Appendix: Government Response
Introduction
1. The Government is grateful to the Political
and Constitutional Reform Committee for its detailed and considered
scrutiny of the Recall of MPs White Paper and Draft Bill and for
its subsequent report published on 28 June 2012.
2. We are also appreciative to those who gave
very detailed and informative evidence to the Committee during
its inquiry on the proposals. There have been many interesting
points raised by witnesses and Committee members alike during
the pre-legislative scrutiny process.
3. The Government remains committed to establishing
a recall mechanism which is transparent, robust and fair. However,
we set out in the White Paper that we would consider the results
of this process with great care. In order to fulfil that pledge,
and to give due consideration to the Committee's conclusions and
recommendations, the Government wishes to take the proper time
to reflect on this policy and determine its future direction.
That way we can be sure of introducing the most appropriate mechanism
for our constitutional framework.
4. This paper therefore provides the Committee
with an initial response and addresses the conclusions and recommendations
as they appear in the report itself. We will aim to send the Committee
a further response in due course setting out our proposals in
more detail.
Background
5. Following the expenses crisis during the last
Parliament, all three main political parties included a commitment
in their respective manifestos at the last general election to
establish a recall mechanism to hold MPs to account for financial
misconduct or serious wrongdoing.
6. We all recognised that it is wrong that, once
an MP is elected, he or she can in certain circumstances be guilty
of serious wrongdoing but still continue in office with impunity.
7. Building upon this, the coalition's Programme
for Government included a commitment to "introduce a power
of recall, allowing voters to force a by-election where an MP
is found to have engaged in serious wrongdoing and having had
a petition calling for a by-election signed by 10% of his or her
constituents".
8. The White Paper and draft Bill published on
13 December 2011 set out the Government's proposals to deliver
this commitment. They set out the model for a recall mechanism
which the Government believed best ensured that MPs are subject
to increased accountability to their constituents without leaving
them vulnerable to attack from those who simply disagree with
them or think that they should have voted a different way on a
particular measure.
9. The White Paper made clear that the proposals
were intended to facilitate a wider debate about what would be
the most appropriate model for a recall mechanism. As part of
this process, the Government invited the Political and Constitutional
Reform Committee to carry out pre-legislative scrutiny on the
draft Bill.
Response to conclusions and recommendations
THE "TRIGGERS" FOR RECALL
Custodial sentence of 12 months
or less
10. Recommendation 1: We recognise the difficulty
of defining what constitutes a political crime or a crime of conscience.
However, we recommend that, for the purposes of the first trigger
of a custodial sentence of 12 months or less, the Government change
its decision not to take account of the motivation of the MP in
committing the offence. One possibility would be to enable the
House itself to decide whether there should be an exemption from
a recall petition in a particular instance because of the political
nature of the crime. (Paragraph 18)
11. We note the views of the Committee and of
those who gave evidence on this point. The Committee acknowledges
that the draft Bill takes no account of an MP's political motivation
in committing an offence, as, under the proposals, constituents
will ultimately have the power to decide if they agree with any
political motivation or moral reasoning by signing or not signing
a recall petition.
12. The Government's intention is that constituents
should be left with this power and, whilst we do not consider
that any substantially new arguments have been advanced which
would alter our position at this stage, we will give further consideration
to the Committee's recommendation before determining how to proceed
on this point.
A RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
The role of MPs in the process
13. Recommendation 2: We welcome the inclusion
of lay members on the new Standards Committee and consider that
this change strengthens it, and arguably further legitimises it,
as an arbiter of MPs' conduct. (Paragraph 26)
14. Recommendation 3: It is not easy objectively
to judge the conduct of one's colleagues, but, overall, we consider
that the Committee on Standards and Privileges has done so successfully.
We are confident that it would continue to be able to do so were
one of the sanctions that it could recommend a recall petition.
This is particularly the case given that in future lay members
will be included on the Committee. (Paragraph 27)
15. We welcome and endorse the Committee's comments
on the participation of lay members in the new Standards Committee's
work.
