Committees on Arms ExportsLetter to the Chair of the Committee from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Thank you for your letters of 24 October and 16 December 2011 about the Government’s answers to the CAEC’s questions on the Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 2010 Arms Export Licensing information provided by the Government. As I mentioned at our recent discussion at the CAEC Oral Evidence session on 7 February, your letter and proposals raised some important issues regarding the handling of classified material that we provide to the Committees.
My officials have been working to clarify our procedures to allow us to provide the Committees with as much unclassified information as possible in response to their questions, supplemented by classified information where necessary to further inform the Committees’ thinking and understanding of the issues.
Vince Cable and I have said we wish to be as open as possible on these issues, both in the interest of thorough public scrutiny of arms exports and of inspiring greater public confidence in the process. The challenge is, as you appreciate, to provide the Committees with as much helpful and comprehensive information as we can from a range of sources, while balancing this with the different sensitivities including our national security.
To this end, and to facilitate publication of information by the Committees, my officials have recast the information already provided to you for Quarters 3 and 4 for 2010, into an unclassified paper containing a set of responses to Section A questions, drawn from (ii) a classified paper that provides responses to all the Committees’ Section A and B questions. I enclose a set of papers for each quarter.
The classified paper clearly specifies which part of an answer is classified and which is not. We hope you will respect the reasons why we set the responses out in this way. The responses are the product of very careful consideration and these papers should provide the Committees with as full as picture as possible of the issues.
The unclassified paper provides information that the Committees may release into the public domain. The classified paper is for the Committees’ own use and provides details of some of the underlying information that we are not able to disclose publicly, but which will hopefully give the Committees greater confidence in that licensing decisions are soundly based. I trust that this solution provides the transparency that you seek.
REQUESTS FOR WRITTEN INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS
Quarterly Report for July–September 2010
Section A: Questions Related to Public Material
Question: Angola: OIEL refused for americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non-military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets;
Response:
This OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs due to potential Criterion 5c (risk of reverse engineering) and Criterion 7 (risk of diversion) concerns under The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.
Question: Argentina: SIELs issued for components for destroyers, components for military utility helicopters and products containing plutonium-239.
Response:
(a)
(b)
(c) The goods (samples containing plutonium-239) were for use in a worldwide environmental radioactivity proficiency (blind) test exercise. The countries who took part in this proficiency test were then granted the correct accreditation. The Government considered that no criteria thresholds were breached.
Question: Azerbaijan: OIEL refused for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography. Specifically, the Committees would be grateful for further information about why this OIEL was refused when two apparently identical OIELs were issued;
Response:
This OIEL was rejected because of concerns related to the value of the goods proposed for export. The exporter was asked to apply for SIELs instead. Subsequently OIELs were approved as the values of the exports did not raise any Criterion 8 concerns, otherwise being similar to the previous OIEL.
Question: Bahrain: OIEL issued for CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades
Response:
The application was approved in August 2010. On the basis of the evidence available at the time we concluded that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression or diverted to an undesirable end-use.
The Government reviewed export licences to Bahrain in February 2011 in light of the changed circumstances in that country. As a result Bahrain was removed as an eligible destination from this OIEL.
Question: Bulgaria: OIEL issued for americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non-military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets
Response:
This application was for equipment to be used by, or under the supervision or instructions of employees of, a private company in provision of oilfield production services. The application therefore presented no Criteria concerns.
Question: China: SIELs issued for technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment employing cryptography (33 licences), equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography (9 licences) and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography;
Question on China Revised by CAEC: Given that there have reportedly been a number of large-scale cyber attacks emanating from Chinese jurisdiction in recent years, the Committees would be grateful to know why, inter alia, three SIELs (Single Export licences) for cryptographic software were granted, rather than refused under Criterion 5 (equipment which could be used against the UK) of the Consolidated Criteria.
Response:
Licences for cryptographic software were granted for export to [commercial] telecommunications companies who supply secure communications, for example wireless network connectivity, secure broadband networks and business radio networks. These applications were in line with the Consolidated Criteria. The exports in question cannot be used to mount cyber attacks.
