Summary
The Fulton Committee of 1966, set up by Harold Wilson
to review the Civil Service, said that special advisers should
be "men and women of standing and experience". Special
advisers have a legitimate and valuable function in Government,
protecting the impartiality of the Civil Service by performing
tasks which it would be inappropriate for permanent, impartial
officials to perform, and helping to ensure that the Government's
policy objectives are delivered. In particular, they are better
placed than permanent civil servants to liaise with Members and
party officials, and to offer advice to their Minister on political
handling. The lines of accountability remain clear in the Ministerial
Code: ministers are responsible for the management and conduct
of their special advisers, who act in their name; but experience
suggests that this responsibility is more theoretical than actual.
Rather than placing artificial limits on the number
of special advisers, the crucial question is whether the case
can be made for the payment of each individual from the public
purse, based on whether the Minister can justify that the tasks
the special adviser is engaged to undertake are in the public
interest; the need for those tasks to be undertaken by a personal
appointee rather than a permanent civil servant; and the person's
qualifications and ability to undertake them.
The position of special advisers is a sensitive one:
they occupy influential positions within Whitehall and have the
potential to destabilise the relationship between ministers and
officials. For special advisers to be effective, rather than potentially
disruptive, ministers, special advisers and officials need to
foster a high level of trust in their working relationships. For
such a relationship of trust to work, it is essential that there
is clarity of expectations about tasks and boundaries. In particular,
it is axiomatic that ministers or officials acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity are expected to act impartially and apolitically. It
should be made explicit that special advisers, who are by definition
not expected to act impartially, should play no part in such processes.
The close relationship between special advisers and
their ministers also means that ministers must have the right
to insist on their own choice of adviser: while the centre of
Government has a role in ensuring that all special advisers are
supported in their work and career development, ministers have
the right to insist on particular individuals that they consider
appropriate, and Number 10 would show little confidence in a Minister
if he or she were forced to accept a particular adviser.
Despite concerns raised by our predecessor Committee
more than ten years ago, the induction and support for new special
advisers remains inadequate. We recommend that the Government
ensure that all special advisers receive induction training covering
the structure and work of the relevant department; the scope and
meaning of the various codes of conduct to which special advisers
are subject; the implications of their status as temporary civil
servants; the nature of their accountability to ministers (and
ministers' accountability to Parliament); the role of permanent
secretaries; and where to seek advice and support on propriety
issues.
We recommend that information about ministers' special
advisers should appear on departmental websites, including advisers'
names and a description of the policy areas in which they work
and the types of tasks they undertake, alongside the equivalent
information about ministerial portfolios and the responsibilities
of members of the Departmental Management Board. We also recommend
that ministers notify the relevant departmental select committee
whom they have appointed as a new special adviser, setting out
that individual's responsibilities and their qualifications for
the role, including why they believe him or her to be of suitable
"standing and experience". This would make it much easier
to tell if a special adviser were acting outside his or her agreed
role, and would help Parliament to hold ministers to account for
the work of their special advisers.
The Ministerial Code is clear that ministers are
"responsible", not simply "accountable", for
their special advisers' management and conduct. This responsibility
is the price of having a special adviser. Ministers who wish to
have special advisers must therefore exercise this responsibility
actively, ensuring that they are fully aware of what their advisers
are doing in their name. We also reiterate our recommendation
that the Prime Minister's Adviser on Ministers' Interests must
be free to investigate any potential breaches of the Ministerial
Code, including potential breaches of the Code relating to the
conduct of a special adviser.
A constructive working relationship between ministers
and their permanent secretaries should ensure that any potential
problems with the performance or activities of special advisers
are resolved at an early stage. We see no reason to impose further
rules, or to change the role of permanent secretaries in ensuring
that departmental business is conducted with propriety and in
accordance with the relevant Codes of Practice and legislation.
Permanent secretaries must be vigilant and proactive guardians
of propriety within their departments, and must provide advice
and support on matters of propriety to special advisers and ministers,
particularly at the start of a new administration. Permanent secretaries
are expected to offer advice in a timely manner, to avert any
suggestion of impropriety or breach of the Codes of Conduct. In
order to do so, permanent secretaries must ensure that they are
fully aware of what departmental special advisers are doing in
the name of their Minister and the department.
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