European External Action Service


The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chair: Mr Christopher Chope 

Barwell, Gavin (Croydon Central) (Con) 

Bingham, Andrew (High Peak) (Con) 

Clappison, Mr James (Hertsmere) (Con) 

Dobson, Frank (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab) 

Ellis, Michael (Northampton North) (Con) 

Elphicke, Charlie (Dover) (Con) 

Hendrick, Mark (Preston) (Lab/Co-op) 

Hilling, Julie (Bolton West) (Lab) 

Hopkins, Kelvin (Luton North) (Lab) 

Horwood, Martin (Cheltenham) (LD) 

Lidington, Mr David (Minister for Europe)  

Shannon, Jim (Strangford) (DUP) 

Spellar, Mr John (Warley) (Lab) 

David Slater, Committee Clerk

† attended the Committee

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European Committee B 

Monday 13 January 2014  

[Mr Christopher Chope in the Chair] 

European External Action Service

4.30 pm 

The Chair:  Does Mr Bingham wish to make a short explanatory statement on behalf of the European Scrutiny Committee? 

Andrew Bingham (High Peak) (Con):  It may help if I explain why the European Scrutiny Committee recommended this debate. Under the Lisbon treaty, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, currently Baroness Ashton, exercises in foreign affairs the functions previously exercised by the six-month rotating EU presidency, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, referred to as the CFSP, and the Commissioner for External Relations. 

The treaty also says that, in fulfilling that mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service, which works in co-operation with the diplomatic services of the member states and comprises officials from relevant departments of the general secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from member states’ national diplomatic services. 

As part of the political decision that set up the EEAS, the High Representative was invited to review how the service was working and present a report in the summer of last year. Her report reviews the EEAS’s performance in its first two years and proposes some short and medium-term recommendations. It is one of the three documents that prepared the ground for the December 2013 European Council and the first for five years to discuss European defence and security policy. 

The Committee has been engaged in discussion with the Government since the High Representative’s report appeared in the summer. The main concerns revolve around the following: continuing pressure for the EEAS to have a role in providing consular assistance, notwithstanding that being a member state competence; ensuring that the defence engagement remains primarily the responsibility of individual member states in the face of, for example, attempts to establish a formal network of military and civilian security experts in EU delegations; any threat of wider competence creep on the part of the EEAS, thus endangering its role of complementing and supporting, not replacing, national diplomatic services; proposals for the increased involvement of the European Parliament in CFSP and the matter of the High Representative’s declaration of political accountability, where the suggestion was that it needed amending accordingly; the absence of any proposals on strengthening the involvement of the proper custodians of CFSP, namely national Parliaments; and the role of EU special representatives who are appointed by the Council at the High Representative’s initiative to represent the EU in various trouble spots. 

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The Committee’s concern has been about the timing and location of the debate. Its intention, of which the Government were well aware, was for the report and the Commission communication on the European defence industry to be debated prior to the European Council, in order for the Government’s various concerns and objectives to be debated. The Committee also intended that the third document, the High Representative’s proposals on common security and defence policy, should be debated after the European Council so that the outcome could be debated with the benefit of the Council’s conclusions, and the Government could be held to account. 

The Government did not schedule the debate prior to the Council. They have also turned down the Committee’s request that the issue be debated on the Floor of the House. Dates for debates on the second and third documents have not yet been set by the Government. On Tuesday 7 January, the Committee took evidence from the Minister for Europe and the Minister with responsibility for international security strategy about what it sees as the Government’s poor handling of these debate recommendations. 

4.33 pm 

The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington):  Mr Chope, it is a pleasure as always to serve under your chairmanship. 

The context of today’s debate is that article 27.3 of the treaty on European Union states that the European External Action Service should assist the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy in her work. In practice, the EEAS has involved the merger of what had previously been separate external services to the Council and to the Commission, together with a system of secondments into the EEAS from national diplomatic services. 

The Government’s policy is to work within the EU to ensure that Europe’s collective weight in the world through the EEAS supports and complements our own efforts to advance the international objectives of the United Kingdom. That means, for example, ensuring that the use of the EU’s levers of influence in the world, such as aid instruments, trade and sanctions, are framed by the foreign policy agreements reached by consensus or by unanimity in the Foreign Affairs Council. 

I welcome the focus of the External Action Service, in line with key United Kingdom priorities, on the European Union’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods —in the Balkans, north Africa and eastern Europe—and on stability in Africa more generally. I would like to see the service do more on developing stronger EU relations with the emerging powers such as Russia, China, India and Brazil. 

Despite a sometimes difficult start, against the backdrop of the Arab spring and the global economic crisis, Baroness Ashton established the EEAS from scratch and, I am pleased to say, has been able to move on from institutional issues to contribute to UK and wider European foreign policy priorities. For example, her personal roles in the E3 plus 3 negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue and in the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo have been widely recognised and she has deserved the commendations for her achievements in those two important matters. 

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That is not to say that the External Action Service is perfect. Issues remain to be resolved. For example, more needs to be done to improve its relations with the Commission, to improve how it works internally and to focus its effort more tightly on key priorities. Budgetary responsibility is also an outstanding point, on which we continue to remind the EEAS of its responsibility to taxpayers of all member states. 

Baroness Ashton’s review, which we have before us this afternoon, looks back at the experience of the first two years of the EEAS and proposes how it should operate in the future. It identifies three main elements of EU foreign policy: Europe’s neighbourhood; a comprehensive approach to crisis management; and international issues where the EU’s collective weight allows it to play a lead role in a globalised world, such as on Iran, Egypt and Syria. 

The review makes a number of recommendations that the Government have welcomed, such as cutting the number of senior posts and separate managerial directorates; improving arrangements for the prevention and management of crises; and more effective co-operation of the Commission with the EEAS, including regular meetings of commissioners who have responsibility for external affairs. 

