2 Implementation of the Ministry of
Justice contract
10. The Ministry agreed that the contract could
go live nationally on 30 January 2012 even though Capita-ALS did
not have anywhere near the number of interpreters, available to
work under the terms of the contract, that the Ministry estimated
were required. The Ministry and Capita-ALS opted for a national
go-live rather than a regional roll out. While this decision was
made partly to start realising savings as soon as possible, we
were surprised to hear that it was also to try to force interpreters
into working under the contract.[20]
11. Capita-ALS was immediately unable to meet
demand for interpreters and, in February 2012, Capita-ALS fulfilled
only 58% of the Ministry's bookings registered. Figure 1 shows
fulfilment rates for the first three months that the contract
was live.[21]
Figure 1: Fulfilment rates for bookings made in
the first three months of the contract
Notes
1. Customer cancelled includes an unknown number
of unfulfilled bookings
2. "Did not attend (customer)" is when
the person the interpreter was booked to interpret for did not
turn up
Source: C&AG's Memorandum
12. The Ministry estimated that Capita-ALS would
need to have 1,200 interpreters available to work under the contract
to meet the Ministry's demand for interpreting services and Capita-ALS
gave assurances to the Ministry that it would have sufficient
numbers of interpreters available. The Senior Responsible Officer
pushed back the go-live date from October to the end of January
due to concerns over the number of interpreters available.[22]
However, on 30 January when the contract went live Capita-ALS
only had 280 interpreters assessed and marked and therefore available
to work under the terms of the contract. The shortfall of interpreters
was to be made up by using interpreters that had not been assessed
or marked. Capita-ALS told us that this arrangement was agreed
by the Ministry.[23]
13. There was some confusion within the Ministry
over the terminology used by Capita-ALS. Capita-ALS told the Ministry
that it had over 2,000 interpreters registered; for Ministry officials
used to working with interpreters from the National Register of
Public Service Interpreters (NRPSI), 'registered' implied that
these interpreters were qualified, checked and ready to work.
However, Capita-ALS referred to all interpreters who had expressed
an interest in working for ALS by registering their details on
the Capita-ALS website as registered. Therefore, whilst Capita-ALS
had details of 2,000 'interpreters' it had not necessarily carried
out any bona fide checks on the interpreters or their qualifications.
Indeed, we have seen anecdotal allegations of fictitious individuals
being registered on the website and being offered work by Capita-ALS.[24]
Capita-ALS told us that staff at a working level in the Ministry
did understand this important difference but the Senior Responsible
Officer told us he believed that there were some 2,000 interpreters
available to work.[25]
14. The inability of Capita-ALS to provide sufficient
interpreters to meet demand has impacted on the delivery of justice.
The number of ineffective trials due to interpreter availability
doubled from 95 to 182. This number excludes delays that did not
cause a trial to be ineffective and delays and cancellations of
non-trial hearings. We heard of cases where individuals were kept
on remand solely because of lack of interpreter availability and
a case where the trial went ahead without an interpreter even
though one had been booked. [26]
The Ministry did not have the management information to be able
to ascertain the cost of problems due to the lack of interpreters.
The Ministry estimated the cost of ineffective trials at £60,000,
but this is an underestimate and does not account for costs associated
with delays, non-trials, the time of victims and witnesses and
the use of custody.[27]
15. It is crucial both that an interpreter turns
up when requested and that they are able to interpret effectively
when they are there. Each case on any given day may well be a
once-in-a-lifetime situation for a defendant and the extent to
which they understand the proceedings and can communicate with
the court could be life-changing. [28]
Under the previous system, responsibility for quality rested with
individual interpreters and to some extent with the NRPSI, whereas
under the Framework Agreement Capita-ALS is responsible for ensuring
that interpreters are of suitable quality.[29]
Interpreters working under the Capita-ALS contract should have
suitable qualifications, mainly the Diploma in Public Service
Interpreting; 100 hours of public service interpreting; and an
enhanced Criminal Records' Bureau (CRB) check.[30]
16. The Ministry was not able to confirm whether
all interpreters working under the contract had the right levels
of qualifications, experience and CRB checks. It relied on Capita-ALS
to check these and had not conducted any audit of Capita-ALS's
processes or spot checks of individual interpreters' qualifications,
experience and CRB checks except where it had received allegations
of problems. By July, the Ministry still had no plans for auditing
the database of interpreters. During the National Audit Office's
investigation 50 interpreters were identified who had worked under
the contract but where Capita-ALS had no evidence of having checked
their qualifications or CRB checks.[31]
17. A novel approach suggested by ALS and incorporated
into the Framework Agreement was for interpreters to be graded
according to their qualifications and abilities in three 'tiers'.
