Science & Technology CommitteeWritten evidence submitted by Georges Mercadal (Risk 10)

Response to the Inquiry on Risk Perception and Energy Infrastructure

Questions addressed:

(a)What are the key factors influencing public risk perception and tolerability of energy infrastructure facilities and projects?

(b)How are public risk perceptions taken into account in the planning process for energy infrastructure?

(c)How do risk perceptions and communication issues in the UK compare to those of other countries? (indirectly addressed)

Response submitted by Georges Mercadal, former Vice President of the French National Commission on Public Debate, with input by Claire Mays, Research Consultant, Institut Symlog de France.

Statement of Interest

G Mercadal is a public servant in France, engineer and researcher, who has held high national positions in urban and infrastructure planning. He has presided a number of national debates on large infrastructure projects and notably the debate on radioactive waste management policy, and has coordinated methodological development of the public debate instrument. C Mays is an independent research consultant many of whose governance research activities have been part-funded by the European Commission R&D directorate including Euratom, with complementary funding provided by the National Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN). She also is employed half-time by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency as social sciences consultant to the “Forum on Stakeholder Confidence” of the Radioactive Waste Management Committee.

Public Debate as Instituted in France

Legislative background

1. Impact assessment is introduced in France by the 1976 law on the protection of nature and the 1977 law on installations classified for the protection of the environment, in such a way as to communicate to the public the analysis of environmental consequences of a given project.

2. The 1983 law democratizing the public enquiry creates the obligation to consult the population in public meetings.

3. In the late 80s-early 90s, widespread opposition to the siting of the high speed train track “TGV Méditerranée”—and creation by civil society of multiple forums for public expression and counter expertise—highlights the need to consult the public much earlier in a project sequence. A government circular in 1992 creates the right to upstream public consultation.

4. A 1995 law creates the National Commission for Public Debate (CNDP), housed in the Environment ministry and tasked with organizing and monitoring public debate, in alignment with the concept of upstream public engagement.

5. In 1999, the Conseil d’Etat proposes to constitute the CNDP as an independent administrative authority and to extend the scope of public debate to the consideration of project justification.

6. This proposal is carried out by the 2002 law on local democracy and completed by the 2009 “Grenelle 2” environmental law which adds post-debate follow up. The transposition into national law of the 1998 Aarhus Convention on public access to information, participation in environmental decision making, and access to justice is thus little by little reinforced, although criticisms as to its completeness remain.

7. In parallel, and in specific regard to the nuclear sector, the public debate on radioactive waste management policy is one contributing factor to the 2006 Nuclear Safety and Transparency Act. This notably creates a High Committee on Transparency and Information on Nuclear Safety, and reinforces the powers and duties of Local Information Committees, effectively instituting the right for local citizens to monitor and control risky facilities.

8. France has thus responded by legislative means to growing awareness of the need to engage with citizens in setting priorities and settling details of infrastructure projects with impact upon the environment, and specifically, by empowering citizens in monitoring nuclear installations.

9. This legislative trend responds well to the classical study findings by Slovic et al which highlight that personal control and familiarity are important elements in the perception of risk and safety. Furthermore, adequate institutional control extended to citizens is similarly important: note the large survey finding that the single element that increased people’s trust in nuclear plant management was that “an advisory board of local citizens and environmentalists is established to monitor the plant and is given legal authority to shut the plant down if they believe it to be unsafe” (Slovic, 1993, 2000). Such findings give a pragmatic basis to the ethical assertion of rights by eg the Aarhus Convention. All in all, citizen engagement in the governance of risky installations is a right, an important factor in the tolerability of risk, and indeed a vector of actual safety (eg CIP, 2010).

10. In what follows, we outline the features of France’s Public Debate instrument and some insights into the conditions of technological governance gained from more than 70 debates held to date.

Structure and organization of the CNDP

11. Composition: 21 members, of which 18 designated by their respective home organizations: Elected officials (mayors, territorial council members, MPs); Environmental protection NGOs; Social partners; administrative and civil magistrates. The full time President and two Vice Presidents are named by Government.

12. Referral: The project proponent must file for each project designated as affecting the environment and worth more than 300 M€. Elected officials or associations may file optionally regarding projects worth between 150 and 300M€. The CNDP examines the referral and decides either: to organize the debate or a consultation, to direct the proponent to consult, or to make no stipulation. These decisions may be contested before the Conseil d’Etat.