Question: China: The Committees would also be grateful for further information about why two SIELs were issued for China for computer analogue to digital equipment, given that two SIELs for identical equipment were refused;
Response:
The two SIELs granted for computer analogue to digital equipment were for civil end-uses such as provision of wireless communications & networking. These applications raised no concerns against the Consolidated Criteria.
The two licences were rejected under Criteria 5 and 7 as the equipment was a high specification and there was a clear risk of diversion to the military.
Question: Colombia: OIEL refused for bomb suits, civil body armour, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military helmets, mine detection equipment, non-military firing sets;
Response:
This OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELS due to potential Criterion 7 (risk of diversion) concerns under The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. This was based on the type of equipment to be supplied and the situation in Colombia at the time of the application.
Question: Hong Kong Administrative Region: SIELs issued for cryptographic software (8 licences) equipment employing cryptography (20 licences), equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras, semiconductor process equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography (8 licences);
Response:
A majority of these applications were for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography for communications companies who supply secure communications, for example to provide banks with secure network data transfer. Only one licence was issued for imaging cameras and one issued for semiconductor process equipment. Both were issued to Universities for civil research purposes into medical science and electronics. All these applications were assessed against the Consolidated Criteria and we had no concerns for the stated end use and end users.
Question: India: SIELs issued for components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment (3 licences)
Response:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Question: Revised CAEC Question on Iran: Given the existence of an extensive regime of international sanctions against Iran, the Committees would be grateful for further information about why SIELs were granted, inter alia, for materials testing equipment and valves. The Committees note that other licence applications for these items were refused during this period.
Response:
Some applications were for goods controlled on the UK national control list (PL9009—civil aircraft and equipment) Such civil aviation equipment is not caught by any of the sanctions regimes against Iran and we assessed there was no clear risk of the goods being used for internal repression or being diverted to military end-use. Other licences granted related to exports where an export licence was required for normally non-controlled goods under the WMD End-Use control. The licences were approved because in each case it was assessed there was no clear risk of the goods being used in a programme of concern.
Question: Iraq: OIEL refused for equipment employing cryptography;
Response:
The application for an OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs. The goods were intended for Government-linked end-users and this raised concerns that the goods may potentially be used for military applications. As a result, and because there is still an arms embargo against Iraq, we decided that an open licence was not appropriate for this type of export. This is consistent with the approach we have taken for other such OIEL applications for Iraq for this kind of equipment.
Question: Israel: SIELs issued for components for naval electronic warfare equipment (2 licences), naval electronic warfare equipment, imaging cameras and nuclear grade graphite;
Response:
Naval electronic warfare equipment
These goods were for use in submarines. We have no evidence to suggest that the use of this class of submarine by the Israeli Defence Forces would cause concern under the Consolidated Criteria.
Imaging cameras
Applications included:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Nuclear grade graphite
These goods are to be machined into consumable products (crucibles, dies etc) to be used in the metallurgical industry. Given the legitimate end-use of these goods this export raised no concerns under the Consolidated Criteria.
Question: Israel: OIELs refused for:
(a)
(b)
Response:
Given the nature of the goods and the destination the applications for OIELs were rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs instead so that greater scrutiny could be given to specific exports.
Question: Kenya: Temporary OIEL issued for technology for the development of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the development of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the development of nuclear reactors, technology for the production of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the production of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the production of nuclear reactors, technology for the use of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the use of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the use of nuclear reactors;
Response:
This temporary OIEL application was made to cover the transmission of information (technology) to a number of overseas destinations including Kenya. The intended recipient of this information was an individual employed by a UK energy company. The purpose of the information transfers was to enable him to undertake work whilst travelling overseas and remain contactable. The licence was granted as there were no Consolidated Criteria concerns on this end use.
Question: Lebanon: OIEL refused for equipment employing cryptography;
Response:
The application for an OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs. The goods were intended for Government-linked end-users and this raised concerns that the goods may potentially be used for military applications. As there is a UN Arms Embargo on Lebanon we decided that an open licence was not appropriate for these exports.
