Transport Committee - Minutes of EvidenceHC 875

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Written evidence from ATOC and Network Rail (LTS 05)

Summary of main points

ATOC and Network Rail have considered the content of the European Commission’s working document.

We see its aim of improving transport security as sound and acknowledge that it raises some important issues. 

However, in developing some of these themes, a number of the arguments are open to challenge and some of the conclusions appear flawed. 

In particular we believe that sharing security related best practice and intelligence across Europe will be far more effective in securing the improvements the document is seeking than will be a legislation based approach.

1.The Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) represents train operators in Great Britain and provides services for the passenger rail sector, such as National Rail Enquiries and the Rail Settlement Plan. Our vision is of rail as a thriving business sector which makes an increasingly positive contribution to national life.

Network Rail is the not for dividend owner and operator of Britain's railway infrastructure, which includes the tracks, signals, tunnels, bridges, viaducts, level crossings and stations - the largest of which we also manage. We aim to provide a safe, reliable and efficient rail infrastructure for freight and passenger trains to use.

We have chosen to provide a joint response to demonstrate the shared position and objectives of the rail industry on this important issue.

2.What are the strengths and weaknesses of current land transport security arrangements in the UK?

2.1.The current UK land transport security arrangements in respect of main line rail are founded on a three way partnership between the DfT Land Transport Security Division, the British Transport Police (BTP) and the rail industry itself. Broadly speaking the overall strategy is set by the DfT with the BTP leading on operational matters.

2.2.This relationship is well established and mature with the three parties combining their respective knowledge, expertise and experience to ensure as far as possible that the security measures put in place are effective and practical within the context of an open, mass transport system

2.3.Network Rail and the train operators continue to be aware of the threat posed by terrorism and other forms of criminal activity. However, we are confident that transport is suitably considered in counter-terrorism work, and that the current arrangements are strong.

2.4.While we see benefits from sharing best practice and intelligence across Europe, do not believe that legislation on transport is necessary to achieve this.

2.5.One challenge we do face is maintaining a high level of both staff and passenger/public vigilance, particularly when the highest security level applies for prolonged periods. However, again this is not an area in which we see legislation as able to offer any benefits.

3.Is there a need for further EU involvement in land transport security issues, as set out in the working document?

3.1.The overall objective of the European Commission’s Staff Working Document – ‘to consider what can be done at the EU level to improve transport security, particularly in areas where putting in place common security requirements would succeed in making Europe’s transport systems more resilient to acts of unlawful experience’ (section 1 of the document) is sound and it does raise some important issues. 

3.2.We support both the decision to set up an Advisory Group on Land Transport Security and the proposal to set up a complementary Stakeholder Advisory Group (section 4.1).  Both these provide a means of sharing experience and good practice between different organisations and countries. This seems a good way of expanding knowledge (both of threats and responses) and we see it as more likely to be effective than legislation at raising standards.

3.3.However, while we see the high level aims as having merit, we have concerns at some of the more detailed proposals. In particular, the document suggests consideration be given to introducing mandatory standards in a number of areas (for example, security standards in general for high speed rail in section 4.1.2 and training of staff in section 4.1.3 and 4.1.4). We do not support the development of legislation in such areas.

The UK government’s approach to security is based on risk and ATOC and Network Rail firmly support this.  The nature of threats to the railway can change rapidly, not only in severity but also in nature (for example the different modus operandi of Al Qaida and the IRA and its splinter groups). It is difficult to see how a legislation based approach would provide sufficient flexibility to respond quickly and effectively to emerging threats.  

3.4.More generally, legislation provides a blunt tool that is likely to be insufficient for high risk parts of the network but excessive for much of the rest of it. 

3.5.
The severity of threat also varies geographically. This is the case within the UK but would apply to an even greater extent at a pan-European level. Self-evidently railways in, say, Finland or Cornwall face a far lower security threat than do major terminal stations in London, Paris or Madrid. Having common legal requirements that are excessive for many parts of the EU’s transport networks but insufficient for those that are potential prime targets of terrorists makes little sense and indeed might result in measures at the latter becoming less onerous, hence rendering them more vulnerable to attack.

3.6.Exposure to international terrorism is likely to be linked to government policy and history – it follows that those countries whose governments do not engage in controversial conflicts (or which are too small to do so effectively) face a very much lower level of threat than those that do. Similarly, countries with a history of domestic terrorism (such as the UK and Spain) have a higher threat than those without. Clearly this is something that is entirely outside the transport operator’s ability to influence.

3.7.Section 4.1.2 compares safety – where requirements are being increasingly harmonised across Europe – with security (where currently they are not).  We do not see this as a valid comparison.  Safety largely concerns risks which by definition are common across all railways – the reliability of physical components, the compatibility of vehicles with infrastructure and interface between the two, signalling systems, etc.  This is not the case for security where risk is based on political, social and human factors. 

3.8.Additionally, the specific focus on the trans-European high speed rail network in the same section is simplistic. While there are some examples where this is self contained (such as in Spain), it is more usually the case that trains on high speed routes start or continue their journeys on the ‘classic’ network while increasingly newly built high-speed lines are designed to also be used by regional passenger services and freight trains.

3.9.The conclusion of the Commission’s paper (section 5) states that ‘inaction has a high price’. While this is true, pro-actively imposing arrangements that are costly to maintain and which are out of proportion or ill-suited to the risk faced may have a greater price. 

4.What would be the positive and negative impacts of potential proposals arising from the working document?

4.1.As indicated above, we support the creation of decision to set up an Advisory Group on Land Transport Security and the proposal to set up a complementary Stakeholder Advisory Group (section 4.1) as a means of sharing best practice. Though as the Working Document notes, terrorism has an international aspect and such sharing should draw on experience from across the world rather than being limited to the EU.

4.2.
The final point of section 4.1.2, proposing legislation requiring security features to be incorporated in the design of stock and infrastructure, has some merit but needs careful thinking through as to how this might impact on other priorities.  For example, if such provision in a coach results in an increase in the overall weight then this will result in more energy being consumed for traction purposes and increased track maintenance costs.

4.3.The fourth paragraph of section 4.1.4 suggests that ‘a legal requirement that all staff working in the public transport domain have basic training to deal with the initial aftermath of a major incident is desirable.’ – presumably this is intended to include office based staff.

In reality, probably the maximum that can reasonably be required of staff in general is knowledge of how to alert the emergency services.  To suggest that an individual member of staff can do much beyond this when confronted by a major incident is untenable. We have thorough plans in place for major incidents, which would include terrorism, and for which the appropriate staff are suitably trained.

4.4.As noted in our answer to Q3 above, we see the biggest risks from the proposals as on one hand adding costs which are disproportionate to the risks faced in those countries/areas where the security threat is minimal while at the same time leaving high risk targets more vulnerable to attack by imposing common standards that undermine the ability to respond quickly and flexibly in the light of emerging threats.

