Aviation Strategy

Written evidence from the Richmond Heathrow Campaign (AS 76)

This submission is made in response to the call for evidence for the inquiry by the House of Commons Select Committee on Transport into the Government’s strategy for aviation.

The Richmond Heathrow Campaign represents three amenity groups in the London Borough of Richmond upon Thames: The Richmond Society, The Friends of Richmond Green and The Kew Society, which together have over 2,000 members.

Our members are affected adversely by noise from Heathrow’s flight paths, particularly in the night period. We nevertheless recognise the importance of air transport and we seek to make a positive contribution to the inquiry.

The main points in our response, following the order of the questions to which they respond, are that: (i) aviation appears to be under-taxed for general revenue purposes; (ii) carrying more passengers per aircraft movement (as envisaged at the Terminal Five Public Inquiry) would increase the number of passengers that can be handled at Heathrow (and at other airports) without additional runway capacity; (iii) carrying more passengers per aircraft would enable night flights to be phased out at Heathrow and noise mitigation measures to be maintained for daytime air traffic; (iv) surface access to and air quality around Heathrow will continue to be major problems, particularly with additional passenger numbers; (v) if the hub model is applied to Heathrow it would require not just a third runway but a fourth as well; (vi) the hub model should be abandoned in favour of more direct services from more airports, with a reduction in the number of passengers who have to transfer.

We have confined our response to answering those of the questions that the Transport Committee is considering that are most pertinent to our areas of our general experience and specific research. We would be happy to provide additional information and would welcome the opportunity to give oral evidence. We are content for our response to be published.

QUESTION 1: WHAT SHOULD BE THE OBJECTIVES OF GOVERNMENT POLICY ON AVIATION?

1 (c). What is the impact of Air Passenger Duty on the aviation industry?

1.1 Air Passenger Duty (APD) was introduced as a specific tax on the aviation sector in order to broaden the general revenue base and in recognition of the fact that the sector was under-taxed due to zero rating for VAT and exemption from fuel tax [1] . The Coalition Agreement includes a commitment that aviation should contribute additional tax in order to fund in part an increase to £10k in the income tax personal allowance. We regard the general revenue need as a sufficient reason for retaining an aviation-specific tax. Those who call for the repeal or reduction of APD should explain how the resulting shortfall in the tax yield would be financed.

1.2 Other forms of public transport are not charged the equivalent of APD, but there are sound policy reasons for not doing so: the majority of passengers by bus or train are travelling much shorter distances than the typical air journey, with competition from the car, not the air fleet. For longer journeys, wherever train is a viable alternative to air (i.e. short haul flights), tax discrimination to encourage the use of train can be justified on transport and environmental management grounds.

1.3 The previous Administration re-branded APD as a green tax on aviation but the revenue continues to be used for general expenditure and is not hypothecated for the mitigation and/or remediation of aviation’s environmental damage. We agree that aviation should meet its environmental costs, but through specifically designed mechanisms (e.g. emissions trading for climate change impacts and airport surcharges for more local impacts such as air quality, road congestion and air traffic noise) rather than through APD.

1.4 APD raises approximately £2.5 billion per year, but there is no criteria against which to assess whether that amount is fair or unfair to the aviation sector. Since the original rationale for APD was in effect as a surrogate tax in view of aviation’s exemptions from fuel duty and VAT, an objective assessment of fairness could be based on a comparison between the amount collected in APD and the amount lost in fuel duty and VAT. Unfortunately the Treasury does not publish these data. But a report published in 2003 by the Aviation Environment Federation estimated that the exemptions were worth £9.7 billion [2] . The wide gap between the amount paid in APD and the apparent value of the exemptions highlights the need for a validated annual estimate of the amount that aviation does not pay in fuel duty and VAT.

1.5 It is difficult to square the apparently favourable tax treatment of aviation with the sector’s image as a dynamo of the UK economy. But two direct consequences follow: (a) the burden on other taxpayers is higher than it would be; and (b) and the prices for air passengers are lower than they would be. Given that price considerations are likely to influence leisure passengers [3] and that leisure passengers account for more than two thirds of all passengers at UK airports [4] , aviation’s apparently favourable tax treatment may have contributed to increased passenger numbers and congestion at UK airports.

1.6 The main direct beneficiaries from the low level of APD are the airlines, with air passengers as the main indirect beneficiaries (i.e. air fares are lower than they would be with higher levels of APD). It is claimed that account must also be taken of the benefits from inward investment and UK-bound tourists that aviation facilitates. But the UK has exported more investment and tourist spending than it has imported over many years and these deficits may also have been facilitated by aviation [5] .

1.7 The main direct loser from the low level of APD is the Treasury, which must either increase the burden on other taxpayers or cut back on public expenditure. The main indirect losers are the general taxpayer or people and projects that depend on State funding (e.g. pensioners, a new hospital). Although many taxpayers are also air passengers, the evidence indicates that those on higher incomes account for significantly more leisure flying than those on lower incomes [6] . That is to say, to the extent that the general taxpayer is subsidising leisure flying, it is disproportionately for the benefit of the better off.

1.8 It should be recalled finally that transfer passengers are exempt from APD, the original rationale being to protect airlines at UK hub airports [7] . More recently, the Government has argued that it would be unfair to charge the airlines twice for transfer passengers (i.e. for the flight to the hub and for the connecting flight from the hub). But, regardless of the rationale for the exemption, its effect is to discriminate in favour of airlines and airports that maximise traffic at a particular hub and may inhibit the development of services direct to ultimate destinations (i.e. without transferring at a hub). It is likely to be the case that the majority of passengers would prefer to fly direct rather than transferring (see our response to Questions 4 (a) and 4 (b) for more detailed comments on transfer passengers).