Question: Libya: SIELs issued for crowd control ammunition (three licences), small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition (two licences), equipment employing cryptography and neutron generators.
Response:
Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition
These applications were approved with the proviso that the goods would not be released to Libyan control until after successful completion of a training programme. The training was audited by MOD police officials and our Post in Tripoli confirmed that the training was carried out successfully. We concluded that there was no clear risk that the goods would be used for internal repression in contravention of Criterion 2. All these applications have subsequently been revoked.
Equipment employing cryptography
This application was for equipment to be demonstrated at a defence and security exhibition. The equipment was to remain under the exporters control at all times whilst abroad. This temporary licence was subsequently revoked.
Neutron generators
The neutron generator was a tool to be used to gather geological data. The equipment was to remain under the control of the exporter’s (an international company) employees at all times.
Question: Malaysia: OIEL refused for CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades.
Response:
Given the nature of the goods and the destination the OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs so that greater scrutiny could be given to specific exports to specific end-users.
Question: Russia: OIEL refused for components for armoured fighting vehicles, components for armoured personnel carriers, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military search and rescue aircraft, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for military utility vehicles, components for naval engines, components for patrol craft, components for tanker aircraft.
Response:
Given the nature of the goods and the destination this OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs so that greater scrutiny could be given to specific exports to specific end-users.
Question: Saudi Arabia: SIEL issued for components for combat aircraft.
Response:
The goods were components for end-use by the Royal Saudi Air Force. In assessing the application we took all relevant information into account including the events during the Saudi-Yemen border conflict in 2009. We concluded that there was no clear risk that the goods might be used in internal repression, external aggression or diverted to an undesirable end-use.
Question: Turkey: SIELs issued for components for combat aircraft (two licences), toxins and products containing plutonium-239.
Response:
NB. When researching the answer to the above question we found six SIELs issued for components for combat aircraft. Details of all these applications can be found below.
Applications included:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
Department for International Development
Ministry of Defence
REQUESTS FOR WRITTEN INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS
Quarterly Report for October-December 2010
Section A: Questions Related to Public Material
Question: Bahrain: For which of the items approved for export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked?
Anti-armour ammunition, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun silencers, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, small arms ammunition, sporting guns.
Response:
Of the licences issued in Q4, licences for the following goods have been revoked:
components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, small arms ammunition.
Question: Bahrain: In addition, for which of the items approved for temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have all of these items been returned to the UK? If so, when, in each case, did this take place?
Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts.
Response:
We revoked a temporary SIEL for equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts that had been originally issued in Q4 2010. It should be noted that for temporary SIELs exporters are obliged to return the goods within 12 months from the date of issue of the licence and they should contact us to inform us when the goods have been returned. It is not our practice to revoke temporary licences, as this potentially removes the obligation to return the goods to the UK, however in the case referred to above circumstances allowed us to do so.
Question: Bahrain: Have either of the two OIELs granted during this period been revoked? If so, please specify which ones and why the decision was taken.
Response:
Neither of the two OIELs issued during this period have been revoked.
Question: Belarus: Why was a SIEL granted for imaging cameras, rather than (as were other items applied for during this period) refused under the terms of either or both Criteria 2 and 3 of the Consolidated Criteria?
Response:
The equipment in question was rated as dual-use and the licence was approved in January 2011. The stated end-user was a municipal fire department and the stated end-use was fire fighting for civilian use. The Government was satisfied that this was the intended purpose.
Question: Chad: Given the human rights situation in Chad and neighbouring countries, why was an OITCL granted for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, rather than refused under the terms of any, all or some of Criteria 2, 3 and 4 of the Consolidated Criteria?
Response:
The vehicle and components were to be used for protection of staff of an international organisation. After considering all the information available, we judged the risk threshold under criterions 2, 3 and 4 was not met.
Question: China: Given the human rights record of the Chinese Government, why was a SIEL granted for small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of either the EU Arms Embargo or Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
Response:
The goods in question were sporting gun ammunition for a sporting end-use. Approval of this application was consistent with our previous advice and interpretation that sporting ammunition is not caught under the EU Arms Embargo. No clear risks were identified to suggest such sporting-gun ammunition would raise Criteria 2 concerns.
