Political and Constitutional Reform CommitteeWritten evidence submitted by the TUC
1. Introduction
1.1 The TUC welcomes this opportunity to make a submission to the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee inquiry into the Government’s consultation Introducing a Statutory Register of Lobbyists.
1.2 The TUC is the umbrella body for Britain’s trade unions. With more than 60 unions and over 6 million members we are Britain’s largest voluntary body.
1.3 Before responding to the questions asked by the Committee in its call for evidence, we think it would provide useful context for our answers by setting out our view of the problem and providing more information about the work of the TUC and trade unions in seeking to influence government and policy makers.
2. What is the problem?
2.1 It is right that ministers and senior officials meet a wide range of people and consider all relevant views and interests before taking important decisions.
2.2 But there is a wide concern that there is inequality of access. Those with the resources to do so can employ professional lobbyists. Lobbyists have a perfectly reasonable role in helping their clients make their case effectively, but may also be able to achieve superior access to decision makers, whether ministers or senior officials, because of their connections and contacts.
2.3 This makes for a problem in a democracy. Those with the cash are not only able to buy assistance in making their arguments in the most effective way, but also get more opportunity to put their case. When everybody gets fair access, but no more, so that all views can be aired we have stakeholder engagement. When only some get to have their say—and access is based on resources and contacts—then we have unfair lobbying.
2.4 This is why the TUC supports more openness and transparency about the operation of lobbyists, and is in broad support of a register of their activities and clients.
2.5 However such a reform will be insufficient to deal with the problem we identify. Not all access to ministers and officials is arranged through lobbying companies. The recent concern about the excessive influence of News International companies was not due to the company’s use of lobbying companies, but their close personal links with politicians of all parties. Sometimes this kind of access can be assisted by in-house lobbying staff, but their existence is not the root cause of this problem.
2.6 Transparency through a register can assist by providing information about the role of lobbyists. In particular it can deal with the specific problem that FoI requests only reveal which lobbyists have met ministers, not their clients. But while this is a genuine transparency gap it can only go some way in meeting public concerns about access to power and decision making. This is because there are two further major transparency gaps that we would identify.
Real transparency comes from requiring those being lobbied to declare contacts. Whatever rules and disclosure requirements are set for lobbyists interest groups will seek ways round them. There are difficult definitional problems about who or who is not a lobbyist, particularly outside lobbying companies. But all their efforts are directed at decision-makers, and they are therefore in the best position to report on the activities—legitimate or otherwise—of those seeking to influence them. The formal meetings of ministers and special advisers are currently covered by FoI requirements, but so-called private or social contacts are not. This must change.
There is a large group of organisations that are excluded from the consultation paper. To read it, one might think the only people who seek to influence government are professional lobbying companies, charities and trade unions. Yet trade unions and employer associations are already highly regulated and have to make comprehensive disclosures of their financial arrangements. The proposed register of lobbyists would introduce some requirements for professional lobbying companies and self-employed lobbyists. But this still leaves many other campaign organisations and think-tanks, whether registered charities or not, able to operate without revealing the sources of their income and other important information about their governance and activities. Of course many such organisations will choose to be transparent about their activities and publish such information—particularly those NGOs who rely on public fund-raising. But there are many secretive campaign organisations and think-tanks who do not publish details of their fund-raising and who would not be covered by the register. Some of these may be registered charities, but while this imposes some regulatory requirements, it does not compel the disclosure of major donors.
2.7 In this latter group we would single out what has become known as astroturfing groups. Wikipedia provides a useful definition:
“Astroturfing is a form of advocacy in support of a political, organizational, or corporate agenda, designed to give the appearance of a “grassroots” movement. The goal of such campaigns is to disguise the efforts of a political or commercial entity as an independent public reaction to some political entity—a politician, political group, product, service or event. The term is a derivation of AstroTurf, a brand of synthetic carpeting designed to look like natural grass.
Like other advocates, astroturfers attempt to manipulate public opinion by both overt (outreach awareness, etc.) and covert (disinformation) means. Astroturfing may be undertaken by an individual promoting a personal agenda, or by organized professional groups with money from large corporations, unions, non-profits, or activist organizations. Services may be provided by political consultants who also provide opposition research and other services. Beneficiaries are not “grass root” campaigners but the organizations that orchestrate such campaigns”
3. Unions and Lobbying
3.1 We do not think it is appropriate for unions to join a register of lobbyists. This is not because we have anything to hide, but because we already have to publish many details of our finance and activities. As we are mass membership organisations with a lively internal democracy much information is available about the activities of unions. We also think the onus should be on those who receive our representations to declare this as we—like many other organisations—often do not have easily defined lobbyists.
