Defence Written evidence from Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

Introduction

1. In addressing the next Defence and Security Review it may be helpful to establish a context relating to experience from the defence postures and operations of recent years. This could usefully involve recognition of deficiencies, especially those that may limit capabilities for operations in the future.

2. It is also appropriate to reflect on broadly-based developments in the evolution of the world-wide security environment in relation to Britain’s limited but still significant potential for contributing to a more peaceful world.

3. In terms of the experience of recent years it is convenient to summarise issues under three headings—acquisition, deployment and operational experience.

Acquisition

4. There remains an enduring and deep-seated problem in the area of defence equipment development and acquisition which has led to entirely unacceptable performances, cost overruns and cancellations, the Nimrod MRA4 experience being the best-known example. There is perhaps an understandable assumption that when a scandal such as the MRA4 breaks, corrections are then put in place which prevent or at least greatly limit future problems. Whether this is actually the case would be well worth exploring, including the inviting of evidence from appropriate sources of expertise. A starting point might be an exploration of the pervasive “revolving door” process of senior uniformed and civilian R&D and procurement officials moving after retirement to second careers in the defence industries.

Deployment

5. Decisions relating to deployment and posture affect all the services, but the Royal Navy presents a particular circumstance. The effect of past decisions on naval equipment means that by early in the 2020s the Royal Navy will essentially be a “two-ship navy”—it will be able to deploy a single SSBN on continuous at sea deterrence (CASD) and a carrier task group centred on a Queen Elizabeth-class boat. Very little else of substance will be possible. Given the heavy capital and recurrent expenditures on these two programmes it is far from clear, for example, that funds will be available to replace current amphibious capabilities at a similar level of activity.

6. Ensuring an SSBN/CASD system, bearing in mind the expensive requirements for deterrence support (SSNs etc) will involve the new generation SSBN programme and much else besides. Cost estimates for Trident replacement are, to put it kindly, somewhat opaque and rarely include deterrence support costs, nor do they take in AWE capital and running costs that are reported to exceed £1 billion p.a.

7. The decision to build two very large fleet carriers and contribute to the F-35 development was a huge mistake at the time and it is regrettable that no government has subsequently felt able to face up to this. As the carrier programme evolves, with its own costly changes and at a time of continuing financial constraints, it will come to dominate the capabilities of the surface navy. A deployed carrier task group will require escort/auxiliary/SSN support that will utilise much of the limited resources the Navy will have by that time, not least because of the rapid decline in numbers of deployable escorts.

8. The next DSR should, as a matter of urgency, review both programmes including the possibility of cancellation or seriously radical revision, there being interesting and relevant options in both case.

9. Linked to the carrier programme should be a review of the overall F-35 programme and its potential cancellation and replacement by available alternatives.

Operational Experience

10. Operations over the past decade have involved two substantial but disastrous long-term deployments, in Iraq and Afghanistan. It should be stressed that by no means all the responsibility for these operations lies with the MoD and the serving military since the decisions in both cases were essentially political. At the same time, questions should be raised concerning the responsibility of the defence community to “speak truth to power” when high level political leadership is proposing and ordering inadvisable military operations.

11. The forceful and rapid termination of the Taliban regime in 2001 was followed by a catastrophic failure to listen to sound advice on post-conflict stabilisation and peace-building, in spite of the availability of first-class expertise. As a result a bitter and protracted insurgency was able to develop which has resulted in a war lasting well over a decade. A politically necessary withdrawal is now in progress with an uncertain outcome but one that is very likely to involve a Taliban role in Afghan governance.

12. The forceful and rapid termination of the Saddam Hussein regime was followed by the early development of armed and violent opposition hugely complicated by deep inter-confessional violence which the occupying forces singularly failed to address despite treaty obligations. Iraq remains in a state of serious instability while the influence of Iran in the region has actually increased, heightening the impact of the Saudi/Iranian proxy element in the Syrian war which is hugely limiting international efforts to contain that conflict.

13. While the termination of the Gaddafi regime in Tripoli was widely welcomed there has been little recognition of three problems that have arisen:

the rise of the militias within the country,

the export of conflict to Mali, and

the impact of the termination on WMD proliferation.

14. In relation to the third point, opinion formers in Tehran and Pyongyang have seen their states described by the world’s sole superpower as members of an axis of evil threatening that superpower which has the right to pre-empt such threats. They then saw regime termination in Iraq where no WMD was found, followed Libya, the latter having earlier renounced its WMD programme.