5.Beyond the areas considered in the working document, are there other ways in which land transport security, both in the UK and across Europe, should be improved?

5.1.There is an acknowledgement (section 2) that some transport operators do not see security as their responsibility to provide.  That this issue is not explored further within the document seems a missed opportunity. 

5.2.While criminal acts can be said to be targeted specifically at the transport undertaking and/or its passengers/customers/staff, a terrorist atrocity is really an attack on the country as a whole (or its government) with transport targets simply providing an effective means of doing so from a terrorist perspective, given the opportunity to cause mass casualties. It follows that entirely preventing terrorist attacks is beyond the ability of transport operators. It is, however, important that transport features in generic counter-terrorist planning and operations, and that transport operators consider terrorism among the threats they face. Thus transport operators need to work with police and security services to monitor and prepare for any threats. The UK’s existing arrangements work well and there would seem to be merit in promoting a similar approach elsewhere within the EU.

5.3.It is here that a direct comparison with safety can usefully be made.  A ‘reasonable practicability’ requirement is enshrined in the Safety Directive and it seems that it is essential that a similar discipline be applied to security.  While there may be challenges in doing so, as security risk will inevitably be far harder to quantify than safety risk, without it there is no basis for balancing expenditure and risk reduction.  This might provide a very useful starting point for the Advisory Group.

5.4.Finally, the Working Document refers to more general criminal activity as well as terrorism. We note that the Committee’s questions refer only to the security related proposals and our responses have been similarly targeted. While organised crime does affect the rail industry – including people, gun and drug trafficking and metal theft – we would expect the BTP to be better placed than ourselves to comment in more detail about the merits of greater EU involvement in such areas.

7 January 2013

Written evidence from the Freight Transport Association (LTS 04)

Introduction

1. The Freight Transport Association (FTA) is pleased to respond to the Committee’s inquiry into land transport security.

2. FTA is one of the UK’s largest trade associations and represents over 14,000 companies relying on or providing the transport of freight both domestically and internationally, to or from the UK. Our members include hauliers, freight forwarders, rail and air freight operators, through to customers-producers, manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. They cover all modes of transport-road, rail, air and sea. FTA members operate over 200,000 commercial goods vehicles in the UK, approximately half of the UK fleet of goods vehicles; 90% of goods moved by rail and around 70% of goods moved by air and sea. We operate a full campaigning presence in Brussels, which governs a significant proportion of the legislative and regulatory environment in which our members operate.

3. Please find below FTA’s views on the issues raised by the Committee for this inquiry. We will respond to the issues that affect our members or where we have a view we wish to express.

4. In FTA’s view the greatest efforts to improve transport security in Europe need to be made at the external border crossings of the Union in eastern and southern Europe where the risks to EU security are highest. FTA would also support the creation of an Expert Group on Land Transport Security within the EU to secure these borders more effectively and ensure trans-European working. For the best outcome, it is important for different administrations in different member states to share intelligence and not to work in silos.

5. Channels of communication between industry stakeholders must be created where none exist; and improved where they do, alongside the creation of a group of experts on land transport security. This will help to ensure the best possible outcomes for both European security bodies and industry stakeholders working across the EU.

6. The costs of providing this additional security and the expert group should be borne at the national or EU level and not by a levy imposed on road fleet operators at border crossings. Not only would imposing a cost on European road fleet operators provide a damaging competitive threat to EU companies where they are in a market with non-EU vehicles (who would be exempt from the charge), but funding it at a national or European level would reflect the importance of logistics to the economic recovery which is so vital to all member states and demonstrate that the EU and national Government understand this relationship.

7. There are many thousands of road freight transport companies in the EU and to measurably improve land security will be a hugely complex and expensive task. A risk-based approach must be adopted.

8. FTA is concerned that additional security could be counter-productive to the flexibility of land-based transport networks. By design, road freight is quickly responsive and can get anywhere relatively easily. Road-based transport operators in particular, in the event of extra security measures, could have to face a plethora of uncoordinated rules and regulations regarding supply chain security. The role of public authorities in the field of security as well as the cost implications for operators also needs to be considered.

9. Our members in the aviation and maritime sectors are well used to working within the restraints imposed by the security requirements of those sectors. But the number of transport operators in those modes of transport is significantly less than in the land freight sector; particularly of course where road freight, comprising many SMEs who are less easily able to absorb additional security costs, is concerned. This makes the implementation of similar systems to those present in aviation and maritime a significantly different and more difficult proposition.

10. Security issues such as cargo theft from vehicles is a large scale problem across the EU. Technology such as "track and trace" and modern vehicle telematics, which can alert an office hundreds of miles away if a vehicle unexpectedly deviates from its expected course, is increasingly used by FTA members as an aid to security. The Department for Transport must be encouraged to keep seeking to persuade the Commission for a simple and harmonised system of Intelligent Transport which can be easily accessed by vehicles irrespective of their member state of registration. Any technology introduced in Europe must not be discriminatory to UK businesses but apply fairly in all member states. Furthermore, it should also be monitored to ensure that any regulation introduced is observed in all member states in practice.

11. It is interesting to note that the Commission’s report values lorry load theft at some €8 billion per annum. FTA has no reason to dispute this figure. Fortunately, drivers are not frequently attacked but it cannot be said that lorry and load theft crimes are victimless. Citizens do not receive the goods they have ordered and factories close down temporarily due to the lack of component supplies. FTA has had a long association with the Home Office and various police forces in the UK and was one of the earliest supporters of the Truckwatch scheme, which is the commercial vehicle fleet operator equivalent of Neighbourhood Watch for householders.

12. FTA regrets the closure early in 2012 of the Home Office and industry-funded TruckPol service, which comprised a small team of police active in compiling intelligence from across the UK on lorry and load theft. With an average theft reported to TruckPol valued at approximately £40,000 it was a valued resource, now sadly lost. The availability of secure lorry parking is pitifully small and measures need to be developed to facilitate the development of additional sites both at home and abroad. This requires genuine political leadership as, despite the strategic economic benefits of safe lorry parking, the creation of sites often meets considerable local opposition.

13. Metal theft from the rail sector is also a major problem in Europe, causing disruption to freight flows and thousands of passenger journeys.

14. FTA believes that HM Revenue and Customs could do more to simplify trade procedures whilst at the same time maintaining security standards by encouraging businesses to obtain Customs approved secure status such as AEO (Approved Economic Operator).

