3 Improving efficiency
McNulty's analysis
33. The McNulty report's analysis of what the railway
should cost "if it was operating at the frontier of efficiency"
estimated that savings of between £2.5 billion and £3.5
billion (in 2008/09 prices) are achievable.[46]
Table 2 shows how the higher level of estimated savings (£3.5
billion) breaks down.
Table 2: Higher estimate (£bn, 2008/09 prices)[47]
| Train operating and rolling stock companies
| Network Rail |
Total |
High estimate of efficiency gap
| 1.2 | 2.3
| 3.5 |
Network Rail savings in control period 4 (2009-14)
| | -1.2
| -1.2 |
Network Rail savings indicated in control period 5 (2014-19)
| | -0.6
| -0.6 |
Remaining Efficiency Gap
| 1.2 | 0.5
| 1.7 |
The Government has tasked the rail industry with meeting the full
£3.5 billion efficiency gap identified by McNulty.[48]
Is it achievable?
34. Many witnesses agreed that the higher level of efficiency
savings identified by McNulty could be achieved. Examples were
given of savings from reform of franchising,[49]
standardisation of rolling stock,[50]
and more efficient freight operations.[51]
However, ATOC, representing many of the firms expected to deliver
savings by 2018/19, cautioned against the scale and deliverability
of the efficiencies.[52]
The Campaign for Better Transport warned that the savings "could
be counter-productive to the overall vision of increasing rail's
share of travel".[53]
35. Many witnesses argued that complex, bureaucratic
interfaces between Network Rail and train operators needed to
be addressed in order to achieve the McNulty efficiency gains.[54]
Manuel Cortes of the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association argued
that "further tinkering" with the system could not deliver
efficiency gains and that renationalisation was necessary instead.[55]
The McNulty report rejects renationalisation because "major
cost reductions and value for money improvements can be achieved
without sweeping away most of the present structure - this latter
course of action would take years to complete, cause major diversion
of effort, incur massive costs, and delay progress on improvements
that are now being initiated or which could be initiated in the
relatively near future".[56]
The DfT has also ruled out further structural change, arguing
that "the rail industry is not broken. The case for a further
round of major structural change ... has not been made".[57]
36. The £3.5 billion savings which the McNulty
report identifies are undoubtedly challenging, particularly as
their achievement would require a large number of companies to
work together to make the railway's current structure work more
efficiently. We support the general approach recommended by McNulty,
but with concerns about some specific issues which we set out
in this report. If these savings do not materialise, the arguments
for more far-reaching structural changes will be compelling.
37. McNulty made a number of recommendations aimed
at "creating an enabling environment" for savings to
be made, including the establishment of a senior change management
team, the Rail Delivery Group (RDG). This group brings together
for the first time the senior management of Network Rail and the
main passenger and freight train operators.[58]
The RDG is in the process of formalising its status as a company
limited by guarantee.[59]
38. The Rail Delivery Group is expected to play a
crucial role in achieving more effective cross-industry co-operation
and delivering the savings identified by McNulty. However, the
Government must not lose sight of the fact that it is dominated
by firms whose principal interest is profit-maximisation and which
have a vested interest in maintaining the industry's current structure.[60]
We recommend that the DfT and ORR keep a close eye on the work
of the RDG to ensure that it acts in the best interests of the
farepayer and taxpayer, rather than of established rail interests.
How to do it
39. The McNulty report makes numerous recommendations
for greater efficiency on the railway, covering over 20 pages
in the summary report. We have not examined each in detail but
looked instead at some of the most significant themes. In the
remainder of this chapter we look at the impact of savings on
staff, alliances between Network Rail and train operating companies,
and opportunities for more commercial development of stations
and rail services.
