1 Introduction and background
1. The Business Appointment Rules govern the
take-up of employment or appointments by former Ministers and
Crown servants (civil servants including special advisers, diplomats,
members of the Armed Forces and members of the security services)
within two years after they leave public office.
2. The Rules are prepared by the Cabinet Office
and approved by the Prime Minister: they have no statutory basis
and include no sanctions for non-compliance, although compliance
with the Rules forms part of the Ministerial Code and the terms
and conditions of appointment of civil servants and special advisers.
3. The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments
(ACoBA) was established in 1975 to advise the Prime Minister and
government departments on the application of the Business Appointment
Rules to the most senior public servants. ACoBA now advises on
applications by all former Ministers and former special advisers,
and former civil servants at Director General or Permanent Secretary
level. Applications by more junior public servants are handled
by the department for which they worked. In most cases, ACoBA
provides its advice to the Prime Minister (or Foreign Secretary
in respect of former diplomats), although it advises former Ministers
directly.
4. Those to whom the Rules apply are expected
to seek advice before accepting any new employment or appointment,
whether paid or unpaid. ACoBA (or the department) can recommend
that a waiting period of up to two years be observed before the
appointment is taken up, or that restrictions be imposed on the
types of activities which the former public servant may undertake
in a particular role. These often include prohibitions on lobbying
the Government, or on the use of information to which the public
servant may have had access while in office. ACoBA can also advise
that it considers a particular appointment "unsuitable",
but it cannot prevent appointments being taken up. Once it is
notified that an appointment has been taken up, ACoBA publishes
its advice, and any restrictions that it recommended. Individuals
can also seek speculative advice, but this is never published.
5. In January 2012, we announced our intention
to examine the effectiveness of the Business Appointment Rules
in ensuring propriety in the future employment of former Ministers
and senior Crown servants; and to consider the potential of the
Big Society agenda to increase traffic through the "revolving
door" between the public sector and business and the voluntary
sector.
6. The Government's proposed reforms to the Civil
Service and public sector delivery are likely to increase the
numbers of civil servants moving between Whitehall and the private
sector:
- There is a growing demand for
civil servants with external expertise, as reported by former
Ministers, during our inquiry into Change in Government: the
agenda for leadership.[1]
- Structural reforms to the Civil
Service as part of the Government's deficit reduction plans seem
likely to mean a significant number of individuals will be leaving
the Civil Service and looking for outside appointments within
the next three years.
- The Government's Big Society
policy calls for a greater diversity of providers of public services,
which will increase the potential for movement of employees between
the traditional public, private and voluntary sectors, as well
as potentially blurring the boundaries between sectors and increasing
the potential for conflicts of interest within a single role.
7. The call for evidence listed the following
questions:
a) How can Government draw in and benefit from
external expertise without giving rise to concern over propriety
and undue influence?
b) Does the Big Society model of government,
under which officials will increasingly procure public services
from the private sector and civil society, require a change in
approach to business appointments after employment in the public
services?
c) Do the Business Appointment Rules work against
recruitment of experts into ministerial and official ranks?
d) Whose responsibility should it be to monitor
the contact between Government and outside interests for signs
of undue influence, and how could this be achieved in a proportionate
manner?
e) How effective is the Advisory Committee on
Business Appointments?
i. Should the membership of the Advisory Committee
on Business Appointments be revised to better reflect the make-up
of society?
ii. Is the current structure of Advisory Committee
on Business Appointments ready to handle a short-term rise in
civil servants leaving the service, and in the longer term a growing
traffic between the Civil Service and private/third sector?
iii. Should the remit of the Advisory Committee
on Business Appointments be extended to allow the Committee to
enforce compliance with its advice?
8. The effectiveness of the Advisory Committee
on Business Appointments (ACoBA) and the Business Appointment
Rules were considered by the previous Public Administration Select
Committee (PASC) in the last Parliament. In its First Report of
Session 2008-09, Lobbying: Access and Influence in Whitehall,
our predecessor Committee concluded:
We also call for ACoBA to be strengthened and its
membership refreshed, bringing in people who are more representative
of society at large and better able to commit time to this work,
and we call for consistent rules to be strictly applied so that
former Ministers and other public servants are prevented for an
extended period from using contacts built up in public office
to further their own and others' private interests.[2]
9. The appointment of the former Conservative
Minister and businessman, the Rt Hon Lord Lang of Monkton DL,
as Chair of ACoBA was scrutinised in a pre-appointment hearing
by the then PASC, which reported in November 2009.[3]
We took further oral evidence from Lord Lang in February 2011
as part of our annual scrutiny of ACoBA.[4]
We would like to thank Lord Lang for helping with this inquiry,
and to underline that our conclusions and recommendations imply
no criticism of him or the conduct of his role.
10. We received nine written submissions to this
inquiry, and held five oral evidence sessions during March and
April 2012. We found many witnesses and potential witnesses to
be at first reluctant to give evidence in public for fear of attracting
or reviving unfair or hostile media coverage. Although select
committees do have the power to compel witnesses to attend and
give evidence, we did not need to resort to these powers, and
we are grateful to all those who gave evidence to the inquiry.
11. We held two meetings in connection with this
inquiry during our visit to Ottawa in February 2012, and we are
grateful to Mary Dawson, Canada's Conflict of Interest and Ethics
Commissioner, and Karen E. Shepherd, Canada's Commissioner of
Lobbying, for giving up their time to meet with us during our
visit.
Terminology
12. Throughout this Report, references to the
"Business Appointment Rules" include those versions
of the Rules applying to both former Ministers and former Crown
servants unless otherwise specified. We include all such people
within the general term "public servants". When referring
to regulations such as the Business Appointment Rules in general
terms, we have adopted the OECD's term of "post-public employment
regulations", although the Canadian system discussed in Annex
A refers simply to "post-employment regulation".
13. For the sake of brevity, we have often referred
simply to interchange or movement between the public and private
sectors, although the Business Appointment Rules apply to any
subsequent employment or appointment, paid or unpaid, and in any
sector or industry.
1 Public Administration Select Committee, Thirteenth
Report of Session 2010-12, Change in Government: the agenda
for leadership, HC 714 Back
2
Public Administration Select Committee, First Report of Session
2008-09, Lobbying: Access and influence in Whitehall, HC
36-I, Summary Back
3
Public Administration Select Committee, Third Report of Session
2009-10, Selection of a new Chair of the Advisory Committee
on Business Appointments, HC 42-I Back
4
Oral Evidence taken before the Public Administration Select Committee
on Tuesday 8 February 2011, HC 780-i Back
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