3 Members of the Consulting Association
37. As we noted above, Ian Kerr told us that
there were 17 initial members of the Consulting Association: Amey,
Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering, Balfour Beatty Construction,
Ballast Wiltshier, Edmund Nuttall, Higgs and Hill, John Laing,
John Mowlem, Kier Group, Morrison Construction, Norwest Holst,
Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd, Tarmac, Taylor Woodrow, Trafalgar House,
Walter Llewellyn and Willmott Dixon. Bovis and G. Percy Trentham
were also involved at an early stage, but dropped out. Other companies
joined, and 43 companies or divisions of companies were at some
point subscribers to TCA (see Table 1 below). So far, we have
taken evidence from representatives of Sir Robert McAlpine, Skanska
and Balfour Beatty, and we have received written evidence from
Carillion. It is our intention to take oral evidence from other
companies in due course.
38. We also received from Ian Kerr the accounts
of TCA that he held, and so we have been able to see the amounts
of money which different companies paid for the services which
TCA offered. These can be seen on our website. We would like to
see TCA's daybook in order to be able to link individual payments
to individual sites. We are quite certain that Sir Robert McAlpine
Ltd was a major force in the formation and operation of TCA, and
it is hardly likely to be coincidence that the company provided
the organisation's Chairmen for eight of its sixteen years (Cullum
McAlpine 1993-97, David Cochrane 2006-09). McAlpine was also a
major spender on the services of TCA; so too was Skanska and its
predecessors and subsidiaries. We will outline the involvement
of those companies from whom we have taken evidence below.
Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd
39. We took evidence from Cullum McAlpine, the
first Chairman of the Consulting Association. Mr Kerr told us
that he was an important part of creating the organisation from
the remnants of the Economic League and the Services Group:
At its inception, the first chairman was the person
who was there guiding it towards becoming the Consulting Association
[
] that was Cullum McAlpine of Sir Robert McAlpine.[50]
Mr McAlpine denied that he was personally an important
part of the creation of TCA. He described how a group of human
resources managers from the companies which had been involved
in the Services Group were working towards forming an association
which would become TCA, and decided that they wanted a main board
director from one of the larger civil engineering and construction
companies to act, in effect, as a figurehead. He was approached,
and referred the issue to the board of McAlpine.[51]
He added that the group "really wanted McAlpine, not me."[52]
40. Mr McAlpine also played down his role as
Chairman during the first four years of TCA. He chaired the finance
committee, which concentrated "pretty much only on budgets
and financial arrangementsincome, expenditure and that
sort of thing", and told us that there was no real control
of the day-to-day or month-to-month activities of TCA.[53]
He summed up his function like this: "My role was to try
to make sure that it [TCA] did not lose money and that it survived
the first three years. To that extent, it was a commercial role."[54]
41. Whatever Mr McAlpine's personal involvement
in TCA, which we will consider a little later, it is evident that
Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd was a major subscriber and client. Between
the financial years 1996/97 and 2008/09 (the years for which Mr
Kerr was able to supply us with usage and subscription charges),
the company spent in excess of £150,000 on the services of
TCAwith each individual check only costing in the region
of £2 (though of course this amount will also have included
the annual subscription fee).
42. We were not persuaded by
Mr McAlpine's description of his role with the Consulting Association
as being hands-off. We accept that there was little direct supervision
of Ian Kerr's activities as Chief Officer of the organisation,
and in that sense Mr McAlpine acted as a non-executive Chairman.
However, his position as the founding Chairman, and as a Director
of one of the biggest spenders on TCA's services, suggests that
his involvement may have been rather more substantial than he
suggested. The evidence we heard from Mr Kerr suggested that he
was simply a paid employee of TCA and that initiative and direction
came from elsewhere. We see no reason to doubt this.
43. Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd is currently facing
a court case over its involvement with TCA, in which Cullum McAlpine
is personally named. The claim is that the company:
Was involved in an unlawful conspiracy with other
construction companies which subscribed to the database, which
involved inter alia the wrongful gathering, storage and use of
information concerning trade union activities and in particular
the making of decisions as to whether or not the Claimants should
be employed.[55]
The company has declined to comment on the claim,
as it is preparing a legal defence. However, a spokesman for Sir
Robert McAlpine Ltd, noting that a large number of construction
companies had contributed information to and accessed information
from TCA's database, added:
Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd has never operated a 'blacklist'.
