Conclusions and recommendations
The science of risk perception
1. When
public risk perceptions diverge from the scientifically objective
risks it should not necessarily be characterised as irrational
or anti-scientific. Public concerns may be influenced by the level
of scientific understanding, but are also likely to be influenced
by other affective (that is, feeling or emotion-based) factors
that may not be changed by explaining risk in scientific terms.
(Paragraph 30)
2. It
is possible for some of the fright factors affecting risk perceptions
to be mitigated, for example by building public trust, communicating
effectively, improving risk governance and operating in a transparent
manner. (Paragraph 31)
3. The
Government considers nuclear power to be an essential part of
the UK's energy mix. The evidence shows that around half of the
population support this, even though it may be a reluctant support
for the least worst option. The Government's position as an advocate
for nuclear power makes it difficult for the public to trust it
as an impartial source of information. In our view, this perceived
lack of impartiality further emphasises the importance of Government
demonstrating that all energy policies are strongly based on rigorous
scientific evidence. (Paragraph 32)
Risk communication and dialogue
4. While
it is commendable that individual Departments have embedded risk
frameworks, coordination of risk communication across Government
is lacking. A senior individual in Government should be visibly
responsible for overseeing risk communication, research and training
across Government. This individual should lead a Risk Communication
Strategy team, drawing together existing expertise within Departments
and public bodies, which should sit at the centre of Government,
either within the Cabinet Office, which houses the Civil Contingencies
Secretariat and the Behavioural Insights team, or the Treasury,
which provides cross-Government risk management guidance. (Paragraph
39)
5. While
comparisons of risk from different energy sources can be useful
for engaging with some audiences, experience has shown that such
factual information does not always change risk perceptions because
they don't take the influence of "fright factors" into
account. The Risk Communication Strategy team should evaluate
whether it would be possible and beneficial to publish risk comparisons
where fright factors have been controlled (for example, not comparing
voluntary risks with involuntary risks). (Paragraph 40)
6. Good
communication is essential for allaying public fear during an
emergency, but time spent by key experts briefing the media must
be balanced with the primary responsibility of producing scientific
advice and advising Government. We commend the work of the Government
Chief Scientific Adviser and SAGE during the Fukushima emergency
and consider the UK's scientific response to have been exemplary.
However, the Government should publish the long overdue "Amplified
Science Guidance" on SAGE as soon as possible, which should
include protocols for SAGE members' engagement with the media.
(Paragraph 48)
7. In
principle, anyone providing scientific advice to Government during
an emergency, including public bodies, should also consider adhering
to media engagement protocols in the "Amplified Science Guidance"
on SAGE when dealing with high profile events. (Paragraph 49)
8. Not
everyone is interested in understanding energy risks and the roles
of various stakeholders. The Government, via the proposed Risk
Communication Strategy team, should evaluate the public appetite
for risk information and consider how this information would be
best disseminated. We recommend that information should be disseminated
using existing sources, with a focus on developing the public
profile of independent regulators as trusted and authoritative
information sources. (Paragraph 50)
9. We
consider that regulatory bodies such as the Health and Safety
Executive, Environment Agency and Office for Nuclear Regulation,
that are independent of Government and technically competent,
are in a unique position to engender public trust and influence
risk perceptions. The impact and profile of the Weightman review
in the UK is a testament to the importance of independent, evidence-based
evaluation of risks. In addition to providing risk information
for technical audiences, regulators should also make greater efforts
to communicate risk to the public and develop their role as trusted
sources of information for lay people. (Paragraph 51)
10. We
commend the work of the Science Media Centre in connecting journalists
with scientists, but consider that more could be done to improve
risk communication of scientific matters in the media. The Government
should clarify what progress has been made in the consideration
and implementation of the recommendations made in 2010 by its
expert group on Science and the Media. We may return to this matter
in the future. (Paragraph 57)
11. Although
it is useful to have a scale to enable the public to make informed
comparative assessments of risk, we agree that the International
Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) is not an adequate
communication tool for conveying risks. The IAEA, in reviewing
the INES, should pay particular attention to (i) the technical
basis of the scale and whether it incorporates sufficient information
about risk as well as hazard; (ii) how to better represent orders
of magnitude; and (iii) how to make the scale comprehensible to
non-technical audiences. As a member state of the IAEA, the UK
Government should influence the review of the INES in this direction.
(Paragraph 60)
12. The
IAEA and UK Government should also consider whether the INES,
or its successor, should communicate the likely impacts of a nuclear
accident on people and the environment, as well as quantifying
the release of radioactive materials. Consideration should be
given to the best method of communicating acute and chronic impacts.
(Paragraph 61)
13. Radiation
exposure thresholds based on reducing exposure to levels that
are as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) should be retained,
as they are key to maintaining public confidence that risks are
being stringently managed. However, the Government, regulators
and other information sources must emphasise that exceeding ALARP
levels may not pose any risk to people or the environment, and
that there is a difference between operational thresholds (which
are purposely set very low) and safety thresholds (based on scientific
evidence) that may allow for significantly greater radiation exposure
to occur without significant risk to health or the environment.
(Paragraph 64)
Public engagement in planning processes
14. The
Government, working with industry, regulators, social scientists
and communities, should produce guidance on best practice in risk
communication for those living near existing or proposed nuclear
facilities. The guidance should address how to present risk information
in accessible formats and language. Complex, technical documents
should continue to be available in the interests of transparency.
(Paragraph 72)
15. Community
benefits are an important way of building trust and negotiations
can enable the public to feel a greater sense of control, choice
over and ownership of energy projects. We encourage the further
use of current community engagement processes led by energy companies,
working with local government and the public, for building trust
around nuclear new build proposals. (Paragraph 73)
16. We
were impressed by the citizen partnership model being developed
in Germany for wind farms and suggest that enabling communities
to feel more ownership of local energy infrastructure by offering
shares in projects could be conducive to building trust and acceptance.
Partnership models could form part of community benefits discussions
for new nuclear build and other energy infrastructure. (Paragraph
74)
17. The
Government and regulators should make better use of their resources
to communicate and engage with the public via the internet and
social media. Lessons could be learned from the communication
strategies employed by campaigning organisations. (Paragraph 76)
New energy technologies
18. The
UK is yet to develop a pilot CCS project and UK public concerns
may be different to those in Germany. However, we consider that
public outreach, such as site visits, should be considered a vital
part of the Government's public engagement strategy for CCS and
other novel energy infrastructure. (Paragraph 77)
19. We
hope our inquiry will highlight the importance of risk dialogue
and understanding public risk perceptions. The Government must
ensure that lessons are learned from risk communication and dialogue
experiences in relation to nuclear energy when developing new
energy technologies and infrastructure. (Paragraph 78)
20. If the Government
intends to rely on carbon capture and storage (CCS) as part of
emissions reduction strategies, it should examine the difficulties
experienced in Germany due to public concerns. (Paragraph 79)
Conclusions
21. We
consider that public risk perceptions must be understood and taken
into account when policies are developed, but that public views
are one form of evidence that must be balanced against political,
ethical and scientific considerations. However, when public opinion
diverges from the evidence of objective risk, policies and decisions
should be primarily based on scientific evidence on risk and safety.
In our view, basing policies firmly on evidence from independent,
impartial, scientific sources and engaging in robust risk dialogue
at local and national levels, are the best way to ensure public
confidence. (Paragraph 81)
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