Question: Djibouti: Given the human rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why were SIELs granted for assault rifles, gun silencers, semi-automatic pistols, small arms ammunition and sniper rifles, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
Response:
These goods are for use by private security companies who are undertaking maritime security work on behalf of commercial shipping companies in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden. We therefore judged there was not a clear risk that such weapons would be used in contravention of Criterion 2 as they were not for use by the armed forces or internal security forces of Djibouti.
Question: Egypt: For which of the items approved for export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked?
Body armour, components for military electronic equipment, components for military radars, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, military helmets and imaging cameras
Response:
None of the SIELS granted for exports to Egypt during this quarter have been revoked.
Question: Egypt: In addition, for which of the items approved for temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have all of these items been returned to the UK?
Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts.
Response:
None of the SIELS granted for exports to Egypt during this quarter have been revoked.
Question: Hong Kong: Given the human rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns about diversion under Criteria 7—and then by extension, Criteria 2—of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs granted for assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, components for machine guns, machine guns, pistols and imaging cameras?
Response:
Criterion Two and Criterion Seven are criteria of concern for licence applications for Hong Kong but for the SIELs referenced we were satisfied that the applications did not breach the Consolidated Criteria for the following reasons:
(a and b) The imaging cameras were for cameras for use at university and their proposed end use raised no criteria concerns.
(c) The body armour and related equipment were to be used by the Hong Kong Government Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government, which has autonomy from the Chinese Central Government on matters of public order, including policing and correctional services. We therefore judged that there was no clear risk that the export would contravene the criteria.
(d) This application for assault rifles was for out of service ex-Russian military equipment for use in the film industry. We therefore judged that there was no clear risk that the export would contravene the criteria.
(e) This application was for body armour and related equipment to be used by the Hong Kong Government Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government, which has autonomy from the Chinese Central Government on matters of public order, including policing and correctional services. We therefore judged that there was no clear risk that the export would contravene the criteria.
(f) This application was for the demonstration and onward sale of imaging cameras for the municipal fire and rescue services. There had been previous exports of this equipment direct to the Chinese fire services.
Question: Israel: Given the actions of the Government of Israel in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in recent years, the Committees would be grateful for further information regarding the following SIELs that were granted during this period: all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for unmanned air vehicles, launching/handling/control/support equipment for unmanned air vehicles, military utility vehicles, small arms ammunition.
Response:
Applications included:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Question: Jordan: Given that there have been pro-democracy protests in Jordan since the beginning of 2011, the Committees would be grateful for further information about how end-use is being monitored regarding the following SIELs that were granted during this period: assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for combat aircraft, components for military combat vehicles, components for military support aircraft, components for military support vehicles, components for military utility vehicles, military combat vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition and technology for the use of military combat vehicles
Response:
The best means of ensuring that goods are not misused is to conduct a rigorous assessment at the licence application stage. This includes careful examination of the information on the proposed end use and end user of the goods.
The primary purpose of any monitoring of equipment once it has left the UK is to generate information to assist the risk assessment of other current or future similar applications. UK Overseas Posts have standing instructions to report misuse of UK-origin defence equipment.
We also take account of a variety of different reporting on end-use which includes reports coming from NGOs, human rights organisation reports, media reporting, and intelligence reports. Posts overseas are instructed to report to the FCO any misuse of UK-supplied equipment.
Question: Kazakhstan: Given the human rights record of the Government of Kazakhstan, why was a SIEL granted for small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
Response:
The goods in question were sporting gun ammunition intended for sporting end-use by civilian end-users. As such the proposed export did not raise Criterion 2 concerns.
Question: Kenya: Given that many observers judge that there is a clear risk of renewed violence in Kenya in the context of the 2012 national elections, why were SIELs granted for air guns, components for military support vehicles, components for military training aircraft, components for pistols, components for rifles, military support vehicles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? In asking this question, the Committees note that SIELs for components for semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols and technology for the use of semi-automatic pistols were refused on precisely these grounds.
