Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. The
Committees recommend that, given the far-reaching significance
of arms export and arms control decisions for the Government's
trade, defence, foreign and international development polices,
Oral evidence should continue to be given to the Committees on
Arms Export Controls by the Secretaries of State. (Paragraph 4)
The Government's "United Kingdom Strategic
Export Controls Annual Report 2010 (HC 1402)
2. We
recommend that the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export
Controls Annual Report continues to be presented to the House
of Commons by the Secretaries of State for Business, Innovation
and Skills, Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and International
Development. (Paragraph 6)
3. We further recommend
that the Secretaries of State should include in their Annual Report
information, not already published by the Government, that will
assist Parliament and the wider public in understanding the Government
arms export and arms control procedures, legislation and policies.
(Paragraph 7)
4. The Committees
conclude that the extensive information provided by the Government
to the Committees' questions on the Government's United Kingdom
Export Controls Annual Report 2010 will be of considerable benefit
to Parliament and the wider public. The Committees, however, recommend
that the Government needs to eradicate the administrative error
that led to the Government's answers being significantly delayed.
The Committees further recommend that in future Annual Reports
the Government should publish Case Studies of licence applications
that are of genuine policy difficulty, such as the previous Government's
2008 Case Study of an application to export armoured personnel
carriers to Libya. The Committees also recommend that the Government
include in its Annual Report not only its information required
for the UN Register of Conventional Arms but also the information
submitted by the UK Government for the EU's Annual Report of exports
of military technology and equipment. Finally, the Committees
also recommend that, following the Foreign Secretary's decision
to update sections of the FCO's annual Human Rights report on
the FCO's website quarterly, the Government should state in its
Response to this Report what quarterly website updating it will
carry out on the United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual
Report. (Paragraph 10)
The Committees' Report of 2010-11 (HC 686)
5. We
conclude that the Government's responses to the Committees have
been uneven—varying from timely, to somewhat delayed, to
unacceptably delayed. We recommend the Government reviews its
internal organisation and procedures for responding to the CAEC
so as to ensure that the Committees always receive timely and
substantive responses to their recommendations and questions.
(Paragraph 15)
The Committees' questions on the Government's
quarterly information on arms export licences
6. We
conclude that the Government was right to accept the Chairman
of the CAEC's representations on behalf of the Committees that
to a substantial degree the Government's answers to the Committees'
questions on the Government's Quarterly arms export reports could
be declassified and thereby made available to Parliament and the
wider public in this Report as from Q3 2010 for the first time.
The Committees recommend that both in the Government's Quarterly
arms export reports and in its answers to the Committees' questions
on those reports, the Government should provide the maximum disclosure
of information on a non-classified basis consistent with safeguarding
the UK's security and trade interests. (Paragraph 18)
Errors in export controls to Somalia
7. The
CAEC concludes that the Government was correct in informing the
Committees of a potential breach by the UK Government of UN sanctions
relating to three export licences issued for Somalia after 1 January
2009. The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report
the Government provides an assurance to the Committees that they
will be informed, and informed promptly, of any future actual
or potential breaches of arms export controls by the UK Government,
whether in relation to embargoed countries or in relation to any
or all UK strategic export controls that are in place. (Paragraph
21)
Extra-territoriality
8. The
Committees conclude that the distinction made by the Secretary
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in his letter of
2 February 2012 between activities that are prohibited and activities
that are subject to licensing is not valid in the context of arms
exports and extra-territoriality. The export of all Category A
and Category B military goods (as detailed in Box A) by any person
within the UK, or a UK person anywhere in the world, without a
licence from the Secretary of State is already prohibited and
is a criminal offence. The Committees continue to conclude that
there is no justification for allowing a UK person to conduct
arms exports overseas that would be a criminal offence if carried
out by any person within the UK. On enforcement the Committees
continue to conclude that the enforcement of extra-territoriality
legislation has already been accepted by successive UK Governments
in relation to all Category A and Category B military goods. We
further conclude that there is no reason why enforcement should
prove any more difficult in relation to Category C military goods
than in relation to all other areas detailed in Annex 2 to our
Report where extra-territoriality legislation already applies.