Of course, the UK does not agree with everything in Baroness Ashton’s review. We oppose some proposals. For example, we reject the assertion that the EEAS decision pointed to a future role for EU delegations in providing consular protection. The treaties and the decision alike allow the External Action Service only a supporting role in consular assistance, to be provided at the request of member states. Similarly, the treaties say that defence engagement should remain primarily the responsibility of individual member states. Therefore we remain opposed to establishing a formal network of military and civilian security experts—some kind of EU defence attaché network—in EU delegations. 

Following publication of the review last summer, member states worked together to find common ground and agree how best to take forward those proposals on which we agreed. Such discussions culminated in the 17 December General Affairs Council, which agreed conclusions on the review. From our point of view, those conclusions were broadly positive. They support improvements in the overall functioning of the EEAS, including language on simplifying administrative and budgetary tasks in EU delegations; improving the EEAS’s relations with EU institutions; and setting out that the one-third target for External Action Service staff to come from member states’ diplomatic services must remain as a minimum. 

I secured acceptable language on sensitive issues such as the common security and defence policy and chairmanship of preparatory bodies of the Council. Despite strong pressure from many member states for a strengthened EEAS role in consular assistance, the conclusions are clear that that remains a national competence and commit us to no more than exploring, within strict parameters, how EU delegations might facilitate and support co-operation between member states. 

As set out in the General Affairs Council conclusions, a further review will take place in 2015, by which time the next High Representative will be in place. Looking forward, I want the service to focus on issues where it

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can make a difference, in support of our own networks, towards achieving UK and European prosperity and security. 

The Government’s policy on the EEAS is to ensure that it contributes to our country’s foreign policy objectives. To that end, we will continue to try to exert influence on the service, including by encouraging talented British officials to seek secondment there and by ensuring that the service acts only in those areas where we agree it should act, and where collective European action can provide genuine added value. 

I look forward to hearing the views of Members present. 

The Chair:  We now have until 5.30 pm for questions to the Minister, which should be brief. 

4.40 pm 

Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab):  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Chope. I apologise for the absence of the Opposition spokesman on Europe, my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West (Mr Thomas). He is on a delegation. I also apologise for the state of my voice, which is affected by the cold that is going around. 

Might I pursue a question raised by the hon. Member for High Peak in his introduction? I regret that the Minister did not address it. As the hon. Gentleman noted, the Committee requested that a debate should take place before the General Affairs Council on 17 December, yet we did not manage to have that. Will the Minister explain the lack of such a debate, which would have been useful in informing the thinking of our Ministers at that discussion? 

Mr Lidington:  I did not mention the request, due to lack of time and because last week I spent an hour and 10 minutes giving evidence on the issue to the European Scrutiny Committee. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will want to take the opportunity to study the published transcript of the Committee’s proceedings. 

The history of this matter takes us back to August, when an explanatory memorandum was sent to the Committee. It was published during last year’s summer recess. On 4 September, the Committee reported that the document remained under scrutiny and requested an update by the end of October. I provided the update on 28 October, mentioning possible December GAC conclusions. On 6 November, the ESC requested further information before a deadline of 18 November, to help it determine whether to refer the matter for debate. I provided that information by letter on 15 November. On 20 November, the ESC requested that further information be examined and debated, as close as possible to the 17 December General Affairs Council. There was, at that point, some confusion. 

I understand that the uncorrected Committee report, which officials saw, stated that it requested a debate in European Committee B, as had been the case in 2012. However, when the Government spoke to the Clerks of the ESC to clarify the matter, they were told that the intention was to refer this matter for a debate on the Floor of the House. Any such request requires conversations with the business managers in the usual way. I told the ESC by letter on 4 December that it was not possible for

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a debate to take place before the Christmas recess, but that it would take place as early as possible in the new year. I said at that time, too, that the debate should take place in Committee, rather than in the main Chamber. 

My reasons for advocating that were twofold. First, because it provided for an earlier debate than would be possible were we to seek a debate on the Floor of the House, for which time would obviously be at a premium. Secondly, European Committee proceedings of up to two and a half hours give all Members of the House who wish to attend the opportunity to do so, ask questions and contribute to the debate—in this case, explore the implications of Baroness Ashton’s review in greater detail—to a much greater extent than is possible in the 90 minutes allotted to such a debate on the Floor of the House. 

Mr Spellar:  I thank the Minister for that reply, although I am not entirely sure that it will satisfy hon. Members. 

The Minister mentioned the implications of the review, one of which is budgetary. In his letter to the Committee of 28 October, the Minister said that the Government are opposed to an EEAS budget increase; however, it appears that the budget has increased by almost 2%. Is the Minister content with that result? 

Mr Lidington:  We have said consistently that there should be restraint in respect of the EEAS, given that member states have to observe domestic budget restraints. As the right hon. Gentleman and the Committee will understand, the service accounts for less than 1% of the European Union’s overall spending, so the sum is pretty small in terms of the big picture. But I am the first to say that one needs to count the pennies as well as the pounds, and so in every aspect of European Union expenditure we look for economy and value for money. 

Earlier in 2013, the EEAS itself requested a 3.1% increase to its budget for 2014. We very much objected to that, as did a number of other member states. The final increase agreed was 2%, equivalent to a real-terms freeze. Our view, along with a number of other countries, continues to be that even a real-terms freeze was too generous, taking into account the overall economic circumstances that taxpayers in European countries are currently facing, as well as what we certainly regard as the inadequate progress made so far by the EEAS in eliminating duplication as a result of merging the previously separate Council and Commission external services. 

We have a final agreement for the overall 2014 EU budget that is £9 billion below the final budget for 2013—a 6% reduction in overall annual EU spending compared with last year. The EEAS real-terms freeze was one small element of that overall package. There was not a separate vote, therefore, on the EEAS budget. The UK, along with Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark, did not support and voted against that final deal because we felt that even though there was a 6% reduction in spending compared with the 2013 annual budget, there had been scope to go further still, and we wanted to demonstrate that we were serious about that. 

Mr Spellar:  The Minister referred to his concerns about the possible establishment of a network of military and civilian security experts in EU delegations. What

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discussions has he had with other EU countries—particularly those with serious military capabilities—on that matter? 