15. The presence of stowaways ("clandestines") on board both lorries and coaches remains a problem for our members. Trading across the UK’s borders, our members’ biggest fear is that, unbeknown to the driver, their vehicles will be found to be concealing persons wishing to enter the UK illegally and that they will be faced with fines of up to £2,000 per person that can be imposed as a result. Any measures proposed to tackle this issue must be made in consultation with industry, and not impose impractical and excessively burdensome measures on the driver which yield little benefit. A fresh look at the problems faced by the industry and discussions on possible solutions is overdue.

Security is central to the logistics industry; both in terms of the commercial importance of what FTA members do, and the social importance of a safe and secure working environment for the many people in every area of the UK who work in the industry. FTA would be happy to discuss these matters further with the Committee if it would aid the effectiveness of the inquiry.

4 January 2013

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Written evidence from the Road Haulage Association (LTS 10)

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to your inquiry into the European Commission’s staff working document on transport security and related issues, which we refer to as "the EC document".

The RHA represents 7,000 firms, providing road haulage and distribution to every sector of the economy. Members operate approaching 100,000 trucks and many thousands of warehouses. Security is a constant area of concern for our members and this is reflected in the content of a number of our member meetings, in our extensive dealings with the police and other agencies, in the RHA Security Forum. We also offer security assessments and training to our members.

Problem of scope of "transport security"

The term "transport security", as used both generally and specifically in the EC document, covers an exceptionally wide range of issues. This creates difficulties when discussing the issue with respect to road transport of goods. Comments made with one aspect of security in mind may have much less relevance elsewhere-and is further complicated in the EC document, as both goods and passenger transport are discussed.

Unlike the EC document, which is concerned with both passenger and goods transport by various modes, our comments are largely restricted to goods transport by road, where we see three different categories of transport security threat, for ease of discussion.

1. Attacks on trucks-from a few pallets, to truckloads of finished goods, to metals; also theft of the vehicles themselves and of diesel from HGV tanks.

2. Trucks used as part of crime- smuggling of fuel, people, drugs etc; VAT fraud.

3. Potentially, as a vehicles used in acts of terrorism.

We note that the EC document asserts (page 3) that there has been insufficient effort to deal with cross-border crime possibilities along with the creation of the European Single Market and the application of Schengen Rules. This may be more of an issue on the Continent than in the UK. Also, the EC’s focus seems to be on cross-border activity but that relates to a small percentage of the total of European road haulage and distribution.

Strengths and weaknesses of current land transport security arrangements in the UK

A number of different agencies have involvement at various levels in the three categories outlined, including: The Home Office, with various branches of the police and other security services, HM Treasury and HMRC; and the Department for Transport, largely as infrastructure provider. This hints at the complexity of the security issue.

In terms of counter-terrorism, we believe that there is a reasonable level of awareness of risk within the industry and especially those sectors of the industry where risk may be greatest. We are conscious, too, that a large goods vehicle is not the only-or perhaps even the best-vehicle for delivering an attack by road. We consider current arrangements in terms of risk and resilience and are adequate and that we have a good foundation for improvement where the need arises.

Smuggling by truck remains a difficult issue, especially for the industry where the haulier may be ignorant of his driver’s actions and, indeed, the driver may himself be ignorant of any crime. We have expressions of strong concern from members relating to smuggling of laundered diesel from the Republic of Ireland into both Northern Ireland and mainland GB. We are aware of concerns over levels of smuggling of alcohol and tobacco and the BBC recently reported that levels of alcohol VAT fraud risked undermining the legitimate bonded warehouse and retail operations. (File on 4 October 2012. Transcript at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/09_10_12_fo4_alcoholfraud.pdf)

The island nature of the UK gives, we assume, a degree of assistance to the enforcement effort of HMRC and other enforcement agencies that is not available elsewhere in the EU.

Security of trucks and the goods they are carrying is the area of greatest immediate concern to RHA members. Strengths in the UK include a clear legal system and, in parts, effective enforcement. The industry has made strong investment in areas such as processes, warehouse security and vehicle track and trace. These investments-themselves a significant cost burden to operators and their customers-tend to be strongest where the risk is greatest and the contribution of TAPA towards promoting the security of high value goods is rightly recognised by the EC document.

As a whole, we can say that the industry generally has tailored its own security arrangements to be broadly in line with risk-which, in terms of goods, range from nil (refuse collection) to very high (money, alcohol) and all stages between those poles. The industry’s practical, pragmatic approach has been reasonably successful and suggests no need for further regulation. There may be room for improvement in terms of training and overall culture, particularly among SMEs, but we would not wish to overstate the need.

RHA members express growing concern over levels of crime against the haulage sector. Much of the crime is low-level but other crime includes assaults on the drivers. The areas of vulnerability and weakness most frequently identified by RHA members are:

1. A shortage of secure parking for vehicles when they are away from their depots. The lack of security offered by motorway service areas, the key parking stops on our national motorway network (and transport-EU network) is especially disappointing and we believe that MSA operators should be required to provide improved security as part of their operating agreement with government. Current standards at MSAs should be seen by the Department for Transport as an embarrassment. More generally, the DfT should do more to promote secure HGV parking provision across the UK.

2. Fuel theft from vehicles. This is a significant area of low-level crime against hauliers.

3. Police consistency and co-ordination. We would like to recognise the excellent work done by some officers and forces in countering crime against the haulage industry. However, overall there is a lack of consistency in approach. In some areas, freight crime appears to RHA members to be of low priority, with many anecdotes about an absence of follow-up by the police, even to quite serious thefts. Members who have suffered significant loss of goods from trucks have received nothing more than a crime number and the telephone number for counselling.

Co-ordination of effort across constabulary borders is often poor, in respect of investigation of single incidents where the operator is from one area and the crime has taken place in a second. That is compounded when the perpetrators are from a third area.

We have been unable to establish the extent of freight crime because the organisation for central aggregation of information and statistics, Truckpol, was only partially supported by police forces as a whole and was in any case wound up in April 2012. The future of even that system is now uncertain.

By its peripatetic nature road freight crime is complex and often falls across police force borders, each pursing their own policy targets and unwilling to pick up the tab for investigation costs. This inconsistent and variable response by police forces to truck crime is a major concern. We have no reliable guide to the UK scale of crime against road haulage and distribution or of trends.

There is a specific concern in respect of theft of HGVs by organised gangs. At present, there is no differential between recording the theft of a moped and large goods vehicles. They are all classified as "Theft of Motor Vehicle" and police response is low due to the high volume status it engenders. The current method and classification system makes it nearly impossible for analysis of the industries crime figures. There is a need for Home Office crime statistics to identify between commercial vehicle theft and thefts of other types of vehicles and we are disappointed that no progress has been made.

We hope to make progress. Paul Broadbent, until this year Assistant Chief Constable and ACPO Lead on Business Crime, has been instrumental in setting up the National Business Crime Solution, a Public Private Partnership hub with business and law enforcement analysts developing cross sector intelligence which, we hope, will incorporate and resurrect Truckpol. The RHA is actively supporting this initiative and we hope that it will provide a better platform for the sharing of good practice and information and also promote efficient reporting of incidents throughout the UK. That remains an aspiration rather than an achievement, however.

