A Robust Grid for 21st Century Scotland - Scottish Affairs Committee Contents


3  Emergency responses to power failures

30. In the event of a significant disruption, or threat of significant disruption, to gas and/or electricity supplies, the UK Government may, under the Energy Act 1976, seek powers to direct appropriate aspects of the production, distribution, acquisition, supply and use of gas and electricity. In addition to these arrangements, electricity and gas transmission and distribution companies have established an emergency planning forum within the Energy Networks Forum that meets every two months to ensure that emergency planning decisions are implemented, and to carry out more detailed planning work. [19]

31. From the evidence we heard, we accept that both companies made every effort to ensure that as much human resource as possible was deployed quickly. SSE stated that its preparation for the approaching storms began on 1 January 2012. This involved over 700 people from across the UK and Ireland, working to restore the electricity supplies, and in some cases rebuilding the worst affected areas within the network. Once the wind speeds had slowed, it also deployed helicopters to assess the damage from the air and carry out restoration work where it was most needed.

32. SSE told us that their Emergency Services Centre proactively contacted thousands of vulnerable customers to ensure that there was adequate support. This included offering accommodation to many customers who had no supply overnight. It also organised hot food vans in Dalmally, Lochgilphead and Dunoon, as well as working with the Scottish Hydro Shop in Rothesay to provide food and refreshment facilities. In addition to this, less mobile members of the community were transported to and from the food vans by SSE staff who also delivered hot food and drinks to some of the more vulnerable members of the community. ScottishPower, as a response to these storms, also offered its customers hot meals and accommodation where they were had no supply for prolonged periods.[20]

33. Despite this effort, there were many customers who had to provide for themselves for up to four days before being reconnected. Evidence from residents in the affected areas suggests that, during this period, there was little information offered from the power companies, or indeed the local authorities, about what was happening and when normal services would be restored. We are concerned that these support services were not being taken up by those who needed them the most because they were unaware such services were available.

Emergency communication

COMMUNICATION WITH CUSTOMERS

34. We were concerned about SSE's communication with customers within the community. Both SSE and ScottishPower told us that, during the storm conditions the volume of calls received by their call centres increased dramatically.[21] Alistair Redman suggested that information provided by SSE was 'confusing and contradictory'. When asked to elaborate on this point he stated that:

You would literally get the woman or gentleman you spoke to at Portsmouth, or wherever it is we are phoning into lately, saying one thing and then you would phone up again and they would say the complete opposite. It was commonplace. First, they would say the road was blocked. Then they would say, "We can't send a gentleman up the cables because it is too windy." Each time there was a different excuse. Almost as many times as you phoned up you had a different excuse.[22]

35. Customers within these areas requested 'real-time' information; their main concern was knowing how long they were going to be without power and when they were likely to be reconnected. Alan Broadbent, Head of Engineering and Networks at SSE, told us:

The biggest single issue for any power company is that, if you have multiple faults on circuits and access is difficult, you cannot predict when someone will be back on supply. This was part of what happened in that particular situation. There is more that we can try to do about that. We can look at storms in general and put in place certain rules, which might establish whether, in this particular area, if there is a storm, we can give this information and generally speaking, whether the power will be off for one day or two days. That is what customers like: they want to know whether they are off for a day or off for two days.[23]

36. According to evidence from Nigel Stewart of Clachan in Kintyre, the information from SSE was not received because many people were unable to power the devices required to do so. They also commented that the information on the website was not easy to find:

The obvious first port of call for consumers in this area is the website www.hydro.co.uk, or that failing www.sse.co.uk. Neither of these sites carried information releases or situation reports during the disruption, nor did www.sse.com. Instead it was necessary to find Scottish and Southern Energy Power Distribution at www.ssepd.co.uk. The average customer is not concerned about the niceties of which part of the company is the right one to seek information from, and it is a pity that the main websites did not carry the information or signpost to it.[24]

37. Many of the customers that are served by both these companies live in rural and remote communities. Word of mouth is sometimes the only means of communication. The service provided by representatives in SSE's shops is paramount to ensuring that, in situations where people cannot be contacted by phone or otherwise, information is disseminated promptly. Alan Broadbent of SSE, commented:

Our shops are a focal point in many of these islands. Last week, I and a colleague met the chap who manages all the shops. We talked about how they can do more and how they can mirror what happened on Rothesay, because Senga did a power of good for that island and a lot of people appreciate what she did. She charged her phone, which actually was working, in her car, because her house was off, and she got information from us and told people how things were. She told people the hot food vans were coming. She went to individual customers and spoke to them and gave them food. We need to do that on a community basis through all of our shops. At the moment, we do not have a database within my part of the business that shows us who is in those shops, what the telephone numbers are, and how to communicate. We will get that. We will find a way through the PMR system—the new system that we are bringing in—to put fixed base stations there, so we will get through and tell the shops and that sort of information can get out to the wider community by word of mouth. It is a bit different in the west coast, because you have widely spread communities, and it is quite difficult to do that.[25]