The Committees, therefore, continue to recommend that extra-territoriality
is further extended to the remaining Military List goods in Category
C. (Paragraph 29)
"Brass Plate" Companies
9. The
Committees conclude that the Government has failed to provide
a substantive response to its recommendation in its 2011 Report
regarding "Brass Plate" companies in the UK trading
in arms from overseas locations with virtual impunity. The Committees
repeat their previous recommendation that the Government states
in its response to this Report what precise action it will take,
including the results of its exploration of the possibility of
using the Companies Act, to dissolve a company which is operating
against the public interest. (Paragraph 33)
A pre-licence register of arms brokers
10. The
Committees conclude that the Government should consider very carefully
whether it should do more to protect access to the UK's arms export
licensing system by those arms brokers whom the BIS Minister,
Mark Prisk, described to the Committees as "the kind of rogues
we are trying to deal with here". We, therefore, repeat our
previous recommendation that the Government carries out a full
review of the case for a pre-licence register of arms brokers,
that its review includes a public consultation and is concluded
with a Ministerial decision within four months of the start of
the consultation. (Paragraph 38)
EU dual-use controls
11. The
Committees conclude that the Government's decision to make public
its response to the EU Commission's Green Paper on the EU's dual-use
export control system was welcome. The Committees recommend that
the Government in its Response to this Report, and subsequently,
informs the CAEC as to which of the UK Government's proposed changes
to the EU Dual-use Regulation have been successfully achieved,
and also as to the outcome on the EU Commission's proposed changes
which the UK Government does not support. (Paragraph 43)
EU end-use control of exported military goods
12. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report states the reasons as to why it has no plans to bring forward
amendments to UK legislation necessary to implement a national
military end-use control when the Government has stated in its
response to the European Commission's Green Paper on the EU dual-use
export control system that the current military end-use control
"is too narrow". The Committees further recommend that
the Government states in its Response to this Report whether the
European Commission has accepted the British Government's proposals
for an expanded Military End-use Control as set out in the Foreign
Secretary's letter to the CAEC of 30 September 2011 and in the
Government's response to the European Commission Green paper on
the dual-use export control system of the European Union, and
if not what further steps the Government will now take. (Paragraph
48)
Torture end-use control and end-use control of
goods used for capital punishment
13. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report:
a) sets out the specific changes it has made since
coming into Office in the UK's export control procedures and legislation
either to prohibit the export altogether, or to make subject to
export licensing and end-use control, items of torture equipment,
including items used to carry out capital punishment, detailing
the specific items concerned, the countries to which their export
is now prohibited or is subject to export licensing and end-use
control, and any expiry time limits set on the relevant procedures
and legislation;
b) provides the CAEC with the outcome of the EU Commission's
review of the content of the Annexes of Regulation 1236/2005 concerning
trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment,
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
which was expected to be finalised by the end of 2011 and the
UK Government's view as to whether this outcome is satisfactory
or requires amendment;
c) provides the CAEC with a copy of the UK Government's
submission to the EU Commission for the Commission's broad review
of the EU Torture Goods Regulation being carried out in the first
half of 2012; and
d) states whether it is still the UK Government's
policy that it does not intend to prepare draft UK national legislation
on torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for
capital punishment, and if so, explains why not. (Paragraph 55)
Re-export controls and undertakings
14. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response details
the controlled goods, for which either the previous Government
or the present Government approved licences for export, that it
believes were subsequently re-exported for undesirable uses or
to undesirable destinations, stating in each case the country
to which the goods were originally exported and the eventual undesirable
use or undesirable destination. (Paragraph 58)
Licensed production overseas
15. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report states what breaches of UK arms export control policies
it believes have occurred under both the previous and the present
Government as a result of the export of UK-designed goods from
licensed production facilities overseas, specifying in each case
the description of the goods concerned, the country in which they
were produced and the country to which they were subsequently
exported. The Committees further recommend that the Government
sets out in its Response what steps it will take to prevent UK
arms export policies being breached as a result of the export
of UK-designed goods from licensed production facilities overseas.