15. Afghanistan and Iraq both require a much more hard-headed acknowledgement of the outcomes. Even the generally supported NATO actions in Libya are worthy of analysis as to their untoward and apparently unforeseen consequences.

16. The motivation for the Afghanistan and Iraq operations was primarily to destroy the al-Qaida movement and by 2010, and in spite of continuing violence in Afghanistan and Iraq, many analysts took the view that the al-Qaida movement was so diminished that it was of very little significance.

17. It can be argued that this was a thoroughly inadequate and premature analysis. In the past three years it has become clear that while a narrowly hierarchical and closely structured al-Qaida entity in Pakistan has been weakened and dispersed, the al-Qaida idea has retained a potency that attracts support in a number of states.

18. Current activity is at a low level in Pakistan but involves significant groups in Iraq and Yemen. A related movement in Somalia has recently experienced some reversals but still controls substantial rural areas while the “Swahili coast” in Kenya and Tanzania has experienced a rise in Islamist support.

17. In West Africa, Nigeria is experiencing a complex and violent uprising centred primarily on the Boko Haram and Ansaru movements, there is an ongoing conflict in Mali and activity in Niger and Mauretania.

18. Perhaps most significant of all is the major role that jihadist paramilitaries are now playing in the Syrian civil war were their undoubted combat skills mean that they are disproportionately significant in gaining territory and even in leading less radical elements of the insurgency. It is ironic that some jihadists fighting the Assad regime gained their combat experience against coalition forces in Iraq in the mid-2000s.

19. Given these experience there is a strong case for a single, thorough and wide-ranging review of the experiences of the period since 2001 involving a robust analysis of the reasons for the failures so that lessons might be learnt in preparation for the forthcoming DSR. In particular there still seems virtually no recognition of the eschatological nature of the al-Qaida movement, a result being that short-term policy making with regard to the movement is thoroughly inadequate.

New Challenges

20. Studies by DCDC and by independent think tanks (such as Oxford Research Group and New Economics Foundation) suggest that the most significant challenges facing global security stem from the interaction of socio-economic divisions and environmental constraints, the most important of the latter being climate disruption.

21. Socio-economic divisions and the rise of knowledgeable but relatively marginalised majorities are leading to clear examples of “revolts from the margins” such as the Naxalites in India and Boko Haram in Nigeria. These are the results of current trends before climate disruption begins to have major effects. As that happens, existing radical and often extreme social movements may rapidly become some of the most serious threats to international peace and security as heavily populated regions become even more marginalised.

22. It is at first sight reasonable to see this evolving world disorder as a threat which must be met with appropriate defences, but unless climate disruption is prevented, not least by moving rapidly to ultra-low carbon economies, then defences are essentially short-term responses that are of little relevance in the long term. The fundamental problems will just get worse and therefore must be addressed.

23. Responding to new security challenges properly falls within the remit of the DSR but understanding them goes much further than conventional security analysis. It requires thoroughly integrated multidisciplinary analysis and policy formulation that requires cross-government coordination of a kind which does not currently exist.

24. There are good analytical teams in the MoD, FCO and DfID, but insufficient cross-fertilisation of analysis. Furthermore, they work primarily in terms of short timescales, with much of their time spent in necessarily responding to immediate ministerial requirements.

25. Furthermore, there is even less in the way of inputs from other branches of government concerned with economic and environmental issues. While the Cabinet Office has a consistently impressive staff, as do the intelligence agencies, they all tend primarily to focus on the short term, measured in weeks, months or years rather than decades.

26. There is an urgent need for a new policy mechanism that goes beyond what is currently available within government, and this should also be reflected in the work of Parliamentary Select Committees. There is thus a case for any consideration of the DSR to be undertaken, at least in part, by a specially convened Committee drawn from existing memberships of Select Committees.

Conclusion

27. The Committee might wish to consider a special committee intended to undertake a wide-ranging study of the security environment as it relates to the DSR. While this should feed into a broad analysis which might make recommendations across government, the Defence Select Committee might subsequently examine the recommendations in relation specifically to the Ministry of Defence.

28. As well as encouraging a much more robust control of the development of new projects the Committee might also consider taking a hard look at the SSBN programme, the carrier programme and the F-35. It is difficult to see how any of these relate sufficiently to the security challenges that the UK and its allies are likely to face in the next two to three decades.

April 2013