Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con):
Carrying on with the subject of financial education for young people, I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s comments. He will be well aware that the Parliamentary Commission
8 July 2013 : Column 43
on Banking Standards also endorsed putting financial education on the curriculum. Does he agree not only that that will reinforce mathematics as a relevant subject, but that a good grounding in financial literacy can prove to be a major engine for social mobility?
Michael Gove: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The more confident every student is with the increasingly sophisticated range of financial temptations they face, the more that social mobility and resilience can be built in.
Mr Robin Walker (Worcester) (Con): I echo those comments on financial education. I also congratulate the Secretary of State on the improvements to the computing curriculum, which will be warmly welcomed by businesses, such as Postcode Anywhere and those in the growing cyber-security cluster in Worcestershire, that have long been arguing for a more computing-focused and less IT learning-focused approach.
Michael Gove: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Industry has been clear that the changes we have made from information and communications technology to computing are exactly what industry needs to ensure that young people are prepared for the opportunities that await them.
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab): The Secretary of State says that changing the curriculum is essential if we are to catch up with the rest of the world. I agree that that has to be the priority, but if it is so essential why is he not applying it to academies, which make up the majority of secondary schools?
Michael Gove: Academies do make up the majority of secondary schools. At the moment, academies make up only 10% of primary schools, and the curriculum is of course more specific when it comes to the foundation subjects at primary level. The curriculum generates a sense of expectation and lays the foundations for the new GCSEs, which we expect to be the principal benchmark for accountability at the age of 16 for all schools.
Guy Opperman (Hexham) (Con): Did the Secretary of State notice Professor Black’s comments today? He said:
“You can’t debate our sense of national identity and our national interest unless you understand our national history. This curriculum put British history first as well…It kicks out woolly empathy”.
Does he agree that that is the right way forward in the longer term?
Michael Gove: I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s point. Professor Jeremy Black is one of the finest and most productive historians working in academia today. He is also one of the most engaging of teachers.
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab):
There is only one constituency in the land where Winston Churchill was never welcome, including after the second world war: the Rhondda. I am therefore delighted that this curriculum, which bizarrely insists on only one politician—Winston Churchill—being studied in the whole of the history of
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the 20th century, will not apply in Wales or in the Rhondda. Why will the Secretary of State still not make clear his position on sex and relationship education, which is the one thing that can make a dramatic difference to the number of teenage abortions and teenage pregnancies?
Michael Gove: My position on sex and relationship education is that I am in favour of it.
Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con): What emphasis will there be on spelling in the national curriculum, and by what age will primary school children be required to learn their 12 times table?
Michael Gove: The 12 times table will be required by the end of year 4, which is a significant advance on where we are at the moment, and there are indicative tables as part of the national curriculum document that lay out how we can ensure that students can spell. I should also say that, on a recent primary school visit that I undertook, I asked the students whether they had enjoyed their national curriculum tests. The universal view was that the tests were fun, but the most fun were the spelling, punctuation and grammar tests that this Government have introduced.
John Glen (Salisbury) (Con): The changes to the history curriculum are often presented in a binary way, as a choice between endless facts and “woolly empathy”. Can the Secretary of State explain the wise logic behind the value of children learning a basic chronology of British history before they are asked to think about what it felt like to live a long time ago?
Michael Gove: My hon. Friend makes an absolutely central point. Every country that teaches history well insists on the history of its own nation being taught. Even the progressive Administration in Holyrood make a point of stressing the importance of Scottish history—I can see the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie), for the Scottish National party, nodding—from which other things flow. I recognise that all nations should in this respect, if in few others, emulate what Alex Salmond has done.
Justin Tomlinson (North Swindon) (Con): I am delighted at the inclusion of financial education and computer programming, both of which are essential skills for our children. Does the Secretary of State believe that they will also help to encourage young children to engage in traditional mathematics, through real-life work and tangible examples?
Michael Gove: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. One of the key things about his successful campaign on financial education is that he always made it clear that it was about reinforcing the importance of rigour in mathematics, not simply meeting the needs of a vocal lobby outside. The way he ran the campaign is a model of how a Back Bencher can shape the education of millions for the better.
Andrew Bridgen (North West Leicestershire) (Con): Can my right hon. Friend reassure me and the House that he has rooted out all the woolly thinking that pervaded the curriculum as drafted by the previous Government?
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Michael Gove: To root out all the woolly thinking that used to pervade the curriculum would have been like cleansing the Augean stables. There may well be a piece of fluff in some corner of the curriculum that we did not manage to get to, but I hope we have managed to hose down the stables effectively.
Ian Swales (Redcar) (LD): Since becoming an AET academy—under the Academies Enterprise Trust—Eston Park in my constituency has gone from good to special measures in less than two years. I welcome today’s proposals, but how can the Secretary of State ensure that free schools and academies benefit from all the excellent thinking that is going on in his Department?
Michael Gove: One of the best schools I have ever visited is in my hon. Friend’s constituency—Nunthorpe academy, which is run by Debbie Clinton, a school that has gone from special measures to outstanding in the last couple of years. However, he is right that one or two academy chains have not done everything they promised. In the case of the organisation he mentioned, we have taken steps to deal with that.
Neil Carmichael (Stroud) (Con): The Secretary of State will know that the Royal Academy of Engineering has stated that we will need at least 100,000 graduates in maths and engineering to compete with the rest of the world. This is something that informed my decision to hold a festival of engineering and manufacturing in my constituency. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] Thank you very much. Does he agree that firm leadership will be required from schools to ensure that we get the best teachers in the right place to deliver on the need that the Royal Academy of Engineering has outlined?
Michael Gove: I completely agree with my hon. Friend. It is a pity that, in one of our best universities for engineering—University college London—fewer than half the undergraduates enlisting in that course are from the United Kingdom. We need to do more, and my hon. Friend is leading the way.
Sir Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD): The Secretary of State referred to more coverage of world history. On the assumption that the 20th century will include the holocaust, will he give me an assurance that the life of Palestinians since 1948 will be given equal attention?
Michael Gove: These are delicate waters, into which I fear to tread too definitively. One thing I would say is that there has been near universal welcome and support for the centrality of the holocaust and the unique evil inherent in the holocaust being in the national curriculum. Once one gets on to the position of the state of Israel after 1948, it is probably better if I step back. I have strong views on the matter and I would not wish to impose them on the curriculum.
Mr Speaker: I hope colleagues, including the hon. Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell), are aware of the event taking place in Speaker’s house tonight under the auspices of the Holocaust Educational Trust.
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Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill Programme (No. 2)
Mr Speaker: Before I call the Minister to move the programme motion, I should inform the House that I have selected a manuscript amendment, amendment (a) in the name of Mr Andrew Tyrie, copies of which have been available from the Vote Office. I call the Minister, in the first instance, to move the motion.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That the Order of 11 March 2013 in the last Session of Parliament (Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill (Programme)) be varied as follows:
(1) Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Order shall be omitted.
(2) Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading shall be taken in two days in accordance with the following provisions of this Order.
(3) Proceedings on Consideration shall be taken on the days show in the first column of the following Table and in the order so shown.
(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the times specified in the second column of the Table.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion three hours after the commencement of proceedings on Consideration on the second day.—(Greg Clark.)
Mr Speaker: I now invite Mr Andrew Tyrie to move his manuscript amendment, the essence of which is to delete reference to 6 o’clock and to substitute for it a reference to 7 o’clock.
4.45 pm
Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con): I beg to move an amendment,
“leave out ‘6.00 pm’ and insert ‘7.00 pm’.”
I am very grateful to you, Mr Speaker, as you have covered the whole of my speech in one sentence. I understand the proposal to replace 6 pm with 7 pm may receive widespread support.
Manuscript amendment agreed to.
Main Question, as amended, put and agreed to.
8 July 2013 : Column 47
That the Order of 11 March 2013 in the last Session of Parliament (Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill (Programme)) be varied as follows:
(1) Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Order shall be omitted.
(2) Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading shall be taken in two days in accordance with the following provisions of this Order.
(3) Proceedings on Consideration shall be taken on the days show in the first column of the following Table and in the order so shown.
(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the times specified in the second column of the Table.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion three hours after the commencement of proceedings on Consideration on the second day.
8 July 2013 : Column 48
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill
[Relevant documents: First Report from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, Session 2012-13, HC 848, andthe Government response, Cm 8545.Second Report from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, Session 2012-13, Bankingreform: towards the right structure, HC 1012. Third Report from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, Session 2012-13, ProprietaryTrading, HC 1034. Fourth Report from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, Session 2012-13, ‘An Accidentwaiting to happen’: The failure of HBOS, HC 705. First Report from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, Changing banking for good, HC175-I and II.]
[1st Allocated day]
Consideration of Bill, as amended in the Public Bill Committee
Objectives of Prudential Regulation Authority
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Greg Clark): I beg to move amendment 1, in page 1, line 20, after ‘body’ insert ‘or of a member of a ring-fenced body’s group’.
Mr Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 17, in clause 4, page 9, leave out lines 8 to 21 and insert—
‘Reviews
‘(1) The Treasury must make arrangements for the carrying out of reviews of the effects of the operation of the provision made by or under this Part in relation to ring-fenced bodies, including ring-fencing rules made by the PRA and the FCA. Such arrangements shall be set out in a statutory instrument subject to approval by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.
(2) The first review must be completed before the end of the period of two years beginning with the date on which section 4 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, so far as it inserts this section, comes into force.
(3) Subsequent reviews must be completed before the end of the period of two years beginning with the date on which the previous review was completed.
(4) Not less than nine months, nor more than 12 months, before the date on which a review is due to be completed, the PRA and the FCA must publish a joint assessment of the impact of the operation of their ring-fence rules.
(5) For the purposes of this section a review is completed when the report of it is published.
142JA Persons by whom reviews are to be conducted
‘(1) The Treasury shall appoint not fewer than five persons to conduct a review of whom one is to chair it.
(2) A person may not be appointed to chair a review unless the chairman of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons has notified the Treasury that, in the chairman’s opinion, the person is likely to act independently of the Treasury, the PRA and the FCA in carrying out the review.
(3) The persons appointed to conduct a review must include at least one person with substantial experience in central banking or financial regulation at a senior level.
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(4) The reference in subsection (2) to the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons—
(a) if the name of that Committee is changed, is to be treated as a reference to that Committee by its new name, and
(b) if the functions of that Committee (or substantially corresponding functions) become functions of a different Committee of the House of Commons, is to be treated as a reference to the Committee by which the functions are exercisable;
and any question arising under paragraph (a) or (b) is to be determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.
‘(1) The persons appointed to conduct a review must give the Treasury a report of the review.
(2) The report must include an assessment of the extent to which the provision made by or under this Part in relation to ring-fenced bodies, including ring-fencing rules made by the PRA and by the FCA, are facilitating the advancement by the PRA of the objective in section 2B(3)(c) and by the FCA of the continuity objective.
(3) If the report is made before section 4 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, so far as it inserts section 142JD, has come into force it must also include a recommendation as to whether or not section 4 of that Act should be brought into force to that extent.
