Defence Written evidence from Admiral Sir John Woodward GBE KCB
This Submission is supported by:
Admiral Sir Michael Layard KCB, CBE.
Major General Julian H A Thompson CB OBE Royal Marines.
Rear Admiral Jeremy Larken DSO.
Subject
This Submission will address the following Areas of Interest iterated by the Committee:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
Having done so it will briefly address:
F.
G.
Executive Summary
(i) The Defence Committee new Inquiry: “Towards the next Defence and Security Review” is understood to embrace cost as well as operational effectiveness. This Submission provides an objective assessment of each measure of effectiveness regarding the specific Areas of Interest raised and proposes a way ahead that would significantly increase capabilities (over current plans), cost-effectiveness and Armed Forces efficiency with respect to the projection of military power overseas.
(ii) This Submission:
(a)
(b)
(iii) Analysis of each of the five areas of interest presents a persuasive argument for a balanced and better-resourced Fleet including a well-equipped air group for each of our new strike carriers.
(iv) It provides a compelling operational and fiscal case for completely revising:
(a)
(b)
(v) It recognises that responses to the Committee’s specific areas of interest must also express wider arguments concerning the state of UK’s Armed Services consequent upon SDSR 2010 and subsequent decisions.
(vi) It concludes that under current circumstances and plans, Britain will be unable to effectively Deter, Contain, Intervene against or Influence some of those that would do us harm. Without the Hard Power and latent Force represented by a genuine Carrier Strike Capability, the projection of effective British political influence and military power on the world stage will not be as effective or potentially possible and we shall not be able to protect our vital Maritime interests—including our energy supplies.
Introduction
1. The Committee is wise to undertake this review of the wider implications of SDSR 2010 and subsequent related decisions.
2. Hitherto, the British Armed Services have had robust resources to deploy flexibly and effectively on a global basis, adapting to the special circumstances. It is now questionable whether the UK has retained such capabilities.
3. That neither Libya nor the so-called “Arab Spring” (instability across the Middle East) were predicted as Strategic Assumptions by SDSR 2010 poses grave questions of the National Security Strategy (NSS) planners who apparently chose to ignore such hidden risks. It calls into question the very basis of the SDSR and most crucially its decision to place the Armed Forces effectively “in limbo” until 2020.
4. It is therefore, respectfully submitted that the Committee will wish to note the fundamental importance of degraded national Defence capabilities and expectations.
5. A further question that over-arches the specific areas of review is: “How can we ensure a more cost-effective and operationally effective global capability for our Armed Forces in the future?”
The Areas of Interest
A. The strategic balance between deterrence, containment, intervention and influence
The Objective
6. It is assumed that the Committee’s reference to “strategic balance” takes into full account the fundamentals of cost and capability for the effective protection of the National Interest.
7. Historically, the four factors Deterrence, Containment, Intervention and Influence have reflected Britain’s ability to deploy effective and visible military power on a global basis. One of the major weapons platforms through which this has been achieved has been the aircraft carrier and associated naval forces. (See Annex A for a history of such effectiveness) The other effective weapons platform is, of course, the SSBN/Nuclear Deterrent.
Deterrence
8. If properly equipped, Britain’s Armed Forces can deter the actions of those that would do us harm through the visible presence of military power and prevent escalation into military combat/war fighting.1
9. In the eyes of rogue States and militant/terrorist groups, military force/power that is not evident within the theatre of dispute is most frequently ignored/disregarded. The most recent evidence of this was when Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. The land-based strategic bombing force of the United States appeared to have had no deterrent value to the Iranian government. However, as soon as one US Carrier Battle Group (CBG) entered the Arabian Gulf and a second stationed itself in the Gulf of Oman, Iran immediately recanted and called for diplomatic negotiation.
10. This ability to deter effectively will be available to Britain when our two new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers are in service but only if they are properly equipped with a balanced air group that can provide full strike carrier capability.2 The embarkation of the F35B STOVL aircraft in our carriers WILL NOT provide Britain with this full carrier strike capability and, through the abnormal configuration of the flight deck with its ramp, would prohibit the embarkation of other vital air group assets such as Air to Air Refuelling, Airborne Early Warning and last but not least Defence Suppression. (See Annex B for justification of this statement.)
Cost and Capability Implications: Deterrence
11. The avoidance of military action through visible military power/deterrence provides for major defence budget and contingency fund saving and at the same time obviates the sacrifice of our armed services’ personnel in combat. It is a “win, win” situation.
12. In seeking to realise such savings, the government would do well to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
13. Of the four factors of interest being addressed by the Committee, effective Deterrence of those that would do us harm would appear to be deserving of top priority investment in that the right investment provides for the solution to the other three factors: Containment, Intervention and Influence.
Containment
14. It is a logical sequitur that if one can provide Deterrence through the projection of visible effective military power, the containment of a threat to our global National Interests can best be addressed and achieved through the same military means, ie naval forces including submarines and surface warships centred on a strike carrier battle group.
Intervention
15. Although it is quite unlikely that Britain will wish to place “boots on the ground” in trouble spots that threaten our trade, energy supplies and national interests, the availability of the capability to do so rapidly and effectively is likely to deter the need for such intervention or, at worst, enable the rapid and effective implementation of such intervention.
16. This is why Britain needs a strong deployable force (Royal Marine Corps) and a substantial capability for amphibious operations which we do not presently enjoy. The threat of Intervention posed by these capabilities to those that would do us harm acts as a further significant deterrent and will often prevent the need for escalation into combat/war fighting.4
17. Note. There is a logical picture emerging here that centres upon Britain enjoying the services of effective Maritime military forces rather than land-based air power and ground forces. The existence of the latter two elements of our military capability is not being questioned: but the balance of investment in these elements rather than in flexible and versatile maritime force most certainly is of questionable merit.
Influence
18. Political and military influence on the global stage results from the capability to take effective action to protect one’s national interests. It is not enough to enjoy significant military power without at the same time demonstrating that one is willing to deploy that power when it is needed (as China is doing today). The rapidly changing topography of world politics and diplomacy has created circumstances in which it is clearly unwise to rely totally on an Alliance with others for the projection of that influence.
19. A sobering reminder of this is becoming relevant with respect to the Entente Cordiale. France has a different perspective and different needs from Britain. She is a continental power that does not rely upon the sea for the provision of her trade and energy supplies to the same extent that we do as an Island Nation. That she should now be considering Draconian cuts to her Maritime capability is clear evidence of this and is a timely warning that when Britain needs to project power and influence, the French are unlikely to be able to provide material support. (See Annex D: “Cross-decking Fixed Wing Aircraft Between Aircraft Carriers”, Nov 2010.)
20. Providing that one does enjoy the available power projection capability of Strike Carrier Battle Groups, a further form of supportive and beneficial influence is provided by the continuous deployment of individual warships (destroyers, frigates and/or corvettes) throughout the oceans of the world—whether conducting goodwill missions, disaster relief, anti-piracy and anti-drug patrols, etc.
Discussion of the Strategic Balance
21. Deterrence, Containment, Intervention and Influence all depend upon the ability to project visible military power in a timely and flexible manner. The Secretary of State has stated that such a capability is based upon our emerging carrier strike capability. Which will be “toothless” given the current plans.
22. Whereas this statement is fundamentally correct for the projection of visible/overt military power, the unseen/covert deterrence and military power of our Hunter-Killer submarines (SSNs) and our nuclear deterrent (SSBNs) is equally important for the deterrence of action against our interests by more developed nations (as opposed to rogue nation states).
23. It is therefore critical to the effective defence of our National Interests that Britain enjoys the services of a balanced Fleet. “Paying lip-service to this vital need” for a credible force and capability will not impress or deter those that would do us harm. Failing to attend to this issue of great National import is tantamount to saying to our enemies that “We are ripe for the taking!”
B. The utility of force
Key points
24. “Force” cannot be respected unless it can be brought to bear effectively when needed.
25. Britain, as an Island Nation, relies upon the sea for its global trade, its energy supplies and its continued prosperity. There is therefore a firm need for Britain to be able to show and apply Maritime force on a global basis in the direct protection of these interests.
Discussion
26. The utility of force therefore depends upon:
(a)
(b)
27. Such force cannot be reliably projected globally by land-based air power. Basing rights, over-flight rights and logistic support are the Achilles heels of the latter. The reliable and flexible projection of such power remains the prerogative of a balanced Fleet (see again, Annex A).
28. Our new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier represents a major weapons platform that is globally mobile and therefore satisfies paragraph 26 (a), above.
29. However, current procurement plans for the carrier air group (just the F-35B STOVL) operating from a ramp-fitted deck:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
30. There is an alternative to this “very limited capability” planned way ahead in the form of the F-18 Super Hornet family of aircraft. It has none of the disadvantages presented by the F-35 STOVL/F-35C aircraft and, along with the Hawkeye AEW aircraft will provide our carriers with the required full carrier strike capability. (See Annex B, Executive Summary and main body of text.)
