Scottish Affairs Committee - A Robust Grid for 21st Century ScotlandWritten evidence submitted by Nigel Stewart

1. Summary

1.1 On three occasions within a month the West Highland village community of Clachan and its surrounding area was without power for a total of almost 100 hours with one continuous outage of 60 hours over three days and two nights. The most recent disruption became intolerable to endure for individuals and communities, however resilient. Without diminishing from the credit due to SSE personnel who worked long hours to restore supply, this level of disruption cannot be regarded as normal or acceptable in the 21st century. This is not about criticising SSE which was clearly overwhelmed by the scale of what it had to face, but as Mr Mark Mathieson, Managing Director, Networks, SSE is quoted “This is the seventh exceptional weather event we have experienced since November”. The Committee’s inquiry is welcome in helping to find ways to ensure our electricity network copes better with more frequent severe weather situations.

1.2 Clachan lies in the Kintyre Peninsula virtually half way between Lochgilphead, 26 miles north, and Campbeltown, a similar distance south. It possesses a significant community identity, and resilience in the face of difficulties. The village has an increasingly elderly population, and is economically mixed. There is a small primary school, a village hall and a village shop/post office/petrol station. The shop/post office/filling station are depended on by a number of residents as more or less their only source for food and day to day household items.

1.3 These are some views from within the community, but they do not purport represent a collective community view. Some aspects are anecdotal, because they come from the perspective of resident and consumer and thus carry little or no technical or professional knowledge of electricity transmission/distribution or of statutory or other governing frameworks.

They fall into four broad headings:

The loss of electricity and some of its impacts.

Weather and the resilience of the network.

Response by the energy company.

Communication and information.

2. Loss of Electricity

2.1 The village was without power on three occasions during the following incidents:

Incident A: On 8 December 2011 for two periods totalling about 6 hours.

Incident B: Over 28 and 29 December for a continuous 27 hours (280 affected).

Incident C: Over three days and two nights from 3 January 2012 until the evening of 5 January over a continuous period of approx 60 hours (for a small number of the 1,200 affected on this occasion some were not restored until 6 January).

2.2 We have become so reliant on electricity that its loss for an extended period saps the soul including the impact of being without the normal domestic functions of cooking, heating, washing and bathing. Beyond that we rely, individually and as a community, on electricity for domestic, business and social communication; for personal and business banking; for reference and education, and for entertainment. None of these—internet or web—were possible for three days.

2.3 The impact on the community became severe. The shop/post office/filling station in effect ceased to function in any normal sense. People were only able to obtain food and other goods from the shop thanks to the generosity and pragmatism of the owner who allowed villagers to take these relying on their honesty to pay when the cash register/card reader was functioning again. The post office did not operate with consequent impact on those who might wish to transact business or receive benefits. Petrol was not available and, since the closure of the filling station in Tarbert, Lochgilphead or Campbeltown supplies were 25 miles away with no certainty that they would be dispensing petrol when you got there. One of the local doctors was found searching for petrol. The shop is the life blood of the village and although a request was made to SSE for a generator to be installed at the shop to maintain community life none appeared—had it done so the impact on the community would have been significantly mitigated. The school and village hall were also out of action.

3. Network Resilience

3.3 During Incident C the 33Kv line and the 11Kv and some low voltage lines were all damaged. Much of the high voltage network in this area traverses areas of commercial forestry. There are three aspects. First relates to the condition of the poles and lines themselves; second is the clearance from adjacent forestry planting and wooded areas; and third is the configuration of the network such as to minimise the impact of a fault to as few properties as possible.

3.4 Dealing with the third of these first. According to information provided by an SSE engineer Incident B was caused when a pole carrying a transformer box snapped. While this raises the question more generally about the condition of the infrastructure, apparently this was on a low voltage spur which serves two to three properties. The question arises as to why the network apparently isn’t configured to restrict the fault to the spur properties without affecting the 280 which were.

3.5 During Incident C a view commonly heard around the village was about apparent inadequate investment in renewing the 33 and 11kv infrastructure. This is anecdotal and it is hoped the Committee will wish to examine SSE’s records of infrastructure surveys over the last 10–20 years, the results of these and the action they have taken arising from them. As part of this it would be appreciated if the Committee will enquire into the use or otherwise of permanently installed overhead line fault passage indicators and other sensors that transmit data to a control point and help reduce fault finding time?

3.6 Another common (again open to correction) view was that the last few years had seen a reduction in tree cutting programmes. Around here it is easy to see many situations where trees are too close to overhead lines. The clearance distance between lines and commercial forest appears to be inadequate in many locations. One SSE linesman put it on day three of Incident C that it looked like a giant had been striding along the forest bringing trees crashing down. He opined that around Inverness and in Forestry Commission areas the clearance gap is more typically 20 metres each side whereas in the privately owned commercial forests in Argyll it is more often 10 metres. It is hoped the Committee will wish to establish whether SSE is fulfilling statutory duties which it has to maintain sufficient clearance between lines and trees and to examine its policies and programmes and actual resources devoted to this.

3.7 One SSE senior manager said the company was trying to work with forest owners on this issue. That statement begs immediate questions. The extent of the powers of the energy company to go onto commercial forestry to maintain or create an adequate gap? Are these powers adequate? How much are they investing in this? Is there a statutory obligation on forest owners to ensure forestry does not come within striking distance of lines and if not should there be? Is the consumer in effect paying both in terms of service disruption and through their fuel bills to keep forestry far enough away from poles and lines which responsibility should properly lie with forest owners.