We are, and have always been, wholly committed to maintaining
good relationships with our workforce and to responsible trade
unionism.[56]
44. During our evidence session with Cullum McAlpine,
we were careful not to engage in any lines of questioning which
might be seen as prejudicial to the case. We hope that Mr McAlpine
was as frank and full in his evidence to us as he could reasonably
have been. There is the potential for considerable reputational
damage for all the construction firms from which we have taken
evidence of appearing to be less than open to a committee of the
House.
Skanska
45. Skanska UK was created in 2000 when Kvaerner
sold its construction arm to Skanska AB, the Swedish parent company.
Kvaerner had previously acquired Trafalgar House in 1996. Trafalgar
House was one of the founders of TCA in 1993. We took oral evidence
from Harvey Francis, Executive Vice President, Human Resources,
Communications and IT for Skanska UK, who had been in post when
the activities of TCA came to light in 2009. He and the then head
of Skanska UK, Mats Williamson, were responsible for dealing with
Skanska's reaction to the revelations about the Consulting Association.
46. Skanska, like McAlpine, spent significant
sums of money on the services of TCA, including in its incarnations
as Trafalgar House and Kvaerner. During the years for which Mr
Kerr provided records, their total spend was over £200,000.
Mr Francis admitted that Skanska had been heavy users of TCA.
While he did not seek to excuse the practice, he did seek to put
it in context, when asked how many individual checks the company
had made:
It is difficult to tell for sure, because the records
that exist are very patchy. We have not seen the database, so
we do not know for sure, but extrapolating from the invoices,
the number is around 66,000. That looks like a huge numberI
am not sitting here trying to excuse that in any waybut
by way of context, if you look at 2008, which was one of our peak
years in terms of volume and large buildings, we had something
like over 90,000 people working on our sites during that one year
alone. You need to think about the cyclical nature of how the
trades come on to projects and go off, and then the churn within
that. I just wanted to explain by way of context why the number
looks big, and is big.[57]
It is clear, therefore, that subscriber companies
to TCA used its reference checking service as a matter of course.
Mr Francis also notedand this is especially relevant to
some of the employment tribunals which have arisen from TCA's
activities, including that of Mr Smith, discussed abovethat
Skanska used the reference checking service primarily for subcontractors,
rather than for people whom the company would be employing directly.[58]
47. Ian Kerr told us that different companies
used the information from TCA's database in different ways. He
said:
It could be shown that some companies took a harder
line, to be fair, and didn't employ becauseI think this
is what you are sayingthe name was there. Some would say,
"Well, that was a long time ago", or "He's not
to come along with any of the others,"say there were
half a dozen involved in a project. "We'll take a chance.
We will note and monitor." In other cases, if the information
was quite old or they thought it was minor, or if they knew the
person it had come from and they thought that person was too hard,
too harsh, they would say, "We'll take him on." This
depended, to a degree, on the company's philosophy. Some were
more hard and earnest than others.[59]
When pressed, he identified Skanska as being among
this latter group of companies.[60]
48. After the discovery of Skanska's involvement
with TCA, senior executives from the company met with trade union
representatives, including Jim Kennedy of UCATT, who has given
evidence to the Committee. The senior executives were Mr Williamson
and Mr Francis. Skanska revealed that their internal investigation
had revealed that the company's named contact with TCA was Stephen
Quant, then human resources director. Mr Quant had also been Chairman
of TCA in 2002 and 2003. There was also a second point of contact,
unnamed, who was a security manager in London. Mr Quant left Skanska
not long after the ICO raid on TCA's premises.
49. We acknowledge that Skanska have faced up
to the responsibilities they had for their use of TCA's services.
Mr Kennedy, of UCATT, told us that, when he met Mr Williamson
and Mr Francis in the wake of the ICO raid:
I have to say that at that meeting they were deeply
embarrassed by the whole scandal and were asking us, "What
can we do to make things right?", you know, in terms of future
processes. What had come out of their internal investigationand
they were adamant about thiswas that Stephen Quant had
assured him that he had only ever requested information concerning
health and safety issues. There was no record of any communication
between Skanska, Kerr and the Consulting Association. Apparently,
all the communications had been done via fax or telephone.[61]
It was not initially clear what "information
concerning health and safety" meant, and it is certainly
no excuse for the illicit use of a blacklist. Mr Francis admitted
to us that the use of TCA's services did not come to general attention
in Skanska. When he was asked if anyone except Mr Quant would
have known what TCA invoices were for, he said that they would
not, as an invoice with an authorised signature (that of Mr Quant)
would have been paid by the finance department without any further
questions.[62]
50. Skanska's internal review, conducted in 2009,
initially concluded that the company had only drawn information
out of TCA's database, rather than added any data to it. However,
Skanska subsequently discovered that that was not the case, and
wrote to the ICO to inform it of this fact.[63]
After some negotiation, Skanska has agreed to make its internal
investigation available to us on the basis of confidentiality,
and we intend to return to the matter in the future.