QUESTION 2: HOW SHOULD WE MAKE THE BEST USE OF EXISTING AVIATION CAPACITY?

2 (a). How do we make the best use of existing London airport capacity? Are the Government’s current measures sufficient? What more could be done to improve passenger experience and airport resilience?

Heathrow Airport

2.1 We consider that better use could be made of Heathrow’s capacity to improve resilience in the short term and to increase passenger numbers in the medium term, while continuing to operate in unbroken segregated mode and within the existing limit of 480 000 air transport movements per year. We consider that the efficient use of this capacity would also enable movements to be phased out in the night period (2300-0700).

2.2 Airport capacity is determined by three related parameters: runway capacity for the number of aircraft movements; terminal capacity for the number of passengers; and (within the two preceding parameters) passenger capacity per movement [8] . The Terminal Five Public Inquiry found that Heathrow - operating in unbroken segregated mode and with Terminal Five in full use - would have the capacity to handle 480 000 air transport movements (ATMs) per year carrying 90 million passengers, with a corresponding increase in the capacity and number of passengers per movement compared the situation at the time of the Inquiry [9] .

2.3 The number of ATMs at Heathrow in 2011 (476 000) virtually reached the forecast maximum number of ATMs per year (480 000) with unbroken segregated mode, while the number of passengers (69 million) was 21 million short of the forecast maximum number of passengers per year (90 million).

2.4 The lack of spare runway capacity at Heathrow with which to manage promptly periodic disruptions to flight schedules (particularly for arriving aircraft) is therefore due to over-scheduling the number of ATMs in particular hours of the day rather than to the number of ATMs exceeding the forecast ATM capacity over the day as a whole.

2.5 Similarly, the passenger capacity bottlenecks at Heathrow have arisen because of the shortfall between the forecast number of passengers per ATM and the actual number of passengers per ATM; not because the actual numbers of ATMs or passengers have exceeded their forecast capacity.

2.6 As regards spare capacity for managing disruption, we consider that the airlines should be given incentives to spread their slots more evenly across the day in order to avoid spikes in the number of slots in particular hours that are vulnerable to disruption. The simultaneous use of both runways for arrivals should be reserved only for the most extreme cases of disruption and not for routine disruption.

2.7 As regards passenger numbers, we estimate that Heathrow’s 90 million passenger capacity would not be fully utilised until 2027 if the airlines increase the number of passengers per ATM to the level envisaged at the Terminal Five Public Inquiry and assuming a similar rate of increase to the annual average since 1991 [10] . We set out our analysis in more detail in Annex 1 to this response.

2.8 Increased passenger numbers per ATM in the short term could be delivered if the airlines aimed at a higher ratio of passenger numbers to passenger capacity in their existing fleet. The number of seats per ATM at Heathrow averaged at about 200 over each of the last five years, with the number of passengers per ATM in 2011 averaging at 146, a seat capacity use of about 73 per cent [11] . There is therefore scope to increase the average number of passengers per ATM, particularly on the most popular routes that are served by many flights per day [12] .

2.9 Increased passenger numbers per ATM in the medium term could be delivered if the airlines replace much of their existing fleet at Heathrow with aircraft with larger passenger capacities. This would not mean switching every aircraft to Jumbo size; but it would mean more aircraft with seats for more than 200 passengers and fewer aircraft with seats for less than 200 passengers [13] . This could be done incrementally in line with routine fleet replacement, with the option of code-sharing between airlines to further defray the costs of switching to larger capacity aircraft.

2.10 More passengers per ATM would enable the same number of passengers to be carried in fewer daily movements, particularly on the most popular routes, which in turn would free up slots for new destinations.

2.11 It is not clear why market forces and the rules of supply and demand - congestion pressures at Heathrow and competition between the airlines - have not resulted in larger passenger numbers per ATM. But carrying more passengers per ATM would create unused slots that would have to be surrendered without compensation under the European Union "use it or lose it" rule. The airlines may wish to retain the slots that they currently hold in order to open new routes in the future; or in order to keep competing airlines out; or in order to sell slots at their most lucrative value [14] .

Other London Airports

2.12 We consider that better co-ordinated use could be made of London’s five main airports (Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and London City). In particular consideration should be given to the reintroduction of air traffic distribution rules for the most popular destinations in order to reduce the number of ATMs to those destinations (by increasing the number of passengers per ATM). This rationalisation would free up slots for new destinations.

2 (b). Does the Government’s current strategy make the best use of existing capacity at airports outside the south east? How could this be improved?

2.13 Congestion at Heathrow and at London’s other main airports is due in part to the continued dependence of the other regions of the United Kingdom on South East England for international aviation connections. We welcome any initiatives to increase the number of direct international services at airports in the other regions in order to reduce the number of domestic terminating and transferring passengers at Heathrow. For example, the development of improved surface access to airports within each region should not lag behind the development of improved surface access from other regions to airports in South East England.

2.14 It might be helpful to commission a comparative study of the UK regions: to what extent can regional economic differences be attributed to the abundance or scarcity of aviation in each region? How does the international connectivity of major airports outside the South East (e.g. Manchester and Glasgow/Edinburgh) compare with airports in some of the smaller EU countries with similar population sizes to the UK regions?