The Ministry would then specify, when booking the job, what level
of interpreter was required for the job. The Framework Agreement
states that all interpreters working under the contract would
be assessed to determine what tier they could accept bookings
under. Capita-ALS was unable to assess many of the interpreters;
in particular, it was only able to assess interpreters in 32 languages
and assessments ceased in February 2012. As a result, unassessed
and unmarked interpreters are working under the contract.[32]
Capita-ALS and the Ministry are still agreeing what to do about
assessments in the future as the model set out in the Framework
Agreement is unworkable.[33]
Under the tiered system, up to one in fifty court bookings is
being filled by a Tier 3 interpreter.[34]
60% of Tier 3 interpreters have a qualification up to an A-level
standard and 40% have no qualifications, relying on previous experience
verified mainly by a reference from a previous employer.[35]
18. Of the 303 Tier 2 interpreters available
to work, although without being assessed and marked, 35% had a
partial Diploma in Public Service Interpreting, 45% had a degree
and the remaining 20% had a range of other qualifications. The
Framework Agreement required Capita-ALS to verify interpreters'
public sector interpreting experience. Tier 1 and Tier 2 interpreters
are required to have100 hours interpreting experience and this
level is desirable for Tier 3 interpreters. Capita-ALS had obtained
evidence for the experience of just 40% of interpreters. It is
now relying on the experience that interpreters are gaining through
working for Capita-ALS, which is not in line with the Framework
Agreement.[36]
19. Even though Capita-ALS was using Tier 3 interpreters
in up to 2% of court bookings and the Ministry was still sourcing
interpreters outside the contract for some tribunals and courts,
Capita-ALS was still fulfilling only 95% of bookings, by October
2012, compared to the key performance measure of 98%.[37]
At the time of the hearing, Capita-ALS told us that they had 677
interpreters available to work that it has placed in Tier 1 (without
conducting and marking assessments in most cases), 303 in Tier
2 and 132 in Tier 3, giving a total of 980 interpreters in Tiers
1 and 2, 80% of the 1,200 that the Ministry estimated were required.[38]
We were concerned that Capita-ALS was not doing more to attract
interpreters in a range of languages and to cover more geographic
areas. Capita-ALS did not offer higher rates of pay or improved
conditions for the harder to fill bookings.[39]
20 Qq 456-457; C&AG's memorandum para 2.3 Back
21
Q 5 Back
22
Qq131-135, 211 Back
23
Qq , 293-296; C&AG's Memorandum para 2.7-2.9 Back
24
Qq 135-138, 140, 143, Q344-348 Back
25
Qq 135, 440-445 Back
26
Qq 26, 105-110, 219; C&AG's Memorandum para 3.6 Back
27
Qq 119-120 Back
28
Q 249 Back
29
Qq 18, 92 Back
30
Qq 147, 213-214 Back
31
Qq 150-163, 434; C&AG's Memorandum paras 2.17, 3.13 Back
32
Qq 186, 188-190 Back
33
Qq 451-455 Back
34
Qq 303, 311-312; Back
35
Written evidence provided by Capita-ALS 6 November 2012 (response
to Q 305-307, 325) Back
36
Written evidence provided by Capita 6 November 2012 (response
to Q 488); C&AG's Memorandum figure 9 Back
37
Qq 126, 249, 311-312, 494; C&AG's Memorandum para 3.7, 3.17 Back
38
Q 362 Back
39
Qq 400-406 Back
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