The Ministry of Justice's language service contract - Public Accounts Committee Contents


2  Implementation of the Ministry of Justice contract

10.  The Ministry agreed that the contract could go live nationally on 30 January 2012 even though Capita-ALS did not have anywhere near the number of interpreters, available to work under the terms of the contract, that the Ministry estimated were required. The Ministry and Capita-ALS opted for a national go-live rather than a regional roll out. While this decision was made partly to start realising savings as soon as possible, we were surprised to hear that it was also to try to force interpreters into working under the contract.[20]

11.  Capita-ALS was immediately unable to meet demand for interpreters and, in February 2012, Capita-ALS fulfilled only 58% of the Ministry's bookings registered. Figure 1 shows fulfilment rates for the first three months that the contract was live.[21]

Figure 1: Fulfilment rates for bookings made in the first three months of the contract

Notes

1. Customer cancelled includes an unknown number of unfulfilled bookings

2. "Did not attend (customer)" is when the person the interpreter was booked to interpret for did not turn up

Source: C&AG's Memorandum

12.  The Ministry estimated that Capita-ALS would need to have 1,200 interpreters available to work under the contract to meet the Ministry's demand for interpreting services and Capita-ALS gave assurances to the Ministry that it would have sufficient numbers of interpreters available. The Senior Responsible Officer pushed back the go-live date from October to the end of January due to concerns over the number of interpreters available.[22] However, on 30 January when the contract went live Capita-ALS only had 280 interpreters assessed and marked and therefore available to work under the terms of the contract. The shortfall of interpreters was to be made up by using interpreters that had not been assessed or marked. Capita-ALS told us that this arrangement was agreed by the Ministry.[23]

13.  There was some confusion within the Ministry over the terminology used by Capita-ALS. Capita-ALS told the Ministry that it had over 2,000 interpreters registered; for Ministry officials used to working with interpreters from the National Register of Public Service Interpreters (NRPSI), 'registered' implied that these interpreters were qualified, checked and ready to work. However, Capita-ALS referred to all interpreters who had expressed an interest in working for ALS by registering their details on the Capita-ALS website as registered. Therefore, whilst Capita-ALS had details of 2,000 'interpreters' it had not necessarily carried out any bona fide checks on the interpreters or their qualifications. Indeed, we have seen anecdotal allegations of fictitious individuals being registered on the website and being offered work by Capita-ALS.[24] Capita-ALS told us that staff at a working level in the Ministry did understand this important difference but the Senior Responsible Officer told us he believed that there were some 2,000 interpreters available to work.[25]

14.  The inability of Capita-ALS to provide sufficient interpreters to meet demand has impacted on the delivery of justice. The number of ineffective trials due to interpreter availability doubled from 95 to 182. This number excludes delays that did not cause a trial to be ineffective and delays and cancellations of non-trial hearings. We heard of cases where individuals were kept on remand solely because of lack of interpreter availability and a case where the trial went ahead without an interpreter even though one had been booked. [26] The Ministry did not have the management information to be able to ascertain the cost of problems due to the lack of interpreters. The Ministry estimated the cost of ineffective trials at £60,000, but this is an underestimate and does not account for costs associated with delays, non-trials, the time of victims and witnesses and the use of custody.[27]

15.  It is crucial both that an interpreter turns up when requested and that they are able to interpret effectively when they are there. Each case on any given day may well be a once-in-a-lifetime situation for a defendant and the extent to which they understand the proceedings and can communicate with the court could be life-changing. [28] Under the previous system, responsibility for quality rested with individual interpreters and to some extent with the NRPSI, whereas under the Framework Agreement Capita-ALS is responsible for ensuring that interpreters are of suitable quality.[29] Interpreters working under the Capita-ALS contract should have suitable qualifications, mainly the Diploma in Public Service Interpreting; 100 hours of public service interpreting; and an enhanced Criminal Records' Bureau (CRB) check.[30]

