4 Trident is removed from Scotland,
what next?
Long term relocation
28. The preference for the UK would be for Trident
and the necessary facilities to remain in Scotland, as Rt Hon
Nick Harvey MP, then Minister for the Armed Forces, told us: "I
would have thought that relocation would be just about the least
favoured option that it would be possible to conjecture."[49]
And as a result, he said:
The UK Government are not making plans for independence,
as I explained, and hence we are not making plans to move the
nuclear deterrent or indeed the submarines from HM Naval Base
Clyde.[50]
29. But, as we have seen, in the event of separation
and a new Scottish Government insisting upon the 'speediest safe
transition' of the nuclear fleet from the Clyde, then this could
be done in less than twenty four months. If the UK wanted to maintain
the nuclear deterrent, then the UK would have to identify and
develop an alternative site, or sites, that replicated the assets
of Faslane and Coulport. (Faslane and Coulport are two sites,
eight miles apart, connected by a road.) We heard differing views
as to how easy this would be.
REPLACING FASLANE
30. Faslane was chosen because it provided ready
access to deep water and space to build a naval base that could
be protected. There are other sites where submarines currently
berth, or could be adapted to provide a home for the Vanguard
submarines. Francis Tusa suggested Barrow, where BAE are currently
building the Astute-class submarines, as it had support facilities,
included a ship-lift, similar to Faslane. The main issues with
Barrow is the shallow approach, that would restrict submarine
access to convenient monthly tides without significant dredging,
and the size of the dock which would not, at present, have room
for more than two Vanguard-class submarines.[51]
Milford Haven does provide access to very deep water, and it would
have more room than at Barrow for docking,[52]
but it was passed over in the 1960s and there are important economic
and industrial facilities there today that would make it less
suitable.[53]
31. Devonport appeared to be the most popular,
it had been the former base to the Trafalgar-class submarines
and the Vanguard-class submarines regularly visit Devonport (unarmed)
for maintenance, but as with the other possibilities, the main
issues with Devonport did not relate to recreating the facilities
of Faslane, but of Coulport, and without Coulport, there is no
deterrent.[54]
REPLACING COULPORT
32. Malcolm Chalmers, who had recently reviewed
the original options for Polaris in the 1960s, concluded that
given time and expense, Devonport might work for Faslane but:
You could not put the Coulport facility in Devonport
because there simply is not the room given the safety margins,
which would be higher now than they were in the 1960s.[55]
33. Coulport is not just a storage site, but
also possesses the huge floating dock where the warheads are placed
inside the missiles, three kilometres from Garelochhead on one
side and Ardentinny on the other.[56]
Any new warhead storage facility would need to provide safety
assurances on a similar scale in relation to loading and offloading
warheads from the missiles in the submarines.[57]
To do so, such a site would preferably be near the submarine base
and on the coast, as Professor Walker said:
In my view, the warhead storage is not the crucial
issue; the crucial question is how you create a facility where
you can marry the warhead and missile, load it on to the submarine
and also remove it from the submarine, if you need to, and bring
it back on shore. That is a very delicate and dangerous operation,
so it is all to do with safety calculations. [...] You don't want
to do anything like this near built-up areas, tourist sites or
whatever.[58]
34. Barrow and Devonport have a large population
too close to satisfy the safety margins required, and Milford
Haven has a huge Liquid Natural Gas facility nearby. Falmouth,
relatively close to Devonport, had been considered as a possible
Coulport in the 1960s, but was ruled out because it would impact
upon an area with a strong tourist economy and involve the loss
of two villages and moving a significant population.[59]
Portland, which was considered in the 1960s, was judged to not
have a suitable site for the warheads depot closer than a Ministry
of Defence tank range 15 kilometres inland.[60]
