Science & Technology CommitteeWritten evidence submitted by Martin J Goodfellow and Adisa Azapagic (Risk 07)
Key Points
Scientific understanding of risk perception has improved considerably over the last 50 years. However, there is still no “grand theory” of risk perception that can explain why individual people perceive the same risk in different ways.
Risk communication should move beyond simply presenting people with “facts” and attempt to engage the public in two-way discussions on perceived risks. This engagement should be endemic to planning processes.
Government can play a role in two-way public engagement on perceived risks of energy infrastructure but it must be careful to avoid a heavy handed approach that may be perceived as an attempt to coerce the public into “falling into line”.
Authors’ Declaration of Interests
1. Corresponding Lead Author; Martin J Goodfellow BSc(Hons) MIET AMInstP, Post-graduate Research Engineer, Sustainable Industrial Systems Group, School of Chemical Engineering and Analytical Science, The University of Manchester.
2. Martin is working on his doctoral thesis, RESearch into the Public Perception Of Nuclear Design [RESPPOND], co-funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and Rolls-Royce Plc via the Dalton Nuclear Institute at the University of Manchester. At the time of writing, Martin is on a three-month EPSRC-funded Fellowship at the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology.
3. Co-author; Professor Adisa Azapagic FIChemE FRSC FRSA, Head of Sustainable Industrial Systems Group, School of Chemical Engineering and Analytical Science, The University of Manchester. Further information can be found here: www.sustainable-systems.org.uk
4. Professor Azapagic is currently leading or is involved in a range of research projects, including Sustainability Assessment of Nuclear Power (SPRIng) and also supervises Martin Goodfellow’s doctoral research. For further information see www.springsustainability.org.
5. The views expressed in this response are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their employing organisations, any of the funding bodies or other parties identified above or mentioned below.
Response to the Questions
Q1. What are the key factors influencing public risk perception and tolerability of energy infrastructure facilities and projects?
6. There is a wealth of scientific literature which has built up over the last 50 years1 detailing the many different psychological,2 sociological and cultural influences3 on risk perception. Some theories are better than others at predicting how individuals, or groups (large and small), will respond to any given risk, but there is no definitive theory that fully explains risk perception.
7. Factors that play a role in the level of perceived risk include:3
level of control over the risk;
how much “dread”is associated with the risk;
the magnitude of the consequences of the hazard;
proximity to the risk; and
how unknown the risk is.
8. Ongoing two-way communication involving the public and allowing them a real opportunity to feel ownership and influence projects and decisions may have some impact on the tolerability of “risky” energy infrastructure facilities and projects. However, it can be difficult to measure the specific impact of one scheme over another, or compared to doing nothing.
9. Furthermore, it is too simplistic to consider “the public” as a single entity. A wide range of views exist on energy infrastructure projects such as new nuclear power plants or wind farms. Even within local areas there can be significant variations in the views held by different groups of the public.4 Therefore, it is more appropriate to refer to the “publics” rather than the “public”.
Q2. How are public risk perceptions taken into account in the planning process for energy infrastructure?
10. The current planning process for energy infrastructure has some positive features, such as high levels of transparency in the availability of documentation via the internet and a simplified approach that invites public involvement.
11. However, there are potential issues around when and how the public is invited to become involved. An example of this can be seen with new nuclear power stations:
Nuclear Plant safety information is made available to the public during the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process in its unaltered “engineering” form. Whilst this is transparent, it is unlikely that the public will be in a position to understand the large volumes of deeply complex technical safety documents. Therefore, the government should think about the ways to provide relevant information in a format more suited for the general public.
Following GDA approval, the local site planning process begins. Although the public can get involved at this stage, the potential exists for them to feel disenfranchised. For example, the public may feel that once the GDA has been approved, the new plant is a “done deal” by the time the local site assessment process begins.
Q3. How effectively does local and central Government communicate risk and could it be improved?
12. It is very difficult for large institutional organisations (such as the Government) to communicate risk to the public. This is for two reasons in particular:
firstly, many risk issues are often described scientifically by technical and complex language that are not easily understood (however, modification or simplification of this language could also be perceived as “airbrushing” or “spin”); and
secondly, it is potentially difficult for the Government to appear impartial when it has a vested interest in energy infrastructure projects succeeding.
13. With respect to the former reason, successive Governments have attempted (with varying degrees of success) to translate technical risk arguments into “plain” language. However, there is debate within the scientific community about the success of the different methods that can be adopted to achieve this.