Mr Lidington:  It will not surprise the right hon. Gentleman that it is those countries with serious military capabilities of their own that are the most sceptical about the proposal. Similarly, the countries that tend to be the most relaxed about it and in general inclined to be supportive of a greater role for the European External Action Service are those with small diplomatic networks around the world; understandably, they tend to look to Brussels to provide them with opportunities that they would not be able to afford on their own. 

Given that the treaties are explicit that defence remains primarily a national competence and that national security is explicitly a national competence, it is clear to us that we should not routinely think of the EEAS as taking to itself the sort of responsibilities implied by a network of defence attachés. I do not rule out the possibility that there might be particular circumstances in which the nature of a particular European Union mission in a particular part of the world meant that it was sensible to send out to that country or region somebody who had a military background and military expertise, but that should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis as an exception and not as a rule. 

Mr James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con):  I am sure the Committee is grateful to the Minister for his long explanation about the holding of this debate, and for the characteristically conscientious way in which he has handled this matter in the past. Is this not yet another example of a debate that should have taken place in advance of a meeting in order to influence that meeting, but that is taking place after the meeting itself? 

Mr Lidington:  We went over this argument in some detail, as my hon. Friend knows, in the European Scrutiny Committee last week, and I can only reiterate the two points I made on that occasion. First, if the Committee had wanted to be certain of securing a debate—whether on the Floor of the House or in Committee is a different matter—in advance of the December General Affairs Council or European Council, it could have made the formal report and request for a debate at an earlier stage in its meetings on either 4 September or 6 November. In fact, the request did not come until later in the day. 

Secondly, I put on record—as I did in detail in the European Scrutiny Committee—that if one looks at the record, one will see that there have been significantly more debates on referred European Scrutiny Committee matters on the Floor of the House since the 2010 general election than in the two years preceding it. Although that is, in part, due to the Lisbon treaty collapsing the old pillar structure, which made more important subjects subject to the scrutiny process, it also demonstrates that the Government have been serious about giving the House many opportunities that were not given to it before to debate European matters on the Floor of the House. 

Mr Clappison:  I hope my right hon. Friend will also accept that the European Scrutiny Committee and its Chairman, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), have not been shy in seeking debates on

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Europe and such matters. In the explanatory memorandum, the Minister refers to Baroness Ashton’s assertion that the EEAS has developed its capacities to engage with national Parliaments in member states. Will he explain how that has been done? 

Mr Lidington:  Yes, I was somewhat intrigued by that. I think—I am speaking from memory—that the External Action Service has submitted evidence to Foreign Affairs Committee inquiries. The scrutiny Committees in both Houses, the Foreign Affairs Committee, and other relevant Select Committees should take Lady Ashton at her word, seize this opportunity, and seek more intense liaison. I am keen to see members of the Commission and the senior officials in Brussels who work to them strengthen their accountability towards national Parliaments and give evidence to inquiries. I urge the Committees not to be shy about seeking evidence sessions, written evidence, or informal conversations with the EEAS. 

Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab):  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Chope. As the Minister knows, I am a member of the European Scrutiny Committee and I attended the recent evidence session on the day that he presented his report from the European Council. I made the point—which I think still stands—that splendid though those Committees are, the Floor of the House has higher status. Would he not accept that the Foreign Office, in broad terms, is uncomfortable with having high-profile debates on these important issues on the Floor of the House? 

Mr Lidington:  No, I simply do not accept that. I have not counted the column inches of me speaking in or attending debates on the Floor of the House since the 2010 general election, but if the hon. Gentleman has a spare half-hour and wants to do that, I think he will find that they add up to a fair old total. 

I am always willing to look at opportunities to have these debates on Floor of the House, but I do not think we should denigrate the role of these Committees. It is a question for the House collectively why more Members—other than those who are experts and connoisseurs of European policy—do not turn up and take part, as they are all entitled to do. I think that is a pity. 

Kelvin Hopkins:  I congratulate the Minister on his work. He is assiduous in giving full answers to questions on the Floor of the House and in Committee, and I am full of admiration for him. However, that does not alter the fact that there is resistance to such debates. My concern—I think it is the concern of the Committee—is the danger of competence creep on important issues within the European Union. Although the Minister insists that defence and foreign policy are national matters for national decisions, there is the fear that some in the European Union want to go further. Does he accept that such fears are justified? 

Mr Lidington:  The hon. Gentleman is right on that count. Some member states, particularly the small ones, look to the External Action Service primarily as an opportunity rather than a threat to what are very small diplomatic networks and capacities of their own. There are also people, particularly in the Brussels machine

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and the Commission, who wish to interpret the Lisbon treaty in a way that maximises the rights of EU institutions to assume the role of speaking on behalf of all member states, particularly in the context of meetings of international organisations. That is why the general arrangements on EU statements, which we negotiated back in 2011, were so important. They set out a framework to govern representational arrangements and statements in the future in a way that safeguarded the foreign policy rights of member states, which are clearly provided for in the Lisbon treaty, and made sure that those could not easily be overrun by an assertion of the Commission and of EU competence in those areas. 

Kelvin Hopkins:  It was difficult to find support for the Lisbon treaty in various member states, particularly in Britain. Is it the case that the term “High Representative” was invented to avoid the accusation that Baroness Ashton—or whoever was appointed—is a Foreign Minister for the European Union? 

Mr Lidington:  I am not allowed access to the Government papers of previous Administrations, so it is not possible for me to say what dark motives may have lain behind decisions taken by Ministers in that Government. I suspect there is an element of truth in what the hon. Gentleman alleges. It is also fair to say that Lady Ashton has, for the most part, respected the rights of member states, and has certainly taken very seriously the fact—embodied in the treaties—that we cannot have a common EU position on a foreign policy matter unless it has been unanimously agreed by every member state. 

Some of the criticism that Lady Ashton has attracted elsewhere in Europe has been launched at her on the grounds that—in the views of some—she has been insufficiently assertive in her role as the leader of opinion for Europe as a whole. The criticism has been that she has waited for member states, rather than getting out and asserting a European position where none had been unanimously agreed. I think that her judgment was right about that. 