One positive step will be the adoption of a common minimum standard of reporting and investigation for road freight crime, developed by CEN. It will, we hope, increase chances of arrest, forensic capture and successful prosecution of offenders. This in turn will, we hope, contribute to a co-ordinated and appropriate level of response to these offences. Freight and lorry theft remains an attractive opportunity to organised crime as it is still considered to be a low risk and high profit option.

The creation of the National Crime Agency and of elected Police Crime Commissioners will bring new dimensions to national policing policy.

It is clear that the Department for Transport-as opposed to the Home Office and HM Treasury-has a relatively minor role in land transport security and we consider that appropriate.

Is there a need for further EU involvement in land transport security issues, as set out in the working document?

We are conscious that the challenges of consistency and co-ordination faced in the UK to improve security, set out above, are likely to be writ large on an EU scale. We would be surprised if many of the difficulties apparent in the UK are not replicated on a grand scale, with the additional complications of differing legal frameworks, culture and language.

We have not seen a need for significant further EU involvement in land transport security issues and we see little evidence of such a need in the new EC document-and particularly evidence of involvement driven by DG Move. We would wish to see clarity of analysis in respect of specific threats and problems in relation to passenger and freight-which may be different-and how greater EU involvement would improve security. We fear that greater EU involvement would risk adding further and unnecessary complexity to the mix and lead to regulation which might well be burdensome, costly, inappropriate and ineffective.

What would be the positive and negative impacts of potential proposals arising from the working document?

4.1 Establishing an Advisory Group on Land Transport Security. We are unclear as to the benefits such a group would bring or the extent to which there is a need for greater communication among member states than already exists. We believe the scoping of the Terms of Reference and activities would be challenging, due to the spread of activities covered by the term "transport security".

Were such a group to be established, we believe industry stakeholders should be part of the group, rather than separate Stakeholder Advisory group, that SME representation should be included. DG Move’s recent record on the last point is at best patchy.

4.1.1 Security of transport interchanges The transport industry’s various sectors, their customers and insurers respond to assessed risk and appear to do so satisfactorily.

4.1.3 Consider bringing forward mandatory requirement for training of security staff and mandatory security awareness training for all persons working in the land transport domain. In the road haulage and distribution sector, we see no reason to give this issue further consideration. Any mandatory requirements are likely to be disproportionate to the threat in terms of cost and we doubt if they would be of great benefit. Goods already have competent security champions-their owners, shippers and receivers-who have responded appropriately to the level of risk, the nature of which is subject to change and to regional variation. Where we seek stronger government intervention is in the greater provision of secure truck parking at the level of local and national government and improved policing. Neither activity is best led top-down from Brussels.

4.1.4 Mandatory regular security exercises In the UK: certainly, very large operators already carry out such exercises and have contingency plans in place, so this proposal is unnecessary.

4.1.5 and 6 Technology and equipment We note an inference that technology suppliers will only invest in research to a specific regulatory standard that is mandated, giving a guaranteed market. We dispute the accuracy of that view. If it is true of some EU companies it is not true of others and nor is it true of firms globally.

Pre-defined standards risk becoming quickly out of date-the EC document states that "the threat the equipment has to detect is constantly changing"-and mandating their use risks large scale imposition on operations to which they are irrelevant or not cost-effective. The proposed approach risks stifling innovation and moving the emphasis from what is needed to what is regulated. We see no evidence that suppliers to the land transport security market-which is global-are failing to provide solutions to those who ship and move goods.

We are struck by the emphasis on technology and equipment throughout the EC document, and we wonder whether the research detailed in Annex II has provided value for money to EU taxpayers. If there is a need for research, there should be more weight given in future to training, culture and human factors relating to transport security.

On a point of detail, we are surprised by the funding reference to security equipment for screening liquids. If there is a lesson to be learned here, it is that the EU needs to improve its processes for any funding it wishes to make available to respond to new and unexpected circumstances.

4.1.7 Sharing of information We doubt that there is a ready read-across from air cargo terrorist risk to either terrorist or criminal activity relating to road haulage.

4.1.8 Consider an EU standard for end-to-end security for transport operators We reject most of this section. The EC document provides no evidence that the absence of common EU rules for supply chain security creates a weakness. The document itself recognises that "or course, not all cargo transported by lorry needs to be subject to end-to-end security" and that TAPA TSR is already an active standard for high value goods.

Defining who should and who should not be regulated, and in respect of what risk, would be endlessly problematic and there is a high risk that the administrative burden and cost risks would be added for little or no benefit. It may prove unaffordable to SMEs, who are essential element in any efficient supply chain but could find themselves excluded. (A previous EC proposal, for an Authorised Secure Operator (ASO) system, was rejected by the European Parliament as too expensive.)

No evidence is offered that airport operators and security experts are unhappy with having screening at airports and we are aware of none.

4.1.9 Secure lorry parking The EU has established a standard (SETPOS/LABEL) for rating the security and comfort of truckstops. The RHA was and is involved with this project. However, we believe that the private sector can take this project forward at both national and international level and that no further EU involvement is necessary.

4.1.10 Cybercrime-requiring transport firms to have back-up systems, if appropriate The issue of cybercrime is complex and fast-changing but we are aware of no evidence that the transport sector and its suppliers are unaware of the issue to the extent that the EU should mandate back-up systems, for which it would, we assume, require a specification. We do not consider in the least likely to be appropriate.

4.1.12 Setting standards for international activity The EC document states (p9) that "In the domain of land transport there is no international body that sets standards for transport security." The accuracy of this statement depends on the meaning of "sets". In the sense of "mandates", it is true; in the sense of "defines", it is not true and ignores work that has and is being done. ISO has done valuable work in this area. CEN has produced a guide for SMEs and has defined a standard crime reporting form that we hope will become standard in the UK, with police acceptance. And TAPA has in effect mandated standards for much of high value goods transport. We see no need for an additional standards body or for mandating standards.

Beyond the areas considered in the working document, are there other ways in which land transport security, both in the UK and across Europe, should be improved?

The EC document suggests a worrying picture in respect of potential levels of illegality in the EU but with little evidence of the scale of the problem in comparison to the scale of the industry as a whole.

Sharing of information and good practice in terms of policing can only be beneficial but we have yet to reach satisfactory levels in the UK, far less the EU. We need to build from the ground up. We see little role for further regulation and it clear that cuts in police and other budgets may make this more difficult rather than less so.

16 January 2013

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Written evidence from ATOC and Network Rail (LTS 05)

Summary of Main Points

ATOC and Network Rail have considered the content of the European Commission’s working document.

