Government response
The Government welcomes the House of
Commons Defence Committee's inquiry 'Towards the next Defence
and Security Review' and the findings set out in the Committee's
report (HC 197), published on 7 January 2014.
The national security and prosperity
of the UK and our decision making on the strategy, approaches
and capabilities we need to assure it is a priority of this Government.
We recognise the detailed work that the committee has undertaken
to contribute to our efforts.
Our formal response to its recommendations
and conclusions is set out below. The Committee's headings and
findings are highlighted in bold, with the Government's response
set out in plain text. For ease of reference, paragraph numbering
in brackets refers to the order in which they are presented in
the Committee's Report.
Was the 2010 Strategic and Security Review strategic?
1. We have previously noted that
the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and the 2010 National
Security Strategy were governed by the overriding strategic objective
of reducing the UK's budget deficit. (Paragraph 12)
The 2010 National Security Strategy
and Strategic Defence and Security Review were about taking the
right decisions to protect our national security in the years
ahead. Despite the biggest budget deficit in post war history,
our national security remains a priority; defence and security
budgets are therefore contributing to deficit reduction on a lower
scale than most other Departments. As the Prime Minister said
recently before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy,
the review was about how we should configure our defence forces,
given Britain's place in the world and our foreign policy and
security policy objectives. This was not driven by spending, but
of course it was informed by what the Government believed was
affordable. This was a strategic defence and security review which
took strategic decisions.
2. We have found it difficult to
divine any other genuinely strategic vision in either document.
This is the first of a series of reports that we intend to publish
to assist in the preparation of the next Defence and Security
Review; we hope that they will both inform and shape the next
Review and the next National Security Strategy and help to drive
a more strategic approach to security across Government. (Paragraph
12)
The National Security Strategy set out
for the first time a clear over-arching vision to use all our
national capabilities to build Britain's prosperity, extend our
nation's influence in the world and strengthen our security: our
national security depends on our economic strength, and vice versa.
To this end, the twin strategic objectives are to ensure domestic
security and resilience, and to shape a stable world.
3. There is a need for an agreed
definition of strategy. Our inquiry has suggested that there is
not a clear definition being adhered to within Government. We
offer our definition of strategy as "a course of action integrating
ends, ways and means to meet policy objectives", which the
Secretary of State has accepted, as one that should be adopted
in preparation of the next National Security Strategy and the
next Defence and Security Review. We recommend that the Ministry
of Defence should work within Government to ensure that this definition
is used consistently. (Paragraph 13)
The Government welcomes the Committee's
recommended definition of "strategy", and agrees that
clear and consistent terminology is necessary to bring coherence
to cross-departmental work. As the Prime Minister said recently
before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy,
strategy is about setting out a very clear series of goals and
making sure that sensible means for achieving those goals are
available. And as the National Security Strategy itself states:
any "strategy" must be a combination of ends (what we
are seeking to achieve), ways (the ways by which we seek to achieve
those ends), and means (the resources we can devote to achieving
the ends). The Committee's proposed definition is consistent with
this overall approach.
We will want to be sure our chosen terminology
incorporates further best practice in strategic thinking, such
as the need for strategy to be insightful in how it applies ways
and means to the ends of policy, and to remain sufficiently flexible
to respond to the future.
Coordinated by the Cabinet Office and
building on such an approach, the MOD and other Government Departments
are already working closely together in preparation for the next
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security
Review.
4. We welcomed the establishment
of the National Security Council which has given greater operational
focus and coordination across Departments. However, we echo the
criticism of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy
that the National Security Council is failing to take on the higher
strategic role that it might have done in Government. (Paragraph
14)
As the Prime Minister said recently
before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy,
while the National Security Council does discuss strategy, its
primary role is to determine policy, agree actions and then evaluate
the implementation of those actions. The balance between strategic
and operational discussions will always fluctuate according to
need. More strategic discussions have examined the UK's relationships
with China, Russia and India, alongside strategic work on the
Emerging Powers, a cross-cutting look at how government spends
resources overseas, and, currently, a strategy looking at long
term relationships with and interests in the Gulf region. Discussions
have been much more operational at critical moments on topics
like Libya and Afghanistan.
