to the building and development of relationships (Morgan and Hunt, 1994): the commitment element here (meaning in essence that both partners believe that their relationship brings sufficient benefits as to be worth devoting time and attention to its continuance) reminds us of the importance of exchanges in that the information which a lobbyist brings to a legislator, for instance, must be valuable and useful if the legislator is to be willing to invest further effort in maintaining the relationship. The component of trust we discuss below in the context of network theory.

32. In lobbying, most of the literature suggests that lobbyists spend the vast majority of their time and effort working with their known supporters (in an effort to reinforce pre-existing views) rather than attempting to convert people who disagree with them. One American study asserted that effective lobbying involves:

… identifying members who are already friendly to the general proposition and providing them with enough material to serve as a rationale for voting the way they would have voted in the first place…. In sheer volume it probably surpasses every other technique for getting bills passed (Kiplinger and Kiplinger, 1975, 207).

33. Actually pressuring policy makers to adopt positions contrary to their own views is utterly counter-productive in the long term: “nothing should be done to alienate policy makers by criticizing them or applying some form of ‘pressure’ to change their views” (Berry, 1977, 218). Julius Hobson, then of the American Medical Association, confirmed this to one of the authors:

You can’t look on somebody as the enemy and deal with them in that fashion—the enemy this morning may be your closest ally this afternoon. It is the same too in terms of your relationships with legislators: the issue of managed care reform is one in which we have just about Democrat and only a handful of Republicans, but on the issue of regulatory relief we have got virtually all the Republicans and only a handful of Democrats (quoted in McGrath, 2005, 256).

34. The experienced lobbyist learns that effectiveness and reputation depend in large part on an ability to cultivate and nurture long-term relationships, which generally precludes crude attempts to convert votes. One academic suggests that, “An attempt to persuade a legislator who is opposed to the interest group’s proposals risks … straining whatever bonds of trust exist between lobbyist and member…. personal contact by the lobbyist trying to change votes is virtually an exercise in stupidity as well as futility” (Holtzman, 1966, 81). In marketing terms, we might suggest that shared values constitute a lynchpin of a productive and lasting relationship.

Network Theory

35. Network theory constitutes a standard thread of modern marketing literature. It suggests that the bonds between the actors in a marketing situation are of crucial importance. As one article puts it, “A company’s products and organization are largely determined by its relationships with a particular set of customers and suppliers…. These bonds reflect the development of inter-connecting relationships between organizations” (Harris, 2002, 242). It is argued, for instance, that as a company and its customers become increasingly familiar with each other over time, a degree of trust (even self-identification with a particular product or brand) in the organization will build up among customers. In the realm of political marketing, this point has been made in relation to the recruitment and retention of members and activists by political parties (Bauer et al, 1996, 159), but the analysis has not yet been extended comprehensively to lobbying by interest groups.

36. Just as trust is an essential component of a successful company-customer relationship, it is a vital ingredient in effective lobbying. According to one academic, “When lobbyists are interviewed about a variety of subjects, no theme is repeated more frequently than their need to protect their credibility. It is the fundamental dogma of their religion” (Berry, 1997, 98). As Howard Marlowe (former President of the American League of Lobbyists) told one of the authors: “When I am talking to a Member of Congress or staff person, it is important that if I don’t have a piece of information I tell them so and say that I will get it for them. In other words those people have to come to rely on me. I am not just going to be there today; I am going to be there five years from now—maybe with a different client—but it is my long-term reputation which matters to me and to the politician” (quoted in McGrath, 2005, 264). Direct lobbying, to be effective, requires that long-term relationships can be established and nurtured between the lobbyist and policy makers; that in turn demands that policy makers can develop a strong degree of trust that the lobbyist is providing them with honest information and useful opinion.

37. Lobbyists themselves often say that it is important when making their position clear to a policy maker that they also deal with the contrary arguments. According to Jim Donofrio of the Recreational Fishing Alliance: “One reason we are so effective is that when we make arguments on Capitol Hill, we also make the argument for the other side. We explain to Congressmen that, “This is how the opposition see things, but we believe you should support our argument because it actually makes more sense in the long-term”. Presenting them with all sides of the argument, makes you much more effective” (quoted in McGrath, 2005, 247). The same point has been very explicitly made by Michael Burrell, a senior London consultant: “The single most important point is to tell the truth: it is surprising how often people don’t do that or are tempted not to do that. If you don’t tell the truth, you are finished, and will never be listened to or trusted again. Telling the truth means acknowledging that there are other people involved in this debate who don’t necessarily share your point of view” (quoted in McGrath, 2005, 308).