31. Without a change in course, our new carriers will therefore suffer from the same major operational limitations and deficiencies experienced by the Invincible class carriers with Sea Harrier air groups (which led directly to unnecessary loss of life and warship platforms in the Falklands war). With the currently planned air group and flight deck, these new carriers will lack the flexibility and effectiveness expected from a properly equipped Strike Carrier.
C. The legitimacy of force, including the political/military interface, and the changing legal environment
The subjective and the objective viewpoint
32. The legitimacy of force has been a matter of discussion throughout the ages and has generally been subordinated to the interests of the nation applying that force. Legitimacy may be viewed subjectively or objectively.
33. Al Qaeda and its sympathisers take the subjective view that the militant/terrorist actions represent legitimate force because they are supported by the tenets of their religion. It is a twisted viewpoint because, for example, the Koran and Islam does not support or promote the slaughter of innocent men, women or children.
34. At the other end of the scale, Britain took an arguably objective view that she had every right to use force to recover the Falkland Islands after the military invasion by Argentina in 1982. That “objective view” was based on established sovereignty rights and, of particular importance, the right of the Falkland Islanders to self-determination. This view was supported by the United Nations.
35. In a nutshell, it is reasonable to suggest that individual nations should judge the legitimacy of force in the context of self-defence, survival and the right to self-determination.
The political/military interface
36. Military commanders ultimately must carry out the political objective, or resign if they are not prepared to do so; but make it perfectly clear that if the means are not provided, it may fail. A good example is the decision to proceed with the landings in the Falklands without having achieved air superiority. When it became apparent that we would not achieve air superiority before landing, Major General Julian Thompson sent a letter back from Ascension Island to Northwood expressing his concern (see 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands: No Picnic, Pen & Sword 2007, bottom of page 31 and top of page 32). Having registered his concern, he then got on with the task as ordered. (See also the minutes of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC) meeting of 18 May 1982 (this was D minus three), attached at Annex E.)
37. Before a campaign begins, the military leaders must make it clear what the risks are. (See points a. and b., page 5 of 7, DOPC Minutes.) When the action starts, the military may have to calm the fears of the politicians, and be as upbeat as possible without minimizing the seriousness of the situation.
The Changing Legal Environment
38. Winds of change are sweeping the world with major power shifts and uncertainty. One can argue that as a member of NATO, one can interpret the legality of the use of force in accordance with the NATO charter. The same is true for membership of the United Nations and the European Community. Each Organisation can have a different view of the legality of the use of force in a particular situation.
39. It therefore obliges individual nations to judge the legality of the use of force based almost entirely upon their inalienable right to self-defence and self-determination.
D. Lessons learned from current and recent operations
Libya, Afghanistan and the “Arab Spring”
40. Libya operations were initially misguidedly proclaimed a successful vindication of the SDSR 2010 Defence cuts. All that they demonstrated was the UK’s limited ability to deploy force within the European NATO area. It did not demonstrate any ability to project force/influence on a global basis including East of Suez and the South Atlantic.
41. SDSR 2010 seems to have had two over-riding considerations:
(a)
(b)
42. Libya and the Arab Spring have quickly and embarrassingly demonstrated the false premise of the SDSR that UK could safely reduce its Armed Services to a bare minimum (until 2020) and that the risks were acceptable.
43. Libya has further demonstrated that the UK does not have the capacity to act unilaterally or even effectively in the Nation’s interests—albeit where these are shared—nor can reliance be placed upon allies. A main plank of Defence Strategy appears to have been the acceptance not so much of allied assistance as a force multiplier but of near total reliance upon allied military assets. The altogether unreliable response of some NATO partners in Afghanistan ought to have forewarned Defence Planners of this delusion; further proof of this unjustifiable reliance is the possible withdrawal of the French carrier Charles de Gaulle and its Rafale fighters from service in the on-going attempts to save the French economy. This completely destroys the Defence planning assumption that the French carrier will be a credible alternative for UK power projection in the absence of RN sea-air capabilities (until 2020).
44. The SDSR has created significant and serious gaps in the national defence structure of the armed forces (on top of 13 years of persistent cuts and reductions already suffered). It would have been surprising if such deficiencies had not restricted political and military options in Libya, degrading UK’s response and resulting in very significant increases in cost implications.
45. Further, the Libya Operation demonstrated that land-based air power:
(a)
(b)
(c)
46. As a result of the SDSR, it is evident that the UK is rapidly becoming a different nation by default and one less likely to be respected by friends and foes alike. Our strategic reach has been severely curtailed because we will no longer be able to support the United States militarily in the key way which the UK has done for decades. This might put in doubt our position as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council if we become unable even to protect our own dependent territories.
The Role and Configuration of UK’s Land-Based Air Power.
47. It is for consideration that the role and configuration of UK’s air power within Britain’s National Defence Strategy should be urgently reviewed.
Physical Constraints
48. The physical constraints of UK’s air power as configured today make it non-cost-effective and generally inappropriate for overseas operations. It relies entirely upon:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
49. These constraints place strict limits upon the ability of the British Government to project military and political influence overseas with land based air in support of the national interest.
Adaptability
50. It is difficult to understand why the government of the UK, aware of our proud history as an Island Nation whose prosperity will always depend upon global maritime trade, continues to procure land-based fighter aircraft that cannot deploy to or be operated from aircraft carriers.
51. The SDSR 2010 team might well have taken into account such compelling logic. Their initial recommendation (to retain the Harrier in service rather than the non-carrier capable Tornado) bears testament to this. The final decision to withdraw Harrier from service was illogical and wrong because it removed Britain’s capability to project power with a flexible and versatile carrier strike capability in favour of the retention in service of an obsolete aircraft that suffers from all the constraints of paragraph 48, above.
The National Interest
52. The Committee might wish to address the root cause for this misguided SDSR 2010 final recommendation. In doing so, the Committee might also wish to investigate the logic behind the procurement of a non-carrier capable Joint Strike Fighter for the limited role of the air defence of the United Kingdom. Whilst the air defence threat is minimal at this time and likely to remain so for the time being, it cannot be disregarded in the longer term. Should an air threat against the UK become evident, robust and mobile carrier strike groups would represent a considerable deterrent; also enabling the embarkation of aircraft from airfields that may be too easily targeted.
53. In the light of Britain’s global maritime interests, logic and common sense would appear to dictate that all fighter and fighter ground attack aircraft procured for the Armed Services should be capable of embarkation in and operation from the new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. This would allow the cost-effective and operationally effective deployment of under-utilised land-based squadrons in a time of need. We would have one type of very capable strike aircraft operating from both runways and aircraft carriers.
E. The relationship between hard and soft power in terms of influence
Assumption
54. It is assumed that “hard power” may be interpreted as “military power” and that “soft power” refers to non-military means of influence such as “sanctions and foreign aid”.
Discussion
55. Hard Power provides the means to deter and to directly de-escalate confrontations with those that would do us harm. It also provides the means to apply effective and deadly force to oppose and overcome the actions of those that would do us harm.
56. Soft Power is arguably a much less reliable and effective form of influence and unless it has Hard Power behind it to demonstrate resolve is unlikely to produce the required result. Unilaterally applied Soft Power is even more unlikely to lead to positive results.
Sanctions
57. Recent history would suggest that sanctions take a very long time to work if indeed they ever produce the desired effect. There are numerous examples of this in the modern world, including Iran, Burma, North Korea, etc.
58. In each instance, any reluctance or failure to demonstrate the will and intention to use Hard Power if sanctions do not produce the required effect reduces the efficacy of the sanctions.
Foreign aid
59. We live in a very corrupt world where foreign aid, if provided in hard cash, is often/inevitably embezzled by those in a position of power (whether in Palestine, Egypt or elsewhere). And where there are no tight strings attached to the determinate use of such aid, the recipients often continue to metaphorically “bite the hand that feeds them”—as is the case in Pakistan, Libya and Egypt.
60. These few examples demonstrate that the giving of aid without appropriate safeguards and strings attached is totally counter-productive.
61. It is also beyond understanding why Britain should give financial aid to wealthy powers such as India, for example, when India is spending equivalent amounts of money procuring arms and weapon systems from China.
F. The “end game”: how do current Government Policies and procurement plans contribute to the effective projection of British political and military power and influence?
62. The concise answer to this question is that, for the most part, current Government Policies and procurement plans DO NOT contribute to the effective projection of British political and military power and influence.
63. It is logical for the Secretary of State to have acknowledged that our new strike carriers are at the heart of Britain’s Strategic Defence Policy. But such acknowledgement lacks integrity and credibility when the vital capability required for our new strike carriers is severely diminished by:
(a)
(b)
64. The F-35B STOVL aircraft of choice brings with it unacceptable flight safety deficiencies and operational limitations that will reduce the Queen Elizabeth capability to that of an Amphibious Support vessel.