38. SSE commented on the difficulty of speaking to their engineers within the field due to mobile phone masts across different network providers in the area being down. Further questioning on the alternative options available when primary means of communication failed revealed that SSE had a contingency of a private mobile radio system. The private mobile radio is still limited in terms of its reliability as the engineers are constantly on the move, and once again there are only certain areas that allow for optimum use. SSE told us they plan to invest £4 million developing its communication systems in emergency situations; it is hoped that this investment will facilitate more reliable communication and provide better coverage of Scotland.[26]

CO-ORDINATING THE RESPONSE

39. Argyll and Bute Council, SSE and Scottish Power all commented on the need for better communication among themselves, as well as with other Scottish Local Authorities. We recognise that for many residents living in the affected areas, the Council could be a valuable source of information. Evidence received from residents of Argyll and Bute stated that the local council was not able to relay any information to them during the storms. During questioning, Jane Fowler, from Argyll and Bute Council, commented on the limitations of Council resources during this weather event. She stated:

communication was extremely challenging. We did not have BT for a period of time on Bute. We did not have any electricity. We had no mobile phone signals on the island. It was very difficult. There is an issue on an island the size of Bute and in other communities where there is absolutely no means of communication, other than people potentially going around with loudhailers saying, "If you want a hot drink come to the Pavilion." Scottish and Southern Energy provided mobile catering units that were in the middle of the town.[27]

40. Following our evidence sessions, SSE sent us a summary of the storm review it had conducted.[28] One of the issues investigated was proactive community engagement. It acknowledged that the level of communication and engagement may have led to a misunderstanding of the cause of loss of supply, and damaged relationships in some communities. It pledged to review its internal processes to ensure that communities are informed of significant network maintenance and improvements. It also said it would explore the possibility of a community representative being trained with the necessary skills to undertake basic restoration work when engineers cannot attend a location immediately.

41. Contact between power companies and the local authorities on how to effectively and efficiently co-ordinate a response in these situations needs to be increased. During our evidence sessions, it was suggested that a nominated individual in the isolated areas, should be given the authority by the distribution company to activate a backup power supply, such as a generator, should the area become disconnected. As it is sometimes difficult for engineers to reach some of these isolated areas quickly, this measure could minimise the length of time customers are left without supply.[29]

42. The relationship between communities, the local authorities and their energy supplier is extremely important, particularly in rural areas such as Islay. SSE should review how it engages with communities and local authorities during emergencies to ensure that the information relayed back to its customers is accurate.

VULNERABLE INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFICATION

43. In order to identify vulnerable individuals, the industry currently uses a priority standard services register to record customers who have disabilities or impairments. However, in order to be placed on the register, the individual has to notify their supplier that they are vulnerable. SSE and ScottishPower operate their own database systems to identify their vulnerable customers when supply is disconnected alongside this industry standard register. ScottishPower has recently upgraded its database system, enabling it to be brought to the advisors' attention when a caller is registered as vulnerable.

44. An issue that all witnesses identified was the need for there to be a shared database of vulnerable individuals available to the emergency and social services, local authorities and power companies. Presently, the majority of the information comes from industry sources, which means that supply companies will identify vulnerable customers and pass on that information to the distribution network operators.

45. In order for a bigger database to be created, there are certain data protection issues that have to be addressed. Any handling of personal data has to be in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Should the data controller need to process any data, it has to be within the conditions set out in the Act. One of these conditions is that the processing is necessary to protect the individuals' vital interests, which could arise should elderly residents find themselves disconnected from supply for prolonged periods. This Act does not prevent organisations sharing personal data where it is appropriate, although it does restrict it. For emergency response planning, therefore, it is necessary to balance those restrictions against the risks involved in not sharing potentially life-saving data.   All relevant parties should be aware of what information may need to be shared in the possibility of an emergency situation arising. For example, the police, the fire service and local councils co-operate to put into place a data sharing agreement, allowing them to get to those who need their help quickly.

46. SSE stated in its storm review that it currently has limited access to customer information. Its priority services register is a voluntary list that depends upon a vulnerable customer informing their supplier of their circumstances. However, the company endeavours to work with all relevant stakeholders to remove barriers to a single co-ordinated vulnerable persons register which could best identify vulnerable customers during periods of supply disruption.[30]

47. The identification of vulnerable individuals in an emergency situation is paramount. Ofgem, power companies and local authorities should work together to ensure the maximum flow of information within the constraints of the Data Protection Act.


19   Ev 38 Back

20   Ev 68, 72 Back

21   Ev 44, 64, 72, 87 Back

22   Q 71 Back

23   Q 153 Back

24   Ev 83 Back

25   Q 154  Back

26   Q 140 Back

27   Q 80 Back

28   Ev 86 Back

29   Q 145 Back

30   Ev 88 Back


 
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© Parliamentary copyright 2012
Prepared 27 August 2012