We see its aim of improving transport security as sound and acknowledge that it raises some important issues.

However, in developing some of these themes, a number of the arguments are open to challenge and some of the conclusions appear flawed.

In particular we believe that sharing security related best practice and intelligence across Europe will be far more effective in securing the improvements the document is seeking than will be a legislation based approach.

1. The Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) represents train operators in Great Britain and provides services for the passenger rail sector, such as National Rail Enquiries and the Rail Settlement Plan. Our vision is of rail as a thriving business sector which makes an increasingly positive contribution to national life.

Network Rail is the not for dividend owner and operator of Britain’s railway infrastructure, which includes the tracks, signals, tunnels, bridges, viaducts, level crossings and stations-the largest of which we also manage. We aim to provide a safe, reliable and efficient rail infrastructure for freight and passenger trains to use.

We have chosen to provide a joint response to demonstrate the shared position and objectives of the rail industry on this important issue.

2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of current land transport security arrangements in the UK?

2.1 The current UK land transport security arrangements in respect of main line rail are founded on a three way partnership between the DfT Land Transport Security Division, the British Transport Police (BTP) and the rail industry itself. Broadly speaking the overall strategy is set by the DfT with the BTP leading on operational matters.

2.2 This relationship is well established and mature with the three parties combining their respective knowledge, expertise and experience to ensure as far as possible that the security measures put in place are effective and practical within the context of an open, mass transport system.

2.3 Network Rail and the train operators continue to be aware of the threat posed by terrorism and other forms of criminal activity. However, we are confident that transport is suitably considered in counter-terrorism work, and that the current arrangements are strong.

2.4 While we see benefits from sharing best practice and intelligence across Europe, do not believe that legislation on transport is necessary to achieve this.

2.5 One challenge we do face is maintaining a high level of both staff and passenger/public vigilance, particularly when the highest security level applies for prolonged periods. However, again this is not an area in which we see legislation as able to offer any benefits.

3. Is there a need for further EU involvement in land transport security issues, as set out in the working document?

3.1 The overall objective of the European Commission’s Staff Working Document-"to consider what can be done at the EU level to improve transport security, particularly in areas where putting in place common security requirements would succeed in making Europe’s transport systems more resilient to acts of unlawful experience" (section 1 of the document) is sound and it does raise some important issues.

3.2 We support both the decision to set up an Advisory Group on Land Transport Security and the proposal to set up a complementary Stakeholder Advisory Group (section 4.1). Both these provide a means of sharing experience and good practice between different organisations and countries. This seems a good way of expanding knowledge (both of threats and responses) and we see it as more likely to be effective than legislation at raising standards.

3.3 However, while we see the high level aims as having merit, we have concerns at some of the more detailed proposals. In particular, the document suggests consideration be given to introducing mandatory standards in a number of areas (for example, security standards in general for high speed rail in section 4.1.2 and training of staff in section 4.1.3 and 4.1.4). We do not support the development of legislation in such areas.

The UK government’s approach to security is based on risk and ATOC and Network Rail firmly support this. The nature of threats to the railway can change rapidly, not only in severity but also in nature (for example the different modus operandi of Al Qaida and the IRA and its splinter groups). It is difficult to see how a legislation based approach would provide sufficient flexibility to respond quickly and effectively to emerging threats.

3.4 More generally, legislation provides a blunt tool that is likely to be insufficient for high risk parts of the network but excessive for much of the rest of it. 

3.5 The severity of threat also varies geographically. This is the case within the UK but would apply to an even greater extent at a pan-European level. Self-evidently railways in, say, Finland or Cornwall face a far lower security threat than do major terminal stations in London, Paris or Madrid. Having common legal requirements that are excessive for many parts of the EU’s transport networks but insufficient for those that are potential prime targets of terrorists makes little sense and indeed might result in measures at the latter becoming less onerous, hence rendering them more vulnerable to attack.

3.6 Exposure to international terrorism is likely to be linked to government policy and history-it follows that those countries whose governments do not engage in controversial conflicts (or which are too small to do so effectively) face a very much lower level of threat than those that do. Similarly, countries with a history of domestic terrorism (such as the UK and Spain) have a higher threat than those without. Clearly this is something that is entirely outside the transport operator’s ability to influence.

3.7 Section 4.1.2 compares safety-where requirements are being increasingly harmonised across Europe-with security (where currently they are not). We do not see this as a valid comparison. Safety largely concerns risks which by definition are common across all railways-the reliability of physical components, the compatibility of vehicles with infrastructure and interface between the two, signalling systems, etc. This is not the case for security where risk is based on political, social and human factors. 

3.8 Additionally, the specific focus on the trans-European high speed rail network in the same section is simplistic. While there are some examples where this is self contained (such as in Spain), it is more usually the case that trains on high speed routes start or continue their journeys on the "classic" network while increasingly newly built high-speed lines are designed to also be used by regional passenger services and freight trains.

3.9 The conclusion of the Commission’s paper (section 5) states that "inaction has a high price". While this is true, pro-actively imposing arrangements that are costly to maintain and which are out of proportion or ill-suited to the risk faced may have a greater price.

4. What would be the positive and negative impacts of potential proposals arising from the working document?

4.1 As indicated above, we support the creation of decision to set up an Advisory Group on Land Transport Security and the proposal to set up a complementary Stakeholder Advisory Group (section 4.1) as a means of sharing best practice. Though as the Working Document notes, terrorism has an international aspect and such sharing should draw on experience from across the world rather than being limited to the EU.

4.2 The final point of section 4.1.2, proposing legislation requiring security features to be incorporated in the design of stock and infrastructure, has some merit but needs careful thinking through as to how this might impact on other priorities. For example, if such provision in a coach results in an increase in the overall weight then this will result in more energy being consumed for traction purposes and increased track maintenance costs.

4.3 The fourth paragraph of section 4.1.4 suggests that "a legal requirement that all staff working in the public transport domain have basic training to deal with the initial aftermath of a major incident is desirable."-presumably this is intended to include office based staff.

In reality, probably the maximum that can reasonably be required of staff in general is knowledge of how to alert the emergency services. To suggest that an individual member of staff can do much beyond this when confronted by a major incident is untenable. We have thorough plans in place for major incidents, which would include terrorism, and for which the appropriate staff are suitably trained.

4.4 As noted in our answer to Q3 above, we see the biggest risks from the proposals as on one hand adding costs which are disproportionate to the risks faced in those countries/areas where the security threat is minimal while at the same time leaving high risk targets more vulnerable to attack by imposing common standards that undermine the ability to respond quickly and flexibly in the light of emerging threats.

5. Beyond the areas considered in the working document, are there other ways in which land transport security, both in the UK and across Europe, should be improved?