65. Of equal importance, this choice of aircraft will cost the British taxpayer and the defence budget approximately £20 billion more than the alternative.
66. This alternative is the F-18 Super Hornet family of aircraft supported by the Hawkeye “mini AWACS” airborne early warning aircraft—which, incidentally, will provide our new carriers with the full carrier strike capability and versatility that should be expected from them. (See Annex B.)
G. Conclusion: The broader implications of failing to invest more efficiently in Maritime power in the context of reacting to instability in the wider region
67. The possible/threatened re-organisation and downsizing of the French military Armed Forces into a continental rather than Maritime stance leaves Britain without any European ally that can be relied upon to support our global, Island Nation defence interests.
68. Our only true ally that can assist in our need to protect our trade routes, energy supplies and other overseas interests is the United States. But they have made it fairly clear in this time of economic constraint that if European nations, including Britain, are unwilling to invest appropriately for the protection of their national interest and security, then the United States will not be able to provide the overarching Maritime defence umbrella that has hitherto been available.
69. Irrespective of whether the French aircraft carrier survives current defence cuts or not, the principle of relying on a French carrier for pro-British use would appear to be most unwise when:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
70. Under current circumstances and plans, Britain will be unable to Deter, Contain, Intervene against or Influence some of those that would do us harm. Without the Hard Power and latent Force represented by a genuine British Carrier Strike Capability, the projection of British political influence and military power on the world stage will not be as effective or potentially possible and we shall not be able to protect our Maritime interests—including our vital energy supplies.
Annex A
Royal Navy Fixed Wing Carrier Operations since 19485
1. This paper provides a brief outline of 18 events, crises, conflicts and deterrence, in which fixed-wing aircraft carriers were successfully deployed in support of UK Government policy since 1948. They show that the availability of sea-based tactical aviation adds immensely to the nation’s overall deterrent capability. On several occasions no other form of intervention was initially possible. Most significant is the inability of potential aggressors to deter the deployment of aircraft carriers into areas supposedly dominated by land-based aircraft. The myth of vulnerability is belied by experience.
Palestine 1948
2. Naval aircraft from HMS Ocean covered the final evacuation of British forces from Palestine in May 1948. RAF aircraft had already been evacuated and only carrier-borne naval aircraft were capable of providing the protection required.
Korea 1950–53
3. HMS Triumph joined the USS Valley Forge to strike at North Korean targets shortly after N Korea attacked the South in June 1950. The British aircraft carriers Triumph, Theseus, Glory and Ocean provided all the UK’s tactical strike and fighter operations throughout the three years of the war. RAF involvement was limited to transport flights into safe airfields and some flying-boat MPA patrols in the open ocean off Japan. RN carrier aircraft flew thousands of effective sorties.
Suez 1956
4. This was a combined assault on Egypt by British and French carrier-borne and land-based aircraft. In the British operations, the RN deployed three fixed-wing carriers, Eagle, Albion and Bulwark plus two helicopter carriers, Ocean and Theseus. Because of their ability to gain better position the strike carriers reacted more quickly to calls for offensive air support than RAF aircraft in distant Cyprus and Malta. Despite only having one-third of the total British strike fighters embarked, RN strike fighters flew two-thirds of the strike sorties and their aircraft spent longer over the target area. RAF aircraft had long transits from their bases, carried less weapons and could spend little time on task, most of that at high level to conserve fuel.
Levant 1958
5. US/UK assistance sought to protect Lebanon and (land-locked) Jordan against Iraqi aggression. Eagle provided support for airborne and amphibious forces deployed into theatre. RAF transport aircraft flying British troops into Jordan were protected by carrier-borne fighters since RAF fighter bases were too far away for their aircraft to be effective.
Korea 1960
6. UN forces including an RN carrier deployed to the Yellow Sea on exercises aimed at deterring the North from launching a renewed attack on the South. Deterrence succeeded. There was no RAF involvement since no land-bases were close enough.
Kuwait 1961
7. British forces deployed to Kuwait to defend it against threatened Iraqi aggression. HMS Bulwark arrived with 42 RM Commando within 24 hours (since good intelligence had put her in the right place) and used its helicopters to deploy and support them. British troops were flown into Kuwait by RAF transport with only what they stood up in—they had to requisition vehicles and wait for RN amphibious shipping to bring in more. Strike carrier Victorious took several days to arrive with her battle group from the South China Sea but brought the “complete package of power” that subsequently dominated the area. A single RAF Hunter squadron had deployed to Kuwait from Bahrain but lacked fuel, ammunition, spares and most of all GCI radar coverage other than that provided by Bulwark. RAF transport was being used to fly in troops and so none was available to support the Hunters which left once Victorious arrived. The need for the RN to support land-based aircraft led to the second commando-carrier, Albion, being fitted with better surveillance radar (Type 965).
Confrontation with Indonesia 1963–66
8. Britain and the Commonwealth supported the Malaysian Government against Indonesian aggression and deployed forces from all three Services. The Far East Fleet provided a considerable deterrent against Indonesian escalation and the presence of its strike carriers posed a threat that Indonesia could not counter. Carrier and air group transits of high-visibility international waters such as the Sunda Strait added to their deterrence value. Land-based air could not provide such a visible deterrent.
9. A decisive role in support of the Royal Marines and Army was played by the Navy’s Commando Helicopters flying several thousands of hours operating from Albion and Bulwark in succession and mostly from Forward Air Bases ashore in unusually demanding conditions over a period of four to five years.
10. The Air Force had a presence of Whirlwind and Belvedere helicopters and Twin Pioneers. But the RAF’s refusal to delegate operational control of helicopter tasking to the Ground Commander and the strict observance of RAF aircrew duty time or monthly aircraft flying hours limits were great obstacles to their effectiveness. In contrast Naval helicopter squadrons had great rapport with the Army and Royal Marines and applied practical exceptions to such limitations.
11. The Commando Ship gave invaluable back up for the aircraft deployed ashore and incidentally was the main form of lift for RAF helicopters from Singapore to Borneo.
East African Mutinies 1964
12. Following a mutiny by Tanganyikan Army units in January 1964, Britain was asked to provide assistance. HMS Centaur was at Aden and embarked 45 RN Commando, 16/5 Lancers with their vehicles and two RAF Helicopters in addition to her normal air group. The subsequent assault was “a model of how flexible carriers are and how quickly they can act”. (Another example of RAF being taken into action by an RN carrier.) Centaur was capable of launching her normal air group although at times it would have been a “squeeze”.
Defence of Zambia 1965
13. Following UDI by Rhodesia, the Zambian Government requested air defence arrangements from the UK. HMS Eagle was positioned from 23 November to 7 December 1965 pending the arrival of RAF fighters.
Beira Patrol 1965–66
14. Followed on from Zambia assistance above. Britain undertook to enforce UN sanctions preventing tankers from entering Beira with oil for Rhodesia. Only carriers could search the vast areas of sea involved in the months it took the RAF to build up an MPA base and deploy aircraft to it. Eagle and Ark Royal both involved for considerable periods at sea.
Aden 1967
15. British forces were evacuated from Aden in November 1967 covered by an RN task force off shore. RAF aircraft were among the forces evacuated and therefore relied on RN carrier-borne aircraft for their defence while they did so.
Belize 1972
16. A show of strength by Buccaneers from Ark Royal prevented a threatened invasion of British Honduras (Belize) by Guatemala. Land-based air was too far away and could do nothing.
South Atlantic 1982
17. Carrier/ship-borne strike-fighters (Sea Harrier) and helicopters were fundamental to the success of the campaign which would not have been possible without them. Significantly the RAF Harrier needed carriers/Atlantic Conveyor to get them into action.
Kuwait 1991
18. USN carriers played a big part in the coercive all-arms forces that drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait; Ark Royal 5 operated in the Eastern Mediterranean in a containment role that was not, in the event, used.
Bosnia/Former Yugoslavia 1992–96
19. RN and USN carriers operated in support of UN and NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia. Carriers were able to position clear of weather which sometimes limited RAF and coalition operations from land bases. The UK Government ordered one carrier to be available constantly in case it proved necessary to withdraw British forces under fire—since land-based aircraft could not guarantee to do so and did not have the valuable mix of fighters and helicopters close to the scene of action.
Sierra Leone 2002
20. Illustrious provided air support in the form of armed reconnaissance missions and a national command centre for British forces that rescued UN forces in Sierra Leone providing a secure base that could not be located or attacked by the terrorists ashore.
Iraq 2003
21. Ark Royal 5 operated in her alternative LPH role with Sea Kings and RAF Chinooks embarked to land RM commandoes on the Al Faw Peninsula. Later, Sea Harrier FA2 fighter aircraft assisted the U.S. Navy in enforcing the no-fly zone over Iraq.