38. Another element of network theory also relates very directly to lobbying: the bonds or activity links between organizations which bring them together. One article states that, “Activity links are where businesses share common interests and relationships to their mutual advantage” (Harris, 2002, 245). Translated to lobbying practice, activity links can be seen in the proliferation of coalitions in which different interest groups come together in order to promote a particular policy position favored by all the coalition partners. Coalition building occurs when groups with a common interest in a particular policy outcome will co-operate with each other to work for its advancement. Defined by one academic as “joint advocacy efforts undertaken by interest groups for the purpose of influencing public policy on specific issues” (Heaney, 2003, 9), coalitions are one of the most common features of the lobbying landscape. It is generally agreed that coalitions play an important—often decisive—role in determining the effectiveness of a lobbying campaign: “It is impossible to under-estimate the value of coalition building” (Nownes, 2001, 205). One study of the effectiveness of British lobbying campaigns expressed a stark conclusion on coalitions—“To be effective, lobbyists rely on coalitional lobbying” (John, 2002, 69), while another (Kovacs, 2001) highlights the importance of credible coalitions in the field of broadcasting policy.

39. Coalition partners very often decide to work together on a policy issue precisely because each partner brings to the united effort a very particular resource—information, membership, money, access to an influential legislator, and so on. In a coalition, organizations which may well be competitors on other issues choose to set aside those differences in order to maximize their joint impact on public policy by exchanging their individual resources to mutual benefit. A coalition enables its members to argue more persuasively together than separately that the viewpoint being expressed represents the public interest, and moreover serves to minimize the undoubted cacophony which can result from a number of groups all lobbying individually on the same issue and all expressing largely similar views although each asking for something slightly different or emphasizing different factors. The connection between lobbying coalitions and political marketing theory is suggested by Kotler and Kotler (1999, 4 and 6) (although they are referring to election campaigns rather than lobbying efforts, their assertions are equally true in the lobbying arena):

Marketing strategy lies at the heart of electoral success because it compels a campaign to put together, in a relatively short period of time, a forceful organization that mobilizes support and generates a winning coalition of disparate and sometimes conflicting groups…. Building coalitions in the campaign world is not unlike the technical partnerships that computer companies form with other companies or that manufacturers form with suppliers and distributors; they are similar to the joint marketing alliances of for-profit firms such as Coca-Cola and Philip Morris with cultural organizations such as museums and performing arts organizations.

Persuasion in Lobbying

40. One very striking component of both marketing and lobbying lies in the fact that at the heart of each activity is the notion of persuasion: a concept which can trigger an instinctive negative reaction. Funkhouser and Parker make the case for the prosecution when they suggests that: “‘practical persuaders’ such as salespeople, con artists, lawyers, street hustlers, and spoiled children concentrate not on changing attitudes, but on getting other people to do what they want them to do” (1999, 27). In common (mis)perception, lobbyists could be added to this unsavory roll-call. Yet it should be stressed that persuasion need not be about arm-twisting or causing people to act against their beliefs: we have already noted that this would be counter-productive in the case of lobbying. Rather, persuasion “entails modifying behavior by influencing its cognitive precursors” (Tybout, 1978, 229). Effective persuasion seeks to cause its target to first internalize the need for some action and then to take that action based on that belief. A lobbyist will attempt to demonstrate some clear rationale to support their preferred policy outcome and thus provide a policy maker with a motivation to take the “correct” decision. That persuasion, though, may well be intended not to change attitudes but to reinforce them, strengthening the policy maker’s resolve to pursue his or her existing preferences.

41. One component of the persuasive communication utilized by those seeking to influence policy potentially offers a wealth of insight into the linkages between lobbying and marketing: that is, how political lobbyists use language consciously to frame policy issues in such a way as to position their organization and its policy preferences to greatest effect (McGrath, 2007). One paper by a group of American academics posed the question, “Why do politicians, media gatekeepers and vast segments of the population care about and devote their energy and attention to some social problems but not others?” (Salmon et al., 2003, 3), before concluding that the, “answers tend to rest less with the objective characteristics of social problems themselves and more with the power, resources and skills of those who seek to mold public sentiment about them” (Salmon et al, 2003, 3). Frames are essentially competing ways of defining a policy issue, and thus influence how that issue will be dealt with by policy makers: lobbyists (on all sides of any issue) will attempt to frame or define the issue in such a way as to suggest that their particular perspective is the correct one (Gerrity, 2010; Schaffner and Atkinson, 2010). So, for instance, one practitioner notes the importance of, “using exactly the right words to name or position the issue” (Jaques, 2004, 192), and gives the example of the way in which activists on both sides of the abortion debate have chosen to label themselves either “pro-choice” or “pro-life” rather than “pro-abortion” or “anti-abortion.” Indeed, abortion policy long has been a forum in which interest groups are keenly aware of the value of framing—Goldman (2006) asserts that the fundamental shift towards abortion reform in the United States came in the late 1960s as a result of the issue becoming framed as a human right rather than, as it had been until then, being centered around arguments to do with the health or welfare of the pregnant woman.