14. Whilst recognising that the Government must be seen to act to allay any fears caused by perceived risks, it must also be recognised that actions taken by the Government that are perceived to be biased or disingenuous may make the situation worse. This has the potential to lead to misunderstanding, sensationalisation, or further erosions of trust.
15. Increasing transparency of documentation during planning and risk assessment processes is a positive move. However, this is not a “silver bullet”, as many documents that are made publicly available are written in complex technical language that the public struggles to understand. Furthermore, it is well know that “throwing” more and more information at the public does not make people more informed or change their views. Therefore, the government should adopt a multi-pronged approach, enabling and facilitating a real two-way engagement with the public.
4. To what extent can public perceptions be changed by improving risk communication?
16. There is a real danger in believing that people simply need to be “shown the truth”, or convinced that their perception of risk is incorrect, either through provision of facts or persuasive argument. Many perceptions of risk are based on distorted or inflated views of real risks.5 In some circumstances presenting facts in a simple, clear and logical way can assist in reducing such distortions or inflations; but in other circumstances this may be ineffective.
17. Engagement with the public is not simply about presenting a message in an understandable (or simplified form). To really understand what the public believe, why they believe it, and what might be done to influence such beliefs, requires two-way engagement which is fully integrated into whatever infrastructure project is being considered.
18. It is not only changing a risk perception that is important. How this change is achieved, and in particular what role the public is allowed or invited to play, is often as (or more) important.
19. The timing of this public engagement is also critical. Ongoing engagement (which starts early in any given process) is likely to be more effective than presenting a final case for “one-off” consideration (see above responses to question 2). Ongoing engagement, which starts early, has the potential to provide the public with real confidence that their views are being taken into account as decisions are made.
20. There is the caveat that on certain issues the public may not be particularly interested in engaging. This can be for a variety of reasons, for example, they may feel disenfranchised or powerless, they may not rank the issue in question as a noteworthy concern, they may have too many other issues to worry about to devote time to the issue in question, etc.
5. How does and should the Government work with the private sector to understand public perceptions of risk and address them?
21. As was described in the answer to question 3, it is very difficult for the Government to present risk information to the public and be trusted (by many) to be impartial. This situation is compounded when the Government is seen to be working with the private sector, particularly in the case of “big business” such as the nuclear industry.
22. In terms of trust, European wide research has shown that governmental and industrial sources are not ranked highly by the public to provide impartial information on risk levels.6 Government collaboration with industry may be perceived by some of the public as collusion.
23. The authors are currently working on research to define a new systems design framework and process for designing nuclear power plants which allows the incorporation of the views of the public at the early stages of design and beyond. This framework also includes an opportunity for other stakeholders (such as regulators and government) to provide input at this early stage. The framework is also in keeping with the private sector led, “free-market”, approach for new energy infrastructure currently taken by the UK Government. This work is due to be published in late 2012/early 2013.
6. How do risk perceptions and communication issues in the UK compare to those of other countries?
24. Some research has been carried out in this area with surveys showing the range of views on issues such as nuclear power7 across the EU. Our most recently published research shows that 42% of the UK public are in favour of nuclear power.7 Making international comparisons of risk perception and communication issues is very difficult because of the many different social and cultural factors at work.
Martin J Goodfellow and Adisa Azapagic
Sustainable Industrial Systems Group
School of Chemical Engineering and Analytical Science
The University of Manchester
13 December 2011
1 Goodfellow M J, H R Williams, and A Azapagic (2011). Nuclear Renaissance, Public Perception and Design Criteria: An Exploratory Review. Energy Policy 39(10) 6199–6210.
2 Fischhoff, B, Slovic, P, Lichtenstein, S, Read, S, Combs, B, (1978). How Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits. Policy Sciences 9, 127–152. Slovic, P, (1987). Perception of Risk. Science 236. 280–285.
3 Douglas, M, Wildavsky, A, (1982). Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers. University of California Press, Berkeley.
4 Wynne, B, Waterton, C, Grove-White, R, (2007). Public Perceptions and the Nuclear Industry in West Cumbria. Centre for the Study of Environmental Change, Lancaster University.
5 Pidgeon, N, Kasperson, R E, Slovic, P (Eds.). (2003). The Social Amplification of Risk. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
6
Eurobaromter 2007, (2007). Europeans and Nuclear Safety, European Commission.
Eurobarometer 2010, (2010). Europeans and Nuclear Safety, European Commission.
7 Azapagic, A et al (2011). Assessing the sustainability of nuclear power in the UK. SPRIng report. www.springsustainability.org
