Scottish Affairs Committee - A Robust Grid for 21st Century ScotlandWritten evidence submitted by Energy Networks Association

1. Energy Networks Association—who we are and what we do

Energy Networks Association (ENA) represents the “wires and pipes” transmission and distribution network operators for gas and electricity in the UK and Ireland. Our members control and maintain the critical national infrastructure that delivers these vital services into our homes and businesses.

ENA’s overriding goals are to promote the UK and Ireland energy networks and enable our networks to be the safest, most reliable, most efficient and sustainable in the world. We aim to influence decision-makers on issues that are common to its interests. These include:

Regulation and the wider representation in UK, Ireland and the rest of Europe.

Cost-efficient engineering services and related businesses for the benefit of members.

Safety, health and environment across the gas and electricity industries.

As the voice of the energy networks sector ENA acts as a strategic focus and channel of communication for the industry. We promote the interests and good standing of the industry, and provide a forum of discussion among company members.

2. Introduction

This submission will not comment on the details of the recent events in Scotland, something the individual companies concerned will be better placed to provide. However we wanted to set out to the Committee what activities and agreed procedures ENA members undertake in relation to weather events, other emergencies and dealing with the impact of climate change. We particularly wanted to emphasise the spirit of cooperation that exists between member companies when such events happen. We also discuss the issues around undergrounding overhead line.

3. Industry Arrangements

The industry works with government, the regulator and other interested parties to ensure the normal supply of natural gas and electricity as a national priority. This is considered an economic imperative and it is vital that it is carried out in a manner which ensures the safety of the public, employees and contractors.

This is achieved through the following arrangements:

(a)An Executive comprising representation from DECC, Ofgem and industry to oversee the development of emergency planning arrangements (Energy Emergencies Executive (E3)).

(b)An Executive Committee (E3C) with wider representation from government, Ofgem and industry to prepare for emergencies by developing, maintaining and testing emergency planning arrangements.

(c)Subcommittees of E3C dealing with specific issues:

E3C and the Task Groups normally meet every two months.

E3C members are jointly engaged in developing plans and processes and undertaking training and exercises with the aim of preserving normal gas and electricity supplies.

Most supply incidents are local or regional in nature and are managed by the relevant utility company. At a national level there are a series of measures to prevent or minimise disruption. First, the commercial arrangements are designed to give participants an incentive to have sufficient supplies to meet their customers’ requirements. If supplies are disrupted then operational arrangements are in place to manage the situation. In the gas industry the Network Emergency Co-ordinator would declare an emergency under the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations and re-establish the balance between supply and demand. In electricity, the Electricity Act 1989 includes provisions for the Fuel Security Code, which sets out how to manage a shortage of generation, and the Electricity Supply Emergency Code, which describes how demand will be curtailed to meet supply whilst protecting certain priority customers. Finally, there are Black Start plans for the re-starting of the UK electricity system following a complete failure. The principle in all these circumstances is for the industry to maintain operational control, while DECC’s role is to cover strategy, policy and liaison with other government departments.

http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/meeting_energy/en_security/en_security.aspx

In an emergency, the UK Government will be responsible for overall policy and strategy, whilst industry will be responsible for the operational management of the incident. It should be noted that whilst the devolved administrations do not have responsibility for energy, Scottish Ministers do have devolved responsibilities related to managing the consequences of emergencies in Scotland and therefore their representative attends meetings of E3C.

In the event of a significant disruption, or threat of significant disruption, to gas and/or electricity supplies, the UK Government may under the Energy Act 1976 seek powers to direct appropriate aspects of the production, distribution acquisition, supply and use of gas and electricity.

In addition to these arrangements electricity and gas transmission and distribution companies have established an emergency planning forum under the auspices of the Energy Networks Association (ENA) that also meets every two months, following E3C, to ensure E3C decisions are implemented and carry out more detailed planning work.

The distribution companies also have mutual aid arrangements in place to assist in the management of localised extreme events by providing for the transfer of staff and resources between companies.

4. Winter Preparedness

4.1 National Grid Winter Outlook Report

National Grid provides information to participants in the gas and electricity markets by publishing an outlook of supply and demand prior to both the winter and summer periods. Prior to the Winter Outlook Report National Grid conducts a consultation exercise designed both to help inform the industry and also to provide National Grid with feedback to support the production of the Winter Outlook Report in September/October. This report is considered by government and E3/E3C.

The consultation is separated into two main sections, a review of last winter and a consultation on the outlook for the upcoming winter and is available on the National Grid web site at http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Gas/TYS/outlook/

Winter Review 2010–11—Key Details

Weather

Coldest December on record but overall an “average” winter due to other months being relatively “warm”.

Fuel Prices

All energy prices increased during winter 2010–11, notably oil and gas. As the relative increase in gas price was higher than that for coal, the economics within winter shifted from gas to coal as the preferred source of fuel for power generation

Gas

Highest demand 20 December 2010 (the 2nd highest) 465 mcm/d 2010–11 supply trends—lower UKCS, more LNG. Increased flexibility from non storage supplies.