42. An important reason why lobbyists take care to construct the most advantageous issue frames is that the frame itself can define not only the problem but the solution. So, for instance, during the 1995 dispute between Greenpeace and Shell Oil over whether Shell should be allowed to dump the Brent Spar oil platform in the North Atlantic, one of Greenpeace’s key messages was to question why this ought to be acceptable when, “no one has been able to dump their rusty old car in the local pond for more than 30 years” (cited in Watkins et al, 2001, 175)—this frame won significant media and public support for not just the identification of the problem but also the solution (ie, that Shell should have to take the costlier route of dismantling the structure and disposing of it elsewhere). Murray Edelman suggests that a road safety public awareness campaign which encourages motorists to drive safely will tend to ignore other relevant factors such as poor design and manufacturing by car companies, high official speed limits, dangerous road construction, and so on. He notes that: “Whether or not a ‘drive safely’ campaign makes drivers more careful, it creates an assumption about what the problem is and who is responsible for it that can only be partially valid…. This form of cognition is helpful to car manufacturers and to the highway lobby” (Edelman, 1977, 36). A similar example is given by Leech et al. who discuss American legislation to exempt the sale of products over the internet from sales taxes: the Bill’s proponents argued that introduction such taxes would stifle the commercial growth and innovation of the internet; while its opponents asserted that to leave internet sales tax-exempt put traditional retailers—who did have to pass on sales taxes to their customers—at a competitive disadvantage, and moreover resulted in lost revenue and hence reduced services for state and local government. One of the anti-tax lobbyists is quoted in Leech et al. (2002, 276) as saying that, “the other side has succeeded in reframing the debate away from taxpayer rights to government revenue and fairness issues.”

43. Lobbyists take care with the precise language they use to frame issues because they appreciate that at its heart lobbying is also an exercise in persuasive communication (Luntz, 2007). As such, the attempt by lobbyists to frame policy issues and define policy solutions represents an important component of the process by which policymakers approach complex issues. Key to this attempt is an understanding of how to communicate lobbying messages most effectively and persuasively.

44. Persuasive communication should, at its best, involve dialogue: lobbyists should listen as well as talk (McGrath, 2006), in order to frame their persuasive efforts so as to address the recipient’s perspective as much as possible. Thus, persuasion starts to take on a two-way nature. Lobbying has often been defined in the academic literature as involving communication with policy makers which is purposely designed to influence public policy in some way. An Italian academic asserts that, “Relations between lobbying and communication are close-knit because lobbying is about persuasion, and both operate in the field of influence” (Graziano, 2001, 3). Another observer compared lobbying to salesmanship because both rely upon persuasive communication:

Government relations is, in a sense, a specialized form of marketing. In that same sense, direct lobbying is often face-to-face selling. The same qualities required to be successful in sales are needed in a successful lobbyist: cordiality and charm, persistence, understanding of the product (ie, the position the “issue sales person” is advocating), and the persuasiveness needed to make the “purchaser” (the public policy-maker) want to buy the “product” (Mack, 1997, 98).

45. Philip Kotler (2004, 16) has commented that, “Marketing has moved from a focus on the mass market to a focus on one-to-one customer relations. Current marketing is moving from a transaction-orientated to a customer–relationship building orientation.” Marketing has been regularly updating its definition of itself, since the first one was coined in 1935. The most recent (2007) redefinition by the pre-eminent American Marketing Association refers to marketing as, “the activity, set of institutions and processes for creating, communicating, delivering, and exchanging offerings that have value for customers, clients, partners, and society at large” (cited in Hughes and Dann, 2009). This update emphasizes the increasing role of managing relationships, exchange theory, non-commercial actors—and the use of persuasion, which is at the core of lobbying. Extending a schema developed by Funkhouser and Parker (1999), unlike some forms of marketing communication (for instance, brand advertising or corporate public relations), lobbying messages generally are directed at very narrow or precise actors, have a very particular intended action, and operate to very specific timeframes. This short-term lobbying is not, however, incompatible with a long-term relationship; indeed, the persuasion and transaction occur within the context of a trusting and mutual relationship. It is worth noting here the distinction Duncan and Moriarty make between different meanings of transaction:

As marketing has shifted to a relationship focus (in which a series of transactions define a relationship), it also has become more concerned with the transactional dimensions of marketing, rather than just the transactions themselves. The focus of a transactional approach to marketing—as opposed to a transaction approach—is on close, long-term, interactive (two-way) relationships (1998, 4).