Libya 2011
22. But for the withdrawal of HMS Ark Royal and the Royal Navy Harrier GR9 squadrons (SDSR 2010), Britain could have supplied in theatre, rapid response, fighter combat offensive air support for the Libyan Operation—as supplied effectively by the French and Italian aircraft carriers and the USS Kearsage. Instead, British rotary wing air power was deployed to great operational effect in HMS Ocean in the form of the Apache helicopters of the Army Air Corps (flown by both AAC and RN pilots) and the Sea King AEW helicopters of the Royal Navy. These resources provided the 24/7 offensive air support that was not available from land-based air situated 600 nautical miles from the theatre of action.
Annex B
THE TROUBLED F-35 “LIGHTNING” II: PROJECT SUMMARY/CRITIQUE
Executive Summary
Expected F-35 programme cost (for 80 aircraft): at least US$46 billion (£28.75 billion).
The serious shortfalls in the capability of the F-35 include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
Expected F-18 programme cost (for 80 aircraft): approximately $US12.9 BILLION (£8 BILLION)
The advantages that the F/A-18 Super Hornet family of aircraft enjoys over the F-35 Lightning II include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
Introduction
1. The UK F-35 Lightning II Project is the third major collaborative fast jet project that Britain has been party to in the last 40 years. The other two are the MRCA/Tornado Project and the Eurofighter/Typhoon Project. Each of these two major projects has experienced considerable problems including:
(a)
(b)
2. The UK F-35 Lightning II Project is showing all the signs of suffering from the same problems.
3. Development problems have plagued the Project resulting in an ever increasing cost, lower than expected performance and a significant delay in the expected In Service Date of the aircraft.6
Progress to Date/The Health of the Project
Cost Developments
Procurement Cost
Table 1
COST PROGRESSION—F-35 PROGRAM
|
Year |
Comment |
Unit Cost |
|
2002 |
Initial Target Fly Away Cost |
$60,000,000 |
|
2002 |
Initial Target Cost—Inflation Linked |
$75,000,000 |
|
2011 |
Current Estimated Fly Away Cost7 |
$190,850,000* |
4. It is likely that the total number of aircraft to be ordered will be cut and this will, as a result, further increase the unit cost of each aircraft.
5. 80 F-35 aircraft would cost the taxpayer not less than US$15.28 billion.
6. A mix of 68 F/A-18 Super Hornet aircraft at US$58 million per unit and 12 E/A-18G Super Growler aircraft at approximately US$90 million per unit would cost the taxpayer US$5.02 billion—a saving of US$10 billion or £6.27 billion. This saving will be markedly greater when project support and in life costs are calculated as in Table 2, below.
Cost per Flying Hour
7. US Naval Air Systems Command:
(a)
(b)
8. Over a 20 year period this would equate to a further saving of £9.16 billion.
Table 2
F-35 LIGHTNING II VERSUS F/A-18 SUPER HORNET BASED AIR GROUP COST COMPARISON
Assumption:
An R.N./RAF establishment of 80 aircraft to service two carrier air groups and an operational conversion unit/Headquarters Squadron.
Costs in US$ millions
|
Aircraft |
number of aircraft |
unit Fly Away cost* |
subtotal |
in life cost ** |
Total |
|
F-35 Lightning II |
80 |
$191 |
$15,280 |
$30,560 |
$45,840 |
|
F/A-18A Super Hornet |
68 |
$60 |
$4,080 |
$6,120.0 |
$12,900 |
|
E/A-18GSuper Growler |
12 |
$90 |
$1,080 |
$1,620.0 |
* As given in DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2012 BUDGET ESTIMATES.
** Lockheed Martin (F-35) has demonstrated higher in life support costs than Boeing (F/A-18). Therefore it has been assumed that in life cost of the F-35 will be double the procurement cost whereas the Boeing F/A-18 in life costs will be 1.5 times the procurement cost. This fits with Naval Air Systems Command projection that the cost per flying hour of the F/A-18 will be 40% less than that of the F-35.
9. The F/A-18 Super Hornet alternative would save the taxpayer and the long-term defence budget some US$32.9 billion or £20 billion.
F-35 Maintenance and Support
10. The F-35 is entirely reliant upon the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) operated by Lockheed Martin. It is not possible to operate the aircraft without access to ALIS.
11. Important subjects which need to be addressed are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
Operational Developments
12. The F-35 has serious problems and limitations that presently remain unresolved.
Stealth
13. The stealth qualities of the aircraft are likely to deteriorate in the salt-laden environment of carrier operations.
Compatibility with the Queen Elizabeth class Carrier
14. The F-35A is not capable of operating from any carrier deck.
15. The F-35B “STOVL” cannot recover on board vertically in hot climates.
16. The F-35C Lightning II (and the F/A-18) requires catapults and arrestor gear for deck operations and cannot operate from a ski jump/ramp-fitted ship.
17. Exaggerated estimates from BAE Systems and a certain MoD departments indicated the cost of reverting to a flat deck with catapults and arrestor gear would be in excess of £2 billion. Extracts from the article at Annex C by Lewis page, dated 6 February 2013, provide some clarification of the muddied fiscal and contractual waters surrounding this estimate. At best, it paints a picture of misleading information and unacceptably poor fiscal accountability within the contractual process.
18. This flawed estimate led to the Government committing the U-turn of returning to the F-35B STOVL option for our carriers (NB paragraph 16 above). This short-term expediency will result in a seriously diminished operational capability and excessive long-term air group costs.
19. As a fundamental precept, it would be cost-effective and efficient to ensure that any future fast jet combat aircraft this country procures is capable of both seaborne and land-borne operations.
Shortfalls in aircraft capability that may well have escaped the attention of the Government
Stealth
20. The stealth qualities of the aircraft are likely to deteriorate in the salt-laden environment of carrier operations.
21. F-35 X-Band Radar Absorbent Material is only effective against a certain wave-band. The Russians and the Chinese are already successfully working on air to air radars in other than X-band.
22. The Americans will be operating the F-35C Lightning II in conjunction with the F/A-18 Super Hornet: relying upon the F/A-18 and E/A-18G Super Growler aircraft to provide Air Superiority and Defence Suppression for any combat operations.
23. This raises the question of the applicability of the F-35 Lightning II in isolation as an appropriate choice for the United Kingdom armed services.
Stealth Combat Experience to Date
24. The F-117 and the B-2 have both conducted successful air-to-ground combat missions in recent conflicts including the Bosnian crisis, the Iraq crisis and Afghanistan. But air supremacy within the theatre of action has been maintained largely by non-stealth fighters launched from aircraft carriers—notably the F-18 Hornet/Super Hornet.
25. Clearly, the stealth factor is still in its infancy.
26. It can be deduced from the above that stealth in its own right is not a panacea for the successful conduct of all air warfare operations.
Suitability of the UK F-35 Lightning II
27. So what capability will the UK be getting? And what is the operational justification for such procurement?
Capability
Stealth—Limitations
28. In the context of Expeditionary Force offensive air support operations there will be further serious operational limitations and these should be recognised:
(a)
(b)
(c)
Air-to-Air Refuelling Limitations
29. The F-35 Lightning II does not have its own inbuilt “buddy-buddy” air-to-air refuelling capability. This will
(a)
(b)
30. A carrier air group needs the availability of an embarked air-to-air refuelling capability on a 24/7 basis and especially for emergency use in poor weather conditions/by night—when landing on board can be extremely difficult/hazardous.
31. The lack of such a capability in the F-35 Lightning II is a severe flight safety limitation. The F-35B STOVL aircraft cannot be fitted with buddy-buddy air to air refuelling. This should automatically debar the STOVL aircraft from consideration for UK carriers.
Reliance upon Satellite Information
32. The F-35 depends to a considerable extent upon the availability of satellite positioning information and intelligence for effective combat operations.8 The United States Navy has recognised this as a latent operational problem and that is why it is now concentrating resources upon the full development of the combined F/A-18F & X-47 UCAV9 strike system. The latter combination will be able to maintain some operational functionality at times when the F-35 Lightning II would be impaired.
Versatility of the F-35B Stovl Aircraft is in doubt
33. The very description of this aircraft indicates a capability for Short Take Off and Vertical Landing. The increase in weight of the aircraft during development has had a severe detrimental effect upon its power/weight ratio and it will not be able to land vertically back on board a carrier or other ships when in a combat configuration and in hot climates. This will be exacerbated in service because all jet engines suffer a gradual deterioration in engine power during their lifetime. It is pertinent to note that the Sea Harrier FA2 was withdrawn from service precisely because of this problem—which was “too expensive to fix”.10
34. The UK F-35 project team are now looking at a standard recovery on board that is not “vertical” and is described as, “A Ship Rolling Vertical Landing” (SRVL). This unproven standard recovery procedure represents a most severe Flight Safety Hazard in its own right and is likely to result in catastrophic accidents on deck and loss of life.
Discussion: F35 Shortfalls
35. If operated in isolation the F-35 Lightning II will not provide the full capability required for safe and effective carrier borne operations.