Mr Clappison:  My right hon. Friend may not have access to the previous Government’s documents, but he will remember what the then Conservative Opposition said about the Lisbon treaty, including about the European External Action Service. Can he understand that an observer listening to the debate may come to the conclusion that our Government are engaged in a constant rearguard action against unremitting movement forward of European competence to the central European institutions, backed by a natural interpretation of what the treaty of Lisbon says? 

Mr Lidington:  I do not resile from the fact that my hon. Friend and I voted against the Lisbon treaty and voted in favour of putting it to a referendum, but when the coalition came into office, we inherited a situation in which the treaty was in force and legally binding. We therefore took a decision that the interest of the United Kingdom would best be served by our engaging with that reality and by our seeking to ensure that European foreign policy positions were developed, including through the EEAS, in ways that best advanced the interests of the United Kingdom and ensured that Europe acted where Europe, collectively, could provide genuine value

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added. The E3 plus 3 negotiations on Iran and the actions taken by the EU in the Balkans and north Africa show that, in some foreign policy areas, 28 countries acting together can have greater leverage and achieve more than even the most powerful member of the European Union trying to act on its own. 

I do not agree with my hon. Friend’s characterisation of our position as fighting a rearguard action. We are certainly vigilant in defending our position regarding the limits of EU competence, but we are very much on the front foot, working closely with France, in particular, to try to ensure that the EU acts effectively, provides value added and delivers results that are in the interests of our country. 

Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD):  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Chope. I can only imagine the self-control you have to exercise to not participate in the debate. 

On provision of consular services, I can see the sensitivities in many of the things we are discussing and debating with regard to defence attachés, the positions we take in international organisations and so on. In general, the principle that those are national competences is good. We should retain the freedom to use our national diplomatic resources in such events. That is also the case with consular services—I have valued the consular support given to my constituents recently in sensitive and difficult cases in Indonesia. 

What exactly is the problem with greater consular co-operation and collaboration, using the resources of the EEAS where appropriate? We understand the deeply felt sensitivities on the issue of competence creep and national sovereignty, but will the Minister set them aside just for one minute? What is the problem with such collaboration and co-operation, using national diplomatic resources when appropriate, but sometimes using EEAS resources, if they could be developed for the benefit of consular services? That could often be sensible, cost-effective and the right thing to do. 

Mr Lidington:  There are issues both of principle and of practicality with my hon. Friend’s suggestion. On the principle, the treaties and the 2010 EEAS Council decision make it clear that the role of the EEAS is limited to supporting member states, upon their request and on a resource-neutral basis. The key document is paragraph 10 of article 5 of the 2010 decision. 

Member states accept their responsibility under the treaty to provide consular support to unrepresented EU nationals on the same basis as they would provide it to their own country’s nationals. Our embassies around the world do that. The EEAS has a proper role helping members with co-ordination. That is particularly useful at a time of international crisis, for example, when one might need urgent co-ordinated action by European countries to try to evacuate their nationals safely from a country riven by conflict. However, that is different from saying that the EEAS or the EU should have a role in providing consular services. Different member states have very different constitutional arrangements for the provision of consular services. In this country, it has always been a matter of Crown prerogative: consular

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assistance is given at the discretion of the Secretary of State, our regime recovers the costs of our consular services from fees and so on. 

The situation is different in a number of our partner countries. They have what amount to statutory entitlements of citizens to a given level of consular service. If we get into a situation in which the EEAS provides consular services rather than helps member states to co-ordinate when they wish it to help them, we would be into a debate about minimum standards, whether we could charge and so on. I do not see how such a debate could be separated from questions of competence, of where power should lie and of accountability to national Parliaments. 

Very briefly, the practical side is that, as Lady Ashton noted in the review, consular assistance 

“is an area for which the Service has very limited resources”, 

either in its headquarters or in EU delegations. She has said that, if the role of the EEAS in consular matters were to be enlarged at all, it would need to be accompanied by a transfer of additional resources into the EEAS budget. She argued that, in those circumstances—she was not advocating it—those additional resources should come from national diplomatic services. We do not agree with that. 

Mark Hendrick (Preston) (Lab/Co-op):  I apologise, Mr Chope, for being late—I was in the House for the statement. 

I have a number of quick comments. First, Members will remember that the Convention on the Future of Europe started many years before the Lisbon treaty. During those years, there was a great deal of consultation and consensus, which resulted not in a constitution, as was originally proposed, but in a treaty that was ratified by all the member states of the European Union. It seems that some hon. Members—on both sides of the House—want to wind the clock back. All I can say is that they should get over it and look to the future rather than to the past. 

Secondly, on the question of foreign policy, we have been talking about the EEAS providing consular services. I imagine there are many countries in the European Union that cannot afford embassy representation in many countries around the world. When I have travelled in Europe and talked to EU Members of Parliament, they have told me that they see the EEAS as a means of having some representation in other countries—they would not be their own representatives, but would provide access to consular services that they otherwise would not have. That part of the discussion has been missed. 

Finally, on foreign policy generally, does the Minister agree that the EU is extremely useful in putting together, under Lady Ashton, what I would call the lowest common denominator in foreign policy? Obviously, unanimity is required, so in 99% of cases all member states would agree with what she says and what her actions would be, whereas in their foreign policy, national Governments look at what might be called the highest common factor—for example, France and the UK agreed on the action that should be taken over Libya. The degree to which member states co-operate can be expressed as the lowest common denominator, which is through the EU, or the highest common factor, which is by national Governments working together. 

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Mr Lidington:  The treaties require all member states to offer consular services to unrepresented nationals from other EU member states on the same basis as they are offered to their own nationals. All EU countries have that assurance. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule, the smaller EU countries that have limited global networks tend to focus those, among other things, on countries where they have a large number of expatriates. It is true that smaller EU countries may not have consular representation in many countries, but they tend to have rather fewer nationals in those countries, and can always look to partners among the bigger EU states to provide consular support. That system works pretty well. I do not yet see evidence for a massive unmet need that would be met if we gave the EEAS the new consular responsibilities that some seek. 