46. We suggest that political marketing scholars will find fruitful ways of considering lobbying if they begin to analyze lobbying activity in terms of just such a transactional approach.

Conclusions

47. Most political marketing theory to date has sought to explain electoral competition or party communication—as Harris says, “most writings in the area called political marketing have concentrated on electoral and political communications and have not looked at the management of pressure on the legislative process as part of marketing” (2009, 60). Lobbying offers political marketing specialists a wide variety of source material: future research may use case studies, interviews with lobbyists, questionnaires, and other methodologies to further explore the ways in which—and the extent to which—lobbying activities conform to standard marketing theories. We have sought in this article to illustrate how particular components of marketing theory can find expression in lobbying and advocacy efforts. Future research should subject this conceptual basis to more empirical investigation—and in particular might attempt to establish the degree to which the ideas presented here are complementary or mutually exclusive. Can evidence be found that lobbyists consciously draw on, for example, exchange theory alongside or instead of network theory? Are aspects of marketing theory more or less useful for lobbyists in one political system rather than another? Do lobbyists in specific sectors or organizational settings tend to adopt and adapt commercial marketing theory? Our primary assumption is that the answers to these questions will reveal a patchwork of professional practice, but that each such study could contribute to our understanding and that cumulatively a range of work would be built up over time which would significantly advance scholarly and practitioner knowledge of how lobbying is undertaken most effectively. As a starting point, we suggest that among the central issues to be explored are the following:

What exactly is exchanged between lobbyists and politicians when they interact in different settings?

Do lobbyists explicitly draw on product positioning theory when choosing how to frame public policy issues most effectively?

Do they relate their own organizational positioning to brand theory?

In what circumstances do the communication strategies of lobbyists seem most persuasive to policy makers, and are different strategies more effective with different types of audiences (Ormrod and Henneberg, 2010)?

Can the use by lobbyists of opportunities presented by party conferences and conventions be illuminated through network theory?

How can network analysis contribute to our understanding of linkages between interest groups and politicians (Robbins and Tsvetovat, 2009)?

If we accept that political lobbying is an integral part of marketing and thus management, then where does this phenomena and its transaction network fit into relationship marketing theory?

Do we need to refine our definitions?

48. Interest group studies have traditionally been the preserve of political science. The agenda which we propose here may be uncomfortable for some scholars as it explicitly requires researchers to go beyond the confines of that discipline by applying communication and marketing theory to our analysis of organized interests’ behavior. It is, though, worth bearing in mind the reality that studies to date have not arrived at a clear answer to the $64,000 question of lobbying research—how effective is lobbying in terms of delivering policy change, and under what circumstances? Perhaps no definitive, universally applicable, answer is possible, but certainly we are more likely to get closer to one by expanding the ways in which we conceptualize and capture how and why policy advocates operate as they do. Viewing lobbying activity through the prism of political marketing theory can open up fresh perspectives and approaches. Moreover, a plausible argument exists to the effect that practitioners are increasingly using the lessons of marketing in their lobbying strategies and campaigns, and that scholars must therefore adapt if their analyses are to keep pace with practice.

49. New patterns of interest group activity (involving for instance coalitions, grass roots and public opinion) have emerged—driven not just by corporations but also by non-profits—which rely upon commercial and political marketing techniques (Althaus, 2009). A good illustration lies in the EU, which has traditionally been centered around private direct lobbying of political and bureaucratic elites, but where we now increasingly see public campaigning on issues based upon an alignment of lobbying with corporate strategy (Titley, 2003). Indeed, the global economic crisis may well accelerate these changes in the public affairs sector. Too often in the past, organizations have run very discreet lobbying campaigns aimed essentially at obtaining funding from government. In this more austere age, it will be increasingly incumbent upon groups and firms to demonstrate the value-for-money of their proposals. They will thus have to be more strategic, more business oriented, more persuasive. Chase and Crane (1996, 138) offer a thoughtful call for companies to pay equal attention to “strategic profit planning” and “strategic policy planning”. Chen (2007, 293) provides some empirical evidence from research into multinational corporations in China that there is a “positive relationship between the participation of government affairs in strategic management and excellence in government affairs.” Activist groups have recently challenged business to go further in aligning lobbying efforts with corporate strategy (AccountAbility, 2005). Lobbying underpinned by marketing is on the rise and can be expected to become more common yet in the future.

50. Political lobbying for competitive advantage is a large scale and increasingly important business activity, which is strategic. The levels and extent of lobbying activities have grown dramatically in the last decade and useful insight can be gained through the application of marketing communication theory. To date the role of strategic lobbying as part of the marketing process has only recently started to be researched and is in need of much further study. Further research into political marketing as it is manifested in the policy–influencing activities of interest groups would be fruitful indeed.

February 2012

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