2 (c). How can surface access to airports be improved?

2.15 Heathrow has spare capacity to handle an additional 21 million passengers per year (see paragraph above). Assuming a continuation of the ratio of two terminating passengers to one transferring passenger (a ratio that has been roughly constant at Heathrow since the mid 1990s) then there would be an additional 14 million terminating passengers per year at Heathrow by the time that its passenger capacity is fully utilised. How would those additional 14 million passengers get surface access to Heathrow?

2.16 The table in Annex 2 to this response sets out the different modes of transport that have been used by terminating passengers for surface access to Heathrow between 1972 and 2010. In 2010 (the most recent year for which the detailed data was available at the time of drafting this response) 30.8 million passengers accessed by road (private car, hire car, taxi/minicab, bus/coach) and 10.8 million passengers accessed by rail (including underground), a ratio of three road accesses to one rail access that has been roughly constant at Heathrow since the opening of the Paddington connection in 2000 (prior to 2000 the ratio was 4:1). Assuming the future continuation of the 3:1 ratio, 10.5 million of the additional terminating passengers would use road access, an increase in the total number of road access to 41.3 million per year. Increased passenger numbers would in turn increase the quantity of consumer goods and other supplies that are delivered to Heathrow primarily by road.

2.17 The road network around Heathrow already experiences significant levels of road traffic congestion, in part because of the high volume of road traffic to and from Heathrow. In many of these areas the air quality is already poor, with road traffic emissions identified as the main pollutant source. Reducing these related adverse impacts is proving difficult even with the present level of Heathrow access road traffic. If increased terminating passenger numbers stimulate increased Heathrow access road traffic there will be a corresponding increase in the magnitude of the adverse impacts on local road traffic congestion and air quality.

QUESTION 3: WHAT CONSTRAINTS ARE THERE ON INCREASING UK AVIATION CAPACITY?

3 (a). Are the Government’s proposals to manage the impact of aviation on the local environment sufficient, particularly in terms of reducing the impact of noise on local residents?

Air Quality

3.1 The Terminal Five Public Inquiry found that the air quality in areas around Heathrow exceeded what were at the time voluntary World Health Organisation (WHO) limit values for exposure to nitrogen dioxide; and that the exceedences would continue in future with or without Terminal Five. By the time the Secretary of State authorised the development of Terminal Five the WHO limit values had been made mandatory within the European Community, with a deadline for compliance by the end of 2010.

3.2 In paragraphs 77 and 78 of the letter dated 21 November 2001 authorising the development of Terminal Five the Secretary of State took issue with what he regarded as an unduly relaxed attitude towards the prospect of continued nitrogen dioxide exceedences around Heathrow:

He [ the Secretary of State ] considers that the Inspector placed too little weight on the European Community law aspects of the air quality issues and he recognises the obligations that Community law imposes on the UK Government … The Secretary of State reaffirms his recognition of the UK Government’s obligations under the EU Directive. It remains the Government’s intention to meet the requirements of the Directive .

3.3 But compliance was not achieved by the end of 2010 and the Government had to apply to the European Commission for an extension for compliance until the end of 2015. With the extended deadline due to expire in just over two years’ time, compliance has still not been achieved.

3.4 Although road traffic in the Heathrow area is considered to be the main source of nitrogen dioxide (and of particulates, another cause of local pollution for which limit values have been set), much of that road traffic is Heathrow bound; and aviation emissions (particularly take offs) make an additional contribution to the overall nitrogen dioxide and particulate levels. Any significant increase in passenger numbers using road access in future would make compliance with the limit values even more difficult.

3.5 Quite apart from the legal obligations on the Government to comply with the EU Directive, the nitrogen dioxide and particulate levels pose a health threat to adults living and working near Heathrow and to children living and attending schools near Heathrow. Recent research by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has confirmed the health risks from air pollution in areas around Heathrow.

Air Traffic Noise

3.6 The high nitrogen dioxide levels are restricted to certain areas within the immediate vicinity of Heathrow. Noise from air traffic extends over a much wider area, several miles to the east and west of the airport to those communities over which Heathrow’s arrival and departure flight paths are routed.

3.7 The harmonised mapping of air traffic noise around major EU airports - undertaken in compliance with Directive 2002/49/EC on the assessment and management of environmental noise - demonstrates that noise from Heathrow air traffic affects more people in the day-evening and night periods than at any other major EU airport.

3.8 Although the noisiest classes of aircraft have been phased out at Heathrow the recent noise trends are not encouraging:

· Day and evening period (0700-2300) The size of the air traffic noise contour shrank by 50 per cent between 1991 and 2001 but the rate of shrinkage has been much slower since 2001. The number of aircraft movements (i.e. the number of individual noise events) increased by 26 per cent in 2011 compared with 1991 (see Annex 3 to this response for fuller details).

· Night noise quota period (2330-0600) The number of aircraft movements increased between winter 1993/4 and summer 2011 but by a much lower percentage than the day and evening period. The noise per movement has not reduced to the same extent as in the day and evening period, as judged by the total number of night noise quota points used and the number of quota points per movement (see Annex 4 to this response for fuller detail).

· Night shoulder periods (2300-2330 and 0600-0700) The number of aircraft movements has increased compared with the situation in the early 1990s, with an average 40 arrivals and 17 departures per night in 2010 (figures for 2011 not yet available).