For the same reason, the Committees would be grateful for further information about why SITCLs for bombs, components for air-to-surface rockets and small calibre artillery ammunition were granted during this period.
Response:
All applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated Criteria. Consideration of the prevailing circumstances in the country, the human rights records of the end user and the risk of internal repression (Criterion 2) are prevalent in our assessments. But for the SIELs referenced below the decision to issue the licences (except for two licences referred to in the question that were refused) were reached after concluding that there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 and that none of the other Criteria were engaged.
(a)
(b)
(c-f)
(g)
(h)
The application was issued in part for air guns as there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 for use by private individuals for sporting purposes.
(i)
Why SITCLs for bombs, components for air-to-surface rockets and small calibre artillery ammunition were granted during this period
This was a single licence for assorted types of ammunition intended for use by the military. There is no evidence of such goods being used against the civilian population and no clear risk identified under Criterion 2.
Question: Libya: For which of the items approved for permanent export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked?
Body armour components for combat aircraft military equipment for initiating explosives cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights weapon sight mounts, weapon sights.
Response:
All licences issued for body armour, components for combat aircraft, military equipment for initiating explosives, direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights weapon sight mounts and weapon sights were subsequently revoked. Some licences for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography remain extant as they were issued to civil end users for civil end use and raised no Consolidated Criteria concerns when all extant Libya licences were reviewed in Q1 2011.
Question: Libya: In addition, for which of the items approved for temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have all of these items been returned to the UK?
Anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for military parachutes, gun mountings, inert chaff, inert decoy flares, inert illuminators, inert signal flares, inert smoke canisters, inert smoke hand grenades, inert stun grenades, inert thunderflashes, machine guns, military combat vehicles, military communications equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, military utility vehicles, semi-automatic pistols, sniper rifles, sniper rifles, software enabling equipment to function as forward observer/target recognition training equipment, software for software for the simulation of military operation scenarios, training small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights, equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras, cryptographic software, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts.
Response:
The licences referred to were for temporary export for exhibition at the LibDex Exhibition which took place in Tripoli in November 2010 and was a trade show for the safety and security industry.
All the above licences were either revoked or surrendered. All but one exporter has assured us that the goods have been returned. This exporter has been unable to confirm the current location of the equipment they exported for the exhibition.
Question: Libya: The Committees would also be grateful to know whether the OIEL granted during this period has been revoked.
Response:
The OIEL issued during this period has not been revoked. This OIEL was for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography. It was decided not to remove Libya from this OIEL (other destinations were covered by the licence) as the goods were dual-use products for onward supply to civilian and business end users.
Question: Mozambique: Given that the capital, Maputo, saw riots in September 2010 in which a number of civilians were shot dead, why was a SIEL granted for body armour and components for body armour, rather than refused under Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
Response:
The stated end user on this application was an organisation specialising in the clearing of land mines. The Government considered that as the goods would be used for humanitarian purposes the proposed export did not raise concerns under the Criteria.
Question: Oman: Given that there was some unrest in Oman during the first quarter of 2011, the Committees would be grateful for more information about why none of the SIELs granted for the items below have been revoked as part of the Government’s review of arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa. How strong are the assurances received regarding end-use?
Components for weapon sight mounts; components for weapon sights; equipment for the use of sniper rifles; gun mountings; gun silencers, semi-automatic pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles sniper rifles, technology for sniper rifles.
The Committees raise the same issues with regard to one of the OIELs granted during this period, which covers the following items:
Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier, equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights
The Committees raise the same issues with regard to the SITCL granted during this period for components for assault rifles.
Response:
We examined all extant export licences for Oman following the limited unrest in the country, and were satisfied that all licences granted for Oman remained, and continue to remain, consistent with the Criteria. In line with normal practice, export licences are kept under review and scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.
Question: Saudi Arabia: Given that there was some unrest in Saudi Arabia during the first quarter of 2011, the Committees would be grateful for more information about why none of the SIELs granted for the items below have been revoked as part of the Government’s review of arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa. Why does the UK believe that the assurances relating to end-use will not be breached?