Professor Chalmers said this criteria of keeping warheads and
missiles far enough away from people and sites of economic value
was why Scottish locations were popular among the 1960s options:
A lot of the issues at that time, which would be
greatly intensified today, would be in relation to the safety
margins that the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate would insist
on. Unless you are prepared to re-house a very large number of
civilians and close down areas of housing and so on, it limits
where you can put the particular facilities.[61]
35. Some, such as John Ainslie, of CND Scotland,
said it would not be possible to find a new site,[62]
although he accepted that there may be sites additional to those
considered in the 1960s.[63]
Others, such as Francis Tusa, editor of Defence Analysis, believed
that the problems of relocation had been exaggerated. He pointed
out that Coulport had been designed to accommodate between 500
to 600 warheads, whereas any new facility would only need to store
around 200 and could be considerably smaller. He suggested moving
the warheads to a modernised AWE Burghfield or AWE Aldermaston,
which both already had full nuclear licences.[64]
Malcolm Chalmers said Aldermaston was not relevant because it
was not on the coast,[65]
and Mr Tusa conceded that it was not ideal to have the warheads
in the middle of Berkshire and the submarines based in Devonport
but "it does not mean you cannot do it." He agreed this
would not happen quickly but: "there are more than enough
nuclear facilities all round the remaining parts of the UK"
and it was "just an article of faith that you can never move
any of the boats anywhere; none of the facilities could be replicated
anywhere else, and it would all take far too long."[66]
THE COST OF RELOCATION
36. We found it difficult to establish what it
would cost to replicate Faslane and Coulport elsewhere. Most witnesses,
such as Professor Walker, thought the cost would be huge:
Don't ask me to put a figure on it; I have no idea
at all, but certainly it would be billions of pounds.[67]
37. In contrast, Francis Tusa thought that finding
a new home would not be too expensive:
the number of options for moving the deterrent out
of Scotland is huge, and a lot of them are not that expensive
either. I have seen reports that it would cost £50 billion
to move. No, it would not; it really wouldn't."[68]
38. When we asked the Ministry of Defence if
they knew how much it would cost, Nick Harvey MP, then Minister
for Armed Forces, said: "It would be a very challenging project,
which would take a very long time to complete and would cost a
gargantuan sum of money"[69]
He told us that a recent upgrade of the facilities at Faslane
had cost £3.5 billion and "If we were to replicate it
somewhere else, that figure would be dwarfed by whatever that
would cost"[70]
39. Nick Harvey MP emphasised that the price
of forcing the nuclear deterrent out of Scotland would not be
seen in isolation:
In the context of that pan-governmental negotiation
to which I alluded earlier, which I would expect the Treasury
to take an active interest in, if a future independent Scottish
Government were to insist upon the nuclear deterrent being relocated
out of Faslane, the impact of that on that pan-governmental discussion
would be very substantial indeed. It is hard to think of any single
item that would be larger in that negotiation.[71]
And the price would not be borne by just the residual
United Kingdom:
if that cost had to be met in a way which, in a practical
sense, would seem to me and I would have thought seemed to people
of good sense to be completely unnecessary, then there would be
an implication of that across the rest of the negotiation. It
would be the largest item looming across the whole piece. [...]
If the residual UK taxpayer had to pick up that bill, their ability
to pick up any other bills would be proportionately diminished.[72]
THE TIME TAKEN TO RELOCATE
40. Similarly, it was difficult to find a consensus
on how long it would take to build a new version of Faslane and
Coulport. It took three and a half to four years to build Coulport,[73]
but most of our witnesses thought the process of building a new
version would take much longer, not least because the political
issues around any new site would lead to unpredictable delays.
