Defence Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence
1. What work is currently being done both in the MoD and in other Departments in preparation for the next SDSR? How is it co-ordinated? How many staff (fte), and of what grades are involved? How many MOD personnel and of what rank have strategy as part of their job titles? What external consultations are being carried out?
Initial preparatory work towards the next National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is already underway across Whitehall. Although at an early stage, this includes identification and analysis of the key questions that may need to be addressed in 2015, based upon an examination of what has changed in the strategic context, and of any lessons learned, since 2010. This will enable consideration of whether any shifts in policy, approach or capabilities may be required in order to protect and promote HMG’s national security interests. This work is being led by the Cabinet Office, including through the cross-government National Security Strategy Network, and falls under the auspices of the National Security Council.
In support of the Cabinet Office-led process, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is undertaking a well-defined programme of research and activity to understand the future strategic context, examine policy options and to test the continued validity of Future Force 2020. This is designed to build an evidence base that will support decision-making in the next NSS and SDSR, and is being closely co-ordinated with other government departments, international partners and external experts. In keeping with the Civil Service Reform Plan’s commitment to open policy making, this includes engagement with numerous academics and subject matter experts in think tanks, universities, industry and non-governmental organisations.
This work is being overseen in the MOD by the Defence Strategy Group, which is co-chaired by the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Chief of Defence Staff. The Group looks beyond the immediate annual budgetary cycle to drive coherence between medium and long-term strategic direction, policy and planning. The Group focuses, in particular, on the 5 to 20 year time horizon in order to ensure consistency with the biennial National Security Risk Assessment process, which will underpin the NSS in 2015, and to which Defence is a major contributor alongside other Government Departments.
The Defence Strategy and Priorities (DSP) team is co-ordinating MOD’s preparatory work for the 2015 NSS and SDSR, on behalf of the Defence Strategy Group and under the newly-established Director Defence Strategy. As well as commissioning and managing work from across the MOD, DSP is around halfway through its own two-year programme of regional and thematic strategic studies. These analyse the geostrategic environment out to 2035 and explore the resultant policy choices and options, which in due course will help to inform resource allocation, force structure and capability development decisions.
DSP draws heavily upon bespoke horizon scanning led by the MOD’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), which is now part of Joint Forces Command. In turn, this is closely co-ordinated with wider cross-government horizon scanning under the auspices of the new Cabinet Secretary’s Advisory Group. Work on the next iteration of DCDC’s flagship Global Strategic Trends document is now underway, and is due to be published in mid-2014. DCDC is also leading work on behalf of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff to explore and develop new strategic and operational concepts for the Armed Forces, following their withdrawal from Afghanistan. In aggregate, this futures and concepts work will provide much of the overarching context for the 2015 NSS and SDSR.
MOD’s preparations for the 2015 NSS and SDSR also include the Strategic Force Development and Balance of Investment processes. These activities are conducted to determine which capabilities, such as personnel and equipment, Defence needs to deliver its policy baseline. This is an iterative methodology, balancing potential policy aspirations with the available resources. The Strategic Force Development process uses existing 2*-level military headquarters to test the capability and resilience of Future Force 2020 against a broad range of illustrative scenarios, operational environments and mission types, thereby identifying any areas of affluence or shortfall within the future force structure. This process is approximately halfway to completion, and will conclude well in advance of the 2015 NSS and SDSR. The Balance of Investment (BoI) programme also considers the key drivers and constraints on the Defence programme, across all aspects of capability, and links proposed spending to potential benefits. In so doing, the BoI work prioritises the Defence programme, highlighting those options that deliver best value for money. It achieves this by considering the Defence Outputs (eg Military Tasks) alongside other factors, such as Defence industrial capacity and dependencies on Allies and partners.
2. May the Committee have a copy of the Report “Enhancing Strategic Capability”, prepared by Major-General Mungo Melvin and presented to the Defence Transformation Board in 2011? What progress has been made in implementing the recommendations of the Report?
Major-General Melvin’s report on Enhancing Strategic Capability was one of many inputs that informed the work of Lord Levene’s Defence Reform Unit. As such, it was part of the process of internal thinking that led up to the final Defence Reform conclusions and recommendations, and was considered in that context. We are not tracking whether or not the report’s recommendations have been implemented and it would not therefore be appropriate to publish it. The Secretary of State will report to Parliament in the autumn regarding Lord Levene’s annual review of progress on Defence Reform implementation.
In creating a smaller, stronger and more strategic Head Office under the new Defence Operating Model that came into force in April 2013, as called for by Lord Levene, we have made considerable progress in enhancing our strategic capability. This includes:
Re-defining Defence strategy and its component parts—corporate strategy, pol/mil strategy and military strategy—in the paper entitled Organising Defence’s Contribution to National Strategy, which has already been shared with the Committee. This approach has been assimilated into the MOD’s new operating model and its principles embedded in the Defence Academy’s various syllabi.
Establishing the aforementioned Defence Strategy Group, to advise the Defence Secretary on strategic issues. This Group has met 13 times since its creation in December 2011, considering issues as diverse as the future of transatlantic and European security co-operation, the implications of China’s rise, future intelligence priorities, the Middle East and North Africa, strategic force development and ballistic missile defence. This has strengthened significantly the MOD’s strategic architecture.
Establishing the new Director Defence Strategy post in MOD Head Office.
Expanding the role of DCDS(Military Strategy & Operations) and establishing the 2* ACDS(Military Strategy), under which there is also a clearer 1* lead for Military Strategic Planning. This has improved the MOD’s ability to plan for emerging threats and crises.
Agreeing and implementing the MOD/FCO International Defence Engagement Strategy. This sits at the heart of the department’s pol-mil strategy and has brought greater coherence and more effective long-term planning to defence activity overseas.
Launching the new Policy, Strategy and Parliamentary profession in MOD, as part of the cross-government Policy Profession, to ensure that civil servants have the right skills, training and education to develop and deliver effective policy and strategy.
Holding regular seminars at the Royal College of Defence Studies to encourage broader, more strategic thinking and to provide valuable training opportunities for staff across the Security Policy and Operations organisation within MOD Head Office.
3. What training and practice in strategic thinking do military personnel receive?
The Defence Academy provides education and training in strategic thinking for military personnel and Defence civil servants. The main intervention is provided through the International Course of the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS). This is designed to prepare selected senior military officers and officials for high-level leadership and management roles, including appointments in the MOD, international organisations and other functions in which strategic thinking is required. The Course seeks to develop strategic understanding and build the capacity for strategic thinking through rigorous analysis of the international security environment; the levers that provide for security, stability and prosperity, and the key tenets of leadership at the national strategic level. The International Course runs for one academic year and includes practical application through strategic analysis and table top exercises. Typically, about 35 UK military officers and 3–4 Defence civil servants undertake the Course. Academic support is provided by King’s College London. The RCDS also provides other opportunities (such as evening seminars) for personnel to discuss strategic themes.
Elsewhere in the Defence Academy, the training delivered by the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) includes education on the strategic context. Attendance on the Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC) and the Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC) is selective: about 24 UK military officers and 5–6 civil servants from the MOD and wider national security community attend the HCSC; and about 180 UK military officers attend the ACSC. Both courses place a premium on developing and refining critical thinking and decision-making skills, and include extensive table top exercises. As a result of changes since 2011, Defence strategy now features more prominently in the Advanced Command and Staff Course syllabus.
4. What plans has the MOD, either solely or in conjunction with the NSC and other departments, to produce a strategic lessons report covering high-level decision-making, operations and activities in Iraq and Afghanistan over the period 2002–2014? How will such analysis, if conducted, feed into SDSR 2015?
The Directorate of Operational Capability (DOC) has produced four classified reports covering the lessons to be learnt from the entirety of the Iraq Campaign, and is currently in the process of producing a report on operations in Afghanistan. These reports are deliberately focused on operational lessons, but also touch upon policy issues. The DOC team is currently working on volume five of what is expected to conclude as a series of seven.
Within Defence’s new organisational construct, Joint Forces Command’s (JFC) Director of Joint Warfare is responsible for strategic lessons. The Defence Strategy Group’s terms of reference encompass oversight of strategic lessons and the Group will therefore, in conjunction with JFC, have a number of opportunities to consider these issues in the run up to the SDSR in 2015.