3.9 Turning to Heathrow’s noise climate in the future, the Department of Transport is proposing to introduce a "noise envelope" at any new hub airport or at any other airport development which is a nationally significant infrastructure project. It is not clear whether a noise envelope would apply at Heathrow if Heathrow was selected for hub expansion (i.e. not a new hub airport) or if hub expansion is to take place elsewhere. But in either event we are deeply suspicious of a noise envelope.

3.10 The basis of our suspicion is that the noise envelope would apparently be based on limiting the size of the 57 decibel air traffic noise contour over 16 hours (0700-2300). A similar restriction already applies at Heathrow as a planning condition for Terminal Five, but the size of the permitted contour is so large that it has not provided any incentive to introduce quieter aircraft. The Planning Inspector at the Terminal Five Public Inquiry had severe reservations about the Department’s preferred method of assessing the impact of noise levels, which would form the basis for assessing compliance with the contour limit. For those reasons he recommended the setting of a 480 000 limit on the number of air transport movements per year at Heathrow. The Secretary of State accepted the Inspector’s reservations about noise assessment and imposed the 480 000 limit as a planning condition for Terminal Five.

3.11 We also have concerns about how the noise envelope would apply to the night period. Again, the precedents are not good. The original restrictions on night flights at Heathrow excluded the noisiest classes of aircraft and imposed a limit on the number of movements by other aircraft. But the last Administration attempted to abolish the limit on the number of movements in favour of sole reliance on a noise quota allowance (in effect a sort of noise envelope) which would have enabled the number of movements in the night period to increase provided that their individual and collective noise levels did not exceed the quota allowance. Again, the noise quotas have been too lax to produce any significant reduction in night noise at Heathrow.

3.12 In our view the only way to reduce the noise from air traffic in the day and evening periods is to set ever-tightening noise standards with which aircraft must comply within a reasonable deadline. That is how the dramatic reductions in the noise contour in the 1990s at Heathrow were delivered. The ultimate objective must be to ensure that the noise levels at Heathrow and other airports do not exceed the guideline values recommended by the World Health Organisation. As regards air traffic arriving or departing in the night period, we consider that the only solution is a blanket prohibition 2300-0700 which could be delivered by increasing the number of passengers per aircraft movement: see our response to Question 2 (a) above.

QUESTION 4: DO WE NEED A STEP-CHANGE IN UK AVIATION CAPACITY? WHY?

4 (a). What should this step-change be? Should there be a new hub airport? Where?

4.1 Air passenger numbers are forecast to increase by a factor of two or three over the next fifty years. Many argue that in order to handle the passenger growth new runways need to be built in South East England, with at least one of the new runways dedicated to maintaining a hub capacity in the South East. But there are widely diverging views as to where the new runways should be built; or to what the best option is for maintaining a hub capacity.

4.2 We accept that passenger numbers are likely to increase significantly. But we consider that the additional capacity could be delivered through primarily through larger passenger numbers per aircraft movement and with better co-ordination of services at London’s five main airports (Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and London City) without the need for additional runways and the implied significant increase in the number of aircraft movements. We also consider that the sheer increase in passenger numbers in future should result in more demand for point to point services, with less demand for transfer services and a reduced role for hubs.

4.3 We commented in paragraph 2.2 above that airport passenger capacity is determined by three parameters: runway capacity, terminal capacity and aircraft capacity. We are surprised that the debate about future capacity needs in South East England has got bogged down in acrimony about the need for additional runways, to the exclusion of any debate about aircraft capacity. In our view enhancing and utilising aircraft capacity is inherently less divisive and less costly than building additional runways.

4.4 We argued in paragraphs 2.5 and 2.7 above that the apparent bottleneck in passenger capacity at Heathrow is due to the shortfall between the forecast and the actual number of passengers per aircraft movement; and that the capacity could be fully utilised within the existing limit on the number of aircraft movements and in unbroken segregated mode by increasing the number of passengers per movement. Delivering that increase at Heathrow would become easier if the same objective was adopted for London’s other main airports (Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and London City), with the additional benefit that additional passenger capacity would become available at all the airports, not just at Heathrow.

4.5 Between 1977 and 1991 traffic distribution rules were in operation at Heathrow and Gatwick in order to ease congestion at Heathrow and to assist the development of Gatwick. None of London’s five main airports needs assistance in their development now, but the consequence of past development has been that many of the most popular destinations are now served by three or more of the airports. There may be a case for introducing new traffic distribution rules across the region in order to promote larger passenger numbers per movement but with an overall reduction in the number of movements to the most popular destinations, thereby freeing up capacity across London for additional routes. Again, this option is likely to be less contentious than building new runways.

4.6 Turning from capacity across London to hub capacity, the term "hub" was first applied to airports in the United States, where numerous hub airports are graded according to their share of overall air traffic at all US airports. A key feature of the US hub model is the use of four runways, two central long runways with a short runway either side. There is no UK definition of a hub airport, but the designation is reserved for Heathrow with its two runways. Those who argue for a short third runway at Heathrow to the north of the existing two long runways in order to maintain its hub status need to explain for how long a third runway would maintain hub status before a fourth runway would be needed (and where it would be located) bearing in mind not just the US four runway hub model but also the presence of four runways at Paris and Frankfurt and five runways at Amsterdam, with all of whom Heathrow is said to be in competition for transfer passengers.

