Committees on Arms ExportsSupplementary written evidence from Amnesty International UK
The New FCO Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance
The UK can provide an important role in providing technical assistance to security and justice institutions overseas. This assistance can help to ensure that those institutions are more efficient and effective and also that they comply with international human rights standards or by improving compliance with those obligations. It is welcome that the guidance applies to both case specific assistance and broader capacity building. It is a positive development that the FCO are now thinking seriously about the human rights impact of these kinds of projects.
However, the UK Government has in the past been criticised for working with or providing assistance to security agencies which continue to have very poor human rights records, such as the Rapid Action Battalion in Bangladesh. The recognition of these risks and the drafting and publication of the guidance is welcome; as is the need for all projects to assess human rights and IHL risks, but the guidance itself is not drafted to ensure that the government does not engage in conduct which might result in serious human rights violations.
The guidance requires Ministers only to be consulted if there is a serious risk that the assistance might directly or significantly contribute to a violation of human rights. As written, it could still allow Ministers to authorise cooperation which might allow involvement in human rights violations or in the face of evidence that there is a serious risk that UK action will result in human rights violations.
Officials are also required to consider steps which might mitigate human rights of IHL risks which have been identified. Whilst many are sensible, they also include the provision of assurances from the host Government and/or recipient institution with the relevant standards. Amnesty has already documented its concerns about the credibility of assurances relating to the use of torture, from governments or institutions which routinely practice torture and would be extremely cautious on relying on such assurances where torture, cruel inhuman and degrading treatment are at stake. The guidance provides that a mitigating factor might be that UK personnel should not supervise, instruct or otherwise provide direct support to investigations where there is a serious risk of torture/CIDT.
In these respects, the guidance is not consistent with other guidance and criteria relating the provision of arms and related equipment, which stipulates a clear obligation to deny such provision where there are substantial risks that those items will contribute to serious violations. Amnesty recommends that the guidance contains clear obligations to deny the provision of security and justice assistance where there is a substantial risk that such provision will result in serious human rights violations.
The sections on Weapons Handling and provision are of concern. As currently written, it merely asks for a view to be received from FCO, BIS or MOD, on whether arms gifted or supplied as part of Security and Justice Assistance might be used in contravention of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. It is imperative that the guidance clearly specifies that no arms or related equipment should ever be supplied where there are clear risks that those weapons might breach the existing criteria, for example by contributing to internal repression or serious violations of human rights or international law.
The section on weapons handling should be re-written to ensure that the provision of any arms or related equipment supplied or gifted as part of any security and justice assistance measures must be formally assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. Where the assessment is that such arms risk being used in violation of these criteria, the guidance must specify that arms and related equipment must not be supplied.
19 April 2012