36. Further, it requires the significant support of other aircraft types and this was not envisaged when the UK opted for the aircraft as its future Carrier-Capable Strike/Air Defence Aircraft.
37. In the United States Navy, Unmanned Carrier Air Vehicle (UCAV) platforms control and operation will be less susceptible to any loss of satellite functionality because they will be able to be controlled during their missions by airborne manned aircraft—the F/A-18F (the two seat variant of the F/A-18 of the Super Hornet), E/A-18G Super Growler and the E-2D Hawkeye (this is certainly the expectation of the US fleet).
38. The single-seat F-35 Lightning II will not be able to perform this function.
39. In the light of all the above (including the high cost) it is clear that the F-35 Project has not come up to expectations and will fall well short of providing the necessary operational flexibility and utility required for a Carrier Air Group consisting of just one type of embarked fighter aircraft.
Conclusion on Capability
40. The F-35 is not an acceptable choice for fully effective operations from our new Queen Elizabeth class carriers.
Operational Compatibility of the F-35 Lightning II with the Queen Elizabeth class Strike Carrier
Introduction
41. This section will review the compatibility of the F-35 Lightning II with the Queen Elizabeth class carrier in the context of:
(a)
(b)
(c)
42. It will draw on the opinions and data provided earlier in this paper.
43. It will highlight the many advantages that would accrue from the procurement of the F/A-18 Super Hornet family of aircraft in lieu of the F-35 Lightning II either as an interim or a permanent measure.
Independent Carrier Battle Group Expeditionary Force operations
Deterrence—The Requirement
44. There can be “visible deterrence” as with a carrier battle group (CVBG) and/or an Amphibious Task Force and “invisible deterrence” as with hunter killer submarines armed with torpedoes and Tomahawk missiles. Different scenarios may require either or both; but for deterrence to work it must be backed up by the ability to escalate into successful and immediate military action.
Military Action—The Requirement
Air Superiority and Airspace Denial
45. Rapid escalation into military action is where the CVBG becomes the vital asset for the projection of military power. The first step to be taken in any military confrontation is the establishment of “air superiority” and “airspace denial”. Without full local control of the combat area airspace, the safety and survival of naval or ground forces and logistic air resources is placed at considerable risk.
46. A CVBG must have the capability to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
Sustained Operations
47. In the sustained operations, the CVBG must have the capability to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
The Queen Elizabeth class Air Group
48. It is currently planned that the F-35 Lightning II should be procured as the single aircraft type for the Queen Elizabeth class air group. However, the F-35 will not have the specialised Growler capability and will not therefore be able to accomplish 47, a) & c), above.
49. With the probability of 24/7 operations in foul weather, the lack of a “buddy-buddy” refuelling version will be a severe operational limitation: restricting flying operations, particularly at night, and this will reduce the aircraft’s effectiveness at 47 and 48, above. If it can’t do all of paragraphs 46, 47 and 48, it is unlikely to be an effective deterrent as at paragraph 45.
50. The uncomfortable fact is that on its own, the F-35 can’t conduct all these tasks effectively without substantial additional expense.
Detect, Attack and Destroy Threat Air Defence Infrastructure
51. The single-seat F-35 Lightning II is expected to be a very competent air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons system but it cannot provide the defence suppression capability of the twin seat E/A-18G Super Growler.
Detect and Destroy Threat Fighter and Fighter Attack Aircraft and Missiles
52. The F-35 Lightning II will be perfectly capable of engaging and destroying threat fighter and fighter attack aircraft and missiles ingressing towards own forces. But it will still rely upon AEW for the detection of all threats and when it uses its air to air radar will forfeit some of its stealth qualities.
53. This places the aircraft on a par with the air-to-air capabilities of the F/A-18 Super Hornet.
Detect, Identify and Destroy other Weapons Platforms
54. The detection and identification of many other weapons platforms that pose a missile threat to the Expeditionary Force is arguably beyond the capability of the F-35 Lightning II. Such capability can be efficiently provided by the E/A-18G Super Growler and/or the E-2D Hawkeye AEW (the latter being well-known and applauded as a “mini AWACS”).
55. A full AEW capability is an essential part of an effective CVGB—it must not simply be dismissed. The savings to be realised from going the F/A-18F route would make procurement of the E-2D Hawkeye entirely feasible; and again a joint RN/RAF force could be procured which would provide for Land-Based AEW requirements as well.
Summary of F-35 Problems
The Health of the F-35 Lightning II Project
56. The F-35 Project continues to suffer from major delays, a large number of high-technology development problems and is high-risk.
The Expected Cost of this Project
57. Project costs continue to rise significantly.
58. The expected “Fly Away” procurement cost per aircraft has risen to at least US$190 million—and it is still rising.
59. As given at Table 2, above, the projected total cost of this Project (for just 80 aircraft) is at least US$46 billion (£28.75 billion).
60. The United States Department of Defense has already cut the size of its procurement program as have foreign customers. With each reduction in planned production, the unit cost of each aircraft rises.
61. The provision of a “buddy-buddy” air-to-air tanking system for this aircraft would cost the UK at least a further US$1.6 billion. (That is enough cash to procure 27 of the F/A-18 Super Hornet aircraft.)
62. The long-term financial cost of the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) operated by Lockheed Martin and the associated “loss of sovereignty” concerning the operation of this aircraft is a matter of considerable concern.
Shortfalls in F-35 Capability
63. The serious shortfalls in the capability of the F-35 include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
Operational Advantages of the F-35 Lightning II over the F/A-18 Super Hornet
64. It is difficult to isolate any operational advantages that the F-35 has over the F/A-18 Super Hornet family of aircraft.
The F/A-18 Super Hornet Option
The Health of this Program
65. The F/A-18 Super Hornet family of fighter aircraft has accumulated approximately one million hours of effective operation. It has been procured by several nations11 and enjoys a worldwide network of efficient support. It being procured by the United States Navy in sufficient numbers to support active combat operations up until the year 2035.
The Cost of this Program
66. As given at Table2, above, the projected total cost of this project (for just 80 aircraft) is expected to be $US12.9 BILLION (£8 BILLION). The procurement of the F/A-18 family of aircraft instead of the F-35 Lightning II would save the taxpayer and the defence budget some US$32.9 BILLION (£20.56 BILLION).
Operational Advantages of the F/A-18 Super Hornet over the F-35 Lightning II
67. The advantages that the F/A-18 Super Hornet family of aircraft enjoys over the F-35 Lightning II (from a UK perspective) include:
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
(m)
(n)
(o)
68. Operational disadvantages are not evident.
Planned U.S. Navy Carrier Air Groups
69. For information, the planned configuration of future US Navy carrier air groups for 2020 is as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
* The U.S. Navy plan to operate F-35 alongside but not in place of the Super Hornet.
Training Aircraft
70. The T-45 Goshawk built by BAE and McDonnell Douglas12 and based upon the Hawk is specifically designed for F/A-18 Super Hornet training including carrier deck qualifications and is built in the UK.
Conclusions
1. The F-35 Lightning II represents a high-risk, high-cost and only partial solution to the U.K.’s need for a Carrier Capable Strike/Air Defence Aircraft.
2. In the light of current fiscal constraint and the projected “black hole” within the UK defence budget, continued participation in the F-35 project would appear to be unwise when there is a low-risk and low-cost alternative available (the F/A-18 Super Hornet) that can satisfy the full operational requirement including Defence Suppression, AEW and Air to Air Refuelling.
3. The F/A-18 Super Hornet family of aircraft does more than cater for all JSF fast jet roles including those prescribed for Typhoon and provides for significant cash savings that will enable the procurement of the AEW aircraft essential to full maritime Strike Carrier operations.
4. From a military and fiscal point of view, the F-18 Super Hornet family of aircraft, together with the E-2D AEW aircraft, represents the logical choice for Britain’s joint strike fighter/carrier air group needs. Continued investment in the F-35 (and the Typhoon) project is tantamount to “throwing good money after bad”.
Annex C
THE TRUTH ON THE NAVY CARRIER DEBACLE? INDUSTRY GOT AWAY WITH MURDER
Extracts from the article by Lewis Page | 6th February 2013
Sold “adaptable” ships which couldn’t be adapted
Analysis
(1) The Ministry of Defence is in the pillory again today, being corporately pelted for the recent unedifying sequence of events in which the Coalition government decided in 2010 to fit the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers with catapults—and then abruptly changed its mind in 2012, reverting to the former plan which will see them able to carry jump-jets and helicopters only.
(2) The new thing today is the issue of a report by the Parliamentary Defence committee….
(3) … The MPs of the committee also take time out in particular to lambast the ministry and the government over the carrier volte-face. They write:
The decision in 2010 to change to the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter was the largest single procurement decision in the [strategic defence review of that year]. It is clear that the decision was rushed and based upon incomplete and inaccurate policy development ... We urge the MoD to learn the lessons of this closed, rushed and flawed decision of 2010.