4.7 The value of transfer passengers is said to be that they enable hub airports to serve a wider range of destinations with a greater frequency of service than would be economically viable if the hub handled only terminating passengers. But that win-win argument has broken down at Heathrow. In the period since 1991 the number of transfers at Heathrow has increased in absolute numbers and at a faster rate than the number of terminating passengers but Heathrow served fewer destinations in 2011 than it did in 1991 [15] . Over the same period of time the number of aircraft movements at Heathrow increased from 362 000 in 1991 to 476 000 in 2011. It would seem that the only impact of the disproportionate growth in transfers at Heathrow over the last twenty years has been to increase the number of movements to destinations for which there was already a high demand from terminating passengers. As a result Heathrow is now more congested and serves fewer destinations than Gatwick [16] even though Gatwick handles half the total number of passengers at Heathrow with far fewer transfers proportionately and in absolute numbers than Heathrow.

4.8 In the early days of civil aviation there were relatively few passengers and transferring at hubs would have been the only economically viable option between low demand destinations. But passengers are likely to prefer to fly direct to their ultimate destination if given the choice, because direct flights should be quicker and cheaper than transferring at a hub. It might therefore have been expected that the growth in passenger numbers over the last fifty years would have resulted in a decline in the number of transfers and a corresponding increase in the number of terminating passengers; and that the projected growth in passenger numbers in future should further increase the demand for direct flights and reduce the demand for transfers and the need for ever-larger hub airports.

4 (b). What are the costs and benefits of these different ways to increase UK aviation capacity?

4.9 New runways in South East England would be controversial and would take several years to build even assuming that political support could be guaranteed. The building costs would be significant and would be "up front" for the airport owners, with the return on investment deferred for many years.

4.10 Larger passenger numbers per aircraft would not be controversial and could begin immediately at little cost. The airlines would have to switch larger aircraft over the medium term. But this could be done incrementally and in line with the routine fleet replacement. Costs could be further defrayed by increased code-sharing between airlines.

4.11 Surface access to airports is likely to become a more significant problem than it already is, regardless of which capacity-enhancing option is adopted, due to the sheer number of passengers accessing major airports in future.

4.12 Larger passenger numbers per aircraft is likely to be significantly less damaging to the environment than new runways, which would involve a large increase in the number of aircraft movements.

4.13 Making better co-ordinated use of London’s main airports would reduce the risk that over-development at any one airport would worsen what are already adverse environmental hot spots.

19 October 2012

ANNEX 1

Heathrow: Number of passengers per movement 1991 - 2011

Years	Passengers		Movements		Average per movement
	(millions)	%	(thousands)	%		%
1991	40.3	100.0	362	100.0	111.3	100.0
1992	45.0	111.7	388	107.2	116.0	104.2
1993	47.6	118.1	396	109.4	120.2	108.0
1994	51.4	127.5	412	113.8	124.8	112.1
1995	54.1	134.2	421	116.3	128.5	115.5
1996	55.7	138.2	428	118.2	130.1	116.9
1997	57.9	143.7	431	119.1	134.3	120.7
1998	60.4	149.9	442	122.1	136.7	122.8
1999	62.0	153.8	451	124.6	137.5	123.5
2000	64.3	159.6	460	127.1	139.8	125.6
2001	60.5	150.1	458	126.5	132.1	118.7
2002	63.0	156.3	460	127.1	137.0	123.1
2003	63.2	156.8	457	126.2	138.3	124.3
2004	67.1	166.5	470	129.8	142.8	128.3
2005	67.7	168.0	472	130.4	143.4	128.8
2006	67.3	167.0	471	130.1	142.9	128.4
2007	67.9	168.5	476	131.5	142.6	128.1
2008	66.9	166.0	473	130.7	141.4	127.0
2009	65.9	163.5	460	127.1	143.3	128.8
2010	65.8	163.3	449	124.0	146.6	131.5
2011	69.4	172.2	476	131.5	145.8	131.0

Source: Civil Aviation Authority, UK Airport Statistics

Notes: The source gives the number of passengers and air transport movements, from which the number of passengers per movement have been calculated. The percentage columns are calculated from 1991 as the base year.

There are minor discrepancies in the passenger numbers given in UK Airport Statistics compared with the Civil Aviation Authority’s Air Passenger Surveys. The Air Passenger Surveys are published later in the year than UK Airport Statistics and presumably contain the more accurate data. But the Air Passenger Surveys have been published annually for Heathrow only since 1996, so UK Airport Statistics have been used to compile this table.

Comment: The report to the Secretary of State on the Heathrow Terminal Five Public Inquiry advised that Heathrow would have an annual runway capacity of 480 000 air transport movements operating in unbroken segregated mode and would be able to handle 90 million passengers per year with Terminal Five fully operational. 480 000 movements carrying 90 million passengers is equivalent to an annual average of 187.5 passengers per movement.

The number of air transport movements (ATMs) per year increased from 362 000 in 1991 to 476 000 in 2011, an increase over twenty years of 114 000 ATMs (31.5 per cent). At the end of 2011 there was spare capacity to handle a further 4 000 ATMs per year (i.e. 480 000 less 476 000). The rate of increase in the number of ATMs between 1991 and 2011 was equivalent to an average annual increase of approximately 5 700. If the same rate of increase continues, the 4 000 spare capacity would be fully utilised by late 2012.