(a) recommendations to the Treasury as to the provision that should be included in orders and regulations under this Part, and
(b) recommendations to the PRA and the FCA about the provision that should be included in ring-fencing rules.
(5) The Treasury must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish it in such manner as it thinks fit.’.
Government amendment 6, page 9, line 21, at end insert—
‘Group restructuring powers
142JA Cases in which group restructuring powers become exercisable
(1) The appropriate regulator may exercise the group restructuring powers only if it is satisfied that one or more of Conditions A to D is met in relation to a ring-fenced body that is a member of a group.
(2) Condition A is that the carrying on of core activities by the ring-fenced body is being adversely affected by the acts or omissions of other members of its group.
(3) Condition B is that in carrying on its business the ring-fenced body—
(a) is unable to take decisions independently of other members of its group, or
(b) depends on resources which are provided by a member of its group and which would cease to be available in the event of the insolvency of the other member.
(4) Condition C is that in the event of the insolvency of one or more other members of its group the ring-fenced body would be unable to continue to carry on the core activities carried on by it.
(5) Condition D is that the ring-fenced body or another member of its group has engaged, or is engaged, in conduct which is having, or would apart fro m this section be likely to have, an adverse effect on the advancement by the appropriate regulator—
(a) in the case of the PRA, of the objective in section 2B(3)(c), or
(b) in the case of the FCA, of the continuity objective.
(6) The appropriate regulator may not exercise the group restructuring powers in relation to any person if—
(a) either regulator has previously exercised the group restructuring powers in relation to that person, and
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(b) the decision notice in relation to the current exercise is given before the second anniversary of the day on which the decision notice in relation to the previous exercise was given.
(7) In this section and sections 142JB to 142JG “the appropriate regulator” means—
(a) where the ring-fenced body is a PRA-authorised person, the PRA;
142JB Group restructuring powers
(1) In this Part “the group restructuring powers” means one or more of the powers conferred by this section.
(2) Where the appropriate regulator is the PRA, the powers conferred by this secti on are as follows—
(a) in relation to the ring-fenced body, power to impose a requirement on the ring-fenced body requiring it to take any of the steps mentioned in subsection (5),
(b) in relation to any member of the ring-fenced body’s group which isa PRA-authorised person, power to impose a requirement on the PRA-authorised person requiring it to take any of the steps mentioned in subsection (6),
(c) in relation to any member of the ring-fenced body’s group which is an authorised person but not a PRA-authorised person, power todirect the FCA to impose a requirement on the authorised person requiring it to take any of the steps mentioned in subsection (6), and
(d) in relation to a qualifying parent undertaking, power to give a direction under this paragraph to the parent undertaking requiring it to take any of the steps mentioned in subsection (6).
(3) Where the appropriate regulator is the FCA, the powers conferred by this section are as follows—
(a) in relation to the ring-fenced body, power to impose a requirement on the ring-fenced body requiring it to take any of thesteps mentioned in subsection (5),
(b) in relation to any member of the ring-fenced body’s group which is an authorised person but not a PRA-authorised person, power to impose a requirement on the authorised person requiring it to take any of the steps mentioned in subsection (6),
(c) in relation to any member of the ring-fenced body’s group which is a PRA-authorised person, power to direct the PRA to impose a requirement on the authorised person requiring it to take any of the steps mentioned in subsection (6), and
(d) in relation to a qualifying parent undertaking, power to give a direction under this paragraph to the parent undertaking requiring it to take any of the steps mentioned in subsection (6).
(4) A parent undertaking of a ring-fenced body by reference to which the group restructuring powers are exercisable is for the purposes of this Part a “qualifying parent undertaking” if —
(a) it is a body corporate which is incorporated in the United Kingdom and has a place of business in the United Kingdom, and
(b) it is not itself an authorised person.
(5) The steps that the ring-fenced body may be required to take are—
(a) to dispose of specified property or rights to an outside person;
(b) to apply to the court under Part 7 for an order sanctioning a ring-fencing transfer scheme relating to the transfer of the whole or part of the business of the ring-fenced body to an outside person;
(c) otherwise to make arrangements discharging the ring-fenced body from specified liabilities.
(6) The steps that another authorised person or a qualifying parent undertaking may be required to take are—
8 July 2013 : Column 51
(a) to dispose of any shares in, or securities of, the ring-fenced body to an outside person;
(b) to dispose of any interest in any other body corporate that is a member of the ring-fenced body’s group to an outside person;
(c) to dispose of other specified property or rights to an outside person;
(d) to apply to the court under Part 7 for an order sanctioning a ring-fencing transfer scheme relating to the transfer of the whole or part of the business of the authorised person or qualifying parent undertaking to an outside person.
(7) In subsections (5) and (6) “outside person” means a person who, after the implementation of the disposal or scheme in question, will not be a member of the group of the ring-fenced body by reference to which the powers are exercised (whether or not that body is to remain a ring-fenced body after the implementation of the disposal or scheme in question).
(8) It is immaterial whether a requirement to be imposed on an authorised person by the appropriate regulator, or by the other regulator at the direction of the appropriate regulator, is one that the regulator imposing it could impose under section 55L or 55M.
142JC Procedure: preliminary notices
(1) If the appropriate regulator proposes to exercise the group restructuring powers in relation to any authorised person or qualifying parent undertaking (“the person concerned”), the regulator must give each of the relevant persons a first preliminary notice stating—
(a) that the regulator is of the opinion that the group ring-fencing powers have become exercisable in relation to the person concerned, and
(b) its reasons for being satisfied as to the matters mentioned in section 142JA(1).
(2) Before giving a first preliminary notice, the regulator must—
(a) give the Treasury a draft of the notice,
(b) provide the Treasury with any information that the Treasury may require in order to decide whether to give their consent, and
(c) obtain the consent of the Treasury.
(3) The first preliminary notice must specify a reasonable period (which may not be less than 14 days) within which any of the relevant persons may make representations to the regulator.
(b) the ring-fenced body, if not the person concerned, and
(c) any other authorised person who will, in the opinion of the appropriate regulator, be significantly affected by the exercise of the group restructuring powers.
(5) After considering any representations made by any of the relevant persons, the regulator must either—
(a) with the consent of the Treasury, give each of the persons a second preliminary notice, or
(b) give each of them a notice stating that it has decided not to exercise its group restructuring powers.
(6) A second preliminary notice is a notice stating—
(a) that the regulator proposes to exercise the group restructuring powers, and
(b) the manner in which it proposes to do so.
(7) The second preliminary notice must specify a reasonable period (which may not be less than 14 days) within which any of the relevant persons may make representations to the regulator about the proposals.
(8) The regulator must after considering any representations made in response to the second preliminary notice give each of the relevant person s a third preliminary notice stating—
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(a) whether it has made any revisions to the proposals, and
(b) if so, what the revisions are.
142JD Procedure: warning notice and decision notice
(1) If the appropriate regulator has given a third preliminary notice, it must either—
(a) if it still proposes to exercise the group restructuring powers, give each of the relevant persons a warning notice during the warning notice period, or
(b) before the end of the warning notice period, give each of them a notice stating that it has decided not to exercise the powers.
(2) The “warning notice period” is the period of 6 months beginning with the first anniversary of the day on which the third preliminary notice was given.
(3) Before giving a warning notice under subsection (1)(a), the appropriate regulator must —
(a) give the Treasury a draft of the notice,
(b) provide the Treasury with any information that the Treasury may require in order to decide whether to give their consent, and
(c) obtain the consent of the Treasury.
(4) The action specified in the warning notice may be different from that specified in the third preliminary notice if—
(a) the appropriate regulator considers that different action is appropriate as a result of any change in circumstances since the third preliminary notice was given, or
(b) the person concerned consents to the change.
(5) The regulator must, in particular, have regard to anything that—
(a) has been done by the person concerned since the giving of the third preliminary notice, and
(b) represents action that would have been required in pursuance of the proposals in that notice.
(6) If the regulator decides to exercise the group restructuring powers it must give each of the relevant persons a decision notice.
(7) The decision notice must allow at least 5 years from the date of the decision notice for the completion of—
(a) any disposal of shares, securities or other property that is required by the notice, or
(b) any transfer of liabilities for which the notice requires arrangements to be made.
(8) The giving of consent for the purpose of subsection (4)(b) does not affect any right to refer to the Tribunal the matter to which any decision notice resulting from the warning notice relates.
(9) “The relevant persons” has the same meaning as in section 142JC.
142JE References to Tribunal
(1) A notified person who is aggrieved by—
(a) the imposition by either regulator of a requirement as a result of section 142JB(2)(a) or (b) or (3)(a) or (b),
(b) a requirement to be imposed as a result of the giving by one regulator to the other of a direction under section 142JB(2)(c) or (3)(c), or
(c) the giving by either regulator of a direction under section 142JB(2)(d) or (3)(d),
may refer the matter to the Tribunal.
(2) “Notified person” means a person to whom a decision notice under section 142JD(6) was given or ought to have been given.
142JF Subsequent variation of requirement or direction
(1) A regulator may at any time with the consent of the person concerned vary—
(a) a requirement imposed by it as a result of section 142JB(2)(a) or (b) or (3)(a) or (b), or
8 July 2013 : Column 53
(b) a direction given by it as a result of section 142JB(2)(c) or (d) or (3)(c) or (d).
(2) The person concerned may at any time apply to the appropriate regulator for the variation of—
(a) a requirement imposed by it as a result of section 142JB(2)(a) or (b)or (3)(a) or (b), or
(b) a direction given by it as a result of section 142JB(2)(c) or (d) or (3)(c) or (d).
(3) Sections 55U, 55V, 55X and 55Z3 apply to an application under subsection (2) as they apply to an application for the variation of a requirement imposed by the appropriate regulator under section 55L or 55M.
142JG Consultation etc. between regulators
(1) Where a notice under section 142JC or a warning notice or decision notice under section 142JD relates to a requirement to be imposed in pursuance of a direction to be given as a result of section 142JB(2)(c) or (3)(c), the appropriate regulator must—
(a) consult the other regulator before giving the notice, and
(b) give a copy of the notice to the other regulator.
(2) The appropriate regulator must consult the other regulator before varying under section 142JF a direction given as a result of section 142JB(2)(c) or (3)(c).
(3) Directions given by the FCA as a result of section 142JB(3)(c) are subject to any directions given to the FCA under section 3I.
142JH Relationship with regulators’ powers under Parts 4A and 12A
(1) Subsection (2) applies in relation to—
(a) a ring-fenced body which is a member of a mixed group, and
(b) a parent undertaking of such a ring-fenced body.
(2) A regulator may not exercise its general powers in relation to the ring-fenced body or parent undertaking so as to achieve either of the results in subsection (3).
(a) that no existing group member is a parent undertaking of the ring-fenced body;
(b) that the ring-fenced body is not a member of a mixed group.
(4) In subsection (3)(a) “existing group member” means a person who is a member of the ring-fenced body’s group at the time when the requirement is imposed or the direction given.