(Paragraph 60)
The Consolidated Criteria
16. The
Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government
explains why its updating of the wording of the Consolidated and
National Arms Export Licensing Criteria before the end of 2011,
as stated in its previous Response (Cm 8079), was not achieved
by that date and that it provides the updated wording in its Response
to this Report. The Committees further recommend that in its Response
to this Report the Government states whether it considers that
the UK Government is fully compliant with each of the Articles
in the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 "defining
common rules governing controls of exports of military technologies
and equipment", and, if not, to specify in which respects
it is non-compliant. The Committees also recommend that as the
EU Common Position is to be reviewed three years after its adoption,
on 8 December 2008, the Government sets out in its Response the
changes to the EU Common Position to which it will be seeking
agreement. Finally, the Committees recommend that where the UK's
arms export policies are arguably more stringent than those set
out in the EU Common Position, for example in the light of the
Foreign Secretary's Oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February
2012 with regard to exports which might be used to facilitate
internal repression, the UK Government should adhere to its own
policy. The Committees wish to be assured by the Government in
its Response that this will be the case (Paragraph 65)
Charging for processing arms export licences
17. The
Committees conclude that the Government's decision not to introduce
charging for the processing of arms export licences is welcome
as a charging system would, at least in the public perception,
have compromised the independence of the Export Control Organisation
from the arms export industry. The Committees recommend that such
policy decisions by Ministers are made known to the CAEC wherever
possible when they are made and not in the course of Oral evidence
by Ministers. (Paragraph 72)
Performance
18. We
recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report:
a) sets out the specific steps it is taking to achieve
its 20 and 60 working day targets for both processing and determining
appeals for Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs); and
b) states whether it will be setting processing and
determining appeals targets for Open Individual Export Licences
(OIELs) and Open General Export Licences (OGELs) and, if so, what
these targets will be.
The Committees further recommend that the Government
in seeking to meet its arms export licence processing and appeal
targets must comply in all cases and at all times with its arms
export control policies as stated in the relevant legislation
and in the Consolidated Criteria, and the Committees wish to be
assured by the Government in its Response to this Report that
this will be done. (Paragraph 80)
Review of the ECO
19. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report:
a) sets out what specific aspects of the ECO's performance
it is reviewing, what conclusions it has reached in respect of
each aspect being reviewed and what specific action it is taking
as a result; and
b) states when it will be providing the Committees
with a further report on its review of the OGEL system previously
promised to be available at the end of 2011. (Paragraph 84)
Transparency of arms export licensing
20. The
Committees conclude that the Government's commitments to introduce
greater transparency into the export licensing system are welcome.
The Committees recommend that the Government keeps the CAEC fully
informed of the specific changes that will be made to achieve
greater transparency of the export licensing system following
the responses it receives to the Government's Discussion Paper
on Transparency in Export Licensing. (Paragraph 91)
Priority markets for UK arms exports
21. The
Committees conclude that, notwithstanding the fact that the Chairman
of the Committees wrote to the BIS Secretary of State on 21 November
2011 specifically requesting that the UKTI DSO's final list of
Priority Markets for 2011/2012 be made available to the Committees
before Ministers gave Oral evidence on 7 February 2012, the Government
was remiss in failing to ensure that the final Priority Markets
list reached the Committees before Ministerial Oral evidence was
given. The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report
the Government sets out fully the reasons why Libya and Saudi
Arabia remain within the UK Trade and Investment Defence and Security
Organisation's Priority Markets list for 2011/2012 when both countries
are also listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in its
latest Human Rights and Democracy Annual Report as being Countries
of Concern. (Paragraph 95)
Trade Exhibitions
22. The
Committees conclude that the Government's supervision of the "Defence
and Security Equipment International" (DSEi) Exhibition in
London in September 2011 to ensure strict adherence by the organising
company Clarion Events of the terms and conditions of its Open
Individual Trade Control Licence from the BIS was inadequate,
as was the supervision by the company itself. The Committees further
conclude that it is a matter of much concern that the information
that certain Category A items were being promoted on the Beechwood
Equipment stand and that cluster munitions were being promoted
on the Defence Export Promotion Organisation of Pakistan and the
Pakistan Ordnance Factories stand was discovered by visitors to
the exhibition and not by either the exhibition's organisers or
by the Government. The Committees recommend that the Government
takes all steps necessary to ensure that no breaches of the terms
and conditions of the BIS licence to the organisers of the next
DSEi event in 2013 occur. The Committees further recommend that
in its Response to this Report the Government states:
a) whether or not it considers the law in this area
is satisfactory with particular reference to Article 21 of the
Export Control Order 2008, and;
b) whether there is any mismatch in the Government's
interpretation of the relevant law between that set out in the
BIS Guidance on the Impact of UK Trade Controls on Exhibitions
and Trade Fairs and that set out by the Secretary of State, Vince
Cable, in his letters to the Committees of 13 February and 26
March 2012. (Paragraph 102)
Enforcement
23.