16. We support the view of the Committee on Standards
and Privileges, and also that of the Committee on Standards in
Public Life, that the inclusion of lay members will significantly
enhance public acceptance of the robustness of the House's disciplinary
processes.
What is serious wrongdoing?
17. Recommendation 4: We understand why the
Government does not want to define "serious wrongdoing".
However, it is not clear from the draft Bill and White Paper whether
the Government intends serious wrongdoing to be restricted specifically
to breaches of the code of conduct for MPs and its associated
rules, as the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards suggested
to us. (Paragraph 36)
18. Recommendation 5: Restricting wrongdoing
to breaches of the code of conduct for MPs and its associated
rules would certainly not cover everything that the public might
consider to be conduct meriting recall. However, it would provide
a rational and comprehensible basis for making a judgement about
conduct. Members of the public who felt that their MP had behaved
improperly, but who found that such behaviour did not fall within
the scope of the code of conduct, would have the opportunity to
express their views at the next general election. Recall should
not be a substitute for elections. (Paragraph 37)
19. Recommendation 6: We consider that wrongdoing
in the context of recall constitutes a breach of the code of conduct
for MPs, while "serious" implies a breach of sufficient
gravity that the Committee on Standards and Privileges would currently
consider it merited more than a period of suspension. (Paragraph
38)
20. We agree that recall should not be a substitute
for elections.
21. The proposed second trigger was that the
House of Commons resolves that a petition should be opened. It
was envisaged that the House should have a power to initiate a
recall petition where it is found that an MP has engaged in serious
wrongdoing which does not warrant immediate expulsion but may
lead constituents to lose faith in their MP.
22. We are pleased that the Committee acknowledges
the difficulty of defining what constitutes "serious wrongdoing"
for the purposes of the second trigger and we are grateful for
the Committee's understanding that it would be undesirable to
include such a definition in the Bill, a view also shared by the
Clerk of the House.
23. Whilst we acknowledge the merits of the Committee's
suggestion of restricting wrongdoing to a breach of the code of
conduct for MPs, we also note that there were mixed views generally
in relation to the proposed second trigger, and that the Committee
itself sees arguments both for and against such a restriction.
24. We will consider further the Committee's
recommendations alongside consideration of the other views expressed
in respect of the second trigger in order to advance the policy.
CONDUCT OF THE RECALL PETITION
Single designated location
25. Recommendation 7: Even a small increase
in the number of designated locations would be likely to increase
participation. The Government should replace the requirement for
a single designated location for signing the petition with a requirement
for at least two and no more than four designated locations. The
locations should be selected with regard to making signing the
petition in person as convenient as possible for everyone in the
constituency. Provision must be made to ensure that duplicate
signatures are discounted. (Paragraph 42)
26. We note the Committee's recommendation for
an increase in the number of designated locations to assist with
increasing participation of those constituents wishing to sign
in person.
27. The Committee cites the arguments in support
of an expansion made by several of its witnesses who felt that
participation might be impeded, especially in the geographically
larger constituencies, if only one location was available.
28. We said we would show consideration to other
recommendations, and the Committee has presented a case for the
larger and more rural constituencies to have more than one designated
location.
29. We will consult further with the Association
of Electoral Administrators, the Electoral Commission and Returning
Officers, as to the feasibility of increasing the number of locations.
30. Recommendation 8: The Government should
include in the final Bill a specific duty on returning officers
to ensure, as far as is reasonable and practicable, the designated
locations for signing the petition are accessible to constituents
who are disabled. (Paragraph 43)
31. We welcome the Committee's comments and agree
that accessibility for all constituents is a key consideration.
32. The Government's view was that the duty recommended
by the Committee would already be covered by existing equalities
legislation and guidance, and that repeating it on the face of
this Bill would be an unnecessary duplication.
33. However, we will consult relevant stakeholders
further to ensure that they are content with this approach.
