4 Preparations for the next DSR
Strategic skills
68. The Public Administration Select Committee
has criticised the levels of skills in strategic thinking across
Whitehall and called for a capability review of strategic thinking
capacity in Whitehall.[70]
Frank Ledwidge spoke of the need to ensure that real expertise
informed the work of the NSC, arguing that "that means that
the National Security Council [...] opens itself up to real expertise.
For example, on Syria, I am wondering how many serious academics
have been asked in to discuss policy there—to give briefings
and lectures and to write papers. The answer, I suspect, is none
at all".[71] He
was also critical of the strategic training provided at higher
command staff colleges, suggesting that it did not encourage challenge.
He compared it to "a theological college: you go in and are
given the answers, and then you are told what the questions are".[72]
69. Edward Ferguson noted that he, in addition
to a number of staff in the Cabinet Office and the National Security
Secretariat, had undertaken the masters course in strategy at
the LSE.[73] In addition,
a number of military staff had completed the advanced command
and staff course, which included an element in strategic training.
We believe that these efforts are welcome but not enough to enhance
strategic capability.
70. We call on the MOD to provide
us with an update on education and skills training in strategy
offered to senior officers and officials, both within the Defence
Academy and at other institutions.
Accurate and timely historical
analysis
71. Mungo Melvin drew our attention to an institutional
failure in the MoD and Government properly to draw together strategic
lessons from previous operations. He told us that
The narratives that should have been written and
the detailed analysis that should have been done have not been
done. This is a strategic gap. It meant that when our forces went
to Iraq in 2003 and asked for the lessons learnt report and the
deep analysis of the Gulf War in 1991, they went to the Army Historical
Branch [...] and found that the work had not been done.[74]
He emphasised the importance of historical lessons
as a basis for challenge in preparing the next SDSR, and regretted
that many of the internal lesson reports from Iraq and Afghanistan
would not be made public.[75]
72. The Ministry of Defence told us that
Each of the Services has its own Historical Branch.
Joint Forces Command is able to call on the services of the most
relevant Historical Branch or, if required, all three. As part
of the Defence Transformation programme, work was undertaken to
examine whether the three Historical Branches remained fit for
purpose or whether there was a case for amalgamating them into
one unit. It was concluded that the current arrangements remain
effective, and recommended a few minor amendments to the Army
Historical Branch, which are currently being reviewed. There are
no plans for a joint Armed Forces Historical Research Centre or
organisation. In addition, the Defence Studies Department of King's
College London, which is an integral part of the Defence Academy's
JSCSC, can also provide historical support to the Department and
to Joint Forces Command (including DCDC). As an example, the Defence
Studies Department includes the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy
Studies; its publishing output aims to promote the understanding
of maritime history and policy.[76]
73. We understand that the Army Historical Branch
is in fact part of the Ministry of Defence's Corporate Memory
function, and is not part of the Army's General Staff, in contrast
with the naval and air historical branches that continue to support
their Services directly. We also understand that recommendations
have been made in the past to establish an Army Historical Research
Centre at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, exploiting the
academic expertise on site but these have not been acted upon.
74. Professor Cornish argued that there was an
enormous amount more that could be done to gather the lessons
of history and that the Army Historical Branch was not doing all
that it could. Frank Ledwidge spoke of the case for "mainstreaming
history into the way we make strategy".[77]
We understand that since the Second World War only two campaign
histories have been published (on Korea and the Falklands) and
there have been no official accounts of military operations associated
with other campaigns including Northern Ireland, the First Gulf
War (1990-91) or the Balkans (1992 onwards), nor has anything
been published on the 'grand strategy' associated with these conflicts
and campaigns. Thus there is an enormous deficit of official historical
research and analysis that contrasts poorly with the huge efforts
made after the Second World War to document both the civilian
and military contributions to the overall war effort, and to capture
the principal strategic lessons learned.
75. It is important that the events are recorded
and the strategic lessons are analysed from both the Iraq and
Afghanistan campaigns. We accept that the Chilcot Inquiry may
address the former, but the latter is surely equally important.
It may well be that the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office
have this matter in hand, but we have received no evidence to
suggest that this is the case. It is important that the history
function within the Ministry of Defence is being performed satisfactorily
and that it is being used systematically to support strategy making.
76. We recommend that the Ministry
of Defence, in close conjunction with the Cabinet Office and National
Security Secretariat, initiate the writing of official histories
of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and of other conflicts since
the end of the Cold War; review how the history function is being
undertaken by all three Services and by the Ministry of Defence
as a whole; and confirm in the 2015 Defence and Security Review
its plans for the preparation and publication of histories and
other measures designed to address these deficiencies. This work
could usefully call on input and expertise from other Government
Departments including the Department for International Development
and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; since the comprehensive
approach became a hallmark of the operations in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, its lessons should be learnt from and shared across
Government as a whole.
Process
77. The National Security Adviser told us that
there was "no precise timetable" for the production
of the NSS,[78] and that
focus was currently on implementation of the 2010 SDSR rather
than on preparation for DSR 2015.[79]
The Oxford Research Group called on us to do all we could to encourage
the Government to "prioritise the updating of the NSS over
the period of 2013-14 so that this document can genuinely inform
the 2015 SDSR and give it a strong strategic rationale".[80]
We support this view.