On the hon. Gentleman’s second point, there is an important difference between the work of the European External Action Service and the bigger picture of effective co-operation among EU countries on foreign policy matters. The EEAS needs to be the servant of member state Governments and try to deliver the outcomes that are agreed unanimously. I hope that those unanimously agreed objectives can be more than a lowest common denominator. 

In my experience, the key to an effective European foreign policy presence in the world is for Foreign Ministers to remain in regular contact, build good relationships with each other, work in partnership and, as they agree a way forward, to try to institutionalise that policy through the EU framework. That is why we work very closely with France in particular, although we work with many other European countries, too, depending on which part of the world we are looking at. 

Motion made, and Question proposed,  

That the Committee takes note of Unnumbered Explanatory Memorandum dated 27 August 2013, submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, on the European External Action Service; and supports the Government's approach of working to ensure the EEAS supports and complements UK international objectives.—(Mr Lidington.)  

5.12 pm 

Mr Spellar:  We have already considered the budget issue, which is particularly pertinent and pressing given the report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs that was published on Friday. It states: 

“There are signs that the FCO is being stretched, almost to the limit. One of the symptoms is the prospect that the Department will need an extra year to meet its target of a 10% headcount reduction in UK-based staff, largely because of ‘sustained pressure to deliver an ambitious policy agenda’.” 

Members of Parliament will be slightly concerned that, despite the Minister’s best intentions, the budget for the EEAS is increasing when our own Foreign Office is suffering such pressures. 

On the wider issue, it is important that we disaggregate some of the arguments on the role of the EEAS. I have some sympathy with the Minister because some of our regular debates on the EU become very binary—between those who wish to come out of the EU and those who feel more favourable to, and are perhaps more uncritical of, the EU. 

Some would argue that the EEAS has, or should have, no role at all, but that is not the most effective route to deciding the appropriate level of activity for the

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EEAS. Those who take such absolutist positions on this and other EU matters may, not for the first time, find themselves unable to find alliances with many across Europe who might share some of their concerns but who recognise that there is also a role for the EU. 

The point is crystallised in the discussions on the transatlantic trade and investment partnership. Those of us who had the privilege of being part of a parliamentary delegation to Washington in November recognise the advantages of the wide network of EU member state and EEAS delegations across the United States, which are able to influence that country’s large number of centres of influence. The EEAS has been able, quite effectively, to co-ordinate the activity of those delegations. If successful, this provision will be of huge benefit to the countries of the EU, the United States, our citizens and the development of business. 

People in the United States have made it very clear that their country does not have an interest in conducting 26 or 28 different negotiations, and therefore the ability to pull negotiations together is extremely important. Interestingly enough, the UK would probably be a more significant beneficiary in this regard than many of our partners in Europe. 

Equally, there is no doubt that the EEAS played a considerable part in moving on the Iran nuclear talks recently; the Minister and others have paid tribute to it for doing that. The EEAS also has a number of other, wider roles in pulling together European support and capability. There are the EEAS taskforces—for Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, for example. Earlier today, we heard of the plight of those in the enormous camps in Jordan and the impact that the camps are having on internal stability there. It is hugely important not only that the suffering of those in the refugee camps should be relieved but that Jordan remains as a stable component of that part of the middle east. 

Tunisia receives less attention, but it is also enormously important and I urge the Minister to focus on it. It has probably one of the best chances of advancing as a secular state, to make progress in moving away from its unfortunate past of dictatorship and towards a better world for its citizens. It can also be an example to other countries in the region. 

We had a report from the Foreign Secretary today regarding Syria. Perhaps the Minister will outline what progress has been made on the involvement of the EEAS in Syria and in Geneva, too. There is also the eastern partnership—a number of countries to the south and west of Russia. In particular, will the Minister say what progress has been made in the discussions with Ukraine, given the rather unfortunate confrontation that happened there late last year? 

Another country has, perhaps fortunately, gone off the agenda; it has certainly gone out of the headlines. I am talking about Myanmar. There is the EU-Myanmar taskforce, which has played a significant role in the movement towards democracy there. I hope that the Minister can update us on that. 

The Minister rightly referred to consular issues. It seems to me that there are two rather separate issues. One is of crisis management when there is an emergency, either because of natural disasters or civil disorder. In such situations, there may well be a role in pulling together the work that is being undertaken, particularly

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in dealing with citizens of countries that, as he rightly said, are under-represented. Equally, and I hope the Minister will amplify on this, the Foreign Office has previously talked about arrangements with Canada and possibly Australia to provide mutual consular assistance in areas where we have limited representation. We would welcome those arrangements. 

I have discussed the issues that ought to be addressed. I hope that the Minister will take on board those concerns and answer some of the questions. 

5.20 pm 

Kelvin Hopkins:  I would like first to touch on the Minister’s point about European Committees. I agree with his suggestion that these Committees are important, as are their debates, but they would carry much more weight if they had permanent memberships. I have emphasised that for a long time. From 1997, I was a member of such a Committee with a permanent membership, and that worked much better because Members felt a greater sense of commitment. That contrasts with now, when Members are put on Committees by their respective Whips Offices at relatively short notice, and pick up the pieces as best they can—often without even really being aware of the procedures. Permanent membership would make a real difference and raise the status of European Committees to where it ought to be. 

When questioning the Minister, I mentioned my concerns about competence creep. There is a fear of confidence creep; there are those in the European Union who undoubtedly want to drive the EU towards being a state, effectively, governed by the European Commission and the European Parliament, with the Parliaments of member states having a relatively lower status. I do not think that we as a country are part of that group, but even within the UK there are those who lean more strongly towards federalism—it is not even federalism, but unitarism. 

Most of us in Britain, however, want a looser association of independent countries co-operating voluntarily for mutual benefit in different areas. I think that that would be agreeable to most people. There is tension in the spectrum of opinion, from those who effectively want a European state governed at its heart by the Commission, with a relatively feeble European Parliament, to those at the other extreme who want complete independence. We share with our European neighbours both history and culture. We are similar in many ways and it is beneficial that we should co-operate. 