Postal voting
34. Recommendation 9: We believe that constituents
who have an existing postal vote should be sent a postal signature
sheet automatically if there is a recall petition. The risk of
being seen to solicit signatures, or of constituents feeling compelled
to sign, should be minimised by clear accompanying instructions
and information about the purpose of the petition. (Paragraph
46)
35. The Government set out in its evidence to
the Committee the reasons why it considered that automatically
sending signature sheets to existing postal voters could be seen
as soliciting signatures, and that some people might feel obliged
to sign without a full understanding of what it was they were
signing.
36. Clear guidance and instructions can assist
people in their understanding of what they are signing, and may
in part mitigate the risk of being seen to solicit signatures.
37. We will consult relevant stakeholders to
develop this point further.
Secrecy and intimidation
38. Recommendation 10: A petition is a public
document and, given that the Government itself admits that it
would be possible to observe people signing it or taking steps
to sign it, it may be more likely to inspire public confidence
in the long run if the Government were to acknowledge that it
is not possible to protect the privacy of people who sign the
petition and to be open about its public nature. (Paragraph 50)
39. Whilst we acknowledge the Committee's comments
about the public nature of a petition, it remains the Government's
view that there are ways in which privacy can be protected.
Northern Ireland
40. Recommendation 11: The Government's proposal
to restrict the methods of signing the petition in Northern Ireland
to postal signing is not a proportionate response to concerns
about intimidation. Everyone who is eligible to sign will be able
to do so by post if they wish, so nobody in Northern Ireland would
have to sign the petition in person unless they actively chose
to do so. We recommend that constituents in Northern Ireland should
be able to sign the petition in person if that is what they wish
to do. (Paragraph 53)
41. We note the view of the Committee which was
equally shared by, among others, the Alliance Party for Northern
Ireland in evidence presented to the Committee by Naomi Long MP.
42. In its development of this measure, the Government
responded to concerns about intimidation at polling stations and,
as a consequence, set out in the White Paper that no requirement
would be placed on the Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland
to provide a designated location for signing.
43. However, we acknowledge and understand the
concerns of the Committee on this point and will take these into
account in looking again at the detail.
Signatures
44. Recommendation 12: The requirement for
eligible constituents to sign the petition in order to show they
support it seems to us reasonable. However, the Government must
ensure that suitable alternative arrangements are made for disabled
people who are unable to sign the petition. (Paragraph 55)
45. We welcome the Committee's comments and agree
that accessibility for all constituents is a key consideration.
46. The Bill makes provision for signing by proxy,
and the Government's intention is that the secondary legislation
will include provision regarding signing with assistance, similar
to that made for voting with assistance in the Parliamentary Election
Rules.
47. The Government is fully committed to further
consultation to develop these proposals.
Wording of the petition
48. Recommendation 13: The clarity of the
wording of the petition, and of the accompanying information about
the process, should be tested by the Electoral Commission before
it is agreed. (Paragraph 56)
49. We agree with the Committee's recommendation
and will work closely with the Electoral Commission on this measure.
Henry VIII powers
50. Recommendation 14: We are uncomfortable
with sweeping powers to amend primary legislation by means of
secondary legislation in a Bill of a constitutional nature and
we recommend that the Government remove these powers from the
final Bill. (Paragraph 57)
51. The Government acknowledges the Committee's
concerns and will further consider the inclusion of these powers
in the Bill.
Campaigning
52. Recommendation 15: We recommend that
the Government reconsider whether returning officers are the best
people to be responsible for the regulation of petition expenditure
and donations, or whether the Electoral Commission might be better
placed to undertake this role. (Paragraph 60)
53. The Government will consult further with
returning officers and the Electoral Commission to develop this
measure.
The 10% threshold for signatures
54. Recommendation 16: If the Government takes
the steps we have recommended to make signing the petition easier—having
several designated locations and those who have an extant postal
vote automatically being sent a postal signature sheet—it
should raise the threshold from 10% to at least 20%. We believe
this would represent a significant level of dissatisfaction with
the sitting MP. (Paragraph 63)
55. The Government acknowledge the Committee's
comments and its previous recommendations concerning making signing
the petition easier.