3.8 The obligations which seem to be placed on energy companies by current regulations and guidance (read from a layman’s view) and the actual situation in this locality do not seem to sit comfortably. It is hoped the Committee will examine the adequacy of clearance distance/arrangements to see whether the statutory position requires to be strengthened, allocating clear and unequivocal statutory responsibility for maintaining these.

3.9 The Committee’s Terms of Reference suggest they will look at alternative forms of infrastructure. Clearly it would be possible to carry the 33Kv and 11Kv lines on metal pylons, rather than poles, higher above the tree line. A personal view is that apart from the undoubted substantial costs, the advantage of such a solution is outweighed by the detrimental visual impact, and a preferable course is to ensure the current infrastructure is renewed and maintained free from obstruction.

4. The Response

4.1 Faults, of course, are diverse. Not everyone’s lights came on at the same time. Naturally everyone wants their supply to be restored as quickly as possible which can give rise to perceived inequalities in how the energy company responds. The energy company really needs to provide much better quality information on fault by fault basis about what it is doing to restore power.

4.2 A search of the SSE related websites does not seem to produce any document (although one may exist) setting out the basis on which faults are assessed and prioritised and thus the prioritisation criteria for personnel and resources deployment. No doubt the Committee will receive information on this, but the local impression was that particularly during Incident C much of Argyll (and particularly the 1,200 affected in this locality) seemed to come at the tail end. SSE will no doubt dispute this, but reading their various press releases seems to indicate two things; that SSE were initially underestimating the scale of disruption; and supplies were being restored earlier elsewhere beyond Argyll.

4.3 Incident B

Although supply was lost during the evening of 28 December, subsequent information from SSE indicated that two engineers were deployed on site but not until 3pm on 29 December, an hour before darkness at around 4pm. Unfortunately they apparently did not have portable pathfinder line fault passage indicators with them which might have aided early diagnosis. Power was not restored until late in the evening of 29 December, despite this apparently being a minor and isolated fault.

4.4 Incident C

Insufficient space prevents a detailed chronological review of the response, but in short (seen through the prism from inside this community) there appeared to be no substantive activity in the area until day 3. By then both the local MP and MSP had made contact with SSE, the Head of the Resilience Unit at the Scottish Government had begun a situation review with SSE and there was escalating interest inside the Scottish Government. Day 3 saw considerable activity by a flood of personnel and power was restored during the evening. By then there were considerable difficulties and SSE had engaged the help of the local Council to assist with setting up arrangements for food and shelter, particularly for vulnerable people. There are questions around whether certain responses might have been quicker. By way of example SSE did deliver a generator to one vulnerable elderly person but not until day 3 and a matter of four or so hours before power was restored.

5. Communication and Information

5.1 If people can’t have electricity the next best thing they want is real time accurate and full information about what is happening to restore supply. This was scarce. The SSE call centre was prone to generalisation and provided on some occasion quite incorrect information. SSE was not able to or it was not willing to provide actual performance information for the fault in this area to help the public assess how effectively it was responding. For example, how many personnel and what resources were actively engaged in this area restoring power to the 1,200 affected was a question (which failed to elicit an answer) asked more than once of a senior manager on day 2 of Incident C when it became apparent that power would not be restored that night. It is to be hoped the Committee will encourage SSE to be much more open and proactive about providing performance information on a fault by fault basis (not simply local authority area).

5.2 Part of the difficulty is of course about capturing and disseminating good real-time information inside SSE. The senior manager admitted that SSE was hampered in getting information from engineers on the ground because they used mobile phones and either there was no signal anyway in remote areas or mobile phone masts were down. The Vodafone mobile telephone mast perched above this village was out. However the mast operated by O2 for the emergency services has a gas powered backup generator to keep it operating. The Committee perhaps might examine the possibility of SSE engineers being able to use emergency services mobile masts, or alternately that SSE utilise satellite related equipment to speed communication.

5.3 The only way for consumers in this area to contact SSE was by phone and vice versa. This is a real problem. SSE to their credit contacted lots of people by phone. In the absence of electricity how are messages to be disseminated widely and promptly. Emails were out of the question as was access to the SSE website, although there was little effective information there anyway. Tweets couldn’t be received. The village broadcasting relay transmitter mast was out of action, so even those who might have battery operated radios couldn’t receive a message. How were people to be told about arrangements including those being made for food or accommodation which was apparently available? An SSE Press release on this topic issued on 5 January was apparently circulated during the evening of 5 January and the morning of 6 January amongst Council, Health Board and other agency personnel. Apart from being too late in being issued, as one recipient put it they did not receive it until the power came back on. It is to be hoped that SSE will identify places in each community where messages can be gathered and given. In this village the shop/post office seems the obvious place which if it were provided with a generator early could then act as that information hub.

5.4 A final point is about how SSE uses its website to provide information. Apart from the comments above regarding open and proactive good information on a fault by fault basis, a question arises about how easy SSE makes it to find web based information. The obvious first port of call for consumers in this area is the website www.hydro.co.uk, or that failing www.sse.co.uk. Neither of these sites carried information releases or situation reports during the disruption, nor did www.sse.com. Instead it was necessary to find Scottish and Southern Energy Power Distribution at www.ssepd.co.uk. The average customer is not concerned about the niceties of which part of the company is the right one to seek information from, and it is a pity that the main websites did not carry the information or signpost to it. It is to be hoped the Committee can encourage SSE to examine all its channels of communication.

6 February 2012