The number of passengers per year increased from 40.3 million in 1991 to 69.4 million in 2011, an increase over twenty years of 29.1 million (72.2 per cent). At the end of 2011 there was spare capacity to handle a further 20.6 million passengers per year (i.e. 90 million less 69.4 million). The rate of increase in the number of passengers between 1991 and 2011 was equivalent to an average annual increase of approximately 1.45 million. If the same rate of increase continues, the 20.6 million spare capacity would be fully utilised by early 2027.

The average number of passengers per movement increased from 111.3 in 1991 to 145.8 in 2011, an increase over twenty years of 34.5 passengers per movement (31.0 per cent). At the end of 2011 there was spare capacity - as implied by the findings of the Terminal Five Public Inquiry - to handle a further 41.7 passengers per movement (i.e. 187.5 less 145.8). The rate of increase in the number of passengers per movement between 1991 and 2011 was equivalent to an average annual increase of approximately 1.7 passengers. If the same rate of increase continues, the 41.7 spare capacity would be fully utilised by early 2036.

In view of the legal limit of 480 000 on the permitted number of ATMs per year and the impending arrival at that number of ATMs, the only way that Heathrow can make full use of its 90 million annual passenger-handling capacity is to increase significantly the number of passengers per ATM.

ANNEX 2

Heathrow: passenger numbers per transport mode for surface access 1972 - 2010

Year	Car/taxi		Bus/coach		Tube/rail		Other		Total
	millions	%	millions	%	millions	%	millions	%	millions	%
1972	-	59	-	32	-	0	-	2	14.3	93
1978	-	63	-	14	-	20	-	1	20.8	98
1984	14.9	66	3.3	14	4.5	20	0.2	1	22.6	101
1987	17.2	64	4.0	15	5.4	20	0.2	1	26.8	100
1991	19.7	66	3.9	13	6.0	20	0.2	1	29.8	100
1996	25.0	67	6.0	16	6.0	16	0.3	1	37.3	100
1997	25.3	66	6.2	16	6.6	17	0.4	1	38.5
1998	27.2	67	5.7	14	6.3	18	0.4	1	40.6
1999
2000	28.4	63.7	6.2	13.9	9.8	22.1	0.3	0.4	44.6
2001	26.6	64.7	5.4	13.1	8.9	21.5	0.3	0.7	41.2	100
2002	25.9	65.3	4.9	12.3	8.8	22.1	0.1	0.3	39.7
2003	25.9	64.3	5.1	12.6	9.2	22.9	0.2	0.3	40.2
2004	27.8	63.7	5.4	12.4	10.2	23.5	0.3	0.3	43.6
2005	27.3	62.7	5.7	13.0	10.4	23.9	0.2	0.4	43.6
2006	28.5	64.4	5.8	13.1	9.9	22.9	0.0	0.0	44.2	100
2007	27.2	61.5	5.8	13.2	11.0	24.9	0.1	0.3	44.1
2008	25.7	59.8	6.1	14.1	11.1	25.7	0.1	0.3	43.0
2009	24.5	59.6	5.7	14.0	10.6	26.0	0.2	0.5	40.9
2010	25.2	60.5	5.6	13.4	10.8	25.9	0.1	0.3	41.7

Source: Civil Aviation Authority Passenger Survey Reports. The surveys have been undertaken annually from 1996 at Heathrow; at less frequent intervals before 1996. The report for 1999 had not been consulted at the time of preparing the table.

Notes: The reports indicate the use of each mode of transport shown in the table [17] as a percentage [18] of the total number of terminating passengers [19] . The reports from 2007 onwards indicate the percentage use of private, public and other surface modes of transport. The number of passengers using each mode has been calculated by applying the individual percentages to the total number of terminating passengers in each year from 1984 onwards [20]

The column car/taxi includes private hire cars and minicabs.

ANNEX 3

Heathrow: Aircraft movements and 16-hour (0700-2300) noise exposure contours: 1991-2011

Years	Number of aircraft movements				Size of 57 dBA contour
	calendar year		24-hours	16-hours	km²	%
	000s	%
1991	382 (362)	100.0	1 046.6	-	234.9	100.0
1992	406 (388)	106.3	1 109.2	-	204.0	86.8
1993	411 (396)	107.6	1 126.0	-	182.3	77.6
1994	425 (412)	111.3	1 164.4	-	175.5	74.7
1995	435 (421)	113.9	1 191.8	-	169.2	72.0
1996	440 (428)	115.2	1 202.2	1 178.4	164.7	70.1
1997	441 (431)	115.4	1 208.2	1 167.0	158.3	67.4
1998	451 (442)	118.1	1 235.6	1 206.1	163.7	69.7
1999	458 (451)	119.9	1 254.8	1 215.5	155.6	66.2
2000	467 (460)	122.3	1 276.0	1 236.3	135.6	57.7
2001	464 (458)	121.5	1 271.2	1 237.7	117.4	50.0
2002	467 (460)	122.3	1 279.4	1 243.2	126.9	54.0
2003	464 (457)	121.5	1 271.2	1 232.2	126.9	54.0
2004	476 (470)	124.6	1 300.5	1 263.0	117.4	50.0
2005	478 (472)	125.1	1 309.7	1 248.7	117.2	49.9
2006	477 (471)	124.9	1 306.8	1 248.0	117.4	50.0
2007	481 (476)	125.9	1 317.8	1 258.2	119.6	50.9
2008	479 (473)	125.4	1 308.7	1 264.8	123.1	52.4
2009	466 (460)	122.0	1 276.7	1 230.5	112.5	47.9
2010	455 (449)	119.1	1 246.6	1 263.8	108.3	46.1
2011	481 (476)	125.9	1 317.8	1 268.6	108.8	46.3

Sources: Civil Aviation Authority: UK Airport - Movement, Passenger and Cargo Statistics for the number of aircraft movements per year. The number of aircraft movements per 24-hour day (Jan to Dec) have been calculated from the number of movements per year. Civil Aviation Authority: Noise Exposure Contours for Heathrow Airport for the size of the noise contour and the number of aircraft movements per 16-hour day (mid-June to mid-Sept). At the time of compiling the table the number of movements had not been identified for the years 1991 - 1995.