56. There were a range of views provided by respondents
on the signing threshold and we will give further consideration
to these alongside the views of the Committee as part of the development
of the recall policy.
THE RATIONALE FOR INTRODUCING RECALL
What impact would the proposals
have on the political landscape?
57. Recommendation 17: The Government has
not made the case for introducing recall. We have not seen enough
evidence to support the suggestion that it will increase public
confidence in politics, and fear that the restricted form of recall
proposed could even reduce confidence by creating expectations
that are not fulfilled. The aftermath of the expenses scandal
has shown that MPs can be, and are, removed by current processes
as quickly as they would be by recall. (Paragraph 76)
58. The Government remains committed to introducing
a power of recall which is transparent, robust and fair. We were
encouraged by sight of the YouGov poll included in the Committee's
report which indicates the proposals would lead to an increase
in confidence in Parliament, which remains a key aim of this draft
legislation.
59. These proposals are about ensuring MPs remain
accountable to their constituents and it is right that constituents
should be able to express their view on their MP when that MP
has committed serious wrongdoing.
Full recall
60. Recommendation 18: There is not a single,
clear job description for an MP and everyone will have their own
idea about what behaviour constitutes being a "good MP".
To an extent, individual MPs must decide for themselves what their
job entails. If their constituents disagree, they have an opportunity
to vote for someone else at the next general election. Differences
of opinion about what constitutes the proper role of an MP should
not be allowed to trigger recall petitions. (Paragraph 83)
61. We thank the Committee for its comments and
endorse its view. It is crucial that MPs remain accountable to
their constituents. At the same time, MPs must not be left vulnerable
to attack from those who simply disagree with them or think they
should have voted in a different way.
62. Recommendation 19: We believe that a system
of full recall may deter MPs from taking decisions that are unpopular
locally or unpopular in the short-term, but which are in the long-term
national interest. It may also discourage them from taking on
powerful interests, or expressing controversial or unusual opinions.
The Government argues that a recall mechanism should not leave
MPs vulnerable to attack from those who simply disagree with them.
We agree. For these reasons, we cannot support a system of full
recall. (Paragraph 84)
63. The Government welcomes the Committee's conclusion
on a system of full recall.
The existing disciplinary powers
of the House of Commons
64. Recommendation 20: We do not believe
that there is a gap in the House's disciplinary procedures which
needs to be filled by the introduction of recall. The House already
has the power to expel Members who are guilty of serious wrongdoing.
This should be regarded as an active option; rather than a theoretical
possibility. We note that expulsion would not prevent the person
concerned standing in the resulting by-election. We recommend
that the Government abandon its plans to introduce a power of
recall and use the parliamentary time this would free up to better
effect. (Paragraph 89)
65. The Government wishes to ensure that the
House of Commons has a full range of powers at its disposal to
deal with behaviour which is of a serious nature, but does not
merit immediate expulsion.
66. In developing its proposals, the Government's
view has been that the House should have a power to initiate a
recall petition where it is found that an MP has engaged in serious
wrongdoing which does not warrant immediate expulsion but may
lead constituents to lose faith in their MP.
67. The Government remains committed to introducing
a recall mechanism and we will consider further the Committee's
views as part of the development of our recall policy and respond
further in due course.
Conclusion
68. We are very grateful to the Committee for
its detailed consideration of the Government's proposals and its
acknowledgement of the coalition commitment to introduce a mechanism
for the recall of MPs.
69. The proposals set out in the White Paper
were intended to facilitate a wide debate on the best model for
a recall mechanism and the variety of responses received by the
Committee during the pre-legislative process has certainly satisfied
that intention.
70. The Government recognises that this is an
entirely novel mechanism for our political landscape and it is
important that we take time to find the best possible approach.
71. We remain committed to introducing a mechanism
for the recall of MPs and will consider further the Committee's
recommendations alongside detailed and careful consultation with
our stakeholders in determining our policy on recall.
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