The drivers of SDSR 2010
5. The 2015 Review should set out
the Government's thinking on how the Armed Forces need to be re-balanced
following the end of operations in Afghanistan, and address the
challenges inherent in regenerating their capability following
the end of operations. (Paragraph 18)
In committing this Government to deliver
the sustainable and balanced Future Force 2020, the 2010 Review
set out how the issue of the Armed Forces' emphasis post-Afghanistan
will be addressed, restructuring our forces to deliver contingent
capability for the future.
In addition, the Armed Forces will continue
to play a unique role in the wider security and prosperity of
the UK. The International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES) published
in February 2013 formalised the MOD contribution to building stability
overseas as one of the four pillars of defence engagement - the
others being: security and non-combat operations; defence diplomacy;
and support to defence and security exports. Our contribution
to NATO, and particularly US and French relationships, continues
to ensure our security and prosperity and that of our allies and
partners.
Initial preparatory work for the 2015
Review is underway. No decisions have yet been taken on its scope.
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
Public support for defence spending and for expeditionary
operations
6. One of the greatest strategic
threats to defence is the disconnect between the Armed Forces
and the public caused by a lack of understanding of the utility
of military force in the contemporary strategic environment. The
Government cannot hope to bridge this divide without looking to
explain what it believes the UK's position in the world could
or should be, and the manner in which that is to be delivered.
Without a proactive communications strategy, there is a serious
risk of a lack of support for defence amongst the public. We ask
the Department to review its communications strategy for the next
Defence and Security Review and keep the Committee fully informed
of its conclusions. We are convinced that there is an important
role for this Committee, and Parliament as a whole, to play in
articulating the case for defence to the public at large. (Paragraph
24)
The Government agrees that Members of
Parliament, and Parliament as a whole, have an important role
to play in articulating the case for defence to the public.
The public show great interest in understanding
the role of the Armed Forces in the contemporary strategic environment.
Armed Forces Day attracts wide support nationally; our dedicated
Facebook page reached 8 million users in the week of Armed Forces
Day 2013. TV programmes in recent years, like 'Our War', the documentary
about operations in Afghanistan shown on BBC 3 in 2011, have attracted
record audiences and reviews across a broad section of British
society, particularly amongst younger audiences.
With the focus on operations in Afghanistan,
we have put great effort in recent years into communicating the
broader role of the Armed Forces and Defence. The 2010 Strategic
Defence and Security Review connects the plan to develop Future
Force 2020 - the requirement for an adaptable, sustainable future
posture able to project power, build stability through upstream
engagement, and work with allies - to the broad range of tasks
required to mitigate the strategic risks the UK faces, as set
out in the National Security Strategy.
Much of the wider work Defence does
- contributing to UK influence and prosperity, and building stability
- is well reported. Our support to humanitarian efforts in the
Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan was widely reported and we reported
on the visits of HMS Daring to South East and East Asia, supporting
the building of Defence links and UK prosperity with powers in
the region. More recently, the military contribution to flood
relief in the UK has received wide and positive coverage, raising
our public profile in a UK contingencies role.
In addition we report to Parliament,
and publicise in the media, a broad range of routine activity
- supporting the French with airlifts into the Central African
Republic, evacuation of UK nationals from South Sudan, routine
deployments to assure the security of overseas territories, counter
narcotics patrols in the Caribbean, and our contribution to multinational
counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. This is about
preventing terrorism, building stability, and supporting UK prosperity
and interests.
In his evidence to the Committee, the
Defence Secretary concluded that there are ways to increase popular
support for Defence. While the approach and timing for the next
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security
Review remain to be decided, strategic communications will be
a key factor.
The case for a national strategy?
7. The imminent end of operations
in Afghanistan provides an opportunity for the Government to think
more strategically about the UK's place in the world in shaping
the 2015 National Security Strategy and the 2015 Defence and Security
Review. We believe that there is a persuasive case for a national
strategy to be incorporated in the National Security Strategy,
defining what position in the world the UK should adopt as the
ends of the strategy and setting out the combination of hard and
soft power that represent the ways and means of getting there.
Even though the strategy will, in practice, be dynamic to meet
changing threats and challenges, the document should make clear
the process by which it has been arrived at, confirming the Government's
priorities, and contain clear definitions of policy and strategy
and how they relate to each other. The National Security Strategy
(NSS) should be the subject of a published annual report on its
implementation. The NSS should provide the strategic context for
the Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph 32)
As the Prime Minister said recently
before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy,
the work for the next National Security Strategy and Strategic
Defence and Security Review will span the period of the next election.