5.1 There is an acknowledgement (section 2) that some transport operators do not see security as their responsibility to provide. That this issue is not explored further within the document seems a missed opportunity.

5.2 While criminal acts can be said to be targeted specifically at the transport undertaking and/or its passengers/customers/staff, a terrorist atrocity is really an attack on the country as a whole (or its government) with transport targets simply providing an effective means of doing so from a terrorist perspective, given the opportunity to cause mass casualties. It follows that entirely preventing terrorist attacks is beyond the ability of transport operators. It is, however, important that transport features in generic counter-terrorist planning and operations, and that transport operators consider terrorism among the threats they face. Thus transport operators need to work with police and security services to monitor and prepare for any threats. The UK’s existing arrangements work well and there would seem to be merit in promoting a similar approach elsewhere within the EU.

5.3 It is here that a direct comparison with safety can usefully be made. A "reasonable practicability" requirement is enshrined in the Safety Directive and it seems that it is essential that a similar discipline be applied to security. While there may be challenges in doing so, as security risk will inevitably be far harder to quantify than safety risk, without it there is no basis for balancing expenditure and risk reduction. This might provide a very useful starting point for the Advisory Group.

5.4 Finally, the Working Document refers to more general criminal activity as well as terrorism. We note that the Committee’s questions refer only to the security related proposals and our responses have been similarly targeted. While organised crime does affect the rail industry-including people, gun and drug trafficking and metal theft-we would expect the BTP to be better placed than ourselves to comment in more detail about the merits of greater EU involvement in such areas.

7 January 2013

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Written evidence from Eurostar (LTS 09)

Introduction

1.Eurostar is the high-speed train service linking the UK to destinations across France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland. We have been operating since 14 November 1994 and have since carried around 115 million passengers, doubling the size of the market for travel between London and Paris in the process.

2.Since September 2010 Eurostar has been a single British-registered company, Eurostar International Limited (EIL), having previously been an unincorporated joint partnership between the British, French and Belgian railways.

As well as helping to streamline decision-making and reduce unit costs, this will better equip us to meet the challenge of increased competition arising from the new Open Access framework. We also believe it will help us more effectively expand our own operations, as we seek to broaden our reach across the UK, regional France, and further into continental Europe.

3.We aim to become the leading travel experience in Europe, substantially increasing the number of connecting passengers to destinations beyond Brussels, Lille and Paris by 2015. At the same time, we want to maintain our leadership on the London-Paris route, which will be central to our success in the future.

Strengths and weaknesses of current land transport security arrangements

4.Eurostar welcomes the Transport Select Committee's inquiry into the issue of land transport security, following the publication of the European Commission's working document on this subject.

As a cross-border high speed railway operator, Eurostar is in a specific situation compared to most other railway undertakings, having to comply with four different sets of security procedures, in all three of its core markets as well as for the Channel Tunnel crossing. Security requirements can differ very significantly from one market to another, which is a cause of complexity for our operations, and eventually of increased financial costs.

5.As a result, Eurostar is in broad agreement with the European Commission's assessment that "there is today no coherent approach to land transport security in the EU".

6.Issues experienced by Eurostar in its daily operation include for instance:

·Different rules for legal responsibility in our restricted zones in stations. In London, Eurostar has full legal responsibility and ability to take ownership for security measures; in Paris, Eurostar is only responsible for management of passenger flows, but not for security measures.

As an example of the practical consequences of this, on some of our trains -ahead of international football matches - our Conditions of Carriage (CoC) allow us to restrict alcohol on board to avoid incidents;

oWe can apply these CoC easily and confiscate bottles in the UK since we operate X-ray machines there through our contractor;

oin France, only customs can be in charge of the X ray machines. They can identify alcohol but will not confiscate it since it is not illegal under French law. Eurostar staff have to also be present to ensure the CoC are implemented.

Similarly, although our CoC take into account the different national rules on prohibited items on board, French customs in charge of X ray machines might only confiscate items which are illegal in France, resulting in confusing situations for passengers who might be allowed items on one leg of their journey and not on the return one

·Different rules on background checks performed on staff (maintenance, train drivers, etc...). Security clearance might be outsourced in the UK in some cases but only performed by the police in France. Criminal records are not managed in the same way across countries;

·Security forces formerly part of the national monopoly are sometimes only allowed to operate in the national incumbent's trains. In addition, the scope for operating is restricted to the national territory, which can obviously be an issue for a cross border operator.

7.In a nutshell, because rail-specific security standards have been developed on a purely national basis, there is no possibility for cross-border rail operators to benefit from common agreed international standards and procedures like in the maritime or airline sectors. This would become even more of an issue for any operator wishing to expand its services across several countries.

Need for further EU involvement

8.In the context of supporting modal shift, Eurostar believes there is a case for increased coordination of security measures at EU level, at the very least for cross-border services, to reduce the costs of having to satisfy multiple and often inconsistent national regulations. We therefore support the idea of further EUlevel discussions on this issue if they can improve the current situation.

4 January 2013

Written evidence from the Department for Transport (LTS 02)

Introduction

On 31 May 2012 the European Commission published their Staff Working Document (SWD) on Transport Security. This examined all transport modes but concentrated largely on land transport security as the sector which is least regulated by the EU. The Document itself does not contain any legislative proposals, but suggests areas where the EU could add value, which at a future stage might become legislation.

At the same time the EC announced the setting up of an Expert Group on Land Transport Security (2012/286/EU) to review the SWD proposals. Minister of State, Department for Transport, Theresa Villiers submitted an Explanatory Memorandum (ref. 11037/12) on 5 July 2012, on the EC’s SWD and confirmed the Government’s position that it did not support the need for European standards or regulations favouring the principle of subsidiarity in the matter. The House of Commons referred it to their Transport Select Committee (TSC) and the following is the Government’s written response to questions raised by the Committee.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of current land transport security arrangements in the UK?

1. The land transport sector, like the other sectors has its own challenges. One significant aspect is that we have "open" domestic rail and bus networks, operating on a "turn up and go" basis where it is not necessary to pre book your travel.

2. Unlike domestic services the Channel Tunnel railway network is not an open system and all passengers, vehicles and goods are subject to screening and searching prior to travel. The Governments of the UK and France jointly protect the Channel Tunnel as part of their territorial sovereignty.

3. It is therefore essential that any security measures deployed across the transport sector are proportionate, practicable and sustainable, ie costs are balanced against the risk, are not unduly burdensome to operators and the travelling public. The current Government security regimes which are tailored to the different modal challenges recognise and provide for this.

4. The strength of the UK transport security arrangements is to take a risk based approach which is proportionate to the current threats that the sector is exposed to, which results in different responses in different modal sectors. Risk is at the heart of the process for determining the level of security needed to manage the threat-one size does not fit all. The assessment of the risk is based upon an analysis of the threat, against the vulnerability of potential targets and the consequences of an attack. By introducing appropriate security measures where practicable, it is possible to reduce the level of risk to an acceptable level, but it is not possible to entirely eliminate it.