As Professor Walker pointed out:
None of these facilities had to go through any kind
of planning system. The public feels it has a right to express
an opinion on these matters, and I can imagine it being very controversial
[...] The Government would have to go through various quite difficult
political processes to try to get consent for this.[74]
Professor Malcolm Chalmers agreed:
For people at Falmouth at the moment, having a nuclear
weapons facility in their back yard is not right at the top of
their agenda, and it would be in this scenario. I think it would
take a very long time to work through. It is very uncertain where
it would all end.[75]
41. As a result, Professor Walker thought it
might take twenty years or longer:
Yes, but 20 years might be a minimum; it might be
longer than that. You would have to sustain your political will
and funding for a very long time. I don't know whether the political
parties could agree upon that and exactly what the ramifications
would be. The process of finding a site might take five to 10
years, and then being sure you have one, and all the engineering
and construction works, mean it could be a long time.[76]
42. Dr O'Brien thought it might be completed
in fewer than twenty years, possibly 10 or 15, but only with an
enormous amount of resources, no objections and cross-party support,
and even then he thought it unlikely.[77]
43. Peter Luff MP, then Parliamentary Under Secretary
of State for Defence, said that while he could not say how long
it would take to relocate Faslane and Coulport, he described some
of the construction complexities at the present site:
Nevertheless, one has to recognise that one is moving
nuclear-qualified facilities and the standard of safety required
is absolutely enormous. Even quite simple engineering tasks for
a conventional boat/ship become immensely more complicated when
dealing with nuclear facilities. I am going to Faslane to see
the new jetties being constructed. It is a saga in itself. One
jetty has been a huge struggle. There are massive problems with
the contractor meeting the very testing requirements of a nuclear-qualified
facility. It is not just a question of shoving up a few buildings.
It is a question of creating an immensely strong infrastructure
against any seismic shock, for example, that you can possibly
foresee. The orders of magnitude for the construction complexity
are significantly greater than any other more routine defence
investment. Therefore, I have no reason to challenge the figure
you are giving but I cannot justify it either. They are much longer
periods of time than are normal for construction projects.[78]
44. He agreed that there would have to be a period
of consultation for any new site, and that: "It would be
a very long project indeed. It could not happen in a couple of
years."[79] In view
of this, we asked the Government if they had held discussions
with the Scottish Government about whether Trident would have
to be removed from the Clyde immediately. Nick Harvey and Peter
Luff agreed the Ministry of Defence had not been approached or
had discussions with the Scottish Government about defence matters
in the event of Scotland becoming a separate country, and Mr Harvey
added:
I find it quite impossible to make an assessment
of their intentions. One can piece together different statements
that have been made at different times. One understands that the
policy position of the SNP has historically been that they are
completely opposed to the nuclear deterrent, but I do not know
what their precise proposition will be when making the case for
independence.[80]
45. Identifying and recreating
a suitable base to replace Faslane and Coulport would be highly
problematic, very expensive, and fraught with political difficulties.
In particular, it would be difficult to find a site that satisfied
the requirements for the co-location of the submarine base, the
warheads depot and the facility to marry the warheads and missiles
on to submarines that adhered to the safety requirements.
46. We were told that the Ministry
of Defence was not making contingency plans for the event of Scotland
becoming a separate country. Estimates suggest it could take up
to twenty years or longer to develop a long-term replacement for
Coulport. It is possible that the clock on relocating Trident
would not start until after the result of the referendum is known.
47. The Minister for the Armed
Forces has said that if a newly separate Scotland insisted upon
the removal of Trident out of Faslane, and the UK was forced into
developing a new base at great expense, then the associated costs
would be included in the separation negotiations.
Alternatives outside England and
Wales
SHARING FACILITIES WITH US OR FRANCE
48. It has also been suggested that the warheads
might be stored and loaded onto the submarines at a base outside
the British Isles, if only as a temporary measure. Two options
had been suggested: the French facilities in Brittany or the US
facilities in Georgia.[81]
Indeed, Alex Salmond MSP, has said that following separation,
the UK would have two choices: relocate to another part of the
UK or use bases in America or France.[82]
Francis Tusa thought the US or France options could work:
Is there any reason why we should not be able to
store warheads in French facilities off Brest? We shared American
storage facilities for nuclear warheads at Iserlohn for 40 years
and no one seemed to care. [...] There were American, German and
British guards. The UK had British bunkers on German soil, but
it was a US sovereign base. I did not notice anyone caring one
way or the other.[83]
49. Professor Malcolm Chalmers told us he did
not think using the US was an option because it would raise questions
about how independent the UK's deterrent was:
The option of having the Coulport facility in the
United States was looked at when Trident was first purchased.
