1 Introduction
1. We announced our inquiry into Deterrence in
the 21st Century on 23 July 2013, as one of four strands
that we are pursuing as part of our overarching inquiry Towards
the next Defence and Security Review. We published our preliminary
report, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part
I, in January,[1] and
expect to publish our final report in this series in the summer.
Our intention, in this series of reports, is to help to shape
and inform the next Defence and Security Review which is expected
to be conducted in 2015.
2. The strands have been entirely paper-based
inquiries in that no formal oral evidence was taken on each. In
another change from our usual practice, the Committee has appointed
Committee Members to act as rapporteurs on each of the strands,
who have presented their findings to the Committee. The rapporteurs
on this strand were James Arbuthnot and John Woodcock.
3. We requested written evidence on
The concept of deterrence: definitions and where
deterrence sits in the continuum stretching from influence to
intervention;
The climate in which deterrence must operate and
how it has changed;
The targets of deterrence: is every threat potentially
deterrable?
The different levels of deterrence, when each might
be appropriate, and the likely efficacy of each: nuclear deterrence,
deterrence through conventional forces, the link between the two,
the significance of Ballistic Missile Deterrence, deterrence by
protection of potential targets and the cyber dimension;
The importance of credibility: the sufficiency of
the means, the sufficiency of the will and of the ways in which
it is expressed, and communication of the message, including to
the target;
How the UK Armed Forces currently contribute to deterrence
and how this contribution can be improved; and
How deterrence can be expected to change in future.
We are grateful to all those who submitted written
evidence to this inquiry. We would also like to put on record
our gratitude to our Specialist Advisers for their contribution
to this inquiry and to the staff of the Committee.[2]
4. We are also grateful for the invitation that
was extended by the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office during the course of the inquiry to James Arbuthnot, John
Woodcock and the Clerk of the Committee to attend a conference
at Wilton Park on the future of non-nuclear deterrence. This conference
gave the individuals concerned a valuable opportunity to exchange
ideas with a wide range of experts in the field.
5. In strategic terms, the MoD explained that
deterrence is one of the "ways" by which a state seeks
to achieve its security policy "ends".[3]
The MoD sought to define deterrence as follows:
deterrence employs the proportionate threat of force
to discourage someone from doing something, by convincing them
that the costs of their actions will outweigh any possible benefits.[4]
The concept of deterrence comprises both deterrence
by punishment (achieved through a threat to inflict costs on a
potential aggressor through retaliation after any attack) and
deterrence by denial (achieved by convincing a potential attacker
that they will be denied the expected benefits of aggression).[5]
6. The concept of deterrence is popularly associated
primarily with nuclear capability. The 2010 Strategic Defence
and Security Review (SDSR) includes a section entitled "The
Deterrent" that refers exclusively to the nuclear deterrent.
However, nuclear deterrence is merely a subset of a broader concept.
The MoD emphasised that the concept of deterrence continues to
be integral to many conventional operations in which the Armed
Forces engage, for example commitments in the South Atlantic;
deterrence of threats to UK airspace; deployment of Rapier air
defence measures in London during the Olympics; and measures to
intercept pirates off the Horn of Africa.[6]
The mere presence of a capability - be it warships or air defence
measures - can provide a deterrent to potential aggressors, reminding
them of the consequences that would follow in the event of an
attack being launched.
7. The MoD told us that deterrence was still
integral to the National Security Tasks of exerting influence
to exploit opportunities and manage risks; and protecting the
UK and our interests against threats from state and non-state
sources.[7] The 2010 SDSR
also demanded "a renewed emphasis on using our conventional
forces to deter potential adversaries" as part of a broader
focus by the Armed Forces on tackling risks before they crystallised.[8]
Deterrence must therefore be set within the broader context of
measures of conflict prevention. However, deterrence can also
be a feature of measures to control the escalation of conflict,
and is therefore also a tool for management of ongoing conflict.
8. Dr Jeremy Stocker, Associate Fellow at the
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), defines deterrence as
a relationship between deterrer and deterree, and notes that communication,
including signalling and perception, is fundamental to this relationship.[9]
He also noted that effective deterrence relies on credibility
— the threatened response to deter any attack must be proportionate,
to be both legal and credible.[10]
Effective deterrence also relied on an ability to deliver the
necessary threat. [11]
9. The MoD told us that "NATO, and the UK's
commitment to it, is the cornerstone of UK defence policy".[12]
NATO is the most important element in a global network of defence
partnerships and alliances to which the UK contributes and from
which it benefits, and the collective defence guarantee enshrined
in Article V of the 1949 Washington Treaty is a key element in
deterring attack on the UK. Article V provides
That an armed attack against one or more [NATO allies]
in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all.
The combined nuclear and conventional capabilities
of all 28 NATO allies continue to have a powerful deterrent effect
to the benefit of all members of the alliance. Although NATO grew
out of the Cold War, it remains key to defending Alliance and
UK territory at a time of substantial geopolitical change and
where the potential for instability on both NATO's southern and
eastern flanks remains high, as evidenced most recently by events
in Ukraine. During the course of this inquiry, we have been keen
to investigate the links between deterrence and security both
in an Alliance context, and, within a broader changing strategic
context, to understand better whom we are trying to deter and
how we can deter them.
10. The concept of deterrence
remains fundamental to the way in which the UK seeks to manage
the threats to its security. Deterrence must be credible to be
effective. This means that it must be possible to both scale the
threatened response to be proportionate to deter the attack in
question and it must be possible to carry out the threatened response.
Any proposed reductions in conventional capabilities must be considered
in this light. Communication of will and intent is also an essential
component of deterrence.
11. We recommend that the MoD
set out in the 2015 Defence and Security Review the contribution
provided by the NATO Alliance to the deterrence of threats identified
in the National Security Strategy and focus on how the UK can
best contribute to the Alliance's continued effectiveness and
overall deterrent capability. Recent events in the Ukraine illustrate
that this remains of profound importance.
1 Seventh Report of the Committee, Session 2013-14,
HC197. Back
2
The declarations of relevant interests by our Specialist Advisers
are recorded in the Committee's Formal Minutes which are available
on the Committee's website. Back
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Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: the Strategic Defence
and Security Review, Cm 7948, paragraph 2.10. Back
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