5. The terrorist threat is under constant review and may change quickly in level and/or nature so the ability of Government to respond promptly to any change is important. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and the Security Services work together to assess the terrorist threat to the UK. They also conduct periodic updates and reviews to help inform Government of any underlying and future trends and so assist in the setting of transport security measures.

6. The principal aim of the current UK security regime is to ensure that proportionate protective security is delivered across the land transport modes. For the regulated sectors, response measures are designed so that security levels can be increased or decreased quickly, to a degree that corresponds to the level of risk of and likely nature of an attack. This is vital since the threat can change at any time and security measures might need to be amended promptly in response. The requirements for securely transporting dangerous goods take account of their properties. More security measures are applied to goods with the potential to yield high consequences as defined by regulation.

7. The primary powers which provide for the Secretary of State to regulate security on the railways are specific to Great Britain. Within Northern Ireland, security guidance is provided to the local railway operator by the Police Service of Northern Ireland. This is supplemented by PSNI’s own policing and security activities and is in recognition of the longstanding and specific security issues in the Province. Discussions with the Department for Regional Development (Northern Ireland) indicate that the totality of this activity delivers a protective security regime broadly similar to that for the railways in Great Britain.

8. In Great Britain, the rail network (the infrastructure operated by Network Rail and HS1 and the Train Operating Companies using it), London Underground, the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) and the Glasgow Subway is mainly regulated by instructions issued under the Railways Act 1993. Under these, the Government places legal obligations on these operators to put in place particular robust security arrangements.

9. The Channel Tunnel and the movement of dangerous goods by road and rail are covered by separate legislation. Channel Tunnel services are subject to specific directions served under the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (CTSO) which ensure that passengers, vehicles and goods are subject to searching prior to boarding. Additionally, Channel Tunnel terminals are restricted zones only allowing persons with legitimate reason to enter them. Internationally, the Treaty of Canterbury 1986 provides for France and the UK to agree security arrangements regarding rail services using the Tunnel. The movement of dangerous goods is based on globally agreed recommendations that are made law by a European Directive.

10. Government compliance inspectors ensure that security requirements are applied and standards are maintained by operators. This includes the use of announced and unannounced inspections, as well as covert testing. A "stepped" approach to enforcement is applied, so depending upon the seriousness or frequency of a deficiency (non-compliance) the appropriate level of action can be taken against the operator.

11. With the smaller and more disparate networks such as trams and buses, which do not individually move such large volumes of passengers as national rail or the London Underground, the Department provides best practice guidance to the respective sectors, rather than formal regulation. For example we recently refreshed and reissued the Bus and Coach Security guidance in consultation with key stakeholders (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bus-and-coach-security-recommended-best-practice).

12. The security arrangements that the Department for Transport puts in place are only part of the holistic security arrangements that are delivered by Government. At the heart of the approach is the Government’s CONTEST strategy to deter terrorism, supported by the police and intelligence agencies using an intelligence based approach to detect and disrupt terrorist planning. At the next layer there is a mixture of visible policing to both deter terrorists and reassure the travelling public.

13. On top of this transport operators undertake a range of tasks under the Department’s security regime which aim to provide reassurance and deterrence, eg by public awareness measures, regular searches of stations, and handling items of left property. The final layer is the "eyes and ears" of the travelling public, with public vigilance and reporting of suspicious items or activity to either police or transport staff. Many of these measures also support the crime reduction agenda-such as high visible staffing and policing and CCTV.

14. Whilst the security regimes help to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack, they are not sufficient to guarantee this and physical improvements are made to the highest risk rail stations as part of their construction, refurbishment or as bespoke programmes of work.

15. Working in conjunction with the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure’s advisors, and British Transport Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisors, the Department provides advice to rail companies and their design teams on security measures. We have recently published a supporting design guide which can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-in-design-of-stations-sidos-guide

16. The key weaknesses relate to the main strengths of these networks. Because they move large numbers of people quickly and efficiently over an extensive network, there are some risks. These are part and parcel of allowing passengers to turn up and travel without the need to pre-book or undergo security checks. The steps described above seek to manage risks in a proportionate way, but they cannot eliminate risk.

Is there a need for further EU involvement in land transport security issues, as set out in the working document?

17. The European Commission has regular programmes of work on aviation and maritime security where there is EU legislation. The Commission has hosted meetings on land transport security, which have largely concentrated on urban transport.

18. The Staff Working Document suggests a number of areas where the European Commission could bring forward proposals and provide value. These include training for security and public transport staff, cross border contingency plans and an EU quality standard for end to end security. However, without robust evidence, we are not convinced that there is a justification for further EU intervention in land transport security matters.

19. The Expert Group on Land Transport Security established by the Commission to enable Member States to consider security could be a useful forum. Closer alignment between policy and the large sums of money allocated to research would be welcomed. It is nevertheless important that both policy and research are guided by clear assessments of the risks. This should help ensure that resource is directed towards areas where the knowledge base requires improvement and where the outputs realised would be of most value.

20. The Government takes the view that Member States will be best placed to assess the level of risk they face in respect of a potential terrorist attack on their land transport networks and the measures appropriate to mitigate that risk. Even when there are cross border issues, where there is a case for cooperation, this does not necessarily mean security measures should be set at EU level if local agreements can be made bilaterally such as under the Treaty of Canterbury for the Channel Tunnel.

21. The terrorist threat for land transport varies across the different modes and Member States. The threat from terrorism can be from either domestic or international extremists, or both. Preferred attack methods can differ between these. So whilst one type of terrorism might be a major concern of a specific Member State this is not necessarily the case for all others. Security measures need to be tailored to the specific threat and to that Member State. Therefore an EU wide approach for land transport security is not felt to be the most effective solution.

What would be the positive and negative impacts of potential proposals arising from the working document?

22. There is little detail on what the Commission is currently proposing so it is difficult to assess the positive or negative impacts. However, more onerous legislation would have a financial burden on the transport industry, could delay passengers when using the network and mismatch measures with threat and risk.

23. Where the EU can make a positive contribution is by bringing Member States together to share information and best practice. This includes a mechanism to exchange threat information and enhance cyber crime resilience. This would enable Member States to learn from each another and should help improve security across the EU.

24. The Government has already issued guidance to ensure proportionate security features are incorporated into the design of railway infrastructure. The proposal to incorporate security features into the design of railway rolling stock is something that the Government also sees merit in doing and current findings align well with current UK vehicle interior safety standards. At the EU level this would be best delivered through updates to the standards found in the Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs). However, exactly what specific security measures the Commission has in mind is unclear and any proposal would need to be considered against the risk and what is practicable, to avoid these being unnecessarily costly or of limited value.