The Committees recommend that the Government in its Annual Strategic
Export Controls Report provides the same information on compliance
for holders of Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) as
it already provides in its Annual Report for holders of Open Individual
Export Licences (OIELs). The Committees further recommend that
the Government states in its Response to this Report:
a) in how many of the 134 cases of the Government's
seizures in 2010-11 of military equipment, dual-use goods or goods
subject to sanctions because of breaches of licence requirements
have the cases been referred to the Crown Prosecution Service,
and in how many of these cases have prosecutions been initiated;
and
b) what it considers to be the main points of difficulty
the Government has, including under present legislation, in achieving
compliance with, and enforcement of, its arms export controls.
(Paragraph 105)
Compound penalties
24. The
Committees recommend that now the present compound penalty regime
in relation to arms exports has been in operation for two years,
the Government in its Response to this Report provides an assessment
of its strengths and weaknesses as shown to date, and details
the improvements it wishes to implement. (Paragraph 112)
Crown Dependencies
25. The
Committees conclude that the MS Thor Liberty incident revealed
how ships registered in the Crown Dependencies could provide a
means whereby shipments of arms could occur that would be in breach
of UK Strategic Export Controls if carried out by a vessel registered
in the UK. The Committees recommend the Government in its Response
to this Report states whether it will give consideration to bringing
the Crown Dependencies within the ambit of UK Strategic Exports
Control legislation. (Paragraph 117)
Combating bribery and corruption
26. The
Committees conclude that the Government's unqualified confirmation
that if it becomes aware of corruption in arms deals it will take
appropriate action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010,
regardless of whether there is a risk of diversion or re-export
under Criteria 7, is welcome. (Paragraph 120)
27. The Committees
conclude that an examination of the EU's Common Position on arms
exports, the text of which is set out fully in Annex 4 of this
Report, shows that there are numerous grounds in the Common Position
on which Member States should refuse an arms export licence based
on the perception of the destination country, for example where
the arms might be used to facilitate internal repression, where
there have been serious violations of human rights, or where sustainable
development would be seriously hampered. The Committees, therefore,
do not accept the Government's view that: "It would not be
appropriate to base an assessment [of an arms export licence application]
merely on the perception of corruption in the destination country."
The Committees continue to recommend that the Government gives
full consideration to proposing the insertion of an additional
Criterion into the EU Common Position on arms exports obliging
Member States to assess the risk of bribery and corruption before
approving an arms export licence to any country. (Paragraph 122)
International Development
28. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report states whether the methodology it uses in relation to Criterion
8 has been changed from that at Annex C of the United Kingdom
Strategic Exports Controls Annual Report 2007, and, if so, to
provide the Committees with the complete text of the changed methodology.