The passage of the Lisbon treaty was difficult. Countries such as Britain were, if you like, dragged reluctantly into that treaty—or at least those of us who took a critical position were. I suspect that a deal was done behind the scenes so that a Briton would take the post of High Representative, because that would overcome all sorts of problems. Had the High Representative not been British, but come from another, perhaps larger, member state, a few concerns, shall we say, might have been expressed in Britain and possibly in other countries as well. 

Baroness Ashton is a fine individual and does an excellent job, but she was appointed at least in part for more delicate political reasons, not just because she is a

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splendid person. As and when she retires and is replaced by someone from another member state, we might see some difficulties. 

Member states are still different countries with slightly different perspectives. In international affairs, it is not in doubt that France has always looked towards the Francophone countries on the rim of the Mediterranean and in northern Africa. We have tended to look towards countries south of the Sahara. The Germans, quite understandably, look towards countries to the east, and so on. 

There are differences of view and emphasis in our foreign policies, and that is absolutely right. We do not want to be governed by a foreign policy made in the EU and the Commission. Some Conservative Members—members of the primary party of the Government—have expressed concerns about the gradual drift towards the creation of a European army, rather than having independent defence capacities and co-operating voluntarily. 

Mr Clappison:  The hon. Gentleman is making some excellent points. The commitment to a European army is there in the Lisbon treaty for all to see. 

Kelvin Hopkins:  I thank the hon. Gentleman for emphasising the point—he put it rather more strongly than I did, but there will be serious concerns. 

Politics evolves gradually. In life in general, if we want to get to a position that is difficult we start gradually and work crabwise; we tack towards our eventual objective without saying precisely what it is at the time. I think it is important that British Ministers in this arrangement constantly emphasise that we believe that foreign and defence policies should be matters for nation states and not for the European Union. 

Baroness Ashton has difficulty because she is pressed one way by those who want what might be called the federal view of Europe and another way by those who want to take the independent member state view. She has to balance those, and does a good job in putting the rather looser view of the British rather than that of those who take a stronger, more centralist view. 

Such things are very important and fundamental to whether we continue as a country to support the European Union as a member state, or whether we take a more sceptical position and drift away. If those who want a more centralised state governed by the Commission start to win, we shall see Euroscepticism getting stronger in Britain and probably in other member states as well. These matters are extremely important. The Minister does a wonderful balancing act; he has to balance opinion within Parliament and also deal with Ministers from other member states in European Councils and so on. 

My view of the European Union is well known. However, I think anybody would accept some of the arguments that I am making as sensible for our future and that of any kind of Europe that would be acceptable. 

5.26 pm 

Martin Horwood:  It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Luton North in these European debates, partly because he is genuinely extraordinarily knowledgeable on the detail of the subject matter and partly because he

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reminds us that hostility to the European Union is alive and well on the Back Benches of the Labour party as well as those of the Conservative party, although not, of course, on the Liberal Democrat Benches. 

I applaud the Minister’s opening remarks, which were in part a tribute to the record of the European External Action Service, in particular that of Cathy Ashton. He was right to highlight the examples of the E3 plus 3 talks that helped to deliver the nuclear deal with Iran and the agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. Those are good examples of how European diplomatic activity can bring real results. They underline how important it is that Britain should not speak alone on such issues, but in concert with the rest of the European Union. 

By acting as a group of 0.5 billion people, as the largest economy and trading bloc in the world, the European Union has enormously more significant clout. When on diplomatic issues our policy is the same as those of other European states, we speak with massively increased influence when we speak as the European Union. 

The point applies to imposing and lifting sanctions against Burma, fighting piracy in Somalia, combating extremism in Mali and promoting democracy and a European future for Ukraine. The right hon. Member for Warley also mentioned the importance of the European Union in promoting trade negotiations with the United States. There are many other examples of trade negotiations. That all highlights the importance and value of European Union co-operation. 

Europe should be a powerful voice for human rights around the world and a voice for peace where that is the right path. It should also be an important voice in promoting international collaboration to meet the challenge of climate change, and innumerable other issues such as the international arms trade and international development. 

There is more that the European Union could do. There are areas, such as the middle east, where we have not found a common European voice. We failed to do so over Syria and even over Libya, which was less controversial. I think we could have done more to bring the Israelis and Palestinians to peace talks much earlier. 

Europe has a unique relationship with Israel and Palestine. We have an enormously valuable trading relationship with Israel, and we are collectively a major aid donor to the Palestinians. That unique dual leverage could be used much more effectively. Instead, we have tended to leave it to the United States to provide diplomatic leadership, even though, in many Arab eyes, it is hopelessly compromised. For all those reasons, there is a positive record to applaud, but also great potential for taking forward collaboration and co-operation in a European common foreign policy. 

On our domestic taxpayers and our contribution to the European Union, the Minister was right to highlight that this should be a time for austerity and looking carefully at budgets both at European level and in most European nation states. The issue is not so much the cost of the European External Action Service, which, as has been pointed out, is a fraction of the overall European budget, but the potential for savings to domestic diplomatic budgets. The co-location of embassies and pooling of resources, which could include drivers, suppliers and so on, offers the potential for savings to national budgets. 

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Collaboration becomes a little more sensitive in areas such as defence attachés and representation in international organisations, but I raise again the issue of consular representation. I heard the Minister’s answer to my earlier question, but it was rather technocratic, if he does not mind my saying so. The idea of a minimum level of consular representation expected by citizens is rather interesting; perhaps we should look to have that kind of guarantee for our citizens. I do not think, however, that the fact that that applies in a technical and constitutional way for other member states should stop us from looking at more consular support being provided through not only national diplomatic services, but, occasionally, where appropriate and without compromising that important principle, the European External Action Service. 

In some parts of the House, there is a bit of an obsession with competence creep, with a slightly ideological approach to such matters even in areas such as consular assistance where it would be terribly practical and pragmatic. The coalition Government sometimes need to have the courage of their pro-European convictions, as seen in everything from the Deputy Prime Minister’s statements to the Prime Minister’s Bloomberg speech, which made some proudly pro-European statements in its detail. We are at our best when we are pragmatic and positive about Europe and not quite so ideological. With those caveats, I welcome the Minister’s opening remarks and support the motion before us. 