(4) Regular readers will recall the basics of the story. The ability to add catapults and arrester gear to the ships had been specified from the earliest stages of their design. The only difficulty in doing so was that the vessels have gas-turbine propulsion, not nuclear, in order to reduce costs. Gas propulsion cannot furnish the steam required by normal naval catapults. Cash-strapped Blighty also felt itself unable to cough up to develop new electric catapults, and so it was planned that at least to start with the ships would have no launch or recovery kit beyond a “ski-jump” ramp and would carry jumpjets and helicopters only.
(5) But by 2010 the US had invented electric catapults to put on its next supercarrier, now nearing completion, and was happy to sell some to old Blighty. In perhaps the only good call in the entire 2010 defence review, the Prime Minister and the MoD team decided that they would purchase the US electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) and fit it to at least one of the British carriers.
(6) This would mean that the associated F-35 stealth fighter buy would need to change from the F-35B jumpjet version to the F-35C catapult type, and this change generally dominated the headlines. In particular, when the government later swerved back to the jumpjet plan, it was pointed out that the F-35C, not being as far along in test and development as the F-35B, would probably not reach the British fleet until 2023 or later—so extending the long wait for restored carrier air capability.
(7) But that was rather to miss the point. Britain having idiotically got rid of its small remaining fleet of Harrier jumpjets, the only aircraft which could possibly be obtained to fly from non-catapult ships would be the F-35B, as it is the only jumpjet now being made. It is also the most complex combat aircraft ever built, the first and only plane to combine stealth, supersonic speed and vertical thrust all in one. It is well known that, while it may arrive a little sooner than the F-35C, F-35B will be more expensive to buy and run and less capable in the air.
(8) In truth, both F-35 variants are likely to be so expensive that Britain will never be able to afford very many of them: certainly not enough to maintain a 40-strong air group with the fleet. If we only buy F-35s, our big new carriers will sail the seas largely empty, carrying 12 jets at most.
(9) But with a catapult ship, none of that matters as it would then be possible to use many other kinds of plane. In particular a big fleet of F-18 [Super] Hornets, as used today by the US Navy and many others, could be bought or leased very cheaply as large numbers of F-18s are already in service. The tricky question of fleet radar aircraft also becomes simple to solve once you have catapults: the Hawkeye pocket AWACS as used by the US and France becomes an option, as opposed to custom built—so, expensive—and not very capable whirlybird solutions.
(10) Once you had a catapult carrier, the case for F-18 (or perhaps Rafales from France) would be irresistible. The ships will be there for 50 years or more, visibly cruising around more than half empty, so sooner or later some administration would be bound to cave in and buy some nice, cheap, modern non-F35 jets to fill their empty decks—if this was possible.
(11) And as the F-18 (or Rafale) is better than any other plane now in British service for all likely missions (and perfectly good in the unlikely case of serious air-to-air combat against any plausible enemy), this would be an excellent thing all round. The carrier jet could perfectly well operate from land bases if required. The MoD might then reconsider the wisdom of keeping its current ruinously expensive-to-run and not very good Eurofighter (aka Typhoon) and Tornado fleets—certainly the aged, crappy Tornado and probably a lot of the Eurofighters too would be marked for the chop. The MoD would surely not bother expensively upgrading the Eurofighter for ground attack as it currently plans to, with the F-18 (already an excellent strike plane) on hand and a fistful of far more sophisticated F-35Cs for tricky jobs on the way.
(12) So the catapult decision was pretty much a no-brainer once EMALS appeared. The puzzler was why on Earth it later got rescinded, on the grounds that putting catapults into the ships was not going to cost £900 million—as the 2010 review had estimated—but actually £2 billion for the Prince of Wales and maybe £3 billion to the Queen Elizabeth. This would be to double the projected price of the two ships.
How is it “adaptable” if adapting it costs as much as buying a new one?
(13) This astonishing cost jump is what the MPs of the Defence Committee have been looking into. There was some foolish talk in the appendices to their report of “price-gouging by General Atomics”, the makers of the EMALS. Mr Bernard Gray, mandarin in charge of defence kit, was happy to let the MPs get the impression that General Atomics had done something bad and this had caused most or all of the price increase. He told them:
On the component parts that build up the change, the cost—in particular of the catapult system—proved, on further dialogue with the US, to be significantly higher. I cannot remember the exact figure for that component, but it was of the order of 50% higher than the original estimate for that piece of equipment.
(14) The original estimate was US$200 million, so that would be an extra £130 million-odd. Mr Gray went on:
There was also a significant component of additional technical advice, which the contractors in the US were recommending was required. That was of the order of over £150 million.
(15) So now the cost is up by £280 million—just another £3,800 million or so of cost increase to account for. General Atomics tacked on still more, Mr Gray tells us:
Additional aircraft launch and recovery equipment was required, on top of the cats and traps, which had not been included in the original estimate. The cost of going through the FMS [Foreign Military Sales] purchasing route and some inflation adjustments were further components.
(16) This last simply can’t have been a big deal, as the original US$200 million was to include all this:
Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System/Advanced Arresting Gear (EMALS/AAG). The EMALS long lead sub-assemblies include: Energy Storage System, Power Conditioning System, and Launch Control System. The AAG includes: Power Conditioning, Energy Absorption Subsystems, Shock Absorbers, and Drive Fairleads. Also proposed are other items for Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, software support, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and all other related elements of program support. The estimated cost is $200 million.
(17) But Mr Gray sought very hard to suggest nonetheless that the four billion pounds plus in cost increases were down to General Atomics in some way. He went on, explaining why nobody in the MoD knew the price of the carriers had almost doubled until last year:
We did not get updated prices from General Atomics until February 2012 to start to plug into the total map ... there was a long debate going on through the back end of last year about what the appropriate price should be. It was not until we got numbers from General Atomics in February that we were in any kind of position to be clear about that.
(18) Minister Peter Luff was a bit more honest. He said:
I want to make it quite clear ... there was some increase in the cost of the equipment, but that is not actually the total picture of the cost. The cost is also a reflection of various other issues ... the cost of the conversion itself was the real issue ...
(19) In other words the huge bulk of the cost increase didn’t come from General Atomics and EMALS. Instead it came from the British shipyards who would have to put the US equipment into the ships. Luff went on to explain that in fact the carriers had not been designed to accept catapults and arrester gear at all.
(20) The fundamental misunderstanding that many of us had was that these carriers would be relatively easy to convert and had been designed for conversion and for adaptability. That is what we were told. It was not true. They were not.
(21) Mr Arbuthnot, reasonably enough, asked:
Having been “designed for conversion”, and conversion having proved far more expensive than we expected, do we have any comeback against those companies that did the design?
(22) Mr Gray answered:
Because the decision to go STOVL [that is the initial decision for jumpjets] was taken in, from memory, 2002, no serious work had been done. It had been noodled in 2005, but no serious work had been done on it. It was not a contract-quality offer; it was a simple assertion that that could be done, but nobody said, “It can be done at this price”, and certainly nobody put that in a contract.
(23) This is a very strange position to take. The decision that was taken in 2002 was not to “go STOVL”. It was to choose the design option then referred to by the government as the “adaptable CVF Delta design”, with “adaptable” specifically to mean that catapults and arrester gear could be added to the ships—not just during construction, but afterwards. A STOVL [jumpjet] only, non-adaptable design was also considered, and the “adaptable” design cost a hell of a lot more. In 2002, Parliament was told:
The estimated cost based on a STOVL [only] design was around £2 billion ... The estimated procurement cost of the future aircraft carriers using the innovative, adaptable design is around £3 billion.
(24) The “innovative, adaptable” ships are now projected by the National Audit Office to cost £5.35 billion, so it’s plain that around a third of that, some £1.8 billion, comes from them being “adaptable” rather than STOVL-only. Except that it turns out they aren’t adaptable at all—fitting them with catapults and arrester gear would, apparently, cost as much as buying two entire new ships.
(25) That has to be a colossal contract violation by the builders: there’s no way it can’t be, provided the word “adaptable” is actually on the contract somewhere (this is a secret of course, like all MoD contracts). No matter what, the shipbuilders cannot realistically claim that the MoD didn’t specify that it should be easy to put in catapults and arrester gear, and they cannot realistically claim that there is any adaptability at all in a ship which costs as much to adapt as it would to just buy a new ship. But the MoD just bends over and bites the pillow held out for it.
(26) This is not even to mention that the builders have a serious conflict of interest here, in that they stand to lose a lot of money if the Royal Navy gets catapult ships and Britain gets some F-18s or Rafales—as it more or less certainly would in the end, once we had mostly empty catapult ships sailing around (the Royal Navy even had pilots flying F-18s with the US Navy in preparation). But the carrier shipyards are mainly owned by BAE Systems plc, the US-centred but UK-headquartered multinational which also made and lucratively maintains the Eurofighter and the Tornado—the jets we would seldom bother using and in many cases might not bother even having, if we had some F-18s.