51. Mr Kennedy of UCATT thought that Mr Quant
was likely to be the lynchpin of Skanska's use of TCA. However,
he pointed to the fact that several operating units in the Skanska
family and 'genealogy' had made checks against TCA's database,
and concluded, "If you look at that, at one point it was
pretty widespread across all operating units in Skanska. There
was, obviously, one point of contact, but a lot of people would
have been feeding into that one point of contacti.e. Mr
Quant."[64]
52. It should be noted that Skanska was not among
those companies served with an enforcement order by the ICO when
TCA's activities came to light. We asked Mr Francis why he thought
that was. He said he did not know, but suggested it might have
been a result of the "full co-operation, transparency and
candidness with which we shared information".[65]
53. One final concern which we have in terms
of Skanska's reaction to its use of TCA's services is that no
individual employees have been held responsible for any wrongdoing.
Mr Francis told us that heand, we assume, by extension,
Skanskapreferred to take corporate responsibility for what
had happened.[66]
54. Skanska's claim is that
its use of the Consulting Association was essentially dependent
on one individual, Stephen Quant, who is no longer with the company.
We have no evidence to contradict this, though it seems implausible
that no-one else in the company had the slightest inkling that
potential employees or subcontractors were being systematically
checked against a database. We acknowledge the extent to which
Skanska subsequently faced up to its responsibilities in this
regard once caught, and conducted a swift internal review. We
look forward to examining this process in more detail. We also
heard extensive evidence from Skanska that practices and cultures
within the company had changed fundamentally as a result of this
review. We accept that Skanska has made significant efforts to
cooperate with the ICO.
55. We remain concerned by the
failure of Skanska to hold any individual to account for the wrongdoing
which it has acknowledged. There is much in the company's determination
to accept corporate responsibility to be admired, but the fact
remains that thousands of workers may have had their employment
prospects blighted and their lives significantly disrupted, whereas
those responsible for the illicit use of TCA's blacklist may still
be employed by Skanska.
Balfour Beatty
56. Balfour Beatty was another significant user
of TCA's services, through a number of distinct subdivisions:
Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering/Major Projects; Balfour Beatty
Construction; Balfour Kilpatrick; Haden Young Ltd; Raynesway/Balfour
Beatty Infrastructure Services; and Balfour Beatty Scottish and
Southern. In July 2009, Balfour Kilpatrick and Haden Young merged
to form Balfour Beatty Engineering Services. All of these companies
were covered by a single group subscription to TCA, but were invoiced
for their usage charges for TCA's services directly. As we mentioned
earlier, Balfour Beatty Construction and Balfour Beatty Civil
were founder members of the Consulting Association.
57. As we discussed in relation to Skanska, Mr
Kerr told us that some members of TCA were especially severe in
applying information found on individuals during reference checks
against the database. He noted that "The Balfour Beatty companies
were particularly hard-nosed, I found".[67]
58. Gail Cartmail, of Unite the Union, told us
that Balfour Beatty Engineering Services was engaged in blacklisting.
One firm in particular is Balfour Beatty Engineering
Services. One of our members, Stewart Hume, was interviewed by
a manager called Gerry Harvey who, if I can put it in the vernacular,
has form on blacklisting. The Committee may say that we could
pursue the victimisation of trade union activities, but I am absolutely
convinced that Stewart Hume will never be engaged by Balfour Beatty
Engineering Services following his redundancy.[68]
Asked if she believed that Mr Hume was blacklisted
on the basis of his trade union activities, she replied, "I
am absolutely convinced of that".[69]
59. As we mentioned above, we heard evidence
from Alan Wainwright, who had been employed by Haden Young, a
Balfour Beatty subsidiary, as Regional Production and Resources
Manager for the Midlands and Southern Region from 2004 to 2006.