5.32 pm 

Mr Lidington:  I am grateful to all hon. Members who took part in this debate and the questions that preceded it, and I will try to run through the many different points raised. 

The right hon. Member for Warley, speaking on behalf of the Opposition, began his—for the most part consensual —remarks by chiding me about the Government’s approach to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office budget. I am always the first to welcome any recognition, from whichever side of the House, of the valuable work played by the FCO, but I was somewhat astonished by his cheek. 

Not only did the Government in which the right hon. Gentleman served leave their successor with a public sector deficit that has required all parts of government to look for ways in which they can make economies, but, given his remarks, it is worth looking briefly at their bequest to us, particularly with regards to the Foreign Office. Our international network of embassies and high commissions has been cut; the Foreign Office language school has closed, and the Foreign Office library has been closed and dispersed. 

Liability for the inevitable foreign exchange risk inherent in a Department that operates in well over 100 different countries has been transferred from the Treasury to the Foreign Office, leading to the ludicrous situation in which the FCO—under the previous Government—had to set up its own hedging unit to look after its foreign exchange exposures. That is not the way to run an effective foreign policy, and I am glad that the Government in whom I have the privilege to serve have opened additional United Kingdom posts, reopened the language school, restored the Foreign Office library, and placed responsibility for our foreign exchange liabilities on a rational basis, with the Treasury once again having the lead. 

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Let me turn to the right hon. Gentleman’s more serious points because he went through a number of different elements. I agree with what he said about the importance of the transatlantic trade and investment partnership, and about the need for the Commission—which has the lead in those negotiations—to use to the full the networks that many different member states have with the Administration, Congress, and state-level US politicians. 

The right hon. Gentleman talked about the importance of building alliances, and I agree with him about that. For Serbia and Kosovo, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the High Representative and vice-president of the Commission have co-ordinated approaches to the Governments of those two countries, and visits to them, very carefully, to maximise our endeavours to achieve a successful outcome there. In Somalia, we have worked closely with Italy and also other partners on three successful EU missions: the naval force that acts against pirates and whose headquarters are at Northwood; the EUCAP Nestor mission to neighbouring countries such as Kenya, the Seychelles and Mauritius, which is designed to help those countries strengthen their legal systems so they can more effectively bring pirates to trial, and sentence and imprison them; and the training mission that is strengthening the capacity of Somali forces to exercise control over their territory. 

The right hon. Gentleman talked, quite rightly, about the strains placed on Jordan by the dispersal of large numbers of displaced people from Syria—a problem that is besetting other neighbours of Syria as well. He will accept that at a time when the violence in Syria is so vicious in character, and when political tensions have become so embittered, it is right that our immediate focus should be on humanitarian support, and that both nationally and within the EU we should try to make it possible for the Geneva process to go forward, because that is the best hope for movement towards a political settlement. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made a detailed statement on our Syria policy earlier this afternoon on the Floor of the House. 

In the medium term, the EU seeks to help to strengthen the capacity of civil society and local government in Syria to bring about reconciliation once—as we all profoundly hope—an overall peace settlement can be put in place. In the long term, various funding instruments and means of widening political support are available through the European neighbourhood policy. 

The right hon. Gentleman asked about Burma-Myanmar. The UK has a close relationship with Burma and we have worked in close partnership with Lady Ashton and the EEAS, which has served as a multiplier for our own priorities, including by providing direct technical support and funding to the peace process and EU aid to those who have been affected by violence in Rakhine state. Within the Council, the EEAS has played a role in co-ordinating our joint approach to using sanctions to leverage change in Burma, and in trying to ensure that the messages from all 28 member states were consistent and comprehensive. That work at European level continues. 

The right hon. Gentleman asked about our work with Australia and Canada. Our missions in Mali and Haiti are co-located with Canada, which means we are

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able to draw on their resources to some extent. We work closely with Canada, where appropriate, and in a crisis we need to act swiftly and maximise joint action between like-minded countries. The same is true for Australia, which helps our small missions in states such as Vietnam and Fiji. Australia has a presence across the small countries of the southern Pacific that we do not have on our own to the same extent. Therefore, in that part of the world we work closely with Australia. In other parts of the world we are co-located with and work intimately with various EU partners, and we are not doctrinaire about it. Our guiding principle is that we seek to work with partners where that delivers the most in the circumstances of that country for the safety of our citizens overseas, and for British foreign policy interests. 

The hon. Member for Luton North talked about the importance of maintaining the principle that national Governments should have control of foreign policy. I agree with the principle behind his speech, which is that the exercise of foreign policy is an essential attribute of a nation state. I also agree—as I think I said earlier this afternoon—that there are people in Brussels who want to see a country called Europe that exercises foreign policy responsibilities on behalf of all 28 member countries of the European Union. I, and the Government, disagree with that vision. 

The key safeguard for us in ensuring a system of effective co-operation that also protects our sovereignty is the requirement for unanimity before a common foreign policy position can be established in Europe. Of course, the European Union Act 2011 provides for an Act of Parliament and a referendum before any Government—this or a future one—can agree to qualified majority voting for foreign policy decisions. 

Mr Clappison:  I am grateful to the Minister for giving way; I appreciate that some are keen to make even faster progress. May I invite him to go back to what was said to the British people in the documents sent to them by the Government in 1975? We were told that unanimity was the guarantee for everything in the European Union—or the Common Market, as it then was. 

Mr Lidington:  I said that I would not be held responsible for what the Government of Mr Blair did regarding the negotiations of the Lisbon treaty, and I will not be held responsible for what the Wilson Government circulated in 1975. 

I take my hon. Friend’s point seriously, of course— 

Mr Spellar:  Will the Minister give way? 