STAFFING
40. The rail trade unions did not respond positively
to the McNulty report's recommendations on staffing. These included
calls for ticket office hours to be reduced, driver-only operating
to be the norm, and salary restraint.[61]
The unions argued that over 20,000 jobs were at risk leading to
a "reduced service to passengers and a reduction in customer-facing
staff that runs directly in contrast to what passengers want".[62]
Mr Cortes warned that taking staff out of stations would enable
them to become magnets for "petty crime, antisocial behaviour
and vandalism" and reduce the service provided to people
with impaired mobility.[63]
41. We have two concerns in this area. Firstly,
any changes to staffing, terms and conditions and salaries should
be made within the context of a wider programme of changes made
throughout the industry and after full consultation with trades
unions. Any changes in the numbers and duties of station staff
should not be pursued solely to reduce costs but should reflect
changes in passenger ticket-buying behaviour and be designed to
improve the passenger experience at stations, including safety.
42. In addition, we are very concerned that proposals
to reduce staffing at stations and on trains could make the railway
less safe, particularly at night, and deter women and vulnerable
users from travelling by train. We recommend the Government develop
a strategy for improving the security of the rail network, as
well as perceptions of how safe the network is.
ALLIANCES
43. One of the innovations which has arisen from
the McNulty report is the formation of a variety of alliances
between Network Rail and train operating companies in certain
parts of the network. As at 26 November there were eight alliances
in place on the network.[64]
The first and most high-profile is on Network Rail's Wessex route,
where a joint senior management team has been formed comprising
staff from Network Rail and South West Trains.[65]
Paul Plummer, Group Strategy Director, Network Rail, said the
alliance "will certainly deliver benefits" in terms
of innovation and new ways of working although he did not think
it would save tens of millions of pounds.[66]
The ORR said that it was too early to say whether alliances would
deliver savings.[67]
We also heard from Balfour Beatty about alliances between contractors
and the rail industry, for example to reduce the disruption caused
by engineering work.[68]
44. The Government has welcomed this development
and intends to encourage alliances in future franchise agreements.
It said "on more complex routes, with many operators or no
single dominant operator, such arrangements may be more difficult.
Nonetheless ... in principle most franchise routes are suitable
for some form of alliancing arrangement".[69]
45. We have no objection in principle to the development
of new models of working between Network Rail and train operating
companies and believe such arrangements could represent a sensible
evolution of railway management. However, the Wessex alliance
raises two concerns which will need to be addressed if such experiments
are to succeed in cutting costs and become more prevalent. Firstly,
we note the concerns expressed by the trades unions that alliances
between Network Rail and train operating companies will create
"mini-Railtracks" which cut corners on safety measures
in order to deliver profits to the train operator.[70]
This was refuted by Network Rail and South West Trains who described
safety as their "first objective" in the Wessex alliance.[71]
The ORR must ensure that the high standard of rail safety achieved
in recent years is not jeopardised by different ways of working
between Network Rail and train operators. We recommend that the
ORR devote additional resources to monitoring safety in areas
where Network Rail and a train operating company have formed an
alliance.
46. Secondly, there is a risk that an alliance which
benefits Network Rail and the principal train operating firm will
not be in the best interests of passengers and may disadvantage
other operators. This is of particular concern to freight operators.
The Freight Transport Association expressed concern that freight
could become "second class citizens on the network".[72]
The ORR is responsible for approving proposals for alliances.[73]
We recommend that in considering proposals for alliances and
joint working between Network Rail and train operating companies
the ORR pay particular regard to protecting the interests of passengers
and firms outside of the alliance. There must be clear procedures
for revising alliances' working practices or ending such arrangements
if it can be shown that they are disadvantaging passengers or
other operators, particularly freight.
COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES
47. ATOC expressed concern that the McNulty report
had not paid sufficient attention to proposals for increasing
the industry's ability to generate income.[74]
However, Sir Roy McNulty told us that the rail industry was under-exploiting
its commercial assets.[75]
We share this concern and specifically sought oral evidence from
Select Service Partners (SSP), the firm which operates many of
the retail outlets and concessions at stations.[76]
We also discussed this issue in the Netherlands, where we heard
that 25% of the income from the Dutch stations division comes
from retail and land sales. They were clear that retailing at
rail stations is a specialist activity and that standard retail
approaches, such as aiming to maximise customers' in-store time,
are inappropriate. Station retailers must be incentivised to speed
passengers through.