(5) Except as provided by subsections (1) to (4), the provisions of sections 142JA to 142JG do not limit the general powers of either regulator.
(6) For the purposes of this section, a regulator’s “general powers” are its powers under the following provisions—
(a) section 55L or 55M (imposition of requirements in connection with Part 4A permission);
(b) section 192C (power to direct qualifying parent undertaking).
(7) For the purposes of this section, a ring-fenced body is a member of a mixed group if a member of the ring-fenced body’s group carries on an excluded activity.
Failure of parent undertaking to comply with direction142JI Power to impose penalty or issue censure
(1) This section applies if a regulator is satisfied that a person who is or has been a qualifying parent undertaking as defined in section 142JB(4) (“P”) has contravened a requirement of a direction given to P by that regulator as a result of section 142JB(2)(d) or (3)(d).
(2) The regulator may impose a penalty of such amount as it considers appropriate on—
(b) any person who was knowingly concerned in the contravention.
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(3) The regulator may, instead of imposing a penalty on a person, publish a statement censuring the person.
(4) The regulator may not take action against a person under this section after the end of the limitation period unless, before the end of that period, it has given a warning notice to the person under section 142JJ.
(5) “The limitation period” means the period of 3 years beginning with the first day on which the regulator knew of the contravention.
(6) For this purpose a regulator is to be treated as knowing of a contravention if it has information from which the contravention can reasonably be inferred.
(7) The requirements that a regulator may be required to impose as a result of a direction under section 142JB(2)(c) or (3)(c) include requirements that t he regulator would not but for the direction have power to impose.
142JJ Procedure and right to refer to Tribunal
(1) If a regulator proposes to take action against a person under section 142JI, it must give the person a warning notice.
(2) A warning notice about a proposal to impose a penalty must state the amo unt of the penalty.
(3) A warning notice about a proposal to publish a statement must set out the terms of the statement.
(4) If the regulator decides to take action against a person under section 142JI, it must give the person a decision notice.
(5) A decision notice about the imposition of a penalty must state the amount of the penalty.
(6) A decision notice about the publication of a statement must set out the terms of the statement.
(7) If the regulator decides to take action against a person under section 142JI, the person may refer the matter to the Tribunal.
142JK Duty on publication of statement
After a statement under section 142JI(3) is published, the regulator must send a copy of the statement to—
(a) the person in respect of whom it is made, and
(b) any person to whom a copy of the decision notice was given under section 393(4).
142JL Imposition of penalties under section 142JI: statement of policy
(1) Each regulator must prepare and issue a statement of policy with respect to—
(a) the imposition of penalties under section 142JI, and
(b) the amount of penalties under that section.
(2) A regulator’s policy in determining what the amount of a penalty should be must include having regard to—
(a) the seriousness of the contravention,
(b) the extent to which the contravention was deliberate or reckless, and
(c) whether the person on whom the penalty is to be imposed is an individual.
(3) A regulator may at any time alter or replace a statement issued under this section.
(4) If a statement issued under this section is altered or replaced, the regulator must issue the altered or replacement statement.
(5) In exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, a power under section 142JI(2) in the case of any particular contravention, a regulator must have regard to any statement of policy published under this section and in force at a time when the contravention occurred.
(6) A statement under this section must be published by the regulator concerned in the way appearing to the regulator to be best calculated to bring it to the attention of the public.
(7) A regulator may charge a reasonable fee for providing a person with a copy of the statement published under this section.
(8) A regulator must, without delay, give the Treasury a copy of any statement which it publishes under this section.
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(9) Section 192I applies in relation to a statement under this section as it appl ies in relation to a statement under section 192H.’
Amendment (a) to Government amendment 6, at the end of subsection (5) to new section 142JA, insert—
‘(5A) Condition E is that the appropriate regulator judges that there are serious failures in the culture and standards of the ring-fenced body or another member of its group.
(6) When judging whether there are serious failures in the culture and standards of the ring-fenced body or another member of its group, the appropriate regulator must take account of the recommendations in the five reports of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards.’.
Amendment (b), in the title of new section 142JC, leave out ‘notices’ and insert ‘notice’.
Amendment (c) to Government amendment 6, in subsection (1) of new section 142JC, leave out ‘first’.
Amendment (d), in subsection (2) of new section 142JC, leave out ‘first’.
Amendment (e), in subsection (2)(b) of new section 142JC, leave out from ‘require’ to end.
Amendment (f), in subsection (3) of new section 142JC, leave out ‘first’.
Amendment (g), in subsection (3) of new section 142JC, leave out ‘14 days’ and insert ‘6 weeks’.
Amendment (h), leave out from subsection (5) to end of new section 142JC.
Amendment (i), in subsection (1) of new section 142JD, leave out from ‘must’ and insert
‘At the end of the period for making representations required under section 142JC(3), the regulator’.
Amendment (j), at end of subsection (1), insert—
‘(1A) If, following representations, the regulator makes revisions to the proposals, it must inform the relevant persons of those revisions.’.
Amendment (k), in subsection (2) of new section 142JD, leave out from ‘beginning’ to end of subsection and insert
‘at the end of the period for making representations required under section 142JC(3).’.
Amendment (l), in subsection (3) of new section 142JD, leave out from ‘require’ to end of subsection.
Amendment (m), in subsection (4) of new section 142JD, leave out ‘third’.
Amendment (n), in subsection (4)(a) of new section 142JD, leave out ‘third’.
Amendment (o), in subsection (5)(a) of new section 142JD, leave out ‘third’.
Amendment (p), in subsection (7), leave out from ‘must’ to end of subsection and insert
‘specify the period for completion of the actions required by the notice.’.
Amendment 18, page 9, line 21, at end insert—
‘Full separation142JD General requirement of separation
‘(1) Where the members of any group include one or more ring-fenced bodies and one or more other bodies, the members of the group must, before the end of the period of five years beginning with the relevant commencement date, take steps to secure that there are no members of the group that are ring-fenced bodies.
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(2) If in the case of any group steps to secure that there are no members of the group that are ring-fenced bodies are not taken within the period specified in subsection (1)—
(a) at the end of that period the Part 4A permission of each member of the group that is a ring-fenced body shall be treated as having been cancelled to the extent that it relates to a core activity, and
(b) after the end of that period the appropriate regulator must refuse to give any member of the group a Part 4A permission to carry on a core activity.
(3) At the end of the period specified in subsection (1)—
(a) section 142H(1)(b) and (4) to (7), and
(4) In subsection (1) “the relevant commencement date” means the day appointed for the coming into force of section 4 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 so far as it inserts this section.’.
Amendment 19, page 9, line 21, at end insert—
‘Power to order full separation142JC Power to order separation in case of particular groups
(a) the members of a group include one or more ring-fenced bodies and one or more other bodies, and
(b) it appears to the appropriate regulator that the conduct of any one or more of the members of the group is such that there is a significant risk that the appropriate regulator will not be able to advance the objective in section 2B(3)(c) (in the case of the PRA) or the continuity objective (in the case of the FCA) otherwise than by acting under this section,
the appropriate regulator may give a notice to each of the members of the group.
(2) The notice must state that the appropriate regulator proposes to require the taking of relevant steps in relation to the group before the date specified in the notice.
(3) In this section “relevant steps” means steps to secure one of the following results—
(a) that there is no member of the group with a Part 4A permission to carry on a regulated activity of a description specified in the notice;
(b) that no member of the group is a ring-fenced body;
(c) that there is no member of the group with a Part 4A permission to carry on a regulated activity which is not a ring-fenced body.
(a) specify a period, of not less than 3 months, during which any member of the group may make representations to the appropriate regulator in relation to its proposal, and
(b) name an independent reviewer who is to report on the conduct of the members of the group and the appropriateness of the proposal made by the appropriate regulator.
(5) A person may not be named as the independent reviewer without the consent of the chairman of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons; and the reference in this subsection to the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons—
(a) if the name of that Committee is changed, is to be treated as a reference to that Committee by its new name, and
(b) if the functions of that Committee (or substantially corresponding functions) become functions of a different Committee of the House of Commons, is to be treated as a reference to the Committee by which the functions are exercisable;
and any question arising under this paragraph (a) or (b) is to be determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.
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(6) After receiving any representations made in relation to the proposal by members of the group and the report of the independent reviewer, the appropriate regulator must decide whether it intends to implement the proposal.
(7) If the appropriate regulator decides that it does intend to implement the proposal, it must publish notice of the proposal, and of its decision to implement it, at least 60 days before it is implemented.
(8) A person who is aggrieved by the decision of the appropriate regulator that it intends to implement the proposal may refer the matter to the Tribunal.
(9) The proposal may not be implemented without the consent of the Treasury; and the Treasury must publish their decision on any application made by the appropriate regulator for consent, together with their reasons for the decision, at least 60 days before it is implemented.
(10) Once the Treasury has consented to the implementation of the proposal and either—
(a) any reference to the Tribunal under subsection (8) has been dismissed, or
(b) the period for making such a reference to the Tribunal has expired without a reference having been made,
the appropriate regulator may implement the proposal by giving notice to the members of the group requiring the taking of the relevant steps specified in the proposal before the date so specified.
(11) If the relevant steps have not been taken by the specified date, the appropriate regulator may—
(a) in a case where the relevant steps are aimed at securing the result in paragraph (a) of subsection (3), take the action specified in subsection (12),
(b) in a case where the relevant steps are aimed at securing the result in paragraph (b) of subsection (3), take the action specified in subsection (13), or
(c) in a case where the relevant steps are aimed at securing the result in paragraph (c) of subsection (3), take the action specified in subsection (14).
(12) The action referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (11) is—
(a) to cancel the Part 4A permission of any member of the group to carry on the regulated activity specified in the notice, and
(b) to refuse to give a Part 4A permission to any member of the group to carry on that activity.
(13) The action referred to in paragraph (b) of subsection (11) is—
(a) to cancel the Part 4A permission of any member of the group that is a ring-fenced body to the extent that it relates to a core activity, and
(b) to refuse to give any member of the group a Part 4A permission to carry on a core activity.
(14) The action referred to in paragraph (c) of subsection (11) is—
(a) to cancel the Part 4A permission of any member of the group that is not a ring-fenced body, and
(b) to refuse to give a Part 4A permission to any member of the group that is not a ring-fenced body.’.
Government amendments 7 to 16.
Greg Clark:
This group deals with some of the recommendations of the first report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which was published on 21 December last year. The Government agreed to bring forward amendments on Report to implement those recommendations, and those amendments are amendments 1 to 4, 6 to 10 and 11 to 16. I will turn to them in a few moments, but the amendment proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) relates to his parliamentary commission’s final report
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on standards and culture, which was published on 19 June, and it therefore provides a perfect opportunity—as I suspect my hon. Friend intended—to say something about that further report and how the Government intend to implement its recommendations.
The Government warmly endorse the report. It is a landmark piece of work and I commend its unflinching, clear-sighted assessment of the damage done to the reputation of banking in this country and all around the world.
Mr Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op): The parliamentary commission requested the Government to consider giving their response—and tabling amendments —well in advance of this Report stage, yet that has been given only this afternoon. Why are we faced with having to absorb this document at very short notice?
Greg Clark: I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman for the long hours he has devoted to the work of that commission. The Government did indeed make a commitment on Second Reading and before then to make use of the Bill before us to take forward the recommendations of the commission. It was always intended that that should be at the House of Lords stages of the Bill, but I will have more to say about that in a few moments. We will absolutely give the required time to consider those amendments and to make use of a Bill that is before the House, enabling us to respond rather than wait for a further piece of legislation.
The commission’s central judgment is absolutely right:
“High standards in banking should not be a substitute for global success. On the contrary, they can be a stimulus to it.”
When I visited Germany late last year, I picked up a copy of Handelsblatt and was struck by a double-page spread with a picture of the City of London and the headline, in English, “City of shame”. That shows the impact of the events of the financial crisis and subsequently on the reputation of this country’s banking system. Exactly as the commission says, if we are to restore the system’s global success, as we must, it is imperative that we improve its standards.
Therefore, in response to the commission’s report, I can confirm today that the Government will strengthen individual accountability by introducing a tough new regime that is recommended to cover the behaviour of senior bank staff; introducing new rules to promote higher standards for all bank staff; introducing a criminal offence for reckless misconduct by senior bankers—those found guilty could face a jail sentence; working with the regulators to implement the commission’s proposals on pay, specifically to allow bonuses to be deferred for up to 10 years and enable 100% clawback of bonuses where banks receive state aid; and reversing the burden of proof so that senior staff are held accountable for regulatory breaches within their areas of responsibility. We will also ask the regulators to implement the commission’s key recommendations on corporate governance. That will ensure that firms have to have the correct systems in place to identify risks and maintain standards on ethics and culture.
We will support competition in the banking sector by providing the Prudential Regulation Authority with what the commission asked for, which was a secondary competition objective to strengthen its role in ensuring that we have banking markets that benefit from the
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vigorous competition that delivers good outcomes for consumers. That will be in addition to the Financial Conduct Authority’s existing competition objective. In addition to introducing seven-day account switching later this year, the Government will ask the new payments regulator, once established, urgently to examine account portability and whether the big banks should give up ownership of the payment systems. The Government have also implemented the commission’s recommendation to conduct a review to look into the case for splitting RBS into a good bank and a bad bank containing its risky assets.
When the commission’s final report was published on 19 June, I undertook to provide an accelerated Government response by way of a Command Paper before the summer recess.
Mr Love: The press release that was—
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab): On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I rise to seek your guidance, because the Minister is making, in effect, a statement on a series of Government policies related not to clause 1 or amendment 1 but to policy areas where amendments have not yet been tabled. Is that in order? Should this not have been done in the proper way—making a statement and allowing the House to ask questions in the normal way?
Mr Speaker: The Minister may wish to reply, because it is important to be clear about the context in which the observations he is making are made. That is central to this matter, and it is difficult to rule on it unless there is some clarity on the subject. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his point of order and let us hear what the Minister has to say.
Greg Clark: I thought that I had explained the context at the beginning, which was that the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester deals specifically with the recommendations of the final report on the culture. As I said, I suspected that he had tabled the amendment in order to afford us the opportunity to debate these matters. I will move on to deal with the other amendments in the group if the House would prefer it.
Mr Love: May I seek some guidance from the Chair? I was about to ask a question pertinent to the discussion—
Mr Speaker: The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right; he has been a model of restraint, on which we congratulate him. He was in mid-intervention and we do not wish to have his aircraft come down prematurely, so let us hear it.
Mr Love: My question relates to the issues covered by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) and the list of policy positions recommended by the parliamentary commission. The press release that accompanied the Government’s document today states that they endorse “the principal findings”. Would the Minister care to tell us which findings they do not endorse?
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Greg Clark: Of course, and today and tomorrow we will go into some further detail on that point. Let me mention one such finding, however: the Government do not agree with the proposal to abolish UK Financial Investments. I will mention various others later. We brought forward the publication of the response, which, just before the report was published, was intended to take place just before the summer recess, because I thought it was germane to the discussions in the House and I encouraged my officials to work their best to try to make it available for today and tomorrow. It has been sent to Members.
Giving a Government response to an 11-month long, 571-page commission report in just 13 working days is, I think, quite an achievement and I thank my officials for losing a nice weekend watching the tennis to do that. I had hoped that it would help the debate.
Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op): This is a very interesting situation. The Minister talks about the 13-day deadline and said that we had to get this done. Correct me if I am wrong, Mr Speaker, but I thought that the Government decided when the Report stage of a Bill was to be held, so the deadline was rather self-imposed. Why on earth are we wasting this Commons consideration of the Bill in Committee and on Report when he could not get his act together either to table amendments or to get a response together in time for us to properly use our time on Report?
Greg Clark: The hon. Gentleman is perfectly aware that the standard response time for a Command Paper responding to a report is two calendar months. That would have taken us into the recess, which clearly is not possible, so we would have had to respond after the recess. I think he is being churlish when I have asked my officials to move at great speed to respond in a very short space of time—13 working days—to make the response available. I thought it was better for us to have it for these debates than to have it next week or in September. I am grateful to my officials for their alacrity, even if he is not.
Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con): I join my right hon. Friend in commending his officials for their amazingly speedy response. The only thing I would ask is that we should have plenty of time on Lords amendments. We had an excellent discussion in Committee, but unfortunately it was on a Bill that will be completely different from the one that is ultimately passed. To maintain the supremacy of this House, I feel it is important that we should have a proper discussion of and decision on the amendments that will be made in the other place.
Greg Clark:
My hon. Friend, who was a distinguished member of the Public Bill Committee, is absolutely right. I have given assurances to the House before that we will have enough time to consider these very important matters, and we always have done. In Committee, we arranged things in such a way that we were able to consider every line of the Bill and every amendment and new clause with time to spare. When I saw the amendments that had been tabled, I made representations through the usual channels to extend what in the original programme motion had been a one-day Report and Third Reading. I had said that I would reflect on the
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volume of amendments and was able to secure an extra half day of consideration. I repeat that assurance—when the amendments return from the House of Lords, it is absolutely right that this House should have the chance to consider them all at leisure and thoroughly. My hon. Friend has my assurance on that.
Let me turn to amendments 1, 2 and 3. In Committee, I gave a number of undertakings that I would table amendments on Report. One such commitment related to the effectiveness of the ring fence, which is the common denominator of the amendments in this group. The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) will immediately spot that amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 act on a commitment I gave to the Committee that in turn reflected the recommendations of the first report of the PCBS, on which the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr Love) and my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester served.
For Members who did not have the privilege of being part of our discussions in Committee, let me set the context. The Independent Commission on Banking set three objectives for the ring fence: first, to insulate essential day-to-day banking services against shocks originating elsewhere in the financial system; secondly, to make banks more resolvable; and, thirdly, to curtail the perceived implicit Government guarantees to banks, which follows from the first two. The Bill turns those ring-fencing objectives into law by making them part of the statutory objectives of the regulators—the PRA and the FCA.
5 pm
Clause 1 amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to require the PRA to seek to ensure that a ring-fenced bank’s business is carried out prudently and protected against risks that might threaten the continuous provision of core services. FSMA is also amended to require the PRA to seek to ensure that the failure of a ring-fenced bank will not interrupt the provision of core retail banking services in the UK. Like any other bank that is poorly managed, a ring-fenced bank will be allowed to fail, but to avoid serious harm to the wider economy essential core services must be kept running, which requires the PRA to ensure that the business of a ring-fenced bank is structured in a way that allows it to be resolved in an orderly fashion, if that bank fails. Questions were raised in Committee about whether the resolvability element fully captured all circumstances in which the regulators might need to ensure that a ring-fenced bank could fail safely, so the amendments clarify the fact that the PRA must seek to minimise damage to the continuity of core services caused by not only the failure of a ring-fenced bank, but the failure of any other member of its corporate group.
Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC): The new structure that the Minister is outlining looks good on paper, but the key to its success is the role of the PRA. How will he stop the problem of the revolving door that arose with the Financial Services Authority afflicting the PRA, because that would completely undermine the ring fence he intends to put in place?
Greg Clark:
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. He will know from our proceedings during the passage of the Financial Services Act 2012 that we needed to reverse the catastrophic decision to take
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supervision of the banking system away from the Bank of England, which had always exercised that role with authority and commanded respect not only in this country but throughout the world. That Act corrected the situation, and the PRA is part of the Bank of England, as he knows, so we have restored that authority.
Guy Opperman (Hexham) (Con): Does the Minister agree that higher banking standards and the PRA’s new role were enthusiastically endorsed at the multi-level banking seminar in support of regional banking that we held in Gateshead only last month?
Greg Clark: My hon. Friend’s ingenious intervention allows me to pay tribute to the excellent event he hosted in Gateshead at which there was palpable enthusiasm for challenger banks entering the market, especially ones with a regional focus. He and I share an ambition that the north-east should be the home of such a bank, which would do wonders for the region’s economy, with its strong, vibrant business culture. The area would benefit from the local knowledge of such an institution. The PRA and the FCA were represented at the discussion, and he is right to reflect that everyone who was present on that Friday was enthusiastic about the steps the PRA is taking to make it easier for challenger banks to come forward.
Chris Leslie: If the Government are so enthusiastic about the concept of regional banking, will the Minister explain to the hon. Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman) why their report, which came out at lunchtime, explicitly rules out any review of a structural arrangement involving regional banking for the Royal Bank of Scotland?
Guy Opperman: You voted against it.
Chris Leslie: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman did not hear me first time round. I am tempted to repeat myself, but it is important that he realises that his right hon. Friend the Minister has ruled out such an arrangement for RBS.
Greg Clark: The right way to approach this is to make it possible for regional banks to enter the market across the board, which is precisely what the PRA is doing. It has reduced the demands that entrant banks must satisfy to establish themselves as a business and speeded up the authorisation process, which is all to the good.
Guy Opperman: Does the Minister recall that in April last year, the Labour party, taking its lead from the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie), who is sat in a sedentary, chuntering position on the Opposition Benches, voted against the implementation of the competition regulations that would have made regional banks happen?
Mr Speaker: Order. The notion of somebody sitting not in a sedentary position is a challenging one, but I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising his point while on his feet, rather than from his seat.
Greg Clark:
It is certainly true that the hon. Member for Nottingham East is seated, and it is also true that he was chuntering. My hon. Friend the Member for Hexham
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(Guy Opperman) has done the House a service in reminding it of the voting record of the hon. Member for Nottingham East, seated or otherwise.
The amendments clarify that the PRA must seek to minimise damage to the continuity of core services caused by the failure of a ring-fenced bank or any other member of its corporate group; an investment bank could, for example, suffer losses that threatened the whole group with bankruptcy. Amendment 1 requires the PRA to minimise the harm to the continuous provision of core services caused by the failure of other group members, as well as of the ring-fenced bank itself.
Amendment 2 clarifies that the failure of a group company includes its insolvency. Amendments 3 and 4 reflect those same changes in the remit of the FCA, in the unlikely event that the FCA ever became the prudential regulator of any ring-fenced bank. I hope that the House will welcome those amendments, which the Committee that scrutinised the Bill and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards suggested.
Mr Love: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for being so generous in giving way. I want to take him back to the discussion about regional banking, because one of the parliamentary commission’s recommendations was that the Government should consider measures to break up RBS into regional banking. I seek his reassurance that the Government have not forgotten that recommendation.
Greg Clark: It delights me to hear the hon. Gentleman refer to today’s publication; it confirms what I thought and hoped, which was that the publication would inform the debate. I think that tomorrow we will come on to clauses that deal with precisely those matters.
Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green): Does the Minister understand the disappointment of those, including me, who believe that the proposals do not go far enough, and that we should look at full legal separation of investment and retail banking, and not just ring-fencing? If we do not, we risk sending a message to the public that politicians still have a surprisingly high degree of trust in the very banks and bankers who caused so much harm to our economy.
Greg Clark: I do not agree with that. We will come on to talk about what the commission referred to as the electrification of the ring fence, and whether it is appropriate to have a power to break up the whole system, so I will address that in a second, if I may. Amendments 6 to 10 concern that electrification of the ring fence, to use the memorable phrase of my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester—or, I dare say, the whole commission.
Mr McFadden: The Minister is being generous in giving way. I would like to take him back to the intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Mr Love). Will the Minister confirm that paragraph 5.11 of the publication that his Department published today states:
“The Government does not believe that the case for breaking RBS’s core operations into multiple entities meets the objectives of maximising the banks’ ability to support the British economy”?
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In layperson’s terms, the Government have today rejected the notion that their review will look at regional banks, as distinct from a good bank/bad bank split. Is that how we should read that?
Greg Clark: No. The right hon. Gentleman has not got it quite right. We are absolutely enthusiastic about creating regional banks, and the exchange that I had with my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham, and the changes made by the regulator to the approvals process, underline that. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) asks a specific question about whether RBS, in which we, of course, have a very substantial stake, should be broken up in that way. It is important that we have regard to value for the taxpayer. I suspect that we will talk about these things tomorrow, but I confirm that it is the Government’s view that we should not damage the potential value to the taxpayer in that way.
As members of the Bill Committee will recall, I made a commitment to introduce on Report amendments to implement electrification, and here they are. The amendments give powers to the regulator, with the consent of the Treasury, to require a group to separate completely its retail and wholesale banking operations. The regulator would be able to require the group either to sell its interests in ring-fenced or non-ring-fenced entities, or to transfer specified businesses to outside ownership. The regulator will be able to require separation if it is satisfied either that the group’s ring-fenced bank is not sufficiently independent of the rest of the group or that the conduct of any member of the group is such that it undermines the regulator’s ability to achieve its new statutory objective to ensure the continuity of core services.
The amendments set out a process for the exercise of that power. The first step is that the regulator must notify all affected members of a group that it is minded to exercise its powers and how it proposes to do so. The affected bank has the right to make representations following the receipt of each notice. Following that stage, the regulator is required to allow members of the group at least a year to take action to rectify the position. If, after that period, the regulator wishes to proceed it must issue a warning notice before a requirement to separate is imposed. The regulator would then allow five years to complete the separation required in line with the disposals required under competition law, particularly state aid interventions.
As the parliamentary commission recommended, the Treasury’s approval is required before that action can be taken. We agree with the commission that providing for a deterrent against any bank that seeks to game or evade the ring fence is a sensible reinforcement in keeping with the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking. Government amendments 11,12, 13 and 14 make technical adjustments to ensure that all the necessary components of structural reform comply with the ring fence and are brought within the scope of the ring-fencing transfer scheme.
Richard Fuller (Bedford) (Con):
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his clear explanation of how the ring fence will work. He is discussing time frames that make sense in benign economic circumstances, but some of the problems with the interaction of retail and
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investment banking came about in circumstances of great financial trauma. Is he confident that the measures he has proposed will work in those circumstances as well?
Greg Clark: My hon. Friend makes a good point. The use of state aid is often a response in the context of difficult circumstances. That was certainly the case in the financial crisis, and it happens in other industries as well. Five years is the standard period for these arrangements to be executed or completed, and that is the reason, anticipating an intervention from my hon. Friend, that period was chosen. I dare say, however, that that there can be reflection on that: my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester may have a different view that he may wish to share with the House later.
Government amendments 15 and 16 reflect concerns expressed both by the Commission and in Committee that the use of ring-fencing transfer schemes to restructure groups could provide unscrupulous banks with an opportunity to shirk their responsibilities, such as liability with past misconduct. The requirement for PRA approval is a substantial safeguard against that, but Government amendment 16 requires that before the PRA can consent to a ring-fencing transfer scheme it must commission an independent report to assess whether anyone other than the bank itself would be adversely affected by the transfer. Government amendment 15 requires the PRA to “have regard” to that report in deciding whether to approve a ring-fencing transfer.
The hon. Member for Nottingham East will of course have more to say about amendments tabled by the Opposition, but his first amendment was debated extensively in Committee. It requires a review of ring-fencing every two years. I am certainly not set against an independent review. Indeed, the Bill builds in future reviews, including the PRA being able to report annually on the operation of the ring fence, and being able to report every five years on whether the detailed rules it has made are still delivering the objectives of the ring fence. Requiring another review specifically to look at the case for full separation risks in many ways achieving the opposite of the Bill’s intention, which is to secure consensus, as far as that can be established, and to provide for a stable regulatory structure.
It would be paradoxical for such a review to be confined to looking at ring-fencing or full separation, but not any other remedy for deficiencies that the review might uncover. Amendment 18 is identical to an amendment that was debated in Committee. The Government’s position is clear: in the Bill, we are following the advice of the commission chaired by Sir John Vickers, which considered the case for full separation—that relates to the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas)—and rejected it. It is a different policy. I know that it has some distinguished advocates, but it is a different policy. Of course, any future Government could adopt it, but they should do so properly, through thorough analysis and following parliamentary and public scrutiny.
It is worth reminding ourselves briefly of the history of the proposals before us. They were not invented during the past few weeks or months. They go right back to 2010, when the Government established the Independent Commission on Banking under the chairmanship of Sir John Vickers. The commission produced three reports, instigated two public consultations, considered 1,500 pages
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of written submissions and hosted more than 300 separate meetings. The Government produced a response and a White Paper, on which they again consulted fully before coming to Parliament. At each stage there was full cost-benefit analysis. Now in Parliament each detail of the policy is being debated—and has been debated in Committee—and in many cases improved.
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The proposal for a further power is a much diminished version of the process that has been undertaken to produce this policy. It would bypass the process of meticulous consultation, consultation of experts and parliamentary scrutiny that ring-fencing will have had, certainly by the time the Bill reaches the end of its parliamentary passage.
Mr Love: The parliamentary commission consulted widely and there was considerable concern about the weaknesses and the ring-fencing that had been suggested by Vickers. That resulted in a proposal for electrification. Is the right hon. Gentleman secure in the view that we have electrified the fence enough on the basis of the amendments he is proposing today?
Greg Clark: I will be even more secure when I have persuaded the hon. Gentleman, as I hope to do. He, being a fair man, will reflect on the fact that his distinguished commission undertook pre-legislative scrutiny of the proposals made by Sir John Vickers and his commissioners. Sir John did not recommend that there should be the power to separate. In fact, he has been persuaded by the institution-specific power of separation that his commission proposed, but has reflected in evidence to his commission that to go further and introduce a system-wide power is a separate matter and should come before Parliament in an explicit way rather than, as would be the case here, through a statutory instrument following an independent review.
The proposals before us, most fair-minded colleagues would concede, fall very far short of the degree of scrutiny and rigorous assessment, including by the hon. Gentleman’s commission, that the current proposals have gone through. Parliament would not have the ability to present amendments to proposals and at that stage to take account of the recommendations even of the independent review. So the procedures proposed are less than adequate to the scale of the policy change that would be embodied in them. If we are to be serious about the need to respect the views and the role of Parliament—as I have made clear, these are important matters—we must accept that the only right and proper and democratic way of legislating for full separation is by coming back to Parliament with full primary legislation, including the rigorous process that we have undertaken.
Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con): I very much agree with the case that my right hon. Friend is making. Is there not a danger with a fixation on structure, which the review advocated by the Opposition would promote, that we work less on making the existing electrification work and getting the behaviours right, and instead allow a focus on structure and the further review? As with any structure, it is possible to ratchet up, but it is also possible to ratchet down, and it would allow a nibbling of the electrification, which would not be constructive.
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Greg Clark: My hon. Friend has some experience of these matters. I think that the debates about structure are important and that structural reform will make an essential contribution to making the system safe for the purposes of taxpayers. However, having looked into it, I think that to have hanging over the system the sword of Damocles—the origins of the metaphor were the subject of an erudite debate in the Commission—would introduce an uncertainty into proceedings that might distract from the important work of implementing the existing provisions.
Mr Love: The reality is that we are seeking to balance conflicting issues. One respects the Government’s view that Parliament should be supreme in this regard, but the alternative argument, of course, is the one that the Minister has just put to us, about the sword of Damocles keeping the feet of the banking industry to the fire. We know that the industry has not been entirely with us in relation to setting up the ring-fencing arrangements and that it needs some encouragement to make it work effectively.
Greg Clark: The hon. Gentleman gets to the nub of the matter, because of course any attempt to evade the ring fence or to nibble the electric fence, as dangerous to health as that would be, could be undertaken only on the part of a particular institution, not the system. That is why we agreed with the commission’s report—it was not part of the Vickers report—that it was necessary, for exactly the reasons the hon. Gentleman mentions, to have a sanction against that type of behaviour, and that is what we have done.
A further power to separate the whole system could not be triggered by an individual and could not punish the actions of an individual institution. That is why I think that is a very different policy. It commands the support of some very distinguished and influential people. The Glass–Steagall approach, which of course the policy is modelled on, has its place in history, but I think that history also reveals that the Glass–Steagall arrangements were not immune to the very dangers my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay) pointed to. It is a good job my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester secured his amendment to the programme motion, because we are having a very interesting debate, but I would like to conclude, because there are other amendments that hon. Members would like to speak to. On that point, however, I urge the House not to allow at this stage the introduction of a very different policy into the Bill.
Let me turn to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester, who I dare say will speak for himself in a few moments. I know that some of them were tabled to afford us the opportunity to discuss his commission’s report, and I think that this is now established as a very relevant opportunity. I will of course listen carefully to what he says. I am confident that the amendment the Government have tabled in response to the commission’s report can be improved during the Bill’s passage to take into account whatever concerns are embodied in his amendments.
Amendment (a) to Government amendment 6 would add a new condition under which the separation powers could be used: namely, when the regulator
“judges that there are serious failings in the culture and standards of the ring-fenced body or another member of its group.”
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Of course, under the Government’s amendment the regulator would have the ability to separate the group if its conduct threatened to undermine the regulator’s ability to meet its continuity objective, but I think that, as the commission’s extensive deliberations showed, cultural failings might be present in banks that can result, for example, in significant harm to individual consumers or groups of consumers but nevertheless do not have systemic consequences. I think that the relevance of the proposed new power to take into account the culture is adequately covered under the provisions already in the Bill.
Amendments (b) to (p) concern the procedures for exercising the separation power. They would remove from the process: the second and third preliminary notice stages that extend to six weeks the time for banks to make representations; the requirement that the group be given a minimum of five years to effect separation; and the requirement for Treasury consent before a group can be required to separate. It is, of course, essential that a clear process be established for the exercise of the separation power. As I have said, I will listen carefully to what my hon. Friend says about reducing the number of warnings, which I think is the essence of what he is recommending, and about departing from the standard practice in financial services of allowing 14 days, rather than the six weeks that he proposes, for representations.
Mr McFadden: I want to compare the Minister’s six-year timetable with the one that the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) has set out in his amendments. What would be the difference for an individual group between moving to full separation under the Minister’s timetable and its doing so under the timetable that would apply if the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester were accepted?
Greg Clark: As I have said, I shall hear from my hon. Friend. I do not think there is any difference of intent between us; we have accepted the commission’s recommendation. We have taken the period of five years because that is the standard time for the disposal of assets when they are required through competition law proceedings.
I am certainly concerned, however, that the banks should be given a chance to address the concerns, and that chance would be lost if amendment (k) were followed. If amendment (p) were followed, we would deny banks the five-year period for divestments to be made that is typical under competition law. But as I have said, I remain open to considering these matters further during the Bill’s passage. I am confident that it can be improved to meet the concern, as I know that there is no disagreement in principle between me and my hon. Friend on the issue.
The requirement for Treasury consent follows from the commission’s own recommendation, without which the regulator could, on its own initiative, instigate radical structural reforms.
Amendment 19 is retabled as an alternative to Government amendment 6, providing for the specific full separation power. As I explained in Committee when the amendment was previously debated—when the hon. Member for Nottingham East was channelling my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester, as he frequently
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did—it suffers from technical flaws. That is why I committed to introducing a Government amendment to deliver its objectives.
Specifically, amendment 19 is rather vague, giving the regulator power to require a group to take steps to separate without specifying what those steps are. It also lacks provision for a minimum period over which groups must execute a separation, leaving the risk of the regulator’s ordering a rushed disposal that could be destabilising to the system.
The Government amendment is intended to address those technical problems, although I have signalled our willingness to make any further improvements that may be necessary as the Bill progresses. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester will be able to withdraw his amendment at this stage, pending further consideration.
Chris Leslie: It is characteristic of the Minister, with his emollient tones, sometimes to give the impression of smoothing over all these issues. He is ever the swan on the surface, yet beneath the water line the chaotic paddling is evident from the Government’s response to the work of the parliamentary commission. That response was rushed out today, in accordance with the Government’s own artificial deadline of a debate on Report, which they could have scheduled so that we had time to consider where the Government stood on some of these issues.
Even the Minister’s hon. Friends did not seem to realise what he was recommending today on RBS—ruling out a review that might consider a regional banking network, for example. The message did not get through to the Government’s own Back Benchers. I do not know whether that is a whipping issue or whether other channels need to be reviewed, but something is not quite right. It would be remiss of me to pass over the fact that we are debating this Bill on Report having had in Committee no consideration of all the hard effort undertaken by the poor souls who had to serve on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Hours, days, weeks and months of their lives went by, never necessarily to be regained. There was no response to that in Committee and there has been barely a nod in its direction on Report.
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Greg Clark: This is uncharacteristically ungenerous of the hon. Gentleman, as in Committee he tabled a whole set of amendments drafted by the parliamentary commission, saving him, I dare say, a lot of weekend drafting work. I think he might want to thank members of the commission and note that the recommendations from its first report were exhaustively considered in Committee.
Chris Leslie:
The right hon. Gentleman is right. Of course I thank them, but it is my sympathy for them that now requires us to speak in their favour. The Government ignored all those amendments. It is true: I have been channelling the wishes of the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) and, indeed, the rest of the commission. They dutifully drafted all those amendments and they were then totally ignored by the Government. The Government set up the parliamentary commission. They did not want to go for a broader independent inquiry; they wanted to take this route. They set up all
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the members to do all the work and have all the hearings. Their final report was more than a ream of paper— 570 pages. Not a jot of those amendments was accepted by the Government in Committee, and, significantly, the same applies on Report.
Let us be clear about this. House of Commons consideration of this Bill is not worth anything; all the business is to be done in the other place by members of the commission who are there. It will go to them in October, presumably they will consider it in October and November, and then we will get a little chunk of time at the end of the process for Commons consideration of Lords amendments. I hope that the Minister will allow us a little more latitude to have a look at what is put into the Bill at that time.
Greg Clark: I think the hon. Gentleman is labouring under a misapprehension. The amendments in this group are a response to the commission’s first report. The essence of this Bill is the ring-fencing of the banking system. This is a response to the independent commission to which the parliamentary commission responded. The amendments implement these changes. The Government always made it clear that the final report on standards and culture would be taken on board during the Bill’s passage through the House of Lords. The situation is exactly as envisaged and perfectly orderly. He is not seeing the wood for the trees. This is about the ring-fencing of banks.
Chris Leslie: Well, pardon me for daring to suggest that the Government have got this totally upside down and the wrong way round. They set up the commission and asked its members to come forward with recommendations, as they dutifully did, for which I thank them, and then ignored them in the Commons Committee and Report stages. That means that it is all to be debated in the detail that is required when the Bill reaches the House of Lords.
Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con): Given that on Second Reading I suggested that much of the real deliberation would take place in the other place, it would be churlish of me to disagree entirely with the sentiments expressed by the hon. Gentleman. The situation was ever thus, given the parliamentary majorities. This has not been a chaotic process but, understandably, a holding response by the Treasury. It is a fast-moving situation. I suspect that a further banking reform Bill will be debated in the next two or three years.
Chris Leslie: It probably will, particularly if there is a change of Administration, but we will come to that in a couple of years’ time.
Mr Love: Some very eminent members of the commission are in the House of Lords, and I have absolutely no doubt that they will do a magnificent job of scrutinising the Bill. However, this is the democratically elected Chamber where most of the debate should take place, and it is incumbent on the Government to make time available for those at this end of Parliament to scrutinise it.
Chris Leslie:
My hon. Friend is 100% correct, and we have made our point; I now want to move on to issues of substance. There is a lack of time and we have to
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finish debating this group of amendments by 7 o’clock. It is ridiculous that the commission spent hours on these matters but only a tiny amount of time has been allocated to debating them today.
Government amendments 1 to 4 seem to be generally welcome with regard to the extension of the regulatory perimeter and the definitions of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. It is intriguing that amendment 4 centres on clarifying the definition of “failure”. It is very tempting to ask if they know what failure is, especially given their weak response to the parliamentary commission today, but I will move swiftly on.
Government amendments 7 to 10 also seem to be fairly unobjectionable, although there appears to be a drafting error in amendment 8. Why has the Minister decided that the proposed subsection (3) should be inserted ahead of subsection (2) of FSMA? Something seems to be amiss, but that is only a minor point.
More importantly, will the Minister talk about the tribunal to which a lot of the issues will be referred? What sort of tribunal will it be and where will it be situated? Will its work add to the functions of an existing tribunal? That is a small point, but I would be grateful if the Minister would address it.
Government amendments 11 to 13 seem to focus on drafting issues. I cannot really see what will be achieved by changing “subsidiary” to “body”, but I do not have anything to say about those smaller, drafting amendments.
The first main issue of substance relates to our amendment 17 on the need for a thorough review process of the ring-fencing of retail banks, such that it augments what ought to be the electrification of the ring fence. We suggested this in Committee and it was a clear recommendation of the commission. It would be better to have a proper and independent review of the adequacy of ring-fencing every two years. We think that a more robust review process would be better than the Government’s PRA-led approach. It would be inadequate for the regulators to lead the process. We need a broader and more substantial review process to ensure successive ring-fencing.
Ultimately, as the commission itself has said, the jury is out on whether ring-fencing will work. It is fine in theory, but in order to keep a close eye on things—especially as these issues fall out of the media spotlight, as they inevitably will in the years to come—we must have a process in place that makes sure that we test, watch and scrutinise what happens.
The commission was right to be disappointed with the Government’s response. It noted that
“the Government did not accept our recommendation on potential ‘electrification’ with respect to the sector as a whole. As our First Report noted, crucial doubts remain about whether all the intended reforms can be put in place and, even if they are, whether this will be enough to prevent the Government from having to step in next time a crisis hits. In particular, we identified the possibility that the partial separation of a ring-fence may prove insufficient.”
That is why we feel that a more rigorous and thorough review process that involves the commissioning of independent members to produce, together with the Chair of the Treasury Committee, a report for Parliament would be far more effective. I do not want to take words out of the mouth of the hon. Member for Chichester,
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but he is right to say that if we leave it to the PRA to do this job and do not have a proper and more thorough process, there is a danger that the regulators will simply end up marking their own exam paper.
Caroline Lucas: Following the logic of what the hon. Gentleman is saying, does he not agree that a better way of restoring public faith in banks and, indeed, in politicians would be to legislate firmly now for the full legal separation of retail and investment banking? Even if that is not what a large number of financial institutions want, would it not be better for the taxpayer and the public?
Chris Leslie: We have tabled an amendment, which I shall discuss shortly, suggesting a clear back-stop power for the full separation of retail and investment banking across the board, in case ring-fencing does not work. We believe that we should give ring-fencing a chance, but it is important to note that the jury is still out on whether it will work. We just do not know. The Bill gives us the opportunity to ensure, as the commission recommended, that nobody has any truck with breaches of the ring fence. That must be the case both on a firm-by-firm basis for specific institutions and banks and for the sector as a whole.
Jonathan Edwards: Given what the hon. Gentleman has just said, are not the titles of the proposed new section in his amendments 18 and 19, which refer to “full separation”, slightly misleading? I will support those amendments, because they would be a step forward from what the Treasury recommends, but the Labour party is arguing for electrifying the ring fence, not for full separation.
Chris Leslie: It is true that we want to give ring-fencing a chance. That seems to be the broad consensus among those who have seriously considered the issue, either on the commission or elsewhere. However, it is important that we keep in our pocket the chance to do something serious and rigorous in case that plan does not work. I suppose we might call it a plan B, although I know the Government have an aversion to ever considering anything outside the narrow tram lines down which they career. It is important that we take this opportunity to put that plan in place.
That brings me to the Government’s rather pathetic, lettuce leaf-like attempt to claim that they are adopting a back-stop electrification power. I am not sure what voltage the Minister has opted for, but for the Government to claim the provision as a firm-by-firm back-stop power is an insult to back-stop powers. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) said, the process in Government amendment 6 will take six years should ring-fencing fail, which is a snail’s pace. I urge hon. Members to look at the various stages involved in that amendment. First, the Treasury will look to the regulator to issue not just one preliminary notice but three—the idea of three preliminary notices seems like an impossibility—all of which will have different timetables. I do not know whether three preliminaries means, “We’re coming to get you, but not quite yet.” It is like the Education Secretary, with his firm, disciplinarian hand, saying to children, “We’re going to come and get you, but we’ll
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give you three preliminary notices before we do so.” The kids would be crawling all over the ring fence for months and years.
After those preliminary notices, a warning notice will be issued, followed very swiftly—not—by a decision notice. There will be at least five steps over a six-year period. “Five strikes and you might be out in six years’ time” does not strike me as an effective back-stop power for galvanising and electrifying the ring fence. If the Government recognised for six years that there was a flaw with ring-fencing but did nothing, their culpability would be almost equal to that of the banking sector. Amendment 6 could be an amendment to a misrepresentation of the people Act, and the Financial Secretary needs to take it off the table and instead consider the amendments that the Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards has tabled.
This is a back-stop power in name only, and just because the Government say it is a back-stop power does not make it so. We need the ability, on a firm-by-firm basis at the very least, to take firm action to a timetable that shows flexibility and can be enacted swiftly if need be. I am afraid I tend to agree with the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester. The provision needs to be truncated and the Government must withdraw amendment 6 as it is wholly inadequate. It would have been more effective to go with amendment 19 as drafted by the commission, which was a far more effective truncated version of a back-stop power on a firm-by-firm basis. That was far clearer, the drafting was improved, and it is a mystery to me why the Government have resisted it at every stage of the process. Whether that was due to lobbying from the banks, or because they do not believe in standing up to the sector and taking on this tough issue, the weakness of the Government on this matter surprises many people.
5.45 pm
Mark Field: Two things come to mind. First, there should be a sense of due process, which I think is present in the Government amendment. Secondly, there is genuine concern about uncertainty and the notion of an electrified ring fence. As the hon. Gentleman will know, I have questioned the whole issue of ring-fencing and the potential uncertainty it provides in this business, particularly in the fast-changing world we have seen over recent years. This is therefore a sensible response from the Treasury to the whole concern, which goes well beyond special pleading from the banking fraternity.
Chris Leslie: Most of the debate we have had in the short time available has pressed for firm action to be taken towards a sector that—let us not forget—brought down the economy, created massive deficits in our public finances, and required rescue by the taxpayer because of a blurring of the lines between issues that affected ordinary households up and down the country and high-risk investment banking activities that needed strong safeguards. Simply saying that we will have ring- fencing with no means to enforce or police that—no “electrification”, as it has been termed—would make that concept totally redundant. That is why members of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards were surprised that the Government always seemed to take the path of least resistance—“Let’s not upset the banks too much; let’s try and go back to business as usual”—and are not learning the lessons of history.
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We have re-tabled amendment 18 not just to have a specific firm-by-firm back-stop power for separation in case ring-fencing fails, but to have sector-wide powers as a back-stop in reserve should ring-fencing not work. We have the capability for full separation, but the Government have stubbornly refused to put that on the statute book—“Oh well, if we have such circumstances we can always legislate further down the line”—as if passing a Bill on such matters can be done quickly or effectively in any way.
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP): I thank the hon. Gentleman for the tone he is using on giving ring-fencing a chance and full separation being a back-stop power, or plan B, to be used only in certain circumstances. Amendment 18—the general requirement of separation and industry-wide potential for that—would clearly mean an end to universal banking, ring-fenced or otherwise. What consideration have he and his hon. Friends given to that issue, and particularly the transfer of cash between the two and the impact that might have on lending to the now retail sector, or lending for investment in business?
Chris Leslie: Those issues were covered pretty substantially by the commission in its first and second reports, and this was the conclusion it reached. Nobody wanted to go for full separation if it could be avoided; we wanted to ensure that ring-fencing arrangements could be upheld and made to work. There are some arguments in favour of that universal model, and therefore it was felt preferable to have such a power in reserve, but in the Bill. It is no wonder that the banking sector breathed a heavy sigh of relief today, when it saw the Government’s response on this and other issues. The markets judged that the banking sector got off lightly, and that there was nothing tough or difficult for the sector. That is why we have seen the market reaction today. The notion of business as usual seems to be back on the table.
I want the House to recognise that this is not an amendment that Labour has come up with in a partisan way. We are simply tabling an amendment that was drafted by the commission after days, weeks and months of deliberation and careful cross-party thought by Members of both Houses, but thrown back in the face of the commission by the Government today. It is important to have this on the statute book. A back-stop power will incentivise the banks to comply with ring-fencing. If the Government are correct in believing that ring-fencing will be adequate, the amendment will do no harm to the policy. It will sit dormant on the statute book. But if the Government are wrong, and this backstop power is not in place when it is needed, serious consequences could arise. It is nonsense for the Minister to ignore this risk, especially as the other place will want to come back to this issue. He may be forced to concede if we get into parliamentary ping-pong at some point.
I do not want to take up too much more time because many other hon. Members have spent a lot more time on this issue than I have, but I wish that the Government would listen to them and to the commission.
Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con):
I shall say a little more than I usually say in the House because these arrangements are quite central to the work of the banking commission and give me an opportunity—
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my first—to explain some of the reasoning behind that work. The two key amendments that I have tabled would empower the regulator to split up a banking group if there were serious failures in the culture and standards of the ring-fenced body or another member of its group. In deciding whether these serious failures have occurred, the regulator would be required to take account of the recommendations contained in the reports of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which I chaired.
We produced five reports about a vitally important industry, one that has become embroiled in very serious scandals that have cost the consumer, taxpayers and the whole country a fortune. The parliamentary commission was the first of its kind for a century. The last, exactly a hundred years ago, collapsed in a heap of partisan acrimony.
We have produced five reports in under a year, all of which were agreed unanimously. We also put in an unprecedented amount of detailed work, taking evidence for 171 hours in no fewer than 76 evidence sessions, in addition to deliberating in private for a further 74 hours. I would like to thank my colleagues on the commission in both Houses for their huge contributions, injections of energy and endurance. I would also like to express my thanks for the equally impressive commitment of the commission staff and specialist advisers, led by Colin Lee and his two deputies, Adam Mellows-Facer and Lydia Menzies. Only the very limited time available prevents me from listing many more of the staff who put in so much work. I would also particularly like to thank the Front Benchers of all parties, who have offered a great deal of support.
The task now is to get the report implemented, primarily by regulators and banks, and, where necessary, supported by statute. The Government have today responded to the commission’s most recent report—our fifth. I have had a chance to flip through the response, but there has been no time to digest it fully—it is about 80 pages—and, of course, no time for anyone to table amendments as a result. In view of the extent to which it looks as if the Bill has been changed, I would be grateful if the usual channels could consider recommitting this Bill to Committee. Failing that, at the very least—as the my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) has said—an extra day should be provided for consideration of what will inevitably be a mass of Lords amendments. Bearing in mind the struggle that we had to get the half-day tomorrow, I hope that the Government will show more flexibility about this extra time.
Having said that, I warmly welcome the supportive tone of the pre-briefing given to the Financial Times about the publication that we have had today. Still, I would rather have heard about it here first. I am also very pleased that so many of the proposals and also the argumentation for them appear to have been accepted in full. But I am not fully reassured. The Government appeared to have accepted the commission’s proposal on a specific power to force the separation of an individual bank, but here we are, at the eleventh hour, trying to prevent the proposal from being severely weakened by the Government. In fact, as I will explain, the Government’s amendments would render the specific power of electrification virtually useless.
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Some of the commission’s important proposals have not been accepted at all, for example on leverage, on which we support the recommendations of the Vickers commission, and on reform of the Bank of England’s antiquated governance structure, on which the commission supports the recommendations of the Treasury Committee.
Other ideas that the Government have rejected include the need to wind up United Kingdom Financial Investments Ltd and the regulatory reforms to provide statutory autonomy for the regulatory decisions committee. I find that especially regrettable. The Government have also rejected the proposal to remove the FCA’s strategic objective. No one can see much purpose to this except the Government. It can be used to trump the operational objectives of the FCA, including that of competition, and can thus serve only to weaken those operational objectives. On all those issues, I hope that their lordships will repair some of the damage that we have been left with no time to attend to here.
Mr Love: I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is an offence to Parliament to read about the Government’s response first in the Financial Times. Give the mixed reception from the Government to our fifth report, we should have adequate time to discuss all the very important issues about which we deliberated for many days and which appeared in our recommendations.
Mr Tyrie: I strongly agree with the hon. Gentleman and I have already made both those points, which he just reinforced. All the amendments that I have tabled on behalf of the commission are about standards. Banking continues to suffer from the effects of poor standards. Even in the seven months that we took oral evidence, we had two more major LIBOR scandals, the interest rate swap scandal, a major bank found to be involved in money laundering in Latin America, and another fined $670 million for sanctions busting in Iran.
It is sometimes suggested that trying to do much about this will drive banks overseas. But all of the evidence we took pointed to exactly the opposite conclusion. Far from imperilling the UK’s global competitiveness, high standards will make the UK a more attractive place to locate. Many good things can flow from higher standards in banking, among them a restoration of trust. Trust is an essential buttress to the UK’s reputation as a global financial centre. It is also vital for the British economy. While banks are not trusted by their clients and particularly by SMEs, there will be less lending and less economic activity.
The crisis of standards and trust in banking—and it is a crisis—is multi-faceted, and so are the necessary remedies. None the less, the nub of the problem can be characterised as twofold. First, there has been a lack of individual responsibility at the top of banks. Collective decision making has diffused responsibility and a sense of duty to be vigilant. Secondly, there has been colossal failure of judgment by regulators, with an approach based on pointless data collection on a huge scale and needless box ticking.
In a nutshell, boards were negligent and the system of regulation was found seriously wanting the first time it was tested. Both boards and regulators were motivated by an understandable desire to cover their backs, but their lapses were inexcusable. The lack of personal
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responsibility in banks has been aggravated by misaligned incentives. By that I mean bonus and remuneration structures. They encouraged bankers to make short-term gains while the full risks and costs became evident only later. The taxpayer ended up picking up much of the tab.
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Of course, many others played a role in the crisis: Governments failed to put in place the right regulatory framework and got too close to banks; auditors and risk rating agencies took large fees and were found to be asleep; central banks, in the main, were slow out of the traps.
The commission’s terms of reference primarily concerned banks. It is to their failings that our recommendations are primarily addressed, and I will speak to them today. The commission examined whether banks could be relied on to sort this out themselves, and we concluded very early on that they could not. We concluded that action was required on many fronts to improve standards. First, it would need to come from the ring fence, but that needed to be reinforced. Secondly, improvements to markets and competition would be needed—competition can often be the best regulator. Thirdly, corporate governance needs to be improved. In particular, it is vital to ensure that remuneration does not, as it has in the past, incentivise excessive risk-taking. Fourthly, regulators need to be better held to account. They need to be incentivised to do their jobs more effectively—a primary duty for Parliament. Fifthly, standards need to be supported by more powerful and effective sanctions in the hands of regulators.
Standards will improve and the incentive to game the Vickers rules will diminish if, and only if, the ring fence is made more robust. If banks try to find holes in the ring fence, they should be at risk of full separation. We argued in our first report that that power should lie primarily in the hands of the regulator, and we called this additional power the electrification of the ring fence. The risk of the shock of separation would be an essential incentive to improve behaviour.
Mark Field: My hon. Friend talks about the idea of incentives to find holes in the ring fence. Surely it is in the nature of the way in which one looks at regulation to try to find holes in the ring fence. There is nothing untoward about the idea of looking at a regulation or law and trying to find a way around it. Obviously, one should try to do so without breaking the spirit of the rule or regulation, but if we live in a highly regulated society it is surely inevitable that those who are regulated will look to try to find ways of avoiding them. Surely that is a fault of having over-regulated societies, whether in banking or in other fields of commerce.
Mr Tyrie: I am not going to delay the House by disagreeing for too long. It is rare that I disagree with my hon. Friend, but I wonder whether we would like surgeons to test all the time the regulations that encourage them to do a good job as they pull out their scalpels and wonder if they can get away with just one incision here or there.
Mark Field:
I think my hon. Friend makes my point for me. The medical profession is a profession and relies on such things as the Hippocratic oath, and it has a
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centuries-old approach to how they go about their day-to-day business. An over-regulated industry is one that encourages the avoidance of regulation. Genuine professionals look on their professional responsibilities in a very different light.
Mr Tyrie: There is a heap of regulation surrounding the wielding of those scalpels. The common feature of the two industries is not the professionalisation or non-professionalisation of the industry; it is that both owe a duty beyond bettering themselves. In the case of the banks, they owe a duty because of the implicit guarantee; in the surgeons’ case, they owe a duty to the patient. I will not prolong this discussion any further, but I think most people accept that we do not want banks constantly trying to find a way around or through the ring fence.
Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con): Will my hon. Friend give way?
Mr Tyrie: I will just this last time, but I have a lot that I want to say today, which is unusual for me.
Sir Peter Tapsell: How can anyone read the evidence that Mr Paul Volcker gave to my hon. Friend’s commission and come away with any other conclusion than that ring-fencing, whether electrified or not, simply will not work when we get the next major banking crisis?
Mr Tyrie: There is considerable force in what my right hon. Friend says. We considered the issue in great depth and published a report—the third report—on exactly that. We discussed the case for full separation, but concluded that although the ring-fence proposals had merit, they should not be reconsidered until we have given the Vickers ring-fence approach a try. We also examined the merits of a closely related proposal for the separation of proprietary trading—exactly what is being suggested—from the rest of banking activity. We concluded that further statutory support was not needed for that approach now, because the Prudential Regulation Authority might already have the powers to implement an effective separation of prop trading. We asked the PRA to present a report to the Treasury and to Parliament on its use of a range of monitoring and corrective actions, which could serve as the subsequent basis for a full and independent review of the case for full separation of prop trading. Unfortunately, as far as I can tell—I have had very little time to absorb this publication, which came out only at 12.30 pm—the Government have rejected even examining the proposal for prop trading. That is a mistake. I regret that, but I hope it will be put right in the other place.
Returning to amendment (a), the Government accepted the case for ring-fencing, arguing that banks that test the ring fence should be strongly deterred and, if necessary, prevented from doing so. However, I am afraid that that will not be the effect of the Government’s amendments. On the contrary, the Government amendments almost guarantee that banks will not get a shock, and will not be discouraged from testing or gaming the ring fence. The regulator needs a useable and credible deterrent. This proposal creates too many obstacles and delays to the sanction of full separation.
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Frankly, it is inadequate for three main reasons. First, it requires the regulator to issue—we have already heard a little about this—no fewer than three preliminary notices and a warning notice before it can act. Secondly, it then requires the regulator to obtain permission from the Treasury no fewer than three times while the process is in train. Putting that requirement on the statute book would transfer most of the effective regulatory decision-making power away from the PRA and the Bank of England to the Treasury. It cannot be appropriate for the Treasury to be the regulator. The commission argued for a Treasury override at the end of the process, not at the beginning or in the middle, but the Government’s amendment requires the regulator to secure the consent of the Treasury on three occasions prior to that point. Even so-called preliminary notices—in effect, expressions of concern by the regulator—will require Treasury consent. That is absurd and compromises the regulator’s independence.
The third objection has also been alluded to. The Government’s amendments allow at least five years for the completion of the separation after a decision has been made. That would create enormous scope—indeed, it would make it ideal—for lobbying for a change of heart in the interim. It would create far too much room for that and we can do without it. It also flies in the face of what the Minister said in Committee, where he alerted Parliament to the risk of what he described as an “inordinately long” delay in implementation. A tool that is so difficult and slow to use is likely to deter no one and that is why I have proposed a number of amendments that would remove some of the obstacles erected by the Government to taking action to separate banks.
Mr McFadden: I want to ask the hon. Gentleman the same question that I asked the Minister about the difference in time scales between his amendments (a) and 19 combined, and the five to six-year timetable in total that the Government have set out. Were we to go down the road recommended in the hon. Gentleman’s amendments, how long does he think it would take between a decision on separation of an individual group being taken and that eventually happening?
Mr Tyrie: That is something on which we can usefully take advice from the regulator, but I would have thought that two years would be a reasonable maximum. Five years is ridiculous. It might take less than two years, but we have people down the road who can give us a clear view and the Government should ask them, if necessary publicly.
I have also tabled an amendment that would give effect to the Banking Commission’s proposal for allowing for full separation, as well as trying to improve the Government’s faulty amendment a bit. I recognise that the amendment has been debated in Committee and that the Government said they did not like it, but their reasons for not liking it were frankly not strong. I still find it curious that the amendment was rejected as a starting point for putting in ring-fencing. When the Bill goes to the other place, I hope that that amendment might be seen to be a better starting point than the Government’s. The Government have had several months to get this right. It is regrettable that they have made so
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little progress on it, but we are where we are. In any case, even ring-fencing with electrification is no cure-all for the standards problems in banks. To improve them, we all have to move forward on many other fronts.
I would like briefly to refer to the main other areas that are needed. To improve competition, we recommended a range of measures. We asked the Competition and Markets Authority to initiate a market study of the retail and SME banking sectors. I noticed that the Government were so enthusiastic about that recommendation that they announced it as soon as they received the embargoed copy of our report. We asked the Government immediately to establish an independent panel of experts to assess ways of enabling much greater personal bank account portability. The Government appear to have ridden back a little from that in the proposals they published today, although I cannot be sure.
We also took a good deal of evidence on RBS. Competition is weak partly because RBS is weak. Further restructuring may well be needed. In our view, the Government will need to be bold. We recommended that they undertake a detailed analysis of a good bank/bad bank split as part of an examination of the options for the future of RBS. That is vital work. In the field of banking reform, a healthy RBS, with the restoration of normal lending to the SME sector, is probably the biggest tonic that could be given to the British economy.
The way in which banks run themselves also needs reform. An accountability firewall had grown up that allowed senior bankers to deny responsibility for their failings. That wall has to be taken down. To give effect to that, we proposed the introduction of a senior persons regime. This would ensure that the direct personal responsibilities of board members, particularly the chairman, reflected the importance of their roles, so that it was clear to bankers and regulators who should reasonably be accountable when things went wrong, and for what. Our study of HBOS—our fourth report—provided a clear example of exactly the opposite. It guided our thinking on this and a number of other areas. Senior board members at HBOS did not take responsibility for what went wrong.
The crisis of standards was partly caused, and considerably inflamed, by the fact that bankers were rewarded for doing the wrong thing. Bonuses were often paid out well before the risks of the actions that they ostensibly rewarded became apparent. Bankers took huge rewards and when the risks turned sour, taxpayers picked up the tab. That has to stop. The Government and regulators should not set levels of remuneration. However, much more radical steps are needed to incentivise better behaviour among all staff whose actions or behaviour could seriously harm a bank, its reputation or its customers. Deferred remuneration for executives should not be viewed as an entitlement. People should keep their deferred bonuses only when it is clear that they have really been earned. That will mean long deferral, in some cases up to 10 years.
6.15 pm
What really stuck in the gullet of the electorate is the fact that many senior bankers, having received huge pay-outs for doing a bad job and having accumulated huge risks on bank balance sheets, walked away with those bonuses and even their massive pension entitlements. That has to stop, too. We propose that, in future, were a
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bank to require direct taxpayer support, the regulator should have the discretionary power to forfeit the remuneration of those responsible and the unvested pension entitlements. That might require changes to employment contracts for senior bankers and possibly legislation, but it is essential.
As for regulation, there is no point in creating a vast regulatory apparatus if it fails when we most need it; and we can now see the full scale of regulatory failure. Consumers have been ripped off in a series of shocking episodes, among them payment protection insurance and interest rate swap mis-selling. Taxpayers have also been ripped off. They have paid—and are still paying—the full price of the bank bail-outs. These were needed not just because banks were irresponsible and undercapitalised, but because regulators were not doing their job. Aspects of the Basel process have been farcically inadequate. In many cases regulators were scarcely even monitoring systemic risk in the run-up to the crisis. Much of their work was frankly a waste of time and money—ultimately, consumers’ money. That is partly why we proposed that, at least for the time being, regulators should operate within existing cash limits, except where they have taken on new responsibilities. We need better regulation, not more regulation.
It is our job in Parliament to watch the watchdogs. It is our job now to make sure that regulators and supervisors are more alert, but we also need to empower them. In theory, they already have a full range of civil sanctions, but we discovered that in practice they felt constrained from using them. The senior persons regime and licensing system that we propose will enable much more effective use of those civil sanctions. Responsibility for specific failures will be much more straightforward to identify once those regimes are in place. A major failing of the approved persons regime was that even where poor standards of behaviour were identified, those responsible were unable in practice to enforce the notionally large powers of civil sanctions.
It is essential that those powers should be proportionately applied. It is partly up to Parliament to ensure that they do not become excessive and are not used in a heavy-handed way: it is up to Parliament to ensure that the regulators do not end up using those considerable powers in an arbitrary fashion. That also applies to a back-stop power that we recommended: a new criminal offence for senior persons of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank, which would carry a custodial sentence. The Government have accepted that proposal. It may never need to be used; but, intelligently implemented, it should change behaviour.
We have been heartened by the initial reception to our final report, as with our previous reports. The big test now lies with the other place to amend the legislation to incorporate our proposals. We have been denied effective scrutiny in the Commons by the Government’s insistence on abiding by what amount to an arbitrary timetable and a rushed end date. Since we have already been hit by the full effects of the crisis, the rush is inexplicable. With a few extra months, the Bill could be immeasurably improved.