Business, Innovation and Skills CommitteeWritten evidence submitted by Dr Ruth Levitt and William Solesbury, Visiting Senior Research Fellows, King’s College London, Dept of Political Economy

Summary

Our memorandum focuses on so-called tsars, that is, prominent individuals from outside government who are publicly appointed by a government minister to advise on policy development or delivery on the basis of their expertise. Their role was considered by PASC in the 2009–20 session, but the Coalition government was largely dismissive of the committee’s recommendations. Our research reveals that of the more than 260 tsar appointments made since 1997, only 15% were women and that the rate of tsar appointments is rising. Tsars are an increasingly important source of expert advice to governments of all complexions. We draw the attention of the BIS Committee to this empirical research evidence of the persistently low proportion of women whom government ministers appoint to be tsars. Our own research has revealed for the first time the extent of this gender bias because Whitehall keeps no central records on tsars. This bias prevails despite recent equality legislation, the Davies report and repeated policy statements espousing greater diversity in recruitment to roles in Westminster, Whitehall, government agencies, public services and companies.

About the Authors

Dr Ruth Levitt and William Solesbury published in November 2012 the report of a research project that critically examines the UK government’s use of policy tsars (prominent expert advisers on contentious issues; formal titles include, Reviewer, Ambassador, Champion). The empirical research has uncovered important new research evidence on the low proportion of women appointed as tsars. Their previous research includes “Evidence for Accountability”,1 which investigated the uses of evidence in audit, inspection and scrutiny, and a study of “Outsiders in Whitehall”.2 They submitted evidence to PASC’s inquiry into Goats and Tsars3 and to the Liaison Committee’s inquiry into Select Committee Effectiveness, Resources and Powers.4

Introduction

1. This memorandum provides empirical research evidence on the role that government ministers have played in relation to the gender profile of tsar appointments. It provides the Committee with important evidence of the practices of government ministers and their departments in relation to women in the workplace, particularly in the context of the Equality Act 2010 and the Public Service Equality Duty.

2. Our research reveals that ministers have made over 260 tsar appointments in the fifteen years since 1997, and the rate is increasing. Tsar appointments have risen steadily with each of the four governments during the period. The first New Labour administration (1997–2001) made 14 appointments. The second (2001–05) tripled that number, appointing 45, and the third (2005–10) tripled it again to 130. Between May 2010 and July 2012 the Coalition administration made 93 appointments. Expressing these as annual rates reveals this strongly rising trend (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

ANNUAL RATE OF TSAR APPOINTMENTS 1997–2012

3. We define a tsar as:

an individual from outside government (though not necessarily from outside politics) who is publicly appointed by a government minister to advise on policy development or delivery on the basis of their expertise.

4. We unpack the definition as follows:

“an individual”—tsars are personally appointed and it is clear to them that their advice will be personal too; in our view this applies equally when tsars have advisors appointed to work them, who may or may not endorse their conclusions.

“from outside government”—they are “external experts” in the words of the Coalition government’s pursuit of “open policy making.”

“(though not necessarily from outside politics)”—quite a few serving or ex- MPs or ex-ministers have been appointed tsars.

“publicly appointed by a government minister”—these are public appointments.

“to advise on policy development or delivery”—tsars (unlike their Russian predecessors) have no executive authority and most of them dislike this media term for that reason; nevertheless we use the term as a pragmatic shorthand.

5. Although tsars have an advisory role, they can be hugely powerful: potentially they each have the power to influence ministers and policies directly and personally, and many of them have used this power strongly.

Demographics and Diversity

6. Taken together, the 267 tsar appointees were not diverse. Tables 1, 2 and 3 show that 85% were males, 83% were over 50 when appointed5 and 98% were ethnically white (whereas nearly 17% of the UK population is non-white).6

Table 1

TSARS: GENDER

85%	226	male
15%	41	female

Table 2

TSARS: AGE ON APPOINTMENT

83%	223	over 50
45%	121	over 60
38%	102	50–60
13%	34	40–50
4%	1	under 40

Table 3

TSARS: ETHNICITY

98%	262	white
2%	5	African or Asian

7. Another notable feature is the very high prevalence of honorific titles among tsars at the time of appointment: 35 lords, five baronesses, 55 knights and six dames, 101 in total, comprising 38% of all appointments.

8. Of the five tsars with African or Asian backgrounds, four (80%) were men (Shaun Bailey, Prof Sube Banerjee, Richard Taylor and Lord Nat Wei) and one was a woman (Sunita Mason). Their age profile was quite different to the white tsars: three (60%) of them were under 40 (Bailey, Mason, Wei), one (20%) was 41–50 (Taylor) and only one (20%) was 51–60 (Banerjee); none were over 60. Female tsars were also younger (see Table 4).

9. How many appointments were female tsars varied widely among ministers. Ministers from six departments chose no women at all (DCMS, DECC, DfID, DTP, FCO and MOD), whereas ministers in three departments appointed women for over a quarter of their tsars: (PM, CO, DfE). Ministers from the other eight departments appointed women as 10–20% of their tsars. The average was 15%.

Table 4

TSARS: GENDER AND AGE

	M	M	F	F
under 40	4	2%	5	12%
40–50	27	10%	7	17%
50–60	85	38%	16	39%
over 60	110	49%	13	32%
	226		41

10. Patterns in the gender of tsars can also be seen by looking at the departments by policy area. While this may only be a rough indicator, as the clusters inevitably contain overlapping areas, we have grouped departments as follows:

economic (BIS, HMT);

social (DCMS, DfE, DH, DWP);

home (DCLG, HO, MOJ);

infrastructure (DECC, DEFRA, DTP);

foreign and security (DfID, FCO, MOD); and

government (CO, PM).

11. For women tsars Figure 2 shows clear differences between policy area clusters, with a greater proportion of all women tsars appointed in the government, social and home policy areas.

Figure 2

WOMEN TSARS BY POLICY AREA

12. These demographic findings suggest several influences. One might be a presumption that men and women further on in their careers may be able to draw on and reflect upon greater depth and/or breadth of work experience than younger individuals because they have more working experience. On the other hand, younger individuals may be more innovative or more open to innovative options than older individuals. Another telling influence may be that the bias towards white males reflects the ethnic and gender profiles of the professions and organisational sectors from which tsars are habitually drawn.

13. These pronounced biases of gender and ethnicity are only now being documented, for the first time, through our research, because Whitehall keeps no central records on tsars. The biases run counter to the Public Sector Equality Duty7 and its predecessors, notwithstanding governments’ rhetoric over many years about securing greater diversity in their own ranks, the civil service and the wider public sector.

14. Furthermore, appointing tsars from a more diverse pool of candidates, including more who are younger, female and from more ethnically diverse backgrounds could introduce fresh stimulus, less affinity to custom and practice and more robust challenge into policy making and political culture. It could make more sensible use of the different perspectives, creativity and imagination that overlooked individuals may be able to contribute.

15. Government ministers and their departments should be exemplars in upholding the spirit and the letter of their diversity policies.

15 November 2012