(27) This is all especially distressing, as Mr Bernard Gray is widely believed along Whitehall to be a defence procurement genius. A former Financial Times journalist and later a Labour defence “spad”—special adviser—he has now been brought in to the civil service proper and put in charge of defence kit specially to sort out the horrific mess of the MoD’s equipment programme and get some value for money for Britain’s cash-strapped forces.
(28) But it turns out he’s just as supine toward BAE, and just as keen to obscure that reality by slippery testimony, as all his predecessors.
Annex D
THE FRENCH ACCORD—CROSS-DECKING FIXED WING AIRCRAFT BETWEEN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
[Dated November 2010—prior to the “F-35B STOVL reversal”.]
“We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”
Lord Palmerston, House of Commons, 1848.
Executive Summary
(i) This paper briefly discusses the manner in which the new UK-France Defence Accord could be developed to provide cost savings in defence expenditure whilst retaining the necessary military capability that is required to satisfy national strategic objectives.
(ii) It then examines in detail the utility of cross decking carrier aircraft and/or Carrier Air Groups to French aircraft carriers.
(iii) It addresses the advantages to be gained from a short term/emergency cross decking capability (which are proven through experience and provide for a useful element of flight safety) and then looks at the considerations, limitations and implications of the longer term transfer of one nation’s Carrier Air Group to the deck of another nation’s aircraft carrier.
Introduction/Discussion
1. The recent UK–France Defence Accord or the “porte-avion entente cordiale” would appear to be a useful step towards the closer integration and mutual support of European military assets. It appears to have been spawned by a desire to reduce national defence costs by sharing these assets.
2. This raises the important question of which assets can be reasonably shared without losing any overall national defence capability. As a vehicle for fiscal efficiency, the Accord should indeed prove advantageous in the longer term provided that operational considerations and global national interests are not forgotten.
3. Within the context of existing and planned UK military forces and national defence strategy, it will be important to define what roles can be shared efficiently and how this would affect our national military capability. It is therefore for consideration that the starting point for “sharing” should be an in-depth look at where our national defence imperatives are the same as those of the French. Having isolated these as the “areas for sharing”, a logical assessment of whether “sharing” will be operationally advantageous and cost-efficient can be made.
4. Arguably, there are three areas in which the sharing of responsibilities and assets could be realistically and cost effectively realised (this paper presents these for consideration but does not address them in detail):
Air Defence of the Homeland Base
Although there is no military air threat perceived against either the United Kingdom or France, each nation invests considerable sums of money and arguably a disproportionate share of national defence budgets in the procurement of land-based air defence fighters. A mutual reduction in the numbers of these fighters could be justified and achieved under the Accord with, for example, Britain concentrating its attention on the North and the North West approaches and France concentrating its attention on the West and the Southern approaches. A co-ordinated UK/French international military airspace would reduce the task of the individual air forces and merit a reduction in the overall number of fighters needed to satisfy the joint National need.
The Maintenance of Adequate Land Forces to Deter any Aggression Against Europe
The overall strength of both nations’ land forces could be refined particularly in those areas where mutual support would be advantageous from a cost and operational point of view.
The Policing of the World’s Maritime Trade Routes
Although each nation has differing offshore interests and responsibilities, the allocation of active or latent trouble points to individual navies would reduce the operational commitment and stretch of each Navy. For example, the French Navy could be allocated the piracy zone immediately to the east of Suez and the Royal Navy could be allocated the Far East and the South Atlantic.
5. National defence imperatives would suggest that the two nations have differing responsibilities and perceptions concerning offshore operations; such as defending overseas territories and essential food, fuel and material supplies. It is in these key areas that any thought of “sharing” must be carefully considered in relation to maintaining a full capability for independent action.
6. It is in the latter context that this paper addresses the suggested “sharing” of Carrier Battle Group assets through the medium of cross decking between each nation’s aircraft carriers.
Assumptions
7. It is assumed that:
British National Defence Strategy will not be driven by this agreement.
British National Defence Procurement Strategy will not be driven by this agreement.
In either instance, that would be “putting the cart before the horse” and prejudicing our sovereignty.
8. Britain’s Defence Strategy will continue to include:
The ability to conduct effective and independent Expeditionary Task Force Operations.
The protection of our Sea Lines of Communication and Trade and our other offshore interests, notably our overseas territories.
9. For the purposes/intent of this paper, “Cross-decking” refers specifically to the operation of conventional take-off and landing manned fighter aircraft (although many of the issues discussed can be read across to other aircraft types, including helicopters).
General Considerations, Limitations and Implications
10. The Royal Navy’s ability to conduct effectively national maritime strategy rests on being properly equipped with reliable ships and weapon systems to do the job demanded of it. Historically, our aircraft carrier/naval aviation capability has been underfunded as a result of the strategies adopted during the Cold War. In spite of this and with limited assets, it has responded to the national need effectively and reliably whenever called upon to do so—as have the Royal Marines.
The Charles de Gaulle and French Naval Air Power
11. If we are to continue operating effectively with limited resources, it will be necessary to be able to rely upon all elements of core naval forces; including naval air power. The in service history of the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier gives little confidence that it could be relied upon “when Britain needs it most”, ie when rapid deployment of visible British force is required.
12. In September 2007, it underwent a major 15 month overhaul including the refuelling of its nuclear power plant (a necessary step after six years in service). The ship required major modifications to allow operation and maintenance of the new Rafale F3 fighter and associated weapons and weapons systems. Shortly after completion of this refit, the carrier had to return to Toulon for in-depth repairs following technical problems. In October of this year, a four-month planned deployment was cut down to a single day when the ship suffered further technical problems (an electrical fault in its propulsion system). Beset with problems, it is not an aircraft carrier that can be safely relied upon to be available when we need it. The next planned prolonged absence from service of the carrier will be from 2015 until at least 2017. In the light of its record to date, it seems likely it may well be out of service for considerable periods between now and 2015.
13. One could be forgiven for assuming that, as France is not an island nation with total dependence upon the sea for its trade and economic prosperity, its carrier battle group capability does not benefit from any priority over other more close to home French defence assets.
14. This should be borne in mind when considering sharing Britain’s offshore responsibilities with the French Navy.
Cross Decking with the French Navy
15. There are two types of cross-decking to be considered:
The short term/emergency contingency.
Sustained operational embarkations/detachments.
Short Term/Emergency Cross-Decking
16. Within the modern NATO navies of the world, it is normal practice for a carrier of one nation to provide a “spare deck” for the aircraft of another nation’s carrier particularly when no land-based airfields are available for emergency use. This type of operation does not require any substantial support from the host carrier of the cross decking aircraft. However, for it to be possible at all, it does require:
Common aircraft catapult configuration and arrester gear compatibility.
Common refuelling capability.
Common aircraft start-up capability; including electrical supplies, etc.
A common language for the safe direction and understanding of aircraft and personnel on the flight deck.
17. This practice represents a sensible flight safety capability—providing a diversion for airborne aircraft when their own deck cannot receive them. When the host carrier is ready to receive its aircraft back, the aircraft will return for a normal turnaround including refuelling, re-arming and scheduled/fault rectification maintenance.
18. The availability of this facility is extremely useful in the context of operating in conjunction with United States Navy carriers that maintain an almost continuous presence close to the various trouble spots around the world. The likelihood of a British carrier operating in conjunction with a French carrier is arguably remote13 even under the terms of the Anglo-French agreement. Therefore, equipping our carrier air groups for the latter contingency rather than for operating with U.S. Navy carriers would be counter-productive.
Sustained Operational Cross-Decking Embarkations/Detachments
Relevant Experience to Date
19. For sustained operational cross decking embarkation/detachments, there are a multitude of considerations, limitations and implications to be addressed. This can be exemplified by recent experience within the Royal Navy when the Sea Harrier was withdrawn from service and our Invincible class carriers had to be modified/reconfigured to support properly a different type of Harrier, the GR7/9. This was an expensive procedure in spite of each aircraft being of the same generic VSTOL type. It is understood that the cost to the taxpayer for converting Invincible class carriers for Harrier GR7/9 use was in excess of £120 million.
20. Each aircraft had completely different weapon system and flight system (including navigation) configurations which meant that the engineering support spaces and equipments had to be significantly modified and re-equipped to cater for the new version of the aircraft. Ordnance supply and storage facilities also had to be re-assessed/modified.
21. De facto, such considerations and others (please see below) have prevented any sustained operational cross decking embarkations/detachments between NATO Navy carriers in the past and, for the most part, militate against their realisation in the future.
Attempting Sustained Embarkations/Detachments
22. Further to the requirements for short-term/emergency cross decking given above, there are significant considerations, limitations and implications attached to sustained cross decking operations, particularly during active combat operations or during the graduated response build up to such operations.