In 2005, while working for Haden Young, Mr Wainwright wrote to
his head office, alleging that the company operated a system of
blacklisting for new recruits and hired temporary agency workers
"to check for any previous history of union militancy, troublemaking".[70]
From time to time, Mr Wainwright claimed, lists of names were
faxed to Haden Young's head office; he believed that this was
so that the names could be vetted. The following year, he resigned
his position at Haden Young and pursued a claim against them at
an employment tribunal, but was unsuccessful. Mr Wainwright confirmed
to the Committee that Haden Young was a subscriber to the Consulting
Association and checked names against its database.[71]
60. Balfour Beatty has admitted using the services
of the Consulting Association. According to an article in The
Guardian in January 2013, Mike Peasland, Chief Executive Officer
of Construction Services UK, Balfour Beatty plc, who gave evidence
to us, wrote to Dennis Hone, Chief Executive of the Olympic Delivery
Authority, admitting that:
Companies within Balfour Beatty's Construction Services
UK division "used the services of the Consulting Association
prior to February 2009 when the office of the information commissioner
raided the Consulting Association's offices". It adds: "We
have carried out an internal review of our operating companies.
We found that in 2008 we used the Consulting Association in connection
with the engagement of 12 operatives".[72]
After the raid of TCA's office by the Information
Commissioner in 2009, six Balfour Beatty companies were among
those served with enforcement notices: Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering
Limited; Balfour Beatty Construction Northern Ireland; Balfour
Beatty Construction Scottish & Southern Limited; Balfour
Beatty Engineering Services (HY) Limited; Balfour Beatty Engineering
Services Limited; and Balfour Beatty Infrastructure Services Limited.[73]
61. Mr Peasland confirmed to us that Balfour
Beatty, as a group of companies, had been a member of the Economic
League, and had been a founder member (in more than one guise)
of the Consulting Association. Once he had acknowledged that TCA
provided a referencing service for potential employees against
a database, we asked him why Balfour Beatty had felt the need
for such a service. He said:
We were suffering huge amounts of disruption in our
business from unlawful acts on our sites. That would have led
to major issues in terms of disruption for our customers, for
our staff and for our own work force. We felt that this was a
way to help prevent unlawful acts on our sites from happening.[74]
He went on to accept that Balfour Beatty had been
slow to react to changes in data protection legislation, and had
been using the services of TCA in an improper way. He said that
"We regret using the Consulting Association".[75]
62. In the wake of the ICO's raid, Balfour Beatty,
like Skanska, initiated a review of its process in these specific
areas. Mr Peasland said that the company's "reaction was
to review exactly where we were with what we were doing and to
change and improve our policies both in terms of our code of conduct
and data protection".[76]
When asked if he thought matters would have improved without the
impetus of the ICO raid, he affirmed that he did, though more
slowly. Pressed on the evidence for this assertion, Mr Peasland
replied, "There is no evidence of that".[77]
63. We asked Mr Peasland what the review had
revealed. He told us that Balfour Beatty's data protection policies
and code of conduct had been found wanting, and needed to be toughened
up "to make it much more visible and explicit in terms of
the actions that would be taken for either the use of or support
of lists that supported people being excluded from sites without
reference".[78]
The existing systems had not been robust enough.[79]
We asked Mr Peasland to supply a copy of the review for us to
see. He declined our request on grounds of legal privilege. However,
we continue to negotiate with Balfour Beatty in the hope that
a satisfactory solution can be found.
64. As we had done with Mr Francis from Skanska,
we asked Mr Peasland if individuals within Balfour Beatty had
been held to account for the failings involving the company's
use and membership of the Consulting Association. He told us that
no-one had either been sacked or made redundant as a result.[80]
He argued that individuals had simply been following existing
company policy: only obeying orders.[81]
65. We welcome the fact that
Balfour Beatty has acknowledged that it was mistaken in using
the services of the Consulting Association. We also welcome the
fact that the company conducted an internal review in the wake
of the ICO's raid. On the first point, however, while we are sure
that Balfour Beatty regrets being caught, we were less convinced
that management regretted its involvement with TCA. On the second
point, we cannot comment on the robustness or extent of the internal
review until we see a copy of the document. We encourage Balfour
Beatty to engage with us in a spirit of openness and honesty.
66. The final point is, once
again, the lack of individual accountability. Balfour Beatty confirmed
that no-one had been sacked or made redundant as a result of the
company's wrongdoing. We find this difficult to accept. Admission
of corporate responsibility is an admirable thing, but it can
be no substitute for holding individuals to account when they
have committed illicit or illegal acts. It is hard to see how
workers who have been systematically and illegally denied employment
will understand that the perpetrators are still in their jobs.
We do not accept the defence that people were only obeying orders.
50 Q 1047 Back
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Q 1422 Back
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55
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56
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Qq 2188-89 Back
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