No decision has, therefore, yet been taken on their final scope.
Initial preparatory work, however, is underway and the Government
notes the Committee's recommendations.
8. The concept of fighting power
provides a useful framework for analysis of the operational effectiveness
of the Armed Forces. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review
(SDSR) pledged that it would not entail a "strategic shrinkage"
for the UK. We ask the Ministry of Defence to provide us with
an assessment of the fighting power of the Armed Forces both prior
to the SDSR 2010 and now, and to outline in the Defence and Security
Review 2015, the impact of any changes on that fighting power.
(Paragraph 33)
The experience of operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq over the past thirteen years has clearly shown the outstanding capabilities,
skill and professionalism of our Armed Forces. We took difficult
strategic decisions to balance defence spending in 2010, but we
still retain one of the most capable Armed Forces in the world.
We have global power projection capability second only to the
US, and among the most capable troops, aircraft, ships and submarines.
We are investing over £160 billion over the next decade in
modernising our capabilities, bringing the Queen Elizabeth class
carrier and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft into service are a clear
demonstration of that. The Future Force we have designed
will be well equipped, capable and deployable, and more sustainable.
Operational effectiveness is not the
only measure of the benefit the UK gains from Defence and the
Armed Forces. International defence diplomacy and defence
alliances, contributions to security operations such as counter
piracy off the coast of Somalia, military capability building
and other activities contributing to conflict prevention, make
a unique and valuable contribution to the security and prosperity
of the UK, her citizens, and those around the world - and fulfil
a wide range of government security objectives. The International
Defence Engagement Strategy is driving effective alignment of
Defence activity with HMG priorities, and improving Defence's
responsiveness.
We will explore the method behind an
assessment of 'Fighting Power' and if a measure is both feasible
and useful. 'Fighting Power' may need relabeling as 'Defence Power'
or 'Defence Effectiveness' to avoid connotations of effectiveness
being solely about our ability to deliver effect on operations.
Assessing the effectiveness of Defence
will always be inherently subjective. As British Defence
Doctrine points out, Fighting Power should always be considered
relative to that of other parties. And the notion of
effectiveness itself will change over time as the strategic context
and our national objectives change, making comparisons challenging.
An assessment of Fighting Power would also represent
a statement of the relative strengths of Defence and could play
into the hands of those who would wish to reduce the security
and relevance of our Armed Forces. Therefore we would not issue
a public assessment. We will update the Committee if we find an
assessment is feasible, in due course.
The last Strategic Defence and Security
Review assessed and set out, in Future Force 2020, the right changes
to our Armed Forces to ensure their enduring effectiveness. The
overall effectiveness of our Armed Forces will be the central
deciding factor in any changes made and communicated in the next
one.
The UK's place in the world
9. A vision of the UK's position
in the world needs to be articulated in the National Security
Strategy as the basis for any consideration of the next Defence
and Security Review. As noted above, this requires active communications
in which this Committee is ready to play its part. This vision
would represent the definition of the ends of the strategy; a
truly strategic DSR should outline the ways and means by which
those ends could be achieved to provide the integration that is
presently lacking. (Paragraph 37)
We will decide on the scope of the National
Security Strategy at the time of the next review but note the
Committee's recommendation. As the Prime Minister said recently
before Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, the
2010 National Security Strategy helped to set the context for
what the Government wanted to do in defence and security; and
strategy should inform defence and security decisions. The National
Security Strategy set out for the first time a clear over-arching
vision to use all our national capabilities to build Britain's
prosperity, extend our nation's influence in the world and strengthen
our security. It needs to be refreshed rather than subjected to
a complete overhaul.
The changing context for the 2015 DSR
10. This short inquiry has only scratched
the surface in examining the potential impact of current geo-political
developments on the UK and its strategic alliances. However, there
can be few developments more fundamental to the UK's strategic
position than the US pivot to the Pacific. The Government's thinking
on the implications of this and other developments for the country's
broader security and for the military capabilities that the country
requires is a matter of vital interest for both Parliament and
the public. The process of development of the National Security
Strategy should be the vehicle for the Government to seek to engage
both in this debate. (Paragraph 43)
As stated above in response to the Committee's
Recommendation 7, the work for the next National Security Strategy
and Strategic Defence and Security Review will span the period
of the next election. No decision has, therefore, yet been taken
on their final scope or on the nature, extent and process of any
external engagement. The Government's response to the Report of
11th July 2012 by the Joint Committee on the National
Security Strategy noted that the Government will be developing
ideas for wider consultation including with external academics,
think tanks and experts.
