Defence CommitteeWritten evidence submitted by the Ministry of Defence

“No state currently has the combination of capability and intent needed to pose a conventional military threat to the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom. Yet history shows that both capability and intent can change, sometimes in a matter of only a few years. Our aim is to deter direct threats, including through our membership of NATO and, ultimately, our independent nuclear deterrent.”

2010 National Security Strategy

Introduction

1. This memorandum considers the current role of deterrence in defence and the involvement of the UK Armed Forces, as well as highlighting areas where new thinking about deterrence is underway. Deterrence has an essential role to play in dealing with the diverse current and future threats facing the UK, but the rapid evolution of the threat, including new state and non-state actors, and the increased accessibility and proliferation of advanced technology, will in some circumstances challenge the UK’s ability to deter in future. This paper aims to inform and reassure the Committee that these complex issues and series of relationships are being properly addressed in the run-up to the 2015 SDSR.

What is Deterrence?

2. The deterrence of threats to the UK’s security, influence and prosperity is the primary peacetime role of the Armed Forces. In strategic terms, deterrence is a “way” by which a state might seek to deliver its policy “ends”. In a military context, deterrence employs the proportionate threat of force to discourage someone from doing something, by convincing them that the costs of their actions will outweigh any possible benefits.

3. Ultimately, deterrence and coercion are about conditioning or changing the perceptions of a potential opponent in order to influence or persuade them. They are different from warfighting, which involves the actual use of physical force to degrade or destroy the capabilities of an adversary to the point where they are unable or unwilling to continue resistance. If force is used in support of coercion or deterrence, it is used in a limited way in order to demonstrate resolve and to establish the credibility of determination and ability to resort to more extreme measures if necessary. Of course, either the threat or the use of force can only be employed in circumstances where there is a sound legal basis.

4. The Armed Forces are only one tool, albeit an important one, in a nation’s ability to deter. Diplomacy and economic statecraft can also offer important levers to affect an adversary’s calculus. These can be used alongside the threat of force in varying combinations and sequences, and with differing degrees of intensity, to achieve the desired effect. Deterrence is in fact most effective when it harmonises effects across government, drawing together and using all the instruments of national and international power.

5. There are two main forms of deterrence: deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by punishment, which threatens to inflict costs on an adversary through retaliation after an attack, is perhaps the better known. Deterrence by denial aims to dissuade a potential attacker by convincing them that their aggression will not succeed and that they will be denied the benefits they hope to obtain. Very often, the two forms of deterrence will work closely together.

UK Deterrence Policy and Doctrine

6. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) acknowledged the important role of deterrence in supporting the strategic objective of a secure and resilient UK. Deterrence is seen as a core part of two of the National Security Tasks: exerting influence to exploit opportunities and manage risks; and protecting the UK and our interests against threats from state and non-state sources.

7. The 2010 SDSR demanded “a renewed emphasis on using our conventional forces to deter potential adversaries” as part of a broader focus by the Armed Forces on tackling risks before they escalate, and on exerting UK influence, as part of a better coordinated overall national security response. To this end, the SDSR sought consciously to maintain a broad spectrum of defence and other capabilities.

Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence

8. To many, the word deterrence has become inextricably linked with nuclear weapons. The UK’s nuclear deterrent is delivered by a fleet of four submarines, known as SSBNs, under Operation RELENTLESS. One of these submarines is always at sea as part of a Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD) posture, which has been unbroken since 1969. This capability is widely referred to as “The Deterrent”. It is there to prevent, at the extreme, any threat to national existence, or nuclear blackmail from a nuclear-armed state against the UK homeland or our vital interests. However, while the destructive potential of nuclear weapons is an extremely powerful deterrent, the possession of which helped to maintain peace with other nuclear powers, that same destructive potential means that the use of nuclear weapons is only appropriate to deter the most extreme threats. The UK views its nuclear weapons as political not military or war fighting weapons. Nuclear weapons are therefore just one element of the total capability to maintain/achieve the deterrent effect the UK seeks. To be most effective, deterrence requires the knitting together of both conventional (including, increasingly, asymmetric capabilities such as cyber) and nuclear capabilities in a carefully graduated tapestry, supported by clear strategic messaging.

9. British Defence Doctrine recognises that, given the complexity and variety of threats faced, “most contemporary deterrence is achieved through conventional means and a wider, more flexible range of postures and responses with the associated levels of military and political risk”. Underpinned by this doctrine, the UK’s armed forces are involved in a number of deterrent activities. These include longstanding commitments, such as that undertaken by British Forces South Atlantic Islands whose mission is “to deter military aggression against the South Atlantic Overseas Territories,” and the RAF’s Quick Reaction Alert deterring threats to the integrity of UK airspace, as well as more targeted or one-off activities such as the deployment of the Rapier air defence system in London for the duration of the 2012 Olympics (a form of deterrence by denial) and the Royal Navy’s contribution to deterring piracy off the Horn of Africa.

10. Future Force 2020 is deliberately geared towards capabilities that have a potential deterrent effect. Ultimately, the British Armed Forces in their entirety serve to deter, with strategic deterrence underpinned by a nuclear capability. The Queen Elizabeth Class (QEC) aircraft carrier, and the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft that will fly from them, will be among the most powerful instruments of conventional deterrence within Future Force 2020. The total capability delivered by these assets is known as Carrier-Enabled Power Projection. This emphasis upon the projection of power and influence reflects a conscious effort to maximise the deterrent effect of this capability. Within the plans for Army 2020 the regional alignment of brigades will help to achieve positive influence with, and understanding of, countries in regions of interest. The retention of high readiness forces that can deploy rapidly to respond to contingencies anywhere in the world is designed to deter adversaries from acting against our interests.

11. The UK does not operate in isolation, but contributes to and benefits from a global network of allies and partners. Most importantly, from the perspective of deterrence, the UK is a member of NATO. Under the terms of Article V of the 1949 Washington Treaty, which established NATO, the Allies agree “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Today, the Alliance is able to draw upon the nuclear and conventional capabilities of 28 NATO Allies, the most important of which is the United States. This commitment to collective defence has played a critical role in maintaining peace in Western Europe since World War II. NATO, and the UK’s commitment to it, is the cornerstone of UK Defence policy.

Effective Deterrence

12. Deterrence is only likely to succeed if the envisaged use of force (and, in the case of wider dissuasion, incentives) is credible and deliverable, and its potential is communicated unequivocally to those whose decision-making it seeks to affect. Each of those component elements are expanded on briefly below:

(a)Capability. At the most basic level, deterrence depends upon the maintenance of sufficient capability to carry out a threat. For deterrence to be effective it is necessary to demonstrate to a potential adversary that the costs of action outweigh the potential benefits to be gained. Thus, for example, in the nuclear context of the Cold War, “neither Britain nor France could have obliterated the Soviet Union, as it could them, but to pose fearful damage as the cost of reaping the advantages of their removal was nonetheless a valid approach”.1 This principle can be adapted into the conventional deterrence context, where the UK on a national basis may not have the capability unilaterally to defeat states with larger populations and Armed Forces, but it can nevertheless still, by conventional as well as nuclear means, deter potentially hostile powers from targeting the UK or its interests.

(b)Credibility. Credible deterrence is based not just on a level of capability, but also upon the demonstrable will to use that capability. If there were no circumstances in which Britain would be prepared to use its nuclear or conventional forces, then neither would have any deterrent value. Credibility depends as much on political will as it does upon military capability.

(c)Communication. Ensuring an adversary understands both our demands and the consequences of not meeting them is challenging. Effective strategic communications are an essential component of deterrence. The secret treaties prior to World War I were an ineffective form of deterrence precisely for the reason that no-one knew about them; by contrast, the terms of NATO’s Article V are transparent and widely understood.

13. Comprehension. Although it is not, in doctrinal terms, a core principle of deterrence, all of this is underpinned by understanding. Just as they must understand us (our thresholds, capability and intent), we must understand them. As noted earlier, deterrence is psychological. In order to influence a decision-maker, or decision-makers, who may come from a different political, military or cultural background, it is necessary to understand their motivations and aims, and to identify those fears or aspirations which are most likely to affect their calculations. Effective deterrence is predicated upon being able to put oneself in the shoes of those whom one is seeking to deter. This is likely to require significant up-front investment in intelligence, engagement (where possible) and in cultural awareness.

Deterrence in a Changing Strategic Context

14. The end of the Cold War changed fundamentally the geostrategic context. The dominant doctrine of Soviet-Western nuclear deterrence through mutually assured destruction was relegated to the most extreme of potential future circumstances. The 2010 NSS, entitled “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty”, noted that the risk picture was likely to become increasingly diverse, with no single risk dominating, and that, as a result, achieving security will become more complex:

“During the Cold War we faced an existential threat from a state adversary through largely predictable military or nuclear means. We no longer face such predictable threats. The adversaries we face will change and diversify as enemies seek means of threat or attack which are cheaper, more easily accessible and less attributable than conventional warfare.”

15. This diagnosis of uncertainty will pose significant challenges to the UK in the future. Future Force 2020 has been designed to ensure that the UK Armed Forces can keep pace with the evolving threat, but, as has already been highlighted, deterrence is a whole-of-government activity in which the military is just one of the instruments available. The important role for diplomacy and engagement in shaping the strategic context, in order to avoid the need for the application of military force, should not be understated. The Armed Forces have an important role to play in these activities too, including through defence engagement activity, such as capacity-building and training to strengthen alliances and partnerships, and to enhance collective defence and deterrence.

16. In this section, we highlight a number of areas to show how the UK Government’s approach has evolved, or is evolving, to face new and emerging threats.

Nuclear Deterrence

17. The UK’s nuclear policy and posture was explained in some detail in the 2010 SDSR. As a responsible nuclear weapon state and party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the UK is committed to the long term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and continues to work to control proliferation and to make progress on multilateral disarmament. However, while large nuclear arsenals remain in existence, and while the threat of nuclear proliferation to new state or even non-state actors remains, the Government is clear that it will not countenance a position in which the UK could be open to nuclear blackmail, or where the UK could be deterred by nuclear means from taking the action necessary to maintain global and regional security. At the same time, the UK’s nuclear deterrent makes a substantial contribution to NATO’s deterrent posture, supporting collective defence of the Alliance as a whole.

18. The UK’s nuclear declaratory policy makes clear the restrained nature of our deterrence posture. The UK has long been clear that they would only be used in extreme circumstances of self defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies, and would not use any weapons contrary to international law. Our focus is on preventing nuclear attack or coercion that cannot be countered by other means. While the UK does not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons, in order not to simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which the UK might consider the use of nuclear capabilities, UK nuclear doctrine is exclusively one of deterrence. Maintaining ambiguity over when, how and at what scale nuclear weapons might be used enhances the deterrent effect.

Ballistic Missile Defence

19. Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) is a form of deterrence by denial. Though still evolving, the concept is designed to deter an actor with limited ballistic missile assets. It reasons that, faced by a reasonably effective BMD system, he may be less likely to launch a valuable missile. In the context of a future threat environment where Europe could be within range of ballistic missiles launched by medium-sized regional powers, BMD has the potential to play an important role within a broader deterrent strategy. It is not, and will never be, a panacea and is limited by the assets it has available. BMD systems are no substitute for a nuclear deterrent.

International Terrorism

20. The threat of international terrorism represents a significant challenge from a deterrence perspective. Non-state actors can complicate issues of attribution, defining and communicating “red lines”, and determining what represents a proportionate and deliverable response. Nevertheless, deterrence undoubtedly has a role to play in dealing with the threat of terrorism, and is a theme that runs through the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST.

21. CONTEST is built around four core strands: Protect, Prepare, Pursue, Prevent. The first two of these strands—Protect and Prepare—are forms of deterrence by denial. They involve, for example, the physical protection of infrastructure to make it harder for terrorists to operate, and to enhance the UK’s resilience where attacks succeed. Pursue involves elements of deterrence by denial, seeking to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist activity before it can endanger the public, and also elements of deterrence by punishment by seeking, wherever possible, to bring those involved in terrorist activity to justice. The latter may not be an effective form of deterrence against an ideologically-motivated terrorist, but it has relevance in the context of state sponsorship of terrorism, or of enablers such as those who offer financial backing. Prevent involves elements of what has sometimes been called “deterrence by counter-narrative”, seeking to undermine the ideological convictions of those who may be inclined to participate in terrorism.

Cyber

22. The deterrence of cyber attack arguably provides the most acute challenge due to its pervasiveness, ease of access, global reach and the difficulty of identifying actors in order to communicate a credible threat. Cyber defence, a form of deterrence by denial and a whole-of-government effort undertaken in close partnership with industry, has benefited from significant investment since the 2010 SDSR, although the exponential growth in the rate and sophistication of attacks undoubtedly represents a severe challenge. The MOD recently announced that, to supplement defensive capability, the UK will build a cyber strike capability—an offensive capability to deter adversaries from attacking us.

Conclusion

23. The UK Armed Forces are at the core of our nation’s security. Wherever possible, the UK will aim to deter a potential opponent from pursuing a course of action that runs counter to our interests, or coerce them into stopping or reversing actions that they have already undertaken through actions short of war. Above all, the Armed Forces give us the means to threaten or use force when other levers of power are unable to protect our vital national interests.

24. Both deterrence and coercion will depend upon the perceived credibility of the threat. An essential part of our credibility rests on the possession of sufficient military capability—both conventional and nuclear—and consistent messaging that, when circumstances warrant it, we can and are prepared to use it. Additionally, we can enhance our credibility both by working closely with other instruments of national power in order to give us more coercive options (for example, economic sanctions) and by aligning ourselves with allies and partners to achieve a multiplying effect. We must think and act creatively, particularly when faced by an asymmetric threat from a non-traditional adversary—for example, we must improve our ability to identify and deal with cyber attackers.

25. Whether deterring or coercing, success will be rooted in understanding the motivations driving the opponent’s behaviour, and we should be ready to consider a mix of threats and incentives in order to shift their decision calculus, persuading them that their interests would be better served by compliance. Where we cannot deter or coerce, we should consider whether the threat can be contained at a level that is acceptable. We will usually consider intervention only when deterrence, coercion or containment of a threat has been unsuccessful.

October 2013