78. The Ministry of Defence informed us that
Initial preparatory work towards the next National
Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review
(SDSR) is already underway across Whitehall. Although at an early
stage, this includes identification and analysis of the key questions
that may need to be addressed in 2015, based upon an examination
of what has changed in the strategic context, and of any lessons
learned, since 2010. This will enable consideration of whether
any shifts in policy, approach or capabilities may be required
in order to protect and promote HMG's national security interests.
This work is being led by the Cabinet Office, including through
the cross-government National Security Strategy Network, and falls
under the auspices of the National Security Council.
Professor Hennessy noted that the Cabinet Office
was "firmly in the lead" on the SDSR but that the MoD
was further ahead than other Departments in preparing its contribution.[81]
79. Edward Ferguson explained further the input
of the Defence Strategy Group in working on preparations for SDSR
2015
"Organising Defence's Contribution to National
Strategy" [...] set out how we try to—the DSG is really
where this happens—fuse together the corporate strategy
function that the PUS owns with the military strategy function
that the Chief of the Defence Staff owns, along with the politico-military
strategy function, which is the exertion of influence that is
jointly owned between them, into something called defence strategy.
That comes together in that group, which they jointly chair. That
is important, because it is a forum where we can do the fusion
of ends, ways and means, and it brings together the people who
are capable of doing that. The discussions there have worked pretty
well.[82]
80. Witnesses emphasised the importance of consultation
and an open approach to taking this work forward. We asked MoD
what plans there were for consultation and Edward Ferguson replied:
the broader cross-Government approach—the engagement
approach—is yet to be determined. In the Ministry of Defence
and within the early preparatory work that we have been talking
about, we have been doing quite a lot of outreach and external
engagement. We have run a number of conferences—most recently,
at the Royal College of Defence Studies, with about 80 experts
from industry, academia and other areas coming to talk about the
implications of technology change, for example. [...] We have
been trying to make sure that we bring in a cross-section of views,
but again, this is really just the in-house Ministry of Defence
work.[83]
In our first report on the SDSR 2010, we raised concerns
that the "inclusion of broadly defined security concerns
within the review does [...] risk the dilution of the defence
contribution".[84]
81. The previous Government published a Green
Paper focused on defence in February 2010. The Deputy National
Security Adviser told us that no decision had yet been made as
to whether there would be a Green Paper produced this time.[85]
The Secretary of State noted that decisions on the process for
incorporating views from outside Government, including the inclusion
of views from other political parties, had not yet been defined,
and that this was a matter on which the Cabinet Office would be
taking the lead.[86]
The decision as to whether or not a Green Paper was produced would
be for the Prime Minister to decide.[87]
82. An important theme in this inquiry has been
the importance of the UK's strategic relationships, not just in
relation to the UK's global posture but in relation to the delivery
of capability. DefenceSynergia noted that
A fundamental assumption in both NSS and SDSR continues
to be that most operations will be conducted with allies.[88]
83. We asked the Secretary of State about the
degree of co-operation with the US and other allies in the process
of drawing up the NSS and the DSR. Edward Ferguson told us that
he had strong links with the office of the US Secretary of Defence
for Strategy and a strong relationship with the Dlégation
aux Affaires Stratégiques in France, which had a central
role in strategic development in France.[89]
The Secretary of State added that
If we are going to work closely with allies in future—principally
the US and France—it is clearly vital that we have a similar
strategic view of the world. As you will know, the British ambassador
to France participated in the French Livre Blanc process, and
we discovered, not to our surprise but to our great pleasure,
that the French strategic analysis is almost identical to our
own, which bodes extremely well for our ability to co-operate
in future to develop joint approaches to challenges in the world
and joint force responses.[90]
84. We see much advantage in
the widest consultation on the next National Security Strategy
and Defence and Security Review. We have no doubt that the process
would be better if Government thinking were available at an early
stage to enable structured comment. We have already recommended
that the NSS should be published in advance of the DSR. We further
recommend that a National Security Green Paper be issued at an
early stage in the proceedings to provide a framework against
which interested parties may comment.
85. We consider that there are
lessons for the MoD to learn from the practice of the French Government
in seeking a wide range of input into the reformulation of its
Livre Blanc. Given the importance of allies to
the implementation of both SDSR 2010 and DSR 2015, it is essential
that the UK's key strategic allies are fully engaged in the process
from an early stage.
A shadow process and red team
challenge
86. Professor Lindley-French made the case for
a "shadow SDSR" process run by external experts and
a similar process for the NSS.[91]
Commodore Jermy suggested setting up a "red team" to
provide external challenge, reporting to the NSC and to this Committee
[92] Edward Ferguson
maintained that the DCDC had taken on the "red teaming"
function; he emphasised that the Ministry of Defence was endeavouring
to build challenge into the process of drawing up the SDSR and
had been working to improve "red teaming" training amongst
head office staff.
87. Constructive challenge must
be part and parcel of national strategy making. We recommend that
independent groups be set up as soon as possible to provide a
structured "Red Team" challenge to both the National
Security Strategy and Defence and Security Review.
70 Public Administration Committee, Strategic thinking
in Government: without National Strategy can viable Government
strategy emerge?, paragraph 66. Back
71
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72
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Q4 Back
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Ev w7 Back
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84
First Report of Session 2010-12, HC 345, paragraph 8 Back
85
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88
Ev 5 Back
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