3.2 Unions are already some of the most regulated organisations in UK society. We have to make annual returns to the Certification Officer, and have to fund a wide range of campaign activities through a separate political fund.
3.3 The consultation document suggests that political funds exist for the direct support of political parties and election candidates. But there is a wider set of activities, other than such direct party support, that can only be funded from political funds. As well as direct support unions that wish to devote resources to
the production, publication or distribution of any literature, document, film, sound recording or advertisement the main purpose of which is to persuade people to vote for a political party or candidate or to persuade them not to vote for a political party or candidate. (S72 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992)
need to set up a political fund from which members can opt-out. To set up such a fund they need a ballot of their members. This mandate must be renewed every ten years in a further ballot. Accounts for these must be returned to the Certification Officer.
3.4 There is a further argument that creates difficulties for unions and charities. The consultation concerns a register of lobbyists. Organisations such as unions may well employ parliamentary or public affairs officers who understand the power structures, processes and procedures of Westminster and Whitehall, but they will not be the only people who lobby. All of the TUC’s senior officials are likely to be involved in meetings that could be described as lobbying. Any of our policy staff may from time to time be involved in representations covering their specialist policy areas. We are a campaigning organisation, not an organisation that employs lobbyists.
3.5 In addition it may be hard to define which meetings we have with ministers or officials count as lobbying. In recent months many meetings have been held as part of the process of seeking a negotiated settlement to the public sector pensions dispute. We would describe these as part of an industrial relations process, not a lobbying one.
3.6 But we would stress that our difficulties with including unions in the register should not be taken as opposition to openness and transparency in what we do. While we will naturally resent requirements based on any view that unions are inherently more suspect than other organisations, we are instinctively in favour of freedom of information about the political and decision making process.
4. The Committee’s Questions
Does the paper present the evidence in a balanced way?
4.1 We have argued above that the consultation document extends the original focus on lobbying companies and self-employed lobbyists in an unbalanced way by including the work of charities and trade unions, but not the non-regulated campaign sector and in particular organisations that might legitimately be called Astroturf groups.
Are you confident that the issues covered are ones on which the Government has an open mind?
4.2 We note press reports such as that suggest some disagreement within government about the extension of the consultation’s document to include trade unions and charities. These suggest that at least some ministers bring an agenda to this consultation document wider than the specific concern about the activity of paid lobbyists that spurred the original proposal for a register.
Is the Government clear wherever it has a preference for a particular option, and is this preference in each case a reasonable one?
4.3 If we confine ourselves to the procedures to register paid for lobbying companies and self-employed lobbyists, we accept that this is a reasonable consultation paper. Our problems are the arbitrary extension to include charities and trade unions and any claim that the proposals in the consultation paper provide a comprehensive solution to legitimate concerns about the lobbying process.
Does the consultation paper contain the right questions? Is each of the questions asked in a balanced way? Are there any important questions that are not asked?
4.4 As we say above if the paper is seen as a modest proposal to secure greater transparency about the work of paid for lobbyists, it takes a not unreasonable approach. However, we consider the extension of the consultation paper’s remit to include unions, without considering other campaign groups to be biased. Nor does the paper ask whether its proposals are sufficient to meet public concern about lobbying. This would require the discussion of disclosure requirements on those being lobbied.
Which lobbying contacts are of greatest legitimate public interest? Does the consultation paper envisage the capture of appropriate information about these contacts, as opposed to other kinds of contact?
4.5 All kinds of lobbying contact are of potential public interest. Those which those being lobbied wish to keep confidential by describing them as private or social will, rightly or wrongly, cause the most suspicion. The exclusion of all such contacts—and the focus of the paper just on lobbyists, rather than the lobbied, is a fundamental weakness.
How should the Government deal in policy and practice with how it might be lobbied on the issue of a statutory register of lobbyists?
4.6 While it would be inappropriate to have a different set of rules of procedures for this issue, there is clearly a need for ministers and special advisers to be aware of the public interest in this issue. The limited nature of the proposals in the consultation document would not capture all such lobbying contacts and emphasises its limited scope.
How open should the Government be about such lobbying contacts?
4.7 As we argue, there should be a standard duty on the lobbied to disclose lobbying contacts.
How should the Government analyse the consultation responses, and seek to balance the weight of opposing argument?
4.8 The Government should treat this consultation in the same way that it should handle all consultations. This should include publishing an honest report on consultation responses, publishing it on the web and once the government has decided its course of action, explaining in detail why it has accepted or rejected the arguments made through the consultation.
Do you have any comments on how any proposals emerging from the consultation should be implemented?
4.9 We will set these out in our formal response, which we will be happy to share with the Committee.
February 2012