The National Interest
23. The Royal Navy Fleet Weapon System is geared to worldwide rapid response to international situations/developments that might threaten any of Britain’s global interests. This Fleet Weapon System has been developed from decades of successful combat and peace-keeping experience and is made up of many inseparable and interdependent parts, all of which need full integration in order to be effective.
24. For years, we have heard of the “indivisibility of air power” which was the phrase used by the old Air Ministry to lend credence to the existence of the Royal Air Force (rather than the latter being subsumed by the Army and the Royal Navy). That phrase transfers directly to the fleet weapon system today—it too is generally “indivisible” although occasional departures can be accommodated. It behoves us now to understand more clearly “the indivisibility of sea power”.
25. The proposed embarkation of a British Carrier Air Group in a foreign naval vessel (such as the French carrier Charles de Gaulle) for sustained periods of time is a strictly political strategy that appears to pays little attention to the need for such a Group to be fully integrated into that foreign navy’s fleet weapon system in order to achieve full operational effectiveness (please see Logistic and Training section below). It also transfers sovereignty over that air group to the host nation. This immediately presents a significant conflict of interest that will come to the fore whenever the two participating nations have different views on the manner in which their Navy can or cannot commit to the resolution of an international incident.
26. Of the many different threat scenarios facing the UK, probably the most realistic would be a second Falklands conflict.14 Arguably, the French or any other Navy might well withdraw its air group from a British carrier if the latter was dispatched in a task force to oppose an invasion of the Falklands by Argentina. In the same vein, a French carrier with a British air group on board would probably be withheld from supporting such an operation.
Logistics and Training
27. The term, Logistics and Training, covers a myriad of topics/issues that are appropriate to this discussion.
28. Some of these are:
Engineering
29. Designated carriers would require a complete set of engineering workspaces, hangar and flight deck equipment tailored to the needs of the embarking aircraft. Each carrier would be required to hold on inventory a complete set of air stores for servicing the aircraft need: from electronic weapon system parts through to spare engines and associated jigs. A formal interface between each ship’s Air Engineering Officers and the embarking Squadron Air Engineering Officers would need to be established and agreed. (Each set of air engineers is essential for the proper running of the carrier and the Squadron.) This is likely to be a complex and unrewarding exercise that would be particularly compounded by any language barrier and by differences in supervisory roles, standards and regulations. Achievement of operational efficiency in such circumstances would be prejudiced. Further, additional Royal Fleet Auxiliary support and capability may well be required at additional cost.
Ordnance
30. Designated carriers would need to embark and store the ordnance required by the embarking aircraft for its role-specific operations. Carriers usually have a defined air weapons storage capacity and this would be likely to limit the number of weapons to be embarked for use by the visiting air group. Further, more ordnance would have to be held in total inventory to satisfy the extra logistic need of possible cross decking—again at additional cost. A formal interface between each ship’s Gunnery/Ordnance Department and the embarking Squadron/Air Group would need to be established and agreed. As with engineering, this is likely to be a complex and unrewarding exercise that would be particularly compounded by any language barrier and by differences in supervisory roles, standards and regulations. Achievement of operational efficiency in such circumstances would be prejudiced.
Security
31. Many of the UK’s air weapons are highly classified. Advanced Air to Air Missiles have highly secret parts (example: radar systems, warhead, fusing, inertial navigation platforms etc). Most of our “smart” air-to-ground weapons are also highly secret (guidance sensors, crypto loads, warhead/fuse). Storing munitions like this on a foreign vessel poses problems that could be insurmountable. It requires the “store man” to understand what you can and cannot do with them, how they should be moved and so forth. Munitions do not always get stored in one completely made up unit; instead they are put together from highly sensitive and component parts when required for use. Despite being partners in Afghanistan with (for example) France, the Americans are unlikely to share technology with us if we leave that technology unattended on a foreign (or French) warship. Indeed, we might also have our own restrictions as would indeed the French. The French CAG may wish to bring with them their “first strike” nuclear and cruise missiles—the ASMP-A nuclear missiles and SCALP EG cruise missiles. It is more than likely that there will be political difficulties in making our carriers “nuclear capable” (and deciding who would have the final control of any suggested launch of a nuclear missile).
Language and Aircraft/Equipment Control Routines
32. Although French air traffic controllers are obliged to be able to communicate with all air traffic in English, this is not necessarily the case with naval Direction Officers and Approach Control Officers. Difficulties with understandable speech communication between a carrier and aircraft airborne on operations have the potential for disastrous mistakes and misunderstanding that could threaten the safety and survivability of all concerned: particularly when stress levels are very high eg by night and in bad weather during combat operations. The same is true for the congested operations that take place on the flight deck where poor communication can be directly related to “an accident waiting to happen”.
Security
33. Modern aircraft use classified mission planning computer hardware and software. Even if there was enough equipment available in our inventory to be left on a foreign vessel this would pose more security problems. Typhoon is not capable of landing on an aircraft carrier but presents an example of how secret their mission planning equipment is: it is Secret UKEO (UK Eyes Only), and on a need to know basis. In other words if you are British but not in the Typhoon force then you cannot have access to it. There are other secret and highly classified avionic systems on modern fighter aircraft such as GPS crypto loads, IFF and SIFF and other transponder codes, radars, secure radio crypto, etc, etc. All of these must be safeguarded.
Flight safety, Search and Rescue and Ship-Borne Safety
34. The preservation of life and the prevention of loss or accident to expensive weapon systems (including aircraft) is of paramount importance and even more critical on-board a carrier than at a land base. Any form of language or procedural miscommunication mitigates against such flight safety considerations. There is also the question of commonality in equipment and training for search and rescue (recovering a ditched pilot from the sea) and the need for all the ship’s company, including visiting air groups, to be fully familiar with the ship and its damage control routines.
Interdependency
35. Essentially, prolonged embarkations by a British Carrier Air Group in a French carrier will require a level of interdependence that goes beyond the established NATO procedures and protocols. For the Anglo-French agreement to work it would mean the effective merging of the British and French carriers into a single fighting force. This would prejudice national political and operational freedom of action.
Rules of Engagement (ROE)
36. Rules of Engagement for a military force conducting combat operations are the prerogative of the national government and different nations’ governments have different views on such rules. Changing British rules to accommodate French government requirements would represent a clear abdication of responsibility and sovereignty. Nor would it be easy to find international agreement upon them.
The Nuclear Option
37. The French Rafale F3 carrier borne fighter aircraft is fitted “for and with” the ASMP-A nuclear missile. Part of the Force de Frappe, in French nuclear doctrine it is the last-resort “warning shot” prior to a full-scale employment of strategic nuclear weapons. Would Britain be content to allow a sustained embarkation of a French carrier air group with this weapon and its associated strategic/political implications? If not, this implies that such embarkations would be subject to differing national defence policies and aims. This leads to the question of what other restrictions might the French wish to place on the roles and intent of any British carrier air group embarked in their carrier. To all extents and purposes, this could result in the political will of the French government deciding where and how British military forces may be engaged in our national interest.
38. The list above is not comprehensive but highlights some of the difficulties and the expense that would be incurred with the prolonged embarkation of a British fixed wing carrier air group in a French carrier. In peacetime, these difficulties might be overcome at the cost of overall operational efficiency in the conduct of flying operations. In a combat situation, many of these difficulties would be politically and militarily unacceptable.
Further Considerations
39. As an island nation that is for the most part totally dependent upon merchant ships and trade, Britain should and does have an entirely different national defence perspective to that of a continental nation such as France. The majority of our vital energy supplies are delivered by sea and any interruption in such supplies would be devastating to our economy. This is not the case for France where much reliance is placed upon nuclear energy and land lines of supply, such as natural gas from Russia.
40. Therefore, although Britain and France both have commitments within NATO and a desire for a stronger, more integrated European Union defence capability (with less reliance upon the United States), Britain’s predominant global defence interests are clearly different from those of France and its continental neighbours. In order to secure these, our fleet weapon system and its integrated carrier battle groups must remain independent of the sovereign will of any other nation, including France. Our national defence focus should therefore be on the maritime sphere first and land-based assets second: this will ensure sufficient resources are available to avoid any disruptive and unworkable carrier sharing agreement with France.
41. If we are to link our integrated fleet weapon system and global maritime strategy to that of another nation, it would be prudent and sensible to choose a nation that actively pursues its global interests through a permanent and robust maritime presence: that is to say, the United States. The latter maintains a strategy of global maritime presence which is entirely in accord with Britain’s need to protect its trade routes, its overseas territories and to support our allies and Commonwealth.
42. Procurement/lease of the F-18 Super Hornet for our new carriers would ensure a compatibility with the U.S. Navy that would prove of considerable benefit on a global basis to our perceived maritime strategy and that would make the sustained embarkation of a carrier air group a more practical and realistic proposition. Such a way ahead would prevent the need for any further investment in carrier workspaces, etc and would therefