Communities and Local Government CommitteeWritten evidence from the Dorset Fire Authority (FRR 14)
1. Introduction
1.1 The Dorset Fire Authority (DFA) is a combined fire authority consisting of Elected Members nominated from Dorset County Council (8), Bournemouth Borough Council (4) and the Borough of Poole (3). The DFA discharges its key statutory duties within the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 through the Dorset Fire and Rescue Service (DFRS).
1.2 Upon announcement of the Knight review, the Dorset Fire Authority invited the review team to Dorset. As the team were unable to accept this invite, we subsequently provided a comprehensive submission which is available for viewing at: http://www.dorsetfire.gov.uk/uploads/file/2013%20Feb%20DFRS%20Efficiency%20Review.pdf
1.3 The DFA welcomes the Knight review and the specific debate and discussion that this is now facilitating in providing a platform and place for fire and rescue services (FRS) to engage in decisions that will ensure that the FRS of the future continues to be both sustainable and successful, and builds on the many good practices that are benefiting local communities. We are also aware of the recent release of a report titled ‘Improving Efficiency, Interoperability and Resilience of our Blue Light Services’ which has been published under the auspices of the All-Party Parliamentary Group of Homeland Security with the main authors being Tobias Ellwood MP and Mark Philips.
1.4 Whilst this response will contain itself to the Knight review, any subsequent discussion will need to consider the synergies with the All Parliamentary Report in order that the best possible vision can be developed for the FRS.
2. Executive Summary
2.1 With the current Select Committee inquiry surrounding the Knight review and associated discussion on the integration of blue light services, we believe there is timely opportunity to fully consider the efficient size of future FRSs and therein arrangements to strengthen the effectiveness of blue light services. At the outset, we believe this discussion needs to be inclusive of all stakeholders and make clear distinctions regarding differing objectives associated to future efficiency and effectiveness.
2.2 There is now a unique opportunity to develop a shared, sustainable and successful vision for the FRS that also compliments current and future changes in public policy. This first step would then allow full identification and consideration of the risks, costs, benefits, deliverables and various structural options available to achieve this vision. Whilst recent discussion has concentrated solely on blue light services, we believe there is benefit in considering broader societal aims associated to wellbeing, health and troubled families.
2.3 Following the above, whilst the Knight review encourages local fire authorities not to wait in relation to its key findings, there is the risk of further complication in governance arrangements and increasing barriers to longer term convergence if local experiments change local structural arrangements without consideration of wider and perhaps national direction and synergies.
2.4 Following the CSR Statement (26 June), DCLG have written to fire authorities outlining revenue and capital grants available from 2015 that will be on a bid basis and will seek to improve blue light working. Whilst these grants are welcome, the promotion of further different local structural arrangements will be a barrier, and perhaps at this stage an unintended consequence should any future national direction be developed in a vision for the FRS.
2.5 Any discussion, debate and decision regarding future FRSs must consider all of the required future functionality, not just response. This must include key statutory duties associated with fire safety, national resilience, civil contingencies and health and safety. Key amongst the ‘discretional’ functions that the FRS undertakes is attendance to flooding incidents and, due to the prominence and public expectation associated with this, we believe this function must be included.
2.6 Any future functionality will need to fully consider the value that the FRS provides to wider societal aims, including youth intervention, troubled families, and health and wellbeing. In all cases, greater co-ordination within and between government departments would provide greater clarity and synergy of the various national and local roles, responsibilities, relationship and information sharing amongst services. Currently local joined up working is sometimes hampered by a lack of joined up thinking within different Ministerial Departments.
2.7 Notwithstanding it is early days, it would be useful if the Government set out an engagement schedule on the Knight review and associated discussions associated to blue light services. This would allow all stakeholders to ensure they are fully engaged, and thereafter ensure local change programmes are synchronised and supportive of national decisions and direction.
2.8 Where mergers are identified as the optimum structural arrangement, we believe the Government should provide flexibility and/or assistance in relation to the equalisation of fire precept and/or council tax between merging authorities. We believe this is often used as a disincentive to merge and should be addressed by Government.
2.9 In Dorset, 33 out of 40 (85%) of frontline fire engines are crewed by RDS. We believe that the broad brush extrapolations in respect of increasing the use of RDS needs to be contextualised in relation to local and national resilience, impact on fire safety, and of course the challenges of retained recruitment, retention and competence. We believe any assumption to increase the use of retained duty staff should be complimented by national awareness campaigns. FRSs like Dorset have unique experience in operating key emergency services with the most cost effective staffing arrangements possible. This approach is even more commendable when the DFA response standard of 10 minutes is considered. We believe there is a unique opportunity for the FRS to support other services and agencies with this method of staffing, and potentially extend the functionality of RDS to include wider blue light functions.
2.10 The fire formula needs a comprehensive review to ensure it is proportionate and positive in supporting future FRSs. We were surprised the review did not acknowledge that huge difference in grants is a key reason for the huge difference in spends between FRSs. In many parts, the formula remains heavily biased to risk criteria that are no longer commensurate with fire risk in the UK.
2.11 The terms of reference for the review were ambitious to say the least. In addition to the key areas mentioned above, there is also benefit in further research in areas such as firefighter safety, firefighting technology and working with local business. There is some speculation that the published review is not the complete research. If this is the case, we would welcome sight of the full review at the earliest opportunity.
3. Chapter 1
What is the Efficiency and How Efficient is the Delivery of FRSs in England?
3.1 The focus of this chapter and indeed on future potential efficiencies is focused solely on response. Notwithstanding that due to the excellent work of FRSs risk is being managed through preventative activities, the correlation to incomplete cost metrics take no account of the resourcing and sustainability of this prevention activity, and indeed wider areas of preparedness and response such as local arrangements for national resilience assets. There appears to be an incomplete consideration of the integrated approach FRSs now take in managing risk—response is merely one part of this. Prevention is saving everyone money and increasing safety. Those benefiting (for example the health and insurance sectors) need to be recognised as part of the solution and need to be part of the discussion going forward.
3.2 As with cost, the local picture in respect of activity is varied throughout England. For example, in Dorset during 2012/13 our attendance at flooding incidents doubled to over 220 incidents, resulting in 52 rescues and incurred costs of hundreds of thousands of pounds. Notwithstanding the recommendation by Sir Michael Pitt that FRSs should have a statutory duty for flooding, to date this has not been actioned by Government and, whilst it remains a ‘discretionary’ service by local FRSs, there is a clear public expectation that when required we will respond.
3.3 Considerable emphasis is made in chapter 1 to the comparative cost of FRSs. Whilst this focus continues throughout the report, particularly in respect of those most expensive, there seems little attention as to how those that are least expensive and in the lower quartile of spend (such as ourselves!) should be positioned and indeed protected in relation to future efficiencies and budget savings that we have already made.
3.4 Whilst it is acknowledged in the report that the cost data used is for 2011/12, this muddies the waters in relation to overall efficiencies that have been found by FRSs to date, and in particular the further reduction of firefighter numbers. Regrettably, this provides an inaccurate headline in relation to the steps FRSs are taking in reducing costs and playing their part in national deficit reduction.
4. Chapter 2
Deploying Resources
4.1 Whilst later sections of the report question the rigour and independence of public consultation, this chapter criticises the defensive approach to reducing the number of fire appliances, stations and redundancies. As an experienced Chief Fire Officer, Sir Ken will of course be aware of not just the trust but the value that local communities place in their FRS. Certainly in Dorset, having run a number of comprehensive public focus groups, there is public appetite to reform the FRS, but also support from them that we may need to raise the fire precept in order to maintain the level of service they expect and need. Our research shows that actually they look at FRSs as the champion blue light which very often leads the way in their communities.
4.2 The DFA supports the discussion to renegotiate terms and conditions for uniformed staff to provide greater flexibility for both individuals and organisations. The DFA also supports the need for Government to review the pension arrangements in order to provide greater opportunity for voluntary redundancies for uniformed staff.
4.3 DFRS has 40 frontline fire engines, 33 of which (or 85%) are crewed by retained or on-call firefighters. In addition, 64% of our operational staff are retained or on-call firefighters. We are therefore largely a pay as you go service. Notwithstanding the economic benefits that this brings, it does necessitate realistic response standards for this sort of crewing and different resourcing to address our preventative and protective duties. The Knight review does not fully acknowledge these issues in its championing of RDS.
4.4 Notwithstanding the economic argument for increasing the use of retained duty staff, the Knight review provides no acknowledgement as to the recruitment and retention difficulties and increasing demands that are now made on RDS staff. The report contains no impact analysis in relation to the use of more RDS staff, or indeed any recommendations to Government in relation to the role they could play in national awareness campaigns (as is done with the Police and Ministry of Defence) for RDS staff.
4.5 Further savings in the report are identified in relation to the ratio of firefighters to senior managers. Notwithstanding the differences that occur, no recognition is made of the role of unformed officers in supporting large multi-agency and indeed national incidents. Very often senior officers are also part of nationally co-ordinated arrangements (by the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser) to act as advisers in times of major incidents. Whilst the comparison is interesting, it pays no attention to the additional support that RDS require and the challenges of travelling and attendance times in FRSs such as Dorset.
4.6 For those authorities that have high numbers of wholetime staff, the Knight review raises questions in relation to the use of latent capacity and challenges whether this is cost effective justification. It is disappointing that the review includes no acknowledgement of the training, preventative or protective functions that this capacity undertakes when not attending operational incidents. Additionally, in suggesting that this latent capacity could be provided more economically by RDS staff, there is no impact analysis in relation to the effect on the national resilience planning assumptions. Our experience in Dorset is that it is uneconomical to use RDS for fire safety and indeed all of their available time must be committed to training.
5. Chapter 3
Collaborating for Efficiency
5.1 The DFA agrees with the opening statement of this chapter which states ‘no-one setting out to make an efficient model for the delivery of fire and rescue services for England would develop the model we now have’. The development of governance arrangements within FRSs has been largely secondary to changes in local government. The current discussion around governance therefore provides an opportunity to provide the optimum arrangements which are fit for the future. The review provides a number of options and experiments that, if simultaneously pursued, will actually provide a greater assortment and tangling of arrangements which unwittingly provide barriers to future changes. It was surprising that the review did not provide a firm recommendation in relation to the optimum size of an FRS, and indeed whether this should be influenced by coterminosity with other blue light services, or indeed local authorities. We would therefore fully support further research in this area so as to provide guidance as to the most efficient optimum size of an FRS, and thereafter how this could be further integrated with emergency services to improve overall effectiveness. It should be recognised that the options and subsequent structural arrangements for efficiency may be different to those options for operational effectiveness.
6. Chapter 4
Driving Efficiency
6.1 Throughout the report, there is commentary regarding an inexplicable difference in spend between different fire authorities with no correlation to size, type, activity or governance arrangements. Whilst the report also illustrates the dramatic difference in funding from the fire formula, we are surprised that the review does not see the obvious reason for differences in spend in relation to the unexplainable difference provided by the fire formula. As the report suggests, the future fire provision needs to reflect changes in societal risk. We believe this is also true of the fire formula. Simply applying broad brush cuts irrespective of financial starting positions is discriminatory and damaging.
6.2 The DFRS, like many, has earned a high level of public trust and we continue to be one of the local chart toppers in terms of public satisfaction. Again, particularly because of the local government relationship, we find ourselves caught in the council tax capping and referendum regime. Interestingly, over the last couple of years the 2% cap for Dorset has amounted to an increase of approximately 2p per week. In most cases, our fire precept is below the council tax charge made for town and parish councils. If we are to remain a local service, responsive and accountable to local communities, then we should have proportionate guidelines in respect of raising council tax and de-minimus/referendum principles. We believe ‘precepting’ by Combined Fire Authorities and Metropolitan Fire Authorities needs to be taken out of the council tax debate. Whilst the collection made is hypothecated to the FRS, it is often considered as a whole with all local government.
6.3 In terms of accountability and scrutiny arrangements, the DFA consists of 15 people who are elected from local communities to serve on councils and thereafter nominated to be part of the DFA. Each member of the DFA undertakes regular visits to their local stations and has an obvious role in their local communities. As with officers, members of the Fire Authority have specific fire related personal reviews. We believe we are therefore accountable to the people we were elected to serve.
7. Chapter 5
What is the Future for Fire and Rescue?
7.1 The report suggests that the scale of change needed to fully transform the FRS is unlikely to be achieved by individual local action alone. Notwithstanding that Government will in due course respond to the review, we welcome the invite by Government to engage with the sector in what is now becoming a discussion around the FRS and indeed other emergency services. In moving forward, it is vital that local politicians and councillors are encouraged and engaged in the discussion and subsequent decision.
7.2 Section 5.2 outlines possible future operating models for the Government to consider. Notwithstanding the benefit of local and national discussion on these options, at this stage the favoured model of the DFA is greater collaboration and potential combination of FRSs. This should be undertaken in a way that longer term may provide coterminosity with other emergency services such as ambulance trusts.
7.3 Our transformation change programme in Dorset includes:
7.3.1
7.3.2
7.3.3
7.3.4
7.3.5
7.3.6
7.3.7
7.3.8
7.3.9
7.4 Finally, we welcome the observation of the upheaval and cost associated with the transition and believe Government will need to play its part in enabling and/or incentivising the national change programme.
June 2013