(Paragraph 125)
29. The Committees
recommend that the Government provides in its Response to this
Report the outcome of the Department for International Development's
consideration of its role in the UK's arms export control system,
including which are the most appropriate Criteria in the Consolidated
Criteria on which it considers it should be consulted. (Paragraph
127)
UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty
30. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report:
a) states when it will be providing the further note
to the Committees as to whether the Treaty processes are robust
and effective following completion of the Pathfinder testing and
Approved Community trials; and
b) sets out the latest position on the Government's
development of a Treaty-specific UK Open General Export Licence
(OGEL) for use by UK members of the Approved Community. (Paragraph
132)
31. The Committees
recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets
out in what precise ways, if any, the coming into effect of the
UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty will reduce the UK Government's
controls over arms exports from the UK to the US, and the transparency
of such exports to Parliament and the public. (Paragraph 135)
UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty
32. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report sets out in what precise ways, if any, the coming into
effect of the UK/France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty
will reduce the UK Government's controls over arms exports from
the UK to France, and the transparency of such exports to Parliament
and the public. (Paragraph 139)
The Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on
arms transfers within the EU
33. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report states precisely what legislative and procedural changes
the Government will be making to its arms export controls in order
to implement and comply with the EU Directive on Intra-Community
Transfers of defence-related products. The CAEC further recommends
that the Government monitors compliance with the Directive by
other EU Member States and reports back to the Committees on any
breaches of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports as a result
of this Directive of which it becomes aware. (Paragraph 143)
34. Finally, the Committees
recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets
out what precise ways, if any, the coming into effect of the EU
Intra-Community Directive will reduce the UK Government's controls
over arms exports from the UK to EU Member States, and the transparency
of such exports to Parliament and the public. (Paragraph 144)
Cluster Munitions
35. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report sets out what steps it will take in relation to UK-based
financial institutions who may be financing, directly or indirectly,
or investing in manufacturers of cluster munitions. The Committees
conclude that the Government's decision to resist attempts to
weaken the Convention on Cluster Munitions with draft Protocol
6 was welcome. The Committees further recommend that the Government
continues to strive strenuously for, as the Minister for Europe
David Lidington has stated, "a world free of cluster munitions."
(Paragraph 155)
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
36. The
Committees conclude that the Government has put at risk the UK's
previous leading role in the drafting and negotiation of the Arms
Trade Treaty by failing to maintain continuity of FCO staff at
a senior level with this responsibility. The Committees also conclude
that the Government's commitment to achieving an Arms Trade Treaty
with the broadest possible scope, including ammunition, is welcome.
The Committees further conclude that the Government's statement
that it is supportive of an Arms Trade Treaty addressing the issue
of corruption is welcome, though in stark contrast to the Government's
refusal to accept the Committee's recommendation that the EU Common
Position on arms exports should also include the issue of corruption
(see paragraph 122). The Committees recommend that the Government
deploys the staffing resources required at a sufficiently senior
level, necessary to achieve a comprehensive and effective Arms
Trade Treaty. (Paragraph 165)
Sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons
37. The
Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response
whether it wishes to see any change in NATO's policy of deploying
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and whether it is taking any
steps to facilitate multilateral reductions in US and Russian
tactical nuclear weapons. (Paragraph 168)
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
38. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report sets out what policies it is pursuing to break the deadlock
at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva over the drafting of
a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and whether it supports the
transfer of responsibility for the drafting of this Treaty to
the United Nations in New York. (Paragraph 172)
The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for
2012-2015
39. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report:
a) details the conditions that the Government
considers need to be fulfilled to ensure a meaningful outcome
to a conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Free Zone;
b) sets out what precise steps the Government
is taking to establish a verification regime for the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention;
c) details the Government's planned expenditure,
and on what projects, under the G8 Global Partnership delivering
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security
improvements on the ground;
d) details the specific provisions in existing
obligations and export control regimes which the Government considers
needs to have their enforcement strengthened; and
e) details any areas in which the Government
considers that the UK's domestic security practices and export
controls need to be strengthened. (Paragraph 174)
Arms exports and human rights
40. The
Committees conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports
and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government
policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there
is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports
to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack
of human rights at the same time. The Committees further conclude
that whilst the Government's statement that "respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations
for all export licence applications" is welcome, those considerations
do not appear to have weighed sufficiently heavily on either the
present Government or on its predecessor given the unprecedented
scale of arms export licence revocations that the Government has
made since the "Arab Spring" — the stated reason
for revocation being in every single case "that this licence
now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3". Criteria 2 is headed "The
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country
of final destination", and Criteria 3 is headed "The
internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function
of the existence of tensions, or armed conflicts." (Paragraph
176)
Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA)
Human Rights Guidance
41. The
Committees recommend that the OSJA Human Rights Guidance is amended
to make it prominently and unequivocally clear that if military
or security equipment is being exported in an Overseas Security
and Justice Assistance programme, the decision as to whether or
not to approve such exports must be made solely and wholly in
accordance with the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria
and procedures. The Committees further recommend that the requirement
on officials in the current guidance merely to consult the Consolidated
Arms Export Licensing Criteria in such export cases should be
replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the Licensing
Criteria and procedures. (Paragraph 181)
Surveillance technology and equipment
42. The
Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response
to this Report:
a) what changes it will make to UK export control
legislation and procedures to prevent surveillance technology
and equipment being exported from the UK to repressive regimes
who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights;
and
b) what action the Government is taking to prevent
such exports from EU Member States generally. (Paragraph 183)
Export of Tasers
43. The
Committees recommend that the Government informs them promptly
of any breaches of the conditions under which Tasers may be exported
under limited circumstances from the UK as set out in the Written
Ministerial Statement made by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Alistair Burt,
on 9 February 2012. (Paragraph 185)
Arms exports and internal repression
44. The
Committees conclude that the Foreign Secretary's statement to
the Committees that there has been no change of policy on arms
exports and internal repression by the present Government from
that stated by the previous Government is welcome, the present
Government's policy being: "The longstanding British position
is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a
clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional
or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal
repression." The Committees recommend that the Government
adheres strictly to its stated policy on arms exports and internal
repression for all export licence applications. (Paragraph 191)
The Government's Arab Spring arms export policy
review
45. The
Committees conclude that the Government's repeated use of the
phrase "crowd control goods" in the context of its arms
export review is misleading given that "crowd control goods"
are generally associated with non-lethal equipment. The Committees
further conclude that the Government's use of the phrase "crowd
control goods" to include "shotguns, small arms, semi-automatic
pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition,
armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles"
is not one that would be acceptable to Parliament or to the wider
public. The Committees recommend that the Government discontinues
the use of the phrase "crowd control goods" in this
context, which as well as being misleading is also profoundly
disrespectful to the thousands of unarmed civilians in the Arab
Spring countries who have courageously demonstrated for human
rights and fundamental freedoms and have put their lives at risk
in doing so. (Paragraph 197)
46. The Committees
conclude that the Government's review of its policies and practices
on arms exports following the Arab Spring should not have been
carried out merely as "an internal review" and should
instead have been the subject of public consultation in accordance
with the Government's stated policy of transparency on arms exports.
The Committees further conclude that whilst the Government's introduction
of a new licence suspension mechanism is welcome, this is not
sufficient to ensure that arms exported from the UK are not used
for internal repression overseas because in many, if not most,
cases the arms will have left the UK before suspension occurs.
The Committees recommend that the Government in its response to
this Report sets out whether the "revised risk categorisation"
proposed by the Foreign Secretary in his Written Ministerial Statement
of 13 October 2011 will, or will not, be applied to arms export
licence applications when initially made, and whether he will
make public the "revised risk categorisation" and explain
fully how it would be applied to arms export licence decisions.
(Paragraph 207)
47. The Committees
conclude that whilst the Government's revocation of an unprecedented
number of 158 arms export licences following the Arab Spring is
welcome, the scale of the revocations is demonstrable evidence
that the initial judgements to approve the applications were flawed.
The Committees further conclude that there were no significant
changes in the repressive regimes concerned between the British
Government's approval of the arms export licences in question
and the start of the Arab Spring in December 2010, and that the
Arab Spring simply exposed the true nature of the repressive regimes
which had been the case all along. The Committees recommend that
the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements
when considering arms export licence applications for goods to
authoritarian regimes "which might be used to facilitate
internal repression" in contravention of British Government
policy. (Paragraph 208)
Arms export licence revocations
48. The
Committees recommend that the Government continues to monitor
all extant licences for arms exports to authoritarian regimes
worldwide which might be used to facilitate internal repression
in contravention of British Government policy and to make public
promptly any further revocations that it makes.