Components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of bombs, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment , military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for bombs, weapon night sights, imaging cameras
The Committees raise the same issues with regard to one of the OIELs granted during this period, which covers the following items:
Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier, equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights
Response:
We examined all extant export licences for Saudi Arabia during the spring, and were satisfied that all licences granted for Saudi Arabia remained, and continue to remain, consistent with the Criteria. To date, there is no evidence that UK supplied equipment has been used in breach of the Criteria in Saudi Arabia, or in Bahrain where Saudi forces were deployed to protect installations as part of the Peninsula Shield force, at the legitimate request of the Bahraini Government. In line with normal practice, export licences are reviewed when there has been a significant change of circumstances on the ground.
Question: Sudan: The Committees would be grateful for further information about how the SIEL granted for military equipment for initiating explosives is consistent with the arms trade sanctions currently in place.
The Committees raise the same issue regarding the OITCL granted for:
Promoting the supply of Category B goods, promoting the supply of military goods, promoting the supply of pepper sprays for self protection, promoting the supply of portable anti-riot devices, promoting the supply of tear gas for self protection and promoting the supply of tear gas/riot-control agents
Response:
This SIEL was for military equipment for initiating explosives.
As they are non-lethal items for humanitarian use they fall under the exemption set out in paragraph 9 of UNSCR 1556 (2004) which states that the arms embargo shall not apply to “Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian, human rights monitoring or protective use, and related technical training and assistance”.
The OITCL was approved for the insurance of de-mining equipment for an NGO operating in Sudan.
Question: Tunisia: The Committees would be grateful for information about why two SIELs for equipment employing cryptography were granted.
Response:
Both licences were granted for supply to commercial entities for civil end use and did not raise any concerns under the Criteria.
Question: United States: The Committees would be grateful for further information about the OIEL granted for toxins.
Response:
We approved two OIELs with a stated civil end-use. We had no Criterion 1 concerns about these applications.
Question: Zimbabwe: The Committees note that this country entry appears to be missing from the pivot report. They would be grateful to receive this information and ask that the report be duly corrected.
Response:
Unfortunately there was an error in the published report, for which we apologise. We are working to correct the error. However, the correct data may be obtained by creating a bespoke report from the searchable database.
Question: Finally, with regard to Open General Export Licences (OGLs), as per the table on pages 9–10 of the pivot report, please provide more information about the OGL named “X”, for which there were two registrations during this period; and give explanations for why a number of OGLs were revoked in full during this period.
Response:
The OGEL “X” allows the export of certain dual-use items to certain destinations, subject to the terms and conditions set out in the licence. Information about the licence and a copy of the licence is available on the export control pages of the BusinessLink website.
The Table shows all Open General Licences in full, including those that have been revoked. The appearance of a revoked licence in this Table does not indicate that the licence was revoked in this period. We would welcome the Committees’ views as to whether fully revoked licences should be excluded from this Table completely or whether it would be helpful to include them with the date of revocation. Regarding the three revoked licences the reasons for revocation are as follows:
Computers—revoked in September 2009—this licence authorised the export of certain high performance computers. However, changes to the control parameters agreed in the Wassenaar Arrangement meant that the coverage of the licence was minimal and feedback from exporters indicated that the licence was not used. Therefore it was revoked.
Vintage Military Vehicles—revoked November 2009—was replaced by the Historic Military Vehicles and Artillery Pieces OGL in order to allow the export of a wider range of goods including artillery pieces and vehicles more than 50 years old where they are intended for historic re-enactment or commemorative events, private battlefield tours or private recreational purposes to all EU Member States plus Channel Islands and Norway, and providing they are returned to the UK within three calendar months.
Open General Trade Control Licence (OGTCL)—revoked in April 2009—replaced by the OGTCL (Category C goods) and OGTCL (Small Arms) following the changes in the trade controls introduced in the Export Control Order 2008.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
Department for International Development
Ministry of Defence
21 February 2012