25. As the UK security measures are risk based, any additional legislation brought forward by the Commission would need to be justified in order not to impose an undue burden or cost to operators and the travelling public. Similarly if less onerous legislative proposals were to be brought forward by the Commission it would be important to ensure that this does not reduce the minimum level of security already provided, because this is specific to the threat faced within this country.

Beyond the areas considered in the working document, are there other ways in which land transport security, both in the UK and across Europe, should be improved?

26. The aviation and maritime sectors each have their respective global standard setting organisation. The land transport sector does not display a similar desire, as countries prefer to set their own national standards. They do however share advice and best practice. This enables governments to determine on a risk basis the most appropriate level of security for their country and whether legislation or advice is the best approach.

27. Therefore, an alternative to EU wide legislation is for the Commission to facilitate the sharing of best practice and information. We have advocated using a "tool box" approach, which means leaving individual Member States and operators the freedom to select the most appropriate security measures set against their different terrorist threat scenarios to mitigate those threats. This would also allow Member States to use legislation or advice, whichever they assess is the most suitable delivery mechanism for them.

28. Using this approach would also enable information to be shared and updated, without the need to agree standards based upon whose approach is best, which can be a lengthy process. It would also help identify where there are areas of security that could be improved and where more research is needed.

29. In addition to the EU there are several international organisations that are currently involved in land transport security. These organisations hold regular discussions with representatives from government and operator organisations, so the Government feels it is important to ensure, as far as possible, that there is no duplication of work, especially with the setting up by the Commission of an Expert Group on Land Transport Security.

30. With this in mind there has recently been some discussion between some of the organisations. It would be useful for the Commission to state how it could better coordinate information sharing with these groups. In doing this it should enable the groups to be more effective and improve land transport security.

December 2012

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Further written evidence from Network Rail (LTS 05A)

Actual Terrorist-Related Attacks

There were no terrorist-related attacks on the National Rail infrastructure and stations in 2012.

Anonymous Threat Messages

¾During Jan-Dec 2012, 164 railway-specific locations were threatened.

¾BTP categorised each threat message as CATEGORY TWO, meaning that the threat was significant enough for a search to be undertaken. This is an assessment of the immediate threat: it does not mean that an anonymous threat message could not have been made by terrorists (or their supporters) as a deliberate hoax.

¾The 164 figure does not reflect the true scale and scope of the phenomenon. The counting rules mean that a threat against "all stations in London" is counted as ONE task. Similarly, a threat against "trains between London and Manchester" is counted as ONE task-irrespective of the number of stations and trains to which it could apply. In this regard, the 164 figure is not necessarily indicative of the response effort required.

¾Experience shows that threat activity can increase dramatically, with little or no notice.

¾It should also be remembered that a) terrorists do not always issue threats prior to an attack, and b) "real" threat messages are often ambiguous and/or delayed.

Wider Context

Crime statistics for the period April-November 2012 are attached.

For context, there were 1.47 billion passenger journeys in Great Britain in 2011–12.

BTP Crime Statistics 01 Apr-30 Nov 2012

Recorded

Detected

Total Violence against the Person

5,259

2,639

Total Sexual Offences

701

232

Total Criminal Damage/Malicious Mischief

2,764

717

Total Criminal Damage/Malicious Mischief

2,764

717

Total Line of Route Offences

1,051

201

Total Less Serious Line of Route Offences

7,107

1,852

Total Theft of Passenger Property

10,111

733

Total Motor Vehicle/Cycle Offences

6,534

646

Total Robbery Offences

433

199

Total Theft of Railway/Commercial Property and Burglary Offences

4,372

1,471

Total Public Disorder Offences

3,599

2,280

Total Less Serious Public Disorder Offences

6,247

3,758

Total Fraud Offences

606

424

Total Less Serious Fraud Offences

5,940

4,082

Total Drug Offences

2,569

2,471

Total Other Notifiable Offences/Crimes

620

329

Total Other Less Serious Offences

4,427

2,574

Total

65,104

25,325

4 February 2013

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Written evidence from Rail Freight Group (LTS 01)

1. Rail Freight Group (RFG) is pleased to submit evidence to the Transport Committee Inquiry into Land Security and in particular the European Commission’s working document on transport security published on 31 May 2012.

2. RFG is the representative body for rail freight in the UK. We have around 120 member companies who are active across all sectors of rail freight including train operators, ports, terminal operators, end customers, suppliers and support services. Our aim is to grow the volume of goods moved by rail where there are economic and environmental benefits in doing so.

Land Security and Rail Freight

3. Dangerous Goods In so far as the movement of dangerous goods is concerned, there is already significant legislation in place at European level which has the effect of harmonising security across Europe. This existing legislation covers all modes, including rail freight.

4. The principal legislation is Directive 2008/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on the inland transport of dangerous goods, which extended existing international modal conventions for dangerous goods to domestic movements.

5. There are three key modal conventions which apply, and which are already aligned between modes:

(a) The European Convention concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by road (ADR Convention)

(b) The European Convention concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by road (ADN Convention)

(c) The regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by rail (RID Convention). Today, these regulations form Appendix C to the convention concerning international carriage by rail (COTIF), applicable in most European contries.

6. In each of these aligned conventions, there is a section on security, in the case of the RID it forms section 1.10 and deals with training, high consequence dangerous goods, security plans, supply and restriction of information about movements, etc. Likewise there are requirements for there to be emergency plans for marshalling yards.

7. These arrangements therefore ensure that the provisions for the security of dangerous goods are already fully harmonised both between the modes and also between the various Member States.

8. Other Goods For the movement of innocuous freight there is already substantial international coordination and harmonisation organised for example by the railway police services (see http://www.colpofer.org/). Colpofer defines a common strategy for railway security and has a dedicated working group for security for international freight traffic by rail.

9. Future Developments If further security initiatives are thought necessary, it might be more sensible to work through existing machinery than develop new legislation.

10. In that context it might be mentioned that the Commission awarded a study (MOVE/D3/2011–409) into the way dangerous goods legislation should be developed and it is understood that the report has recently been submitted.

11. It is particularly important that any new or revised requirements are fair between modes and do not give any greater financial or administrative burden to certain sectors. For example, the current €750 security fee levied on any through rail freight service entering the UK via the Channel Tunnel is proving prohibitive to traffic growth, particularly as a similar tariff is not applied to other modes.

Summary

12. In summary therefore we consider that the current regulations and systems for transport security for freight are already well established, aligned between modes and generally working well. We consider that any reform should be within the existing framework rather than via new legislation. Any revised approach must continue to be aligned between modes, and ensure all modes are treated equitably.

December 2012

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Prepared 21st March 2013