5. What plans are there within the MOD—in association with the Cabinet Office and NSC—for writing an official history to cover operations and activities in Iraq from 1991 to 2008, and that in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014? Is the MOD working with the FCO on such projects already, and if not, is this being considered? If not, why not?
The UK Government’s official history programme is overseen by the Cabinet Office which, in consultation with other relevant Government Departments, nominates subject areas and then commissions the appropriate authors. Official histories are not the only source of information on past operations, but they aim to provide the definitive official perspective regarding the events that took place. Consequently, they need to be written quite some time after the event in question to ensure that they are as complete and objective as possible. This means that the lead times for commissioning them can be quite long. For example, the Falklands Islands official history was published in 2005, some 23 years after the conflict. It should also be noted that this was a government-wide history of the crisis and conflict, not just of the military operations. This was very different from the military-centric official histories of the First and Second World Wars, for which the lead times were shorter. For further details concerning the future of the official history programme, I would refer Committee members to the Cabinet Office.
6. What historical support does each of the Services receive? Who supports Joint Forces Command? Are there plans for a joint Armed Forces Historical Research Centre? Could this feature in SDSR 2015 as a capability enhancement?
Each of the Services has its own Historical Branch. Joint Forces Command is able to call on the services of the most relevant Historical Branch or, if required, all three. As part of the Defence Transformation programme, work was undertaken to examine whether the three Historical Branches remained fit for purpose or whether there was a case for amalgamating them into one unit. It was concluded that the current arrangements remain effective, and recommended a few minor amendments to the Army Historical Branch, which are currently being reviewed. There are no plans for a joint Armed Forces Historical Research Centre or organisation. In addition, the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, which is an integral part of the Defence Academy’s JSCSC, can also provide historical support to the Department and to Joint Forces Command (including DCDC). As an example, the Defence Studies Department includes the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies; its publishing output aims to promote the understanding of maritime history and policy.
7. What capability within the MOD now exists to cover the work previously conducted by the former Conflict Studies Research Centre and the Advanced Research and Assessment Group at the Defence Academy? How will any observed deficiencies be addressed in the SDSR 2015?
The MOD has a wide array of capabilities at its disposal in order to analyse current threats, future risks and the longer-term strategic and operational environments. The Defence Academy’s academic partners—King’s College London and Cranfield University—undertake research and the Academy recently refreshed the arrangements through which the MOD (and other Government Departments) can propose or sponsor research by the Academy’s significant number of Master’s degree students. Other key sources of expertise include: the Defence Intelligence organisation, which provides all-source threat assessments to the MOD and other Government Departments; Defence Strategy and Priorities which, as outlined above, is undertaking a programme of strategic studies in preparation for the next NSS and SDSR; and DCDC, which produces concepts and doctrine, synthesises operational lessons and identifies future trends, all underpinned by thorough research and experimentation. In addition, the MOD has access to an extensive range of external sources. This includes corporate membership of several major Think Tanks and increasingly close engagement with a network of academics and subject matter experts, in accordance with the Civil Service Reform Plan’s commitment to open policy making.
8. I understand the Cabinet Office has reported on the implementation of the Levene reforms. If it is within the power of the MoD to let the Committee see it, they would be grateful. If it is not, I will approach the Cabinet Office.
Having consulted the Cabinet Office, which sets cross-Government policy in respect of maintaining the integrity of the Gateway Review process, we have concluded that the level of redaction necessary to enable release of this report to the Committee would make it meaningless. As the Committee will be aware, however, in November 2012 the Defence Secretary published Lord Levene’s first annual review of progress towards implementing the recommendations of the Defence Reform Review. Lord Levene’s letter to the Secretary of State for Defence, and the associated assessment against each of the recommendations, can be accessed online (via https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-reform-an-independent-report-into-the-structure-and-management-of-the-ministry-of-defence--2). The Cabinet Office also publishes an annual report on the implementation of the 2010 NSS and SDSR; the most recent was released in November 2012, and is available online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/83775/121128-Annual-Report-to-Parliament-on-NSS-and-SDSR.pdf.
July 2013