Notes: The percentage columns for the number of aircraft movements per year and for the size of the air traffic noise exposure contour take 1991 as the base year for observing the extent of subsequent changes. The numbers marked in bold indicate the years in which there was a reversal in the prevailing trend compared with the preceding year (an increase in the number of aircraft movements and a decrease in the size of the air traffic noise exposure contour - see comments below). The numbers in brackets in the column for the number of aircraft movements per year are the numbers of air transport movements (i.e. engaged in the transport of passengers, cargo or mail).

Comment: The general trends (0700-2300 hours) have been for an increase in the number of aircraft movements in parallel with a decrease in size in the air traffic noise exposure contour. These trends were most pronounced and were continuous in virtually every year 1991 - 2001. The trends have been flatter since 2001, with several years showing a reversal in the trend for the number of movements or for the contour size; or for both.

ANNEX 4

Heathrow: Aircraft movements and noise quota points in the night quota period (2330 - 0600)

Winter seasons 1993/4 - 2010/11

Seasons	Number of aircraft movements		Number of noise quota points used
			total points used		points per movement
		%		%		%
1993/4	2 352	100.0	4 384	100.0	1.86	100.0
1994/5	2 668	113.4	5 020	114.5	1.88	101.1
1995/6	2 751	117.0	4 760	108.6	1.73	93.0
1996/7	2 525	107.4	3 901	89.0	1.54	82.8
1997/8	2 446	104.0	3 858	88.0	1.58	85.0
1998/9	2 688	114.3	4 423	100.9	1.65	88.7
1999/00	2 529	107.5	3 972	90.6	1.57	84.4
2000/1	2 615	111.2	4 118	93.9	1.57	84.4
2001/2	2 684	114.1	4 257	97.1	1.59	85.5
2002/3	2 620	111.4	4 316	98.5	1.65	88.7
2003/4	2 683	114.1	4 425	100.9	1.65	88.7
2004/5	2 591	110.2	4 361	99.5	1.68	90.3
2005/6	2 669	113.5	4 355	99.3	1.63	87.6
2006/7	2 659	113.1	4 266	97.3	1.60	86.0
2007/8	2 710	115.2	4 100.25	93.5	1.52	81.7
2008/9	2 715	115.4	3 947.50	90.0	1.45	78.0
2009/10	2 686	114.2	3 863.25	88.1	1.44	77.4
2010/11	2 577	109.6	3 735.25	85.2	1.45	78.0

Summer seasons 1994 - 2011

Seasons	Number of aircraft movements		Number of noise quota points used
			total points used		points per movement
		%		%		%
1994	2 905	100.0	5 109	100.0	1.76	100.0
1995	2 968	102.2	5 159	101.0	1.74	98.9
1996	2 566	88.3	4 340	85.0	1.69	96.0
1997	2 757	94.9	4 276	83.7	1.55	88.1
1998	2 828	97.4	4 668	91.4	1.65	93.8
1999	3 138	108.0	5 342	104.6	1.70	96.6
2000	3 028	104.2	4 967	97.2	1.64	93.2
2001	2 939	101.2	4 694	91.9	1.60	90.9
2002	2 937	101.1	5 051	98.9	1.72	97.7
2003	2 899	99.8	5 165	101.1	1.78	101.1
2004	2 993	103.0	5 218	102.1	1.74	98.9
2005	2 956	101.8	5 225	102.3	1.77	100.6
2006	3 059	105.3	5 232	102.4	1.71	97.2
2007	3 053	105.1	5 235	102.5	1.72	97.7
2008	2 922	100.6	4 634	90.7	1.59	90.3
2009	2 848	98.0	4 429.25	86.7	1.56	88.6
2010	3 033	104.4	4 504.75	86.2	1.49	84.7
2011	2 958	101.8	4 491	87.9	1.52	86.4

Sources: Department of Transport and BAA Heathrow for the number of aircraft movements and noise quota points used, from which the number of quota points per movement has been calculated.

Notes: The percentage columns take winter 1993/4 and summer 1994 as the base seasons for observing the extent of subsequent changes. The numbers marked in bold indicate an increase compared with the previous season.