Electricity

Peak demand 7 December 2010 at 17:30 59.7 GW.
Actual generator availability at the peak 80%.

4.2 Other information not included in the 2010–11 review

Although there was an exceptionally long spell of snowy conditions, the electricity and gas transmission and distribution systems performed well and there were no significant weather related incidents reported.

4.3 Other information concerning 2011–12 preparedness

Gas and electricity transmission and distribution companies will be reviewing their winter preparedness when their emergency planning managers meet at the next ENA forum on 11 October.

Typical actions for companies include:

Recommissioning circuits following summer maintenance or reinforcement/replacement work to ensure networks are as robust as possible.

Reviewing emergency plans and ensuring that staff are briefed for their emergency roles.

Reviewing emergency stocks of plant and equipment.

Reviewing the availability of specialist vehicles including four wheel drive.

Considering long range weather forecasts and constantly monitoring medium and short rang forecasts. Companies have contracts with the Met Office for the provision of specialist weather warning information including longer distance probability based forecasts. This can enable companies to put in place emergency arrangements before severe weather arrives. In some circumstance this may include cancelling routine work, establishing an emergency management team and initiating contact with other companies regarding mutual assistance.

5. Undergrounding

5.1 When considering whether to underground an overhead line a balance needs to be drawn between cost, impact and the benefits. Undoubtedly undergrounded line is resilient to weather however there are other factors that need to be considered.

5.2 The cost—The primary consideration is the greatly increased cost of undergrounding a line. The cost of undergrounding a transmission line is up to 10 times the cost of building it over ground. The average cost of building an overhead high voltage line is £1 million per Km. Therefore the cost of undergrounding this is an additional £9 million per Km. This cost would have to be borne by the customer. As a result this would have to be a matter for Government and the Regulator ultimately but they need to ask whether this cost would be justified for the possible benefit.

5.3 The impact on the landscape—Any undergrounding of higher voltage lines will require a clearance above of up 20 meters wide. That would mean no trees or other large vegetation as well as no agricultural or other cultivation at a width of a three lane motorway both ways for as long as the underground cable is going.

5.4 A smarter networks means less pylons—Developing a smarter network will enable greater efficient use of existing electricity generation which in turn will reduce the need for even greater development of overhead lines. With greater electrification of transport and heat this will be essential.

6. Adaptation to Climate Change

ENA worked with its member companies in 2010–11 to develop a response to the requirements placed on them as reporting authorities by the Climate Change Act. Electricity companies are more affected by the predicted changes in climate and a “core” assessment has been prepared by a task group of electricity distribution and transmission network operators. The task group included the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and received inputs from the Office of Gas and Energy Markets (Ofgem), the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Environment Agency (EA), the Met Office and other organisations.

The Engineering Report considers those issues that are common to electricity network companies across the UK and has been used by companies as the basis for their individual reports which will also include company specific information.

UK electricity network companies have experience in operating in a range of weather conditions and have always used the latest information when considering current threats and potential climate change impacts. For climate projections this was initially UKCP02, which was used by the Met Office in a report commissioned by energy companies and published in 2008. The report investigated the potential impact of climate change on energy companies. UKCP02 has now been superseded by UKCP09, which is used in all current research.

The EP2 report was a groundbreaking initiative that brought climate science closer to business applications. This was the first project sponsored by an entire sector to review the specific impacts of climate change on their industry. Supported by climate scientists, experts from the industry worked together to understand their precise requirements and developed practical applications and business strategies for a changing world.

Further work has recently been completed with the Met Office to build a risk model that quantifies the relationship between climate and network faults, and also the vulnerability and exposure of the network to these faults. This model can be driven with climate projections to assess how network resilience may be affected by climate change.

The ENA “core” report considers all other available evidence from a variety of sources including EA, SEPA, UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) and those involved in the National Climate Change Risk Assessment programme.

The main impacts on electricity networks from the current climate change projections are:

Temperature—predicted increase.

Precipitation—predicted increase in winter rainfall and summer droughts.

Sea level rise—predicted increase.

Storm surge—predicted increase.

At present there is no firm climate change evidence to support increased intensity of wind or ice storms both of which can cause extensive damage to overhead electricity networks.

The report considers each component of transmission and distribution systems and uses current industry techniques to calculate the effects of climate change to 2099.

Individual company reports incorporating all this information and the ENA Core Report were published on the Defra web site on 10 December under the banner heading:

“Energy firms’ climate change plans will keep Britain’s lights on.”
Notes

1.ENA and its member companies have supported the Environment Agency (EA) in the development of a new flood warning system for infrastructure owners. This will automatically indicate which items of infrastructure are affected by which flood warning and will be a particular help to infrastructure owners when large numbers of their sites are affected by multiple warnings. It is expected that this system will be in commission in the late autumn and more information is available from the EA.

2.Following the severe flooding in 2007, ENA and its member companies worked with EA, Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), Met Office, Ofgem DECC and the Pitt Review Team to produce a ten year strategy for improving the resilience of electricity substations and gas infrastructure to the effects of flooding. This programme continues to improve network resilience to flood events and is now part of the National Critical Infrastructure Resilience Programme.

19 January 2012