11. The fact that a number of the
asymmetric security threats to the UK, such as from terrorism
or cyber attack, may not be capable of being deterred in all circumstances
requires the Government to think more strategically about the
resilience of the country's critical infrastructure and recovery
following a successful attack. This needs to inform the next NSS
and DSR and an assessment must be made of the proportion of resources
dedicated to these functions. (Paragraph 50)
The Government agrees that it is important
to have a strategy for all risks to security. The next National
Security Risk Assessment is due in 2014 and will inform the next
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security
Review. As this work will span the period of the next election,
no decision has been taken on their final scope. Initial preparatory
work, however, is underway and the Government notes the Committee's
recommendations.
Ensuring the UK can keep essential services
running is one of the eight vital national security tasks set
out in the Government's National Security Strategy. Government
Departments work closely with infrastructure owners and operators
to monitor and prioritise security and resilience.
One way Departments do this is through
each Lead Government Department producing annual 'Sector Resilience
Plans'. These alert Ministers to any vulnerabilities in sectors'
Critical National Infrastructure to risks identified in the National
Risk Assessment, and set out what industry action and Government
support are planned over the next year to address them.
As it is not always possible to prevent
disruption, the Government has continuing programmes to develop
robust response capabilities to ensure that disruption is minimised
when it does occur, and that recovery is as quick as possible.
Given that often the same response is required to disruption from
different threats and hazards, strategically building generic
response capabilities helps ensure we reduce potential duplication
of effort and allocate resources most effectively. This also increases
flexibility, especially when we do not know exactly what we face
until it happens. Bespoke arrangements for high-impact risks,
such as pandemic influenza, or risks with unique consequences,
supplement these to ensure that the UK is resilient to all potential
risks.
12. The list of changing factors
identified in this interim inquiry gives only a flavour of the
full range of those that will need to be taken into account in
framing the next NSS and DSR. We acknowledge that some factors
affecting Government strategic thinking cannot be put in the public
domain, but, if the public is to be brought on board, the Government
must do more to set out the rationale behind its strategic thinking
and make a commitment to allocate the necessary resources to give
it substance. (Paragraph 51)
As noted above, the work for the next
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security
Review will span the period of the next election. No decision
has been taken on their final scope; but initial preparatory work
is underway. The next Review will of course need to balance strategic
and financial perspectives. The Government notes the Committee's
recommendations.
A Comprehensive Spending Review
13. We raised concerns in our report
on the last SDSR that there might be a discrepancy between the
ambitions outlined and the resources available to fulfil them.
If the expected real-terms increase in funding from 2015 were
not to be made available, the Defence and Security Review would
have to make clear that strategic ambition would have to be curtailed,
and explain how that would be achieved. There is an inescapable
link between budget and the capacity to deliver a strategic ambition
which must be recognised and acknowledged in any DSR process.
(Paragraph 59)
The Government recognises that national
security strategy must take account of capabilities and financial
realities, and that it should not be pre-determined by resource
allocations. The Government notes the Committee's recommendation
for the next Strategic Defence and Security Review.
14. A failure to meet the Ministry
of Defence's budgetary assumptions could lead to a disproportionate
decline in the Armed Forces' fighting power, which would have
a significant impact on the UK's strategic ambition. (Paragraph
60)
The Government remains committed to
an Equipment Plan growing at 1% a year in real terms after the
next Spending Review.
Defence cannot operate outside the context
of the economic health of this country, and a Strategic Defence
and Security Review must balance strategic and fiscal perspectives
to find a sustainable solution for Defence. The budget for Defence
will be decided under the next Spending Review, in consultation
between departments.
A key tenet of our Defence posture is
to be flexible and adaptable to meet the UK's strategic objectives.
This includes financial flexibility, and we have shown how resilient
we are when the financial means available to Defence change unexpectedly.