ANNEX 5

Heathrow: Number of destinations in 1990, 2001 and 2011

Region	1990			2001			2011
United Kingdom	24	(18)	(6)	14	(10)	(4)	11	(7)	(4)
Western Europe	54	(40)	(14)	33	(32)	(1)	35	(29)	(6)
Central Europe	53	(41)	(12)	33	(31)	(2)	35	(32)	(3)
Eastern Europe	16	(13)	(3)	26	(23)	(3)	21	(21)	(-)
Near East	20	(17)	(3)	18	(17)	(1)	15	(14)	(1)
Africa	29	(24)	(5)	24	(21)	(3)	23	(23)	(-)
Far East	25	(25)	(-)	29	(28)	(1)	30	(30)	(-)
Americas	43	(33)	(10)	35	(34)	(1)	41	(36)	(5)
Totals	264	(211)	(53)	212	(196)	(16)	211	(192)	(19)

Source: Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation Statistics, Table 12.1 (International Air Passenger Traffic to and from Reporting Airports) and Table 12.2 (Domestic Air Passenger Traffic to and from Reporting Airports)

Notes: The table sets out the number of destinations per listed region served by air transport movements from Heathrow in the years 1990, 2001 and 2011. The first column of numbers is the total number of destinations. The second column of numbers is the number of destinations to which 2 000 or more passengers (arrivals and departures) were transported. The third column of numbers is the number of destinations to which less than 2 000 passengers (arrivals and departures) were transported.

The number of passengers at Heathrow increased from 45.6 million in 1990 to 60.4 million in 2001 (an increase by 32 per cent compared with 1990), and to 69.4 million in 2011 (an increase by 52 per cent compared with 1990). The number of air transport movements (ATMs) increased from 368 000 in 1990 to 458 000 in 2001 and to 476 000 in 2011.

Comment: The table shows that the total number of destinations served by Heathrow decreased by approximately 20 per cent in 2001 compared with 1990, with a further decrease of less than one per cent in 2011 compared with 2001, despite the increase in the number of ATMs in 2001 and 2011.

The number of destinations that carried less than 2 000 passengers in 1990 decreased by approximately 65 per cent. The number of destinations that carried 2 000 or more passengers in 1990 decreased by approximately 5 per cent.

The table shows that changes in the number of services to destinations carrying more than 2 000 passengers in 1990 varied between regions, with five regions experiencing net decreases and three regions experiencing net increases.

The largest decreases in destinations served affected the United Kingdom (down from eighteen destinations to seven), Western Europe (down from forty destinations to twenty nine) and Central Europe (down from forty one destinations to thirty two), with smaller decreases in the Near East (down from seventeen destinations to fourteen) and Africa (down from twenty four destinations to twenty three).

There were increased services to Eastern Europe (up from thirteen destinations to twenty one), the Far East (up from twenty five destinations to thirty) and the Americas (up from thirty three destinations to thirty six).

Analysis of the individual destinations within the regions served by Heathrow shows variation between regions and within countries, with some destinations closed and others newly opened. The data upon which the table is based indicate that the majority of destinations that are no longer served by Heathrow (e.g. Antwerp, Corfu, Las Palmas) are now served by one or more of London’s other major airports (Gatwick, Stansted, Luton, London City).

ANNEX 6

Heathrow: Terminating and transfer passengers 1972 - 2011

Years	Terminating passengers		Transfer passengers		Total passengers
	(millions)	%	(millions)	%	(millions)	%
1972	14.3	76.4	4.4	23.6	18.7	100.0
1978	20.8	77.2	6.1	22.9	26.9
1984	22.6	76.6	6.9	23.4	29.5
1987	27.0	76.9	8.1	23.1	35.1
1991	29.8	73.8	10.6	26.2	40.4
1996	37.3	66.8	18.5	33.2	55.8	100.0
1997	38.6	66.6	19.1	33.0	57.9
1998	40.6	67.4	19.6	32.5	60.3
1999	?	?	?	?	?
2000	44.7	70.2	19.0	29.8	63.7
2001	41.1	68.6	18.8	31.4	59.9	100.0
2002	39.6	64.0	22.3	36.0	61.9
2003	40.1	63.7	22.8	36.3	62.9
2004	43.6	65.2	23.3	34.8	66.9
2005	43.6	65.3	23.2	34.7	66.8
2006	44.2	65.9	22.9	34.1	67.1	100.0
2007	44.0	65.8	22.9	34.2	66.9
2008	43.2	64.6	23.6	35.3	66.8
2009	40.9	62.1	24.9	37.9	65.8
2010	42.2	64.2	23.5	35.8	65.7
2011	45.9	66.4	23.3	33.6	69.2	100.0

Source: Civil Aviation Authority Passenger Surveys Reports [21] . Where the totals do not sum this is due to rounding. At the time of preparing the table the Report for 1999 had not been consulted.

The Reports for the years 1972 to 1998 give the number of terminating and transfer passengers only as percentages of the annual total number of passengers. The numbers in the table for the years to 1998 have therefore been calculated from the percentages and the total number.

Comment: The table shows consistent growth in the total number of passengers at Heathrow between 1972 and 2004, with stabilisation between 2004 and 2010 and renewed growth in 2011. Within this overall growth there were increases in the absolute number of terminating and transferring passengers throughout the period. But since 1991 the rate of growth has been faster among transfers, who have accounted for one or more passengers in three since 2002 compared with less than one passenger in four prior to 1991. The number of air transport movements (ATMs) at Heathrow increased from 362 000 in 1991 to 476 000 in 2011.

The large number of transfer passengers increase the present levels of congestion at Heathrow. It is argued that transfers enable the airlines at Heathrow to serve a wider range of destinations than would be economically viable with only terminating passengers. But the period of exponential growth in transfers since 1991 coincided with a fall - rather than an implied increase - in the number of destinations served by Heathrow (see separate table for details). The impact of the additional transfer passengers since 1991 may therefore have been limited to inflating the number of ATMs to destinations for which there was already a high demand from terminating passengers.