I think part of the reason it was rejected was that it was seen
as just a step too far to being perceived as not having an independent
deterrent if both your missile servicing and warheads were based
in the United States. It would have saved money. There was also
an issue at that time, which was not fully explored, as to whether
the United States would be prepared to have a foreign nuclear
weapons base on its territory or whether it would ask, "If
you are not even prepared to have your nuclear servicing done
in your own country, how serious are you about having an independent
deterrent?" [84]
He also considered the French option unlikely:
I think that in the case of France it would be a
different dynamic. There may be a stronger French stake in Britain
remaining a nuclear weapons state than there is an American stake
in that, but, even then, it would not be automatic that the French
would be prepared to have a sovereign foreign nuclear weapons
base on their territory. They would think twice about it. It is
possible; I think it is an option, but I think it would be a difficult
one.[85]
50. John Ainslie said that the UK submarine fleet
probably could not be accommodated in France; the current base
at Ile-Longue would be too small to accommodate the additional
UK submarines so would require building a new base, which would
take time, and be exacerbated by all the political problems that
would flow from a foreign power building a new base on French
soil.[86] Indeed, Peter
Luff MP admitted that while the UK does collaborate with the French
on nuclear and security issues: "The idea of dumping off
the boats there for a few years while we sort out a long-term
solution would be a little tricky to manage."[87]
MAINTAINING A UK BASE IN A SEPARATE
SCOTLAND
51. An agreement between the UK and Scottish
Governments to keep Faslane and Coulport as a UK base within a
separate Scotland would save the costs and inconvenience of relocation.
Dr O'Brien thought the issue was not whether a deal could be negotiated
but whether any agreement could be managed on a day-to-day basis:
You can cut a deal that, yes, you can use the base,
but that opens up a huge number of other questions: how long,
how you protect it, and what if there are protestors. To my mind,
it is a little more involved than just saying, "You pay;
you use."[88]
52. The agreement would need to address how UK
submarines might pass through Scottish waters, how the current
convoys to AWE Burghfield would continue across Scotland, and
how it would manage the geographical fact that Faslane and Coulport
are eight miles apart, and including the connecting road in a
UK sovereign base would cut Garelochhead and the Rosneath peninsula
off from the rest of Scotland.[89]
William Walker explained some of the problems relating to ensuring
access to the sea:
Under the Law of the Sea, territorial waters extend
for 12 miles. Essentially, that means 24 miles, which takes
you south of Arran. Am I right in remembering that, under article
20 of the Law of the Sea, any foreign submarines have to fly a
flag and be on the surface when travelling through territorial
waters? There is an issue there. Would the Scottish Government
be at all times informed of the movement of submarines up and
down these channels? I imagine there would have to be a separate
treaty between the two as to exactly how these waterways will
be managed. There is also sonar equipment and many other things
to do with this, which I imagine are very sensitive matters for
the UK Government, but all of this would have to be part of a
treaty between the two as to exactly how these waterways were
managed.[90]
He thought this would provide problems for both governments,
not least how to police the area if anti-nuclear protests continued:
I have always felt that, if the UK Government look
at a situation of having their strategic nuclear force in this
particular place in a foreign country, they will feel extremely
uncomfortable and will wonder how to manage it, what the international
implications are, and how to react to exactly what you are suggestingthe
idea that you might have public protests happening there and so
on. You might have an accident in the Clyde. How exactly do they
respond to this? I think they would feel very uncomfortable.[91]
53. John Ainslie, CND Scotland, did not think
a sovereign base was tenable:
If the force is based in Scotland, and if we are
looking at the scenario of an independent Scotland, which is a
separate, sovereign state, the idea of a sovereign state having
its whole nuclear weapons capability indefinitely in another sovereign
state is probably not sustainable.[92]
54. Neither did Professor Walker think a sovereign
base, secured by a treaty, was likely.[93]
He said the idea of a sovereign base was an outdated concept,
and thought it more likely that the land remained Scottish sovereign
territory with a long lease to the UK, managed by a formalised
gentlemen's agreement between the two countries.[94]
If this was the case, then Dr O'Brien said the nature of any agreement
depended on the NATO question:
If Scotland were a NATO ally, you might be able to
work up an agreement, but so much of this hinges on the NATO question.
If Scotland remained in NATO, you could perhaps limit it and give
Scotland, as a NATO ally, certain defensive responsibilities without
it. A non-NATO Scotland would mean they [the UK] would want a
fully protected area.[95]
55. The Americans previously had a submarine
base on the Holy Loch, and at the time the UK had provided secure
access to the sea. This was workable because the agreement between
the US and the UK was made within a formal alliance. With that
in mind, Dr O'Brien said:
Personally, I don't see how a nuclear power can,
in the long term, base its weapons in another country, particularly
if it is done by gentleman's agreement that could be changed because
of domestic political changes in that country. Scotland could
go down another route. I could see that as being the best short-termeven
medium-termsolution, but not in the long term.[96]
56. The UK's preferred option is for nothing
to change. Failing that, the next best option would be securing
an agreement that enabled the submarines to operate out of Faslane
until an alternative base was found elsewhere. Doing so, without
the status of a sovereign base, appears to be at odds with what
Nick Harvey MP told us, that if the UK Government could negotiate
for the base to remain in some form, then it would consider it
"critical" to have "complete freedom of actioncomplete
control and complete sovereignty over the facility."[97]
And, while not speculating on contingency plans that the MoD were
not making, he said: "the critical point of principle would
have to be complete control over what we did there."[98]
Would a newly separate Scottish Government be willing to facilitate
and guarantee this? Allowing the base to remain would seem unlikely,
as Alex Salmond told the BBC that while it was for the UK Government
to decide what to do with Trident once it was removed from Scotland:
That doesn't mean we think it reasonable to lease
out part of Scottish territory to what you describe as a Cyprus
situation. If Scotland, by majority, doesn't want nuclear weapons,
the SNP proposition is to write that into the constitution of
the state. So that would make the possession of nuclear weapons
illegal."[99]
A PHASED RELOCATION
57. The advantage of the UK having continued
use of Faslane and Coulport would mean Vanguard-class submarines
could continue to operate out of the Clyde while the MoD identified
and developed an alternative base for the Successor submarines.[100]
Professor Walker suggested this might enable CASD to continue:
If it is a question of the replacement submarines
going somewhere else and you are building up a replacement fleet
in other bases, you can manage the transition so that you phase
out an old submarine and bring in a new one, although it is located
elsewhere. I can imagine it working. If you are doing it rather
suddenly and rapidly, it is hard to imagine. There would be periods
in which there was no deterrent operating in those circumstances
but, again, it is a matter of how it is phased and managed. You
could imagine it working; in other scenarios it wouldn't work.[101]
58. Even such an agreement could be reached on
a phased transition, this would necessitate the Scottish Government
agreeing to a timetable that could mean nuclear weapons remaining
at Faslane for at least another twenty years. Malcolm Chalmers
said that this could work in Scotland's favour in the separation
negotiations:
If a Scottish Government were to accept that for
a significant period of time, perhaps indefinitely but certainly
a long period of time, Trident would have to remain because there
simply is not anywhere else to put it, that in itself would be
a significant bargaining card for Scotland. Scotland could say,
"We've given you this, but in return we want a reasonable
negotiation that leaves Scotland with a defence force that is
small but does the job, and a Scotland in NATO that therefore
does not have to rely entirely on itself for its own security."[102]
This last point is important. The SNP have said that
they would like to co-operate with the UK on some military matters.
The UK is highly unlikely to co-operate if Scotland is not willing
to co-operate on Trident.
59. If there was co-operation, then the UK might
avoid temporary loss of CASD, but it would not avoid the costs
of relocation. It would still require the UK to build a new base,
it would still cost a large amount of money, and it would mean
nuclear submarines carrying armed Trident missiles operating out
of Scotland for possibly another twenty years. There would be
a transition period where the UK would be operating two bases
simultaneously: one for Vanguard in Scotland, possibly until 2028,
and one for Successor in England or Wales. The running costs for
operating Faslane and Coulport alone are an estimated £2
billion a year,[103]
and there is a risk that the combined cost of replacing Trident
and developing a new base may be incompatible with maintaining
the deterrent in the future.[104]
60. Any agreement whether to
relocate the UK nuclear deterrent outside the British Isles, possibly
in France or the USA, would be a decision for the UK in discussion
with its allies. However, the evidence presented to us suggested
this would be very difficult, both logistically and politically.
61. An arrangement to allow
the UK to continue to operate Trident out of the Clyde in a separate
Scotland could be negotiated in theory but it would be very difficult
in practice. The Scottish Government would need to agree to the
UK retaining complete freedom of action, either as a sovereign
base in Scotland or some sort of lease arrangement. The agreement
would have to assure the UK Government that the Scottish Government
would cooperate sufficiently to ensure the base could operate
on a day to day basis. A political deal or a gentlemen's agreement
would be vulnerable to a change of government and withdrawal of
cooperation. Any agreement would have to be formalised.
62. An agreement allowing Trident
to remain on the Clyde would enable the UK to continue to operate
Continuous At Sea Deterrent. Such an agreement could be to allow
Trident to remain indefinitely, or allow time for the UK to develop
a new base elsewhere in England or Wales for the new Successor
submarines.
63. A separate Scotland would
be presented with a choice over Trident. It could honour the long
held policy of the SNP that there should be no nuclear weapons
in Scotland and insist the 'speediest safe transition' of Trident
from Scotland, which can be done within twenty four months. In
fact, Trident can be deactivated within a matter of days. The
process requires the Vanguard submarines to come off patrol, the
UK would lose the ability to operate its nuclear deterrent and
inevitably create the prospect of unilateral nuclear disarmament
being imposed upon the Royal Navy and UK Government, since the
construction of facilities elsewhere could take upwards of 20
years.
64. Alternatively, a separate
Scotland could, in cooperation with the UK, allow Trident to remain
on the Clyde long enough for the UK to identify and develop a
new base elsewhere. This would mean armed nuclear submarines operating
out of Scotland for 20 years or longer. Developing a new base,
particularly replicating the facilities at Coulport, could only
be done at great expense, and the UK Government has made it clear
that any such costs would be included in the separation negotiations.
This would be alongside other items such as retaining the Bank
of England as a lender of last resort and financial regulator
for Scotland, or access to intelligence and the work of GCHQ.
49 Q 327 Back
50
Qq 316-317 Back
51
Q 251 and Q 1129 Back
52
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53
Q 263 Back
54
"Nuclear subs will stay in Scotland, Royal Navy chiefs decide",
Daily Telegraph, 26 January 2012 Back
55
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56
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57
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59
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60
CND Scotland, Trident: Nowhere to Go, January 2012 Back
61
Q 262 Back
62
CND Scotland, Trident: Nowhere to go, January 2012 Back
63
Q 1128; Qq 1175-1183 Back
64
CND Scotland, Disarming Scotland, June 2012. CND believed
that the Special Ammunition Site at RAF Honington, Suffolk, home
to the Ministry of Defence's Chemical, Biological, Radiological
and Nuclear warfare unit, could be used also. Back
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82
"Nuclear weapons 'outlawed' in an independent Scotland, says
Salmond", BBC Scotland, 21 October 2012 www.bbc.co.uk Back
83
Qq 195-196 Back
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86
Q 1121. See also Trident: Nowhere to Go, January 2012 Back
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99
"Nuclear weapons 'outlawed' in an independent Scotland, says
Salmond", BBC Scotland, 21 October 2012, www.bbc.co.uk
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