16.  The Ministry was not able to confirm whether all interpreters working under the contract had the right levels of qualifications, experience and CRB checks. It relied on Capita-ALS to check these and had not conducted any audit of Capita-ALS's processes or spot checks of individual interpreters' qualifications, experience and CRB checks except where it had received allegations of problems. By July, the Ministry still had no plans for auditing the database of interpreters. During the National Audit Office's investigation 50 interpreters were identified who had worked under the contract but where Capita-ALS had no evidence of having checked their qualifications or CRB checks.[31]

17.  A novel approach suggested by ALS and incorporated into the Framework Agreement was for interpreters to be graded according to their qualifications and abilities in three 'tiers'. The Ministry would then specify, when booking the job, what level of interpreter was required for the job. The Framework Agreement states that all interpreters working under the contract would be assessed to determine what tier they could accept bookings under. Capita-ALS was unable to assess many of the interpreters; in particular, it was only able to assess interpreters in 32 languages and assessments ceased in February 2012. As a result, unassessed and unmarked interpreters are working under the contract.[32] Capita-ALS and the Ministry are still agreeing what to do about assessments in the future as the model set out in the Framework Agreement is unworkable.[33] Under the tiered system, up to one in fifty court bookings is being filled by a Tier 3 interpreter.[34] 60% of Tier 3 interpreters have a qualification up to an A-level standard and 40% have no qualifications, relying on previous experience verified mainly by a reference from a previous employer.[35]

18.  Of the 303 Tier 2 interpreters available to work, although without being assessed and marked, 35% had a partial Diploma in Public Service Interpreting, 45% had a degree and the remaining 20% had a range of other qualifications. The Framework Agreement required Capita-ALS to verify interpreters' public sector interpreting experience. Tier 1 and Tier 2 interpreters are required to have100 hours interpreting experience and this level is desirable for Tier 3 interpreters. Capita-ALS had obtained evidence for the experience of just 40% of interpreters. It is now relying on the experience that interpreters are gaining through working for Capita-ALS, which is not in line with the Framework Agreement.[36]

19.  Even though Capita-ALS was using Tier 3 interpreters in up to 2% of court bookings and the Ministry was still sourcing interpreters outside the contract for some tribunals and courts, Capita-ALS was still fulfilling only 95% of bookings, by October 2012, compared to the key performance measure of 98%.[37] At the time of the hearing, Capita-ALS told us that they had 677 interpreters available to work that it has placed in Tier 1 (without conducting and marking assessments in most cases), 303 in Tier 2 and 132 in Tier 3, giving a total of 980 interpreters in Tiers 1 and 2, 80% of the 1,200 that the Ministry estimated were required.[38] We were concerned that Capita-ALS was not doing more to attract interpreters in a range of languages and to cover more geographic areas. Capita-ALS did not offer higher rates of pay or improved conditions for the harder to fill bookings.[39]


20   Qq 456-457; C&AG's memorandum para 2.3 Back

21   Q 5 Back

22   Qq131-135, 211 Back

23   Qq , 293-296; C&AG's Memorandum para 2.7-2.9 Back

24   Qq 135-138, 140, 143, Q344-348 Back

25   Qq 135, 440-445 Back

26   Qq 26, 105-110, 219; C&AG's Memorandum para 3.6 Back

27   Qq 119-120 Back

28   Q 249 Back

29   Qq 18, 92 Back

30   Qq 147, 213-214 Back

31   Qq 150-163, 434; C&AG's Memorandum paras 2.17, 3.13 Back

32   Qq 186, 188-190 Back

33   Qq 451-455 Back

34   Qq 303, 311-312;  Back

35   Written evidence provided by Capita-ALS 6 November 2012 (response to Q 305-307, 325) Back

36   Written evidence provided by Capita 6 November 2012 (response to Q 488); C&AG's Memorandum figure 9  Back

37   Qq 126, 249, 311-312, 494; C&AG's Memorandum para 3.7, 3.17 Back

38   Q 362 Back

39   Qq 400-406 Back


 
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© Parliamentary copyright 2012
Prepared 14 December 2012