13. Documents circulated to the public: The initial project dossier (presentation of the project, counter-examination if any, etc); existing studies; report of counter expertise, ordered by the Commission if that has been requested by the public, paid for by the CNDP or by the project proponent; the Commission’s report of the debate; the decision within three months by the proponent to go ahead or to effect modifications.

14. Process: The debate lasts four months; all expenses are ordered by the Commission and paid for by the project; the Commission must remain completely neutral, arguing neither for nor against the project in the debate report; the Commission sets up all means to facilitate participation (Internet site, thematic documents or stakeholder statements; Q&A, press relations, etc) and organizes public meetings open to all, on general or specific themes related to the project and in appropriate localities as implied by the national and/or local character of the project.

Lessons learnt from the sum of more than 70 public debates

15. Given its organization and the sample of participants gathered by the public debate, this instrument is neither a referendum nor an opinion poll. It is a legitimate project critique performed by persons external to the project yet concerned by it, and who are aided by experts of their choice. The debate is based in both knowledge and feelings. At least five criteria emerge as significant in regard to guaranteeing the legitimacy of the debate:

16. Time: No public engagement is possible without time, to understand the project, to identify questions, to learn, to deliberate and to formulate judgments. A debate lasts 4 months; it must be conceived of as a moment in a longer process of guaranteed interaction between the proponents and the public.

17. Alternatives: Being able to ponder different alternatives is essential to meaningful participation and thus, to trust building. Alternatives must be presented by the proponent or designed by counter experts on behalf of the attendance.

18. Territorial sense of justice: The concern of local politicians is not the welfare of the nuclear industry on its own; rather it is the sustainable development and well-being of their community. The project must be integrated in a comprehensive and meaningful development project.

19. Openness: Patience and willingness to learn are needed on the part of the nuclear sector, which must accept to internalize the feedback from society. Engineers and scientists must take participants’ suggestions as a valuable input, not discard it at once as technically irrelevant. For instance, actors of the debate may be brought to perform multidisciplinary analysis of some science and society hybrid objects (examples from the radioactive waste management field include “retrievable disposal”, “perennial storage” and other apparently paradoxical concepts, but which respond to both technological and societal objectives).

20. Governance: Regular debate proceedings must be accompanied by support mechanisms and followed up by adaptation: access must be guaranteed to pluralistic expertise, and, on a day to day basis, relevant data; a follow up round table should be organized between the actors of the debate, to build compromise after the polarization of the debate; easy ways for the public to appeal on safety matters must be provided.

21. All in all the experience of public debate around large infrastructure projects in France highlights the need to create and adapt public engagement instruments. Tolerability of risky installations is not a static quality but a social construct, grounded in a shared societal and technological approach to their governance. The public debate is one instrument with a certain scope; more intensive means of constructive democracy (Lavelle et al, 2011), highlighting the strategic and heuristic empowerment of civil society, too may be sought.

References and Further Reading

CIP (COWAM in Practice) (2010) European-level Guidelines for the inclusive governance of radioactive waste. On line: www.cowam.com/IMG/pdf_CIP-EUG_version_finale_telechargeable.pdf

CNDP (2007) Les Cahiers Méthodologiques Edition 2007. On line: www.debatpublic.fr

Fourniau, J M. (2007) “L’institutionnalisation du débat public”, Projet n° 297, Mars 2007. On line:
http://www.ceras-projet.com/index.php?id=633

Lavelle, S, Hériard Dubreuil, G, Gadbois, S, Mays, C & Schneider, T (2010) Démocratie constructive et gouvernance de la technique: Les conditions de la gouvernance démocratique dans un processus technique et social complexe; Revue Gouvernance, vol 7 n° 2, Winter 2010. On line (URL published with incorrect date):
www.revuegouvernance.ca/images/content/Spring2007/lavelle_et_al.pdf

Mercadal, G (2007) Garantir le débat, Projet n° 297, Mars 2007. URL:
www.cairn.info/revue-projet-2007-2-page-4.htm.

Slovic, P (1993; 2000) Perceived risk, trust, and democracy, Risk Analysis vol 13 n° 6 (1993); also published in Slovic, P (2000) The Perception of Risk, Earthscan, London.

14 December 2011

Prepared 6th July 2012