48. We were surprised to hear that the market share
for SSP was as high as 30-40% and that many of the brand names
found at stations are actually franchises run by SSP.[77]
Joel Brook, SSP's Property Director, said that there were stations
where SSP provided the only retail outlet but emphasised that
his firm was "a long, long way from a monopoly" position.[78]
49. Witnesses noted that retail facilities at major
stations were evolving to become destinations in themselves, particularly
new developments such as St Pancras International and the redevelopments
of King's Cross and Waterloo stations in London.[79]
However, in our view there remains scope for Network Rail and
the train operating companies to generate more income from the
railway. Retail offerings at stations can be tired and uninspiring
or at many stations non-existent. On-train retail is often similarly
unimaginative. The facilities at St Pancras International station,
now a destination for shoppers and people eating out, have set
a standard to which other major stations should aspire. We
recommend that the Rail Delivery Group, working with Passenger
Focus, develop and publish a clear strategy for improving retail
facilities on stations and trains. This would be welcomed by passengers
and could generate extra revenue to contribute to achievement
of the McNulty targets.
50. There is also scope to raise money by selling
off or developing redundant railway land. We took evidence on
this issue from Simon Rutter of Solum Regeneration, a joint venture
between Network Rail and Keir Property which aims to use the commercial
development of rail land to pay for improvements to existing rail
infrastructure.[80] We
do not object to selling redundant railway land in principle,
but note with concern that the rail depot we visited in Allerton,
Liverpool, was nearly sold off for redevelopment some years ago
but has now been brought back into use because of the growth of
the railway. Mr Rutter explained that the ORR had the final say
in land disposals.[81]
We recommend that the ORR take a cautious approach to approving
the sale or redevelopment of former railway land, given that with
the growth of the industry that land may be needed again for rail
in future, while responding promptly and positively to proposals
for disposing of genuinely surplus land.
46 McNulty summary pp25-26. Back
47
Ibid, p26. Back
48
Command Paper paragraph 11 and CP5 HLOS and SOFA
paragraph 2 Back
49
ROR 7 (Railfuture) paragraph 2.1. Back
50
ROR 2 (Angel Trains). Back
51
ROR 17 (DB Schenker Rail) paragraph 16. Back
52
ROR 25 (ATOC). Back
53
ROR 22 (Campaign for Better Transport) paragraph 2.1. Back
54
ROR 22 (Campaign for Better Transport) paragraph 2.2 also ROR
18 (TravelWatch NorthWest). Back
55
Q94. Back
56
Realising the Potential of GB Rail: Report of the Rail Value
for Money Study, detailed report, May 2011, p283; and Q3. Back
57
Command Paper paragraph 7 Back
58
www.raildeliverygroup.org and their submission to this inquiry,
ROR 1. Back
59
http://www.raildeliverygroup.org/Formalisation.aspx. Back
60
See ROR 19 (Local Government Association) paragraph 3.2 and ROR
24 (trades unions) paragraphs 10 and 26. Back
61
McNulty summary section 6.9. Back
62
ROR 24 (trades unions) paragraph 31. Back
63
Q118. Back
64
ROR 26B (letter from the Minister of State to the Committee Chair,
26.Nov 12). Back
65
http://www.stagecoach.com/media/news-releases/2012/2012-04-30-south-west-trains-and-network-rail-alliance.aspx.
Back
66
Q226. Back
67
Qq723-24. Back
68
Q228. Back
69
Command Paper paragraph 4.11. Back
70
Q95. Back
71
Qq232-34. Also see Q39. Back
72
ROR 21 (Freight Transport Association) paragraphs 14-15 and see
ROR 17 (DB Schenker) paragraph 19. Back
73
Command Paper paragraph 4.12. and Alliancing: ORR policy
statement, Mar 12 (see http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.10854).
Back
74
ROR 25 (ATOC). Back
75
Q42. Back
76
Qq431-36. Back
77
Qq 433-34. Back
78
Qq434, 440. Back
79
Qq448, 450. Back
80
Qq 417, 426. Back
81
Q418. Back
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