But our ability to meet our strategic ambition is not solely related
to our financial resources. Though we plan to spend £160
billion over the next ten years on state-of-the-art equipment,
and to regenerate the Armed Forces for the requirements of the
post-Afghanistan defence and security environment, in the last
Strategic Defence and Security Review we also said that closer
co-operation with allies and partners would be increasingly important
to our security and prosperity. We are increasing the depth and
breadth of our co-operation with our key allies to improve our
policy and strategy alignment, and interoperability to ensure
we can work increasingly effectively together and deliver greater
effect from our respective defence budgets. We continue to develop
our relationships with new international partners to enhance our
global influence.
Any significant future budget reductions,
which cannot be absorbed by non-front line savings alone, do,
however, run the risk of impacting our strategic ambitions.
15. There is a danger of defence
becoming a matter of discretionary spending. We note that the
National Security Adviser referred to expeditionary capability
as "optional". To a degree, the NSA is correct. However,
discretionary decisions about the expeditionary capability that
the UK retains must be based on proper strategic decision making
about the UK's place in the world and not simply flow from the
"horse-trading" that surrounds the CSR process. (Paragraph
61)
As noted above in response to Recommendation
13, the Government recognises that National Security Strategy
must take account of capabilities and financial realities, and
that it should not be pre-determined by Spending Review allocations.
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation for the next
Strategic Defence and Security Review.
Sequencing of the NSS, CSR and DSR
16. While we accept that the three
documents should be developed in parallel, we believe that the
National Security Strategy should be published first. As we have
argued, the NSS should outline a vision of the UK's role in the
world that should not be driven purely by a consideration of the
resources available. (Paragraph 66)
Within the overall package, strategy
should set out the general approach and priorities. The Strategic
Defence and Security Review then follows logically in specifying
decisions and conclusions on resources; but in practice, strategy
and Strategic Defence and Security Review must be coherently integrated,
as they were in 2010.
17. The NSS, together with the CSR,
setting out respectively the "ends" and the "means"
should logically precede the DSR outlining the "ways"
of meeting the security objectives within the resources available.
The allocation of resources will be based on national spending
priorities set to meet the nation's security needs. Once the national
strategy has been articulated in the NSS, the process of agreeing
the ways and the means is therefore an iterative one. Getting
the balance right between the CSR and the DSR is more important
than strict adherence to a particular timetable. (Paragraph 67)
As stated in response to the Committee's
Recommendation 13, the Government recognises that National Security
Strategy must take account of capabilities and financial realities,
and that it should not be pre-determined by Spending Review allocations.
All three processes should interact over time pragmatically. There
is debate to be had over the exact sequencing: the balance has
to be struck between all three elements; one cannot be satisfactorily
completed without considering the others: we cannot live beyond
our means. As the Prime Minister said recently before the Joint
Committee on the National Security Strategy, in the difficult
and straitened times in which we live, it is essential to consider
what is affordable alongside what is desirable. But strategy should
inform defence and security decisions.
Strategic Skills
18. We call on the MOD to provide
us with an update on education and skills training in strategy
offered to senior officers and officials, both within the Defence
Academy and at other institutions. (Paragraph 70)
The Defence Academy provides a range
of education and training interventions in strategy for senior
officers and officials. The Academy provides military officers
with a comprehensive grounding in strategy and the associated
skills, at progressively greater depth and sophistication, through
the Advanced and Higher Command & Staff Courses (conducted
at the Joint Services Command and Staff College) and the Royal
College of Defence Studies (RCDS) International Course. As set
out in our written evidence, the latter course is the main educational
intervention on strategy. The objective of the Course is to ensure
that:
The RCDS graduate understands the
international strategic context, is skilled in analysis and able
to work intuitively across national, cultural and ideological
boundaries to lead or contribute to developing strategy at the
highest level.
An entire term is devoted to Conflict
and Strategy in the Modern World. The term enables participants
to consider the key features of the strategic and geo-political
environment and their implications for strategy, the applicability
of different levers of national and multinational power, and the
methods and tools of strategy. It also develops skills in the
analysis and formation of strategy through a series of table top
exercises and practical case studies. The aspiration is that,
in future, all officers with potential to reach 3* rank will complete
the RCDS Course.
Both the Advanced Command & Staff
Course and the RCDS International Course are accredited to Master's
degree level by King's College London, one of the Defence Academy's
principal academic partners.
Strategy is also addressed in the shorter
Higher Command & Staff Course for future operational commanders.