(Paragraph 213)
Countries of Concern
Bahrain
49. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 97
extant UK arms export licences to Bahrain now contravenes the
Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British
position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there
is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong
regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate
internal repression" including those licences for assault
rifles, sniper rifles, body armour, gun silencers, shotguns, small
arms ammunition, pistols, weapon sights and equipment employing
cryptography. (Paragraph 222)
Egypt
50. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 124
extant UK arms export licences to Egypt now contravenes the Government's
stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is
clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear
risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional
or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal
repression" including those licences for body armour, weapon
night sights, weapon sights, components for semi-automatic pistols,
semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, components
for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, combat shotguns, assault
rifles, sniper rifles, pistols and cryptography .
(Paragraph 228)
Libya
51. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 24
extant UK arms export licences to Libya now contravenes the Government's
stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is
clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear
risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional
or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal
repression" including those licences for all-wheel drive
vehicles with ballistic protection and cryptography . (Paragraph
233)
Saudi Arabia
52. The
Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response
to this Report whether it applies different or the same considerations
in deciding whether or not to approve arms export licences to
Saudi Arabia to those applied to other countries in the region
and, if different, what those considerations are. The Committees
further recommend that the Government in its Response states whether
it remains satisfied that none of the 288 extant UK arms export
licences to Saudi Arabia now contravenes the Government's stated
policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear:
We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk
that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or
internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal
repression" including those licences for:
Components for armoured fighting vehicles, components
for armoured personnel carriers, armoured personnel carriers,
ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for
military combat vehicles, components for military communications
equipment, components for water cannon, components for sniper
rifles, components for weapon sights, weapon sights, gun silencers,
small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, technology for military
communications equipment, technology for sniper rifles, technology
for the use of sniper rifles, assault rifles, components for assault
rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components
for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles,
components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine
guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols,
rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, hand grenades,
components for machine guns, components for military support vehicles,
military combat vehicles. (Paragraph 239)
Syria
53. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 9
extant UK arms export licences to Syria now contravenes the Government's
stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is
clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear
risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional
or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal
repression" including those licences for all-wheel drive
vehicles with ballistic protection and cryptography . (Paragraph
244)
Tunisia
54. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 47
extant UK arms export licences to Tunisia now contravenes the
Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British
position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there
is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong
regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate
internal repression" including those licences for military
support vehicles, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection,
small arms ammunition and cryptography . (Paragraph 249)
Yeman
55. The
Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this
Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 11
extant UK arms export licences to Yemen now contravenes the Government's
stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is
clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear
risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional
or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal
repression" including those licences for all-wheel drive
vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components and
equipment for military cameras and cryptographic equipment and
technology. (Paragraph 255)
Argentina
56. The
Committees conclude that the Government's decision to tighten
controls on the licensing of, and trade in (trafficking and broking),
controlled goods and technology to military end users in Argentina
is welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government states
in its Response to this Report:
a) what are the exceptional circumstances in which
the Government is still willing to consider approving export licences
for military or dual-use goods being supplied to military end
users in Argentina;
b) what licences for military goods to Argentine
armed forces have been revoked;
c) what UK strategic export control licences for
Argentina remain extant; and
d) what steps the Government is taking to get the
US Government, the Governments of EU Member States, and the Governments
of other countries who export military goods, military technology
and dual-use goods to Argentina to make the same change of policy
as that announced by the British Government. (Paragraph 258)
China
57. The
Committees conclude that given the lack of clear progress on civil
and political rights in China, the Government's support for the
EU Arms Embargo on China to continue is welcome. The Committees
recommend that the Government provides in its Response to this
Report an explanation as to why, according to the EU's latest
Report, the UK Government in 2010 gave a larger number of arms
export licence approvals to China than any other EU Member State
notwithstanding the EU Arms Export Embargo on China. (Paragraph
265)
Extension of the Review to authoritarian
regimes and to countries of concern worldwide
58. The
Committees conclude that the Government's stated policy is to
refuse arms export licences "which might be used to facilitate
internal repression" and not merely to await internal repression
becoming patently clear. The Committees therefore continue to
recommend that the Government extends its arms export policy review
from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian
regimes and countries of human rights concern worldwide. (Paragraph
270)
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