Mr Lidington:  Perhaps I can complete my answer to my hon. Friend. Whatever was said in the 1975 referendum, subsequent Governments—Margaret Thatcher’s Government at the time of the Single European Act, John Major’s Government at the time of the Maastricht treaty, the Blair Government at the time of the treaties of Nice, Amsterdam and Lisbon—negotiated treaties at European level and ratified them by Acts of Parliament. The constitutionality of the further accretion of powers to Brussels was proper, in terms of our parliamentary system. 

It is a political argument about whether or not, at any of those stages, a referendum should have been sought to secure the explicit agreement of the British people

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and go more widely than Parliament. By enacting the European Union Act 2011, we have ensured that any future treaty change that gives the European Union new competence to act will attract a referendum. Had that Act been in place, all the big European Union treaties of the past 20 years would have been captured by it. We can debate whether that would have been good or bad, but it is a fact. 

Mr Spellar:  The Minister said that he did not want to be responsible for the acts of the 1974-79 Labour Government, but I am sure that he will at least concede that they were the only Government, after the Heath Government had taken us into Europe, to give the British a say. 

Mr Lidington:  So far. I do not know whether that is a hint from the right hon. Gentleman that he is tempted to move towards the Prime Minister’s position and offer the people a referendum; so far, the Leader of the Opposition has been reluctant in the extreme to commit himself. Where my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere is right—this is implicit in his question—is in saying that the character of the European Union has changed dramatically since 1975 and the time has now come to say to the people that they should have the right to determine whether they wish to remain part of that organisation. Different Committee members and political parties will have different views about how to campaign and vote in such a referendum, but putting the question to the people is the only way we will be able to settle finally this debilitating argument. 

Mark Hendrick:  Does the Minister agree that the moving of the European Common Market from six to nine to 12 to 15 to 26 and now 28 member states means that the old regime, where unanimity was needed for every decision, is virtually impossible? Unanimity could have been achieved easily with six sympathetic pro-European member states. It is now a recipe for disaster. The truth is that many on his side of the House, and a few Opposition Members, want that disaster to happen. 

The Chair:  Order. I hope in answering that question the Minister will return to talking about the European External Action Service. 

Mr Lidington:  I am sure, Mr Chope, that you do not want me to stray into a general debate about the European Union and Britain’s membership, but to respond to the hon. Gentleman, one would need to go into such a debate. I will confine myself to saying that, for example, collapsing the third pillar—justice and home affairs—and bringing the subjects into the communitised method of legislation was unnecessary. There was no evidence that it was required by the enlargement of the EU. 

I realise that I did not respond to the question from the right hon. Member for Warley about Tunisia. The European Union is a key international actor in Tunisia and is leading policy dialogue on most issues to do with that country. The EU recently announced a €50 million allocation of Arab spring funds and since 2011 it has programmed more than €400 million to support economic governance, competitiveness and political reform. 

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At a political level, the EU special representative and the EAS managing director for the middle east and north Africa visited Tunisia in 2013 to encourage dialogue and consensus among all political parties, and in particular, to resolve the crisis that arose from the assassination of an opposition leader. I agree with the message of the right hon. Gentleman: it is essential that European countries work together to maintain momentum on EU activity in Tunisia, and the current negotiations on a new action plan with Tunisia to implement neighbourhood policy are an important element of that. 

Turning to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham: yes, we should be ambitious and, yes, we can always look for ways to do more. There is sometimes an inherent tension between the requirement for unanimity, which I continue to regard as important for the reasons I explained earlier, and the need to act speedily—getting a consensus among 28 member states sometimes takes time. It took time with Libya, one of the cases he cited, where the urgent need was to protect many thousands of people in Benghazi whose lives were at imminent risk. I was at the Foreign Affairs Council when it was discussed, and Germany in particular took the position that it was unable to agree a common European approach to Libya. 

The middle east peace process is a key foreign policy objective for the EAS, and Lady Ashton takes a significant personal interest in it. She has maintained strong links with Secretary Kerry and has supported the process that he has led. The EU and EAS have a particular role in funding programmes, rather than at the level of high level political negotiations, so the External Action Service led negotiations with Israel on how to implement the funding guidelines, published in 2012, to ensure that Israel could participate in programmes such as Horizon 2020. It has also continued to engage with Israel on regional security issues such as Iran and Syria. The Palestinian territories are the biggest recipient of EU funds per capita in the world, and that effort goes towards state-building efforts and humanitarian aid. 

The December 2013 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions included an offer of special privileged partnerships to both Israel and Palestine, the aim being that that would strengthen the EU’s ties to both parties in the event of a final status deal. I am more sceptical about the EU trying to launch a separate initiative to that which Secretary Kerry is leading to try to broker a peace a deal, because I think it is such a difficult and fragile process already. A separate parallel peace initiative would simply complicate matters unnecessarily, but we do have an important role to play in offering the prizes that would come to both parties were such a deal agreed. 

Martin Horwood:  I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I want to reiterate that I was not suggesting we pursued an entirely separate process. I agree with him on that point, but we could have exercised more leadership earlier. Always deferring to the United States for that leadership is not necessarily the best outcome for the middle east. 

Mr Lidington:  I do not think I agree with the hon. Gentleman on that point, but I understand the point that he makes. It is a legitimate argument to make. 

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If we look at Mali, there are examples where willing countries—in this case, France—have acted first, and then the European Union has agreed unanimously on a way forward to support that action. The EU training mission that has been deployed in Mali followed the French action that President Hollande authorised at very short notice, because of the immediate threat to the integrity of Mali from al-Qaeda-linked forces in the north of that country. 

Similarly, France has acted in the Central African Republic, and there are active discussions at EU level as to whether a common security and defence policy mission would now be appropriate to take forward the process of reconciliation and peacekeeping in that country, too. 

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I have been grateful for the opportunity to respond to the many different points that hon. Members have made during the debate. I commend the motion to the Committee. 

Question put and agreed to.  

Resolved,  

That the Committee takes note of Unnumbered Explanatory Memorandum dated 27 August 2013, submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, on the European External Action Service; and supports the Government's approach of working to ensure the EEAS supports and complements UK international objectives .—(Mr Lidington.)  

5.53 pm 

Committee rose.  

Prepared 14th January 2014