Its objective is to ensure that students can:
Make sound, timely decisions, in
the current context, at the military-strategic and operational
levels of conflict.
The Defence Academy also provides training
in strategy for civil servants - whether those selected to attend
these courses or, more widely, through the new Policy, Strategy
and Parliamentary Profession 'Base Camp' course.
The syllabi of all these courses are
continuously developed to take account of the changing strategic
context. For example, the Advanced Command & Staff Course
is currently being extensively redesigned to ensure that it prepares
officers for the challenges of the future operating environment,
with greater emphasis on analytical and critical thinking skills.
The Defence Academy is not a closed
environment. A wide range of speakers, representing diverse perspectives,
speak to the courses - and free discussion is encouraged. The
presence of a significant number of international students also
provides other perspectives. Both the Joint Services Command &
Staff College and the RCDS have formed external advisory panels
to ensure that syllabi benefit from external challenge.
As well as its International Course,
the RCDS arranges periodic strategy seminars for officers and
officials. In July, RCDS plans to bring together more than 40
senior civil servants from across Whitehall to review cross Government
thinking on Strategy. Finally, the Defence Academy provides guidance
on strategy for a wider audience through CDS's Reading List which
is published on the Academy's website.
In addition to the opportunities available
through the Defence Academy, the Department sponsors about 10
officers per year to study for Master's degrees in strategy or
strategic issues at other universities.
Accurate and timely historic analysis
19. We recommend that the Ministry
of Defence, in close conjunction with the Cabinet Office and National
Security Secretariat, initiate the writing of official histories
of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and of other conflicts since
the end of the Cold War; review how the history function is being
undertaken by all three Services and by the Ministry of Defence
as a whole; and confirm in the 2015 Defence and Security Review
its plans for the preparation and publication of histories and
other measures designed to address these deficiencies. This work
could usefully call on input and expertise from other Government
Departments including the Department for International Development
and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; since the comprehensive
approach became a hallmark of the operations in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, its lessons should be learnt from and shared across
Government as a whole. (Paragraph 76)
We agree the value of cross-Government
learning of lessons from history and cross-Government input into
Official Histories, but in our evidence to the Committee we noted
the value of a time lag before producing them. The existing programme
of Official Histories is continuing, with its commissioned histories
being published at the rate of one or two a year.
We have already learned some of the
most significant and immediate lessons from operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq, and the political complexity around them. The need to
develop upstream understanding and influence has become a
central part of our international Defence Engagement plans. And
the lesson of the value of clearer strategy and vision for the
role of Defence has influenced responses to Libya and Syria.
In addition to improvements in the work
considered by senior level boards noted in evidence to the Committee,
the Ministry of Defence has taken steps to improve the supply
and demand for history, particularly amongst policy and strategy
staff and personnel. Work is underway, under the joint leadership
of MOD Head Office and Joint Forces Command, to ensure that those
working within Defence are better able to learn from the lessons
of the past - both Defence lessons, as well as broader areas of
historical information. For example, last year we introduced an
occasional 'learning from history' series of lectures and presentations
in Head Office. And information is readily available on the Defence
Intranet and in the Head Office library based in Defence Main
Building, including a growing repository of documents covering
strategic and organisational decision-making and lessons, and
links to each of the Historical Branches and operational lessons
teams.
The programme to formalise a Policy
profession within the Civil Service includes training on a holistic
approach to policy and strategy - in Defence known as the Defence
Policy Guide - which encourages professionals to draw on history
and past lessons as a routine part of their work. Defence Academy
courses make extensive use of historical case studies to illuminate
contemporary and potential future strategic challenges. The MOD
is currently engaging with the Institute for Government on its
work to consider how history can be better exploited within policy
making and will continue to take a close interest in how we can
do that, and whether or not it is appropriate for the White Paper
to convey how this will be done.
Process
20. We see much advantage in the
widest consultation on the next National Security Strategy and
Defence and Security Review. We have no doubt that the process
would be better if Government thinking were available at an early
stage to enable structured comment. We have already recommended
that the NSS should be published in advance of the DSR. We further
recommend that a National Security Green Paper be issued at an
early stage in the proceedings to provide a framework against
which interested parties may comment. (Paragraph 84)
As stated in the Government's response
to the Report of 11th July 2012 by the Joint Committee
on the National Security Strategy, the Government will be developing
ideas for wider consultation including with external academics,
think tanks and experts. The Government notes the Committee's
recommendations.
21. We consider that there are lessons
for the MoD to learn from the practice of the French Government
in seeking a wide range of input into the reformulation of its
Livre Blanc. Given the importance of allies to the implementation
of both SDSR 2010 and DSR 2015, it is essential that the UK's
key strategic allies are fully engaged in the process from an
early stage. (Paragraph 85)
We accept the Committee's view on the
importance of engaging early with Allies and we will be actively
seeking their views. How and when we will formally engage with
allies as we develop our National Security Strategy and Strategic
Defence and Security Review will be confirmed by the Government
in due course. As the Secretary of State for Defence noted in
giving evidence to the Committee, we have already had preliminary
discussions in particular with the US and France following our
engagement in the French Livre Blanc and US Quadrennial Defense
Review processes. We enjoy close working relationships between
our policy, strategy and force planning communities. Our equipment
co-operation programmes, like F-35 with the US and the Future
Anti-Ship Guided Weapon with France, go from strength to strength.
Finally, embedded exchange officers in both policy and operational
posts ensure working-level familiarity. These links provide us
with an ideal basis for consultation with close Allies during
work on the next National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence
and Security Review.
A shadow process and red team challenge
22. Constructive challenge must be
part and parcel of national strategy making. We recommend that
independent groups be set up as soon as possible to provide a
structured "Red Team" challenge to both the National
Security Strategy and Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph
87)
As stated above, no decision has yet
been taken on the scope and process for the next National Security
Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review; but initial
preparatory work is underway and the Government notes the Committee's
recommendation on "Red Team" challenge.
Different government departments already
have a variety of existing approaches to 'Red Team' policy and
strategy which could be considered. For example, MOD uses academic
engagement quite extensively in research and consideration of
policy including through its connections with think tanks like
the Royal United Services Institute. At the strategic level, the
Foreign Secretary already regularly uses a mechanism called 'The
Locarno Group', a trusted group of academics and retired ambassadors
and officials with the express purpose of subjecting FCO analysis
and policy to challenge.
Conclusions
23. Our inquiry has focused on the
need for a truly strategic approach to the next Defence and Security
Review, which integrates the ends of what the UK wants to achieve,
with the ways, outlining the full spectrum of capabilities of
both hard and soft power required, and the means available. This
methodology requires the Government to set out a national strategy
in the National Security Strategy, identifying the UK's position
in the world and how the UK's national interests and obligations
will be upheld in the face of shifting threats and profound geo-political
and geo-economic changes. This document should be published giving
sufficient time to provide the strategic context for the 2015
Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph 88)
24. There is a lack of understanding
amongst the public of what HM Armed Forces should be for, and
this represents one of the greatest strategic threats facing the
Armed Forces. Public sympathy and support for the Armed Forces
is to be welcomed, but it must not obscure or undermine a hard-headed
understanding of what they are for. The process of producing the
next Defence and Security Review, shaped by the next National
Security Strategy, is the opportunity to engage the public in
understanding the future of the Armed Forces. Parliament and this
Committee, in partnership with the Ministry of Defence, have an
important role in debating and explaining the case for defence
to the public at large. For this reason, we have made a number
of recommendations around the process for preparation of the next
Defence and Security Review to ensure that it is inclusive, is
informed by full historical analysis, and is subject to robust
internal and external challenge. (Paragraph 89)
The Committee will understand that the
content and conduct of the next Review remains 'to be confirmed',
as it spans the period of the next election.
The last National Security Strategy
and Strategic Defence and Security Review confronted the issues
facing Defence and National Security in 2010. As we noted above,
it articulated a clear over-arching vision to build Britain's
prosperity, extend our nation's influence in the world and strengthen
our security in the face of the changing strategic environment
and risks to our security. Recognising our national security depends
on our economic strength, and vice versa, it set out strategic
objectives of ensuring domestic security and resilience, and shaping
a stable world.
We welcome and note the Committee's
recommendations and will consider them as we move towards the
next Review. We are making progress on a number of areas: for
example, our use of history, our strategic training, and in our
approach to the emerging cross government preparatory work for
the next Review, with which we will build on the solid approach
of the last review. This will ensure we continue to make the most
effective decisions for the national security of the UK.
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