1 Introduction
The inquiry
1. People face a range of risks in everyday life
and therefore become adept at managing most of them. However,
public reaction to novel or unfamiliar risks may run counter to
scientific evidence. Understanding, assessing and communicating
risks is of central importance to the Government and public bodies.
This was evident to us when we conducted our inquiry into Scientific
advice and evidence in emergencies. The report, published
in March 2011, made several recommendations aimed towards improving
public confidence in Government's risk management processes for
emergencies, looking at past emergencies such as the 2009-10 swine
flu pandemic and the 2010 volcanic ash disruption to aviation.[1]
2. On 11 March 2011, just nine days after we
published our report, one of the largest earthquakes on record
occurred off the coast of Northern Japan, triggering a tsunami
and the destabilisation of one of the Fukushima nuclear power
plants.[2] The Government's
emergency-response machinery swung into action, with scientists,
headed by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA), advising
UK nationals abroad on the risks posed by events at Fukushima.
We took evidence on the Government's response to the emergency
in June 2011.[3] Public
and political reactions to Fukushima around the world were mixed,
with some countries continuing with their civil nuclear programmes
and others withdrawing. We were interested in how public reactions
to the same risk could vary so markedly. We therefore decided
to conduct an inquiry looking into public risk perceptions in
relation to energy infrastructure. On 9 November 2011, we issued
a call for evidence on the following matters:
a) What are the key factors influencing public
risk perception and tolerability of energy infrastructure facilities
and projects?
b) How are public risk perceptions taken into
account in the planning process for energy infrastructure?
c) How effectively does local and central Government
communicate risk and could it be improved?
d) To what extent can public perceptions be changed
by improving risk communication? (please provide examples)
e) How does and should the Government work with
the private sector to understand public perceptions of risk and
address them?
f) How do risk perceptions and communication
issues in the UK compare to those of other countries?[4]
3. As anticipated, almost all of the written
submissions we received focused on nuclear energy. We held five
evidence sessions with witnesses including social scientists,
the nuclear industry, media experts, safety regulators and the
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC). A full list of
written submissions and witnesses can be found at the end of this
report. We would like to put on record our thanks to those who
provided written or oral evidence to this inquiry.
4. As part of this inquiry we visited Germany,
to explore perceptions of risk associated with nuclear and other
energy infrastructure. We visited a carbon capture and storage
(CCS) research facility in Brandenberg and met a number of stakeholders
with diverse viewpoints on nuclear power, CCS and electricity
grid expansion. It was an insightful experience and we would like
to thank those we met and particularly extend our thanks to the
British Embassy in Berlin for organising and hosting our visit.
5. Our inquiry did not explore the pros and cons
of nuclear energy or other energy sources and focused instead
on public risk perceptions. In this report we refer to "the
public" and "public perceptions", however, we recognise
that this is a generalisation and that individuals react differently
to risk. We have attempted to identify and refer to specific sections
of the public where possible.
6. This Report contains three further chapters.
Chapter 2 outlines risk perceptions and the factors affecting
them. Chapter 3 delves into risk dialogue and the final chapter
draws on lessons learned from risk perceptions of nuclear energy
for public debates about new energy technologies.
1 Science and Technology Committee, Third Report of
Session 2010-12, Scientific advice and evidence in emergencies,
HC 498 Back
2
Science and Technology Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session
2010-12, Scientific advice and evidence in emergencies: Government
Response to the Committee's Third Report of Session 2010-12,
HC 1042 Back
3
Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee
on 15 June 2011, HC 1059-i Back
4
"Committee announce new inquiry into risk perception and
energy infrastructure", Science and Technology Committee
press release, 9 November 2011 Back
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