6 Conclusion
Foreign relations and Trident
74. A separate Scotland would have to demonstrate
that it shares the same defence and security posture, and interests,
as the UK for its defence industrial base to benefit from a relationship
with the UK. The issue of whether Scotland is a member of NATO
is a good example.[126]
We are aware that asserting a different foreign policy is one
of the motivations for separation, for example so Scotland could
deploy its armed forces overseas on different terms to that of
the UK. This raises the question as to how different Scotland
would want to be while maintaining nothing has changed, and what
it would mean in practice. For example, would a Scottish Government
refuse to allow military exports from a firm in Scotland if the
item being exported was to be used in what the Scottish Government
termed an illegal war, or an action of which it disapproved? This
is a very real concern—the Belgians refused to sell the
UK ammunition during the Falklands War.[127]
The SNP has expressed differences on foreign interventions before.
Mr Salmond called the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 "an
act of dubious legality, but above all one of unpardonable folly."[128]
Similarly the First Minister has repeatedly said they would not
have supported the war in Iraq.[129]
It would be very difficult for the UK to work with a separate
Scotland if it could not rely upon security of supply.
75. All of our witnesses have said that the removal
of Trident would complicate any negotiations and the extent to
which the MoD would withdraw from Scotland. Removing Trident would
incur a huge financial cost and risk the UK losing its nuclear
deterrent.[130] Membership
of NATO cannot be assumed. Professor Chalmers summarised how he
thought other NATO countries would react to the eviction of Trident:
It is one thing accepting a re-division of territories,
which very few other countries in NATO would sympathise with at
all, but quite another if it was seen to be taking a radically
different foreign policy course, and that is what rapid expulsion
would be.[131]
76. The policy of Scotland to the nuclear weapons
currently based in Scotland would impact upon UK-Scottish relations.
It would also impact upon US-Scotland relations.[132]
New Zealand adopted an anti-nuclear stance in the 1980s and was
frozen out by the US for nearly 25 years.[133]
Scotland would need to reassure the US that its defence policy
was not against US interests.[134]
Ian Godden said:
It reinforces my point that the relationship
with the US for Scotland on defence policy is rather crucial.
Although it is an interim solution, they will get extremely nervous—even
in an interim solution—understanding what the defence policy
is and what the attitude is to this new Government.[135]
77. The SNP have said they would ban nuclear weapons
from Scotland, while operating a "don't ask, don't tell"
policy on foreign vessels visiting Scottish ports and waters.
It would appear that in these circumstances, Scotland would allow
a US vessel carrying nuclear weapons into a Scottish port, because
they would not ask. There is a contradiction in evicting UK nuclear
weapons from the Clyde while accommodating visiting vessels carrying
nuclear weapons from the US or other nations.
78. One of the most important ways that Scotland
can contribute to the collective defence offered by NATO is to
allow Trident to remain on the Clyde. We would urge the Scottish
Government to explain what it would contribute, if not the submarine
base, if it wanted to avoid the accusation of free loading on
the security offered by NATO.
Defence policy and the defence
industry
79. Over the course of the inquiry, several witnesses
stressed the importance, for any country, of developing a defence
policy first before deciding on defence industrial policy. For
example, Ian Godden told us:
We have to recognise that the game, in terms
of an industry and a policy around industry, relates to Government,
to Government defence policy and purchasing. You start with defence
policy. You don't start the other way round, which is how we protect
jobs by doing this. You have to start with the defence policy.
For me, assessing it as an industrialist, defence policy comes
as number one. What are we trying to achieve with our defence
and what is the capability we require to do that?[136]
80. We believe the defence industry in Scotland would
benefit from more information on the future defence policy of
a separate Scotland and how it would relate to Scottish industry.
The SNP Foreign, Security and Defence policy, agreed at its conference
in October 2012, said:
A Scottish defence industrial strategy and procurement
plan will fill UK capability gaps in Scotland, addressing the
lack of new frigates, conventional submarines and maritime patrol
aircraft.[137]
A separate Scotland may wish to build or buy frigates,
submarines or maritime patrol aircraft; but it needs to explain
how that will affect the industry, which currently is tailored
to meet the needs of the UK and the joint enterprises that the
UK is a part of. Those proposing a separate Scotland need to explain
to those who currently work in the defence industry in Scotland
what it would do to retain defence jobs and skills in Scotland
once the MoD withdrew its spending power.
81. The SNP policy accepted the benefits of a joint
procurement strategy:
Joint procurement will be pursued with the rest
of the UK and other allies as well as shared conventional basing,
training and logistics arrangements, fulfilling shared priorities
in 'Smart Defence'. This includes sharing conventional military
capabilities, setting priorities and better coordinating efforts
providing economic synergies, job stability and taxpayer value
for money.[138]
As we have said, to pursue joint procurement with
the UK or any other NATO member, then Scotland would need to provide
more information on where it would assert policies that are different
to those of the UK or the rest of NATO, and accept that those
policy differences may make joint working very difficult. For
example, Smart Defence is a NATO initiative,[139]
so a separate Scotland would have to apply to join NATO to take
advantage of that. Entry to NATO would not be automatic, particularly
given that a separate Scotland would want to undermine the collective
security of its intended NATO partners by evicting Trident.[140]
In addition, it would need to demonstrate a consistency of policy
to build relations and persuade key allies and NATO partners that
joint procurement or foreign investment could be possible. Otherwise,
we believe that the defence industry that is currently such an
important sector in Scotland would be very seriously damaged and
diminished if Scotland was a separate country. This may not take
place overnight, but we believe this would lead to considerable
loss of employment in Scotland at places like Selex, BAE Systems,
Vector Aerospace, Thales and DM Beith.
82. Our next report will look at some of the issues
of affordability and force structure for a separate Scotland to
fulfil its foreign policy objectives.
126 Q 172 Back
127
The Guardian, Belgium PM strives to mend fences at No 10,
1 December 1999 Back
128
BBC, NATO bombing 'unpardonable folly', 29 March 1999 Back
129
The Daily Telegraph, Alex Salmond: Labour MSPs responsible
for Iraq war deaths, 20 March 2013 Back
130
Q 1901 Back
131
Q 165 Back
132
The Economist, Interviewing Alex Salmond, the man who wants
to break up Britain, 12 January 2012; Holyrood Magazine, War
of Words, 22 October 2012 Back
133
www.fas.org/ See also Q 1395 Back
134
Q 1988 Back
135
Q 1988 Back
136
Q 1996 Back
137
SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy update, October 2012 Back
138
SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy update, October 2012 Back
139
Smart Defence is a NATO concept encouraging allies to cooperate
in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities
with the aim of undertaking NATO's core tasks as agreed in the
strategic concept-the strategic concept being collective defence
including nuclear weapons. Back
140
Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence, to the Defence
Committee, Session 2012-13, Defence implications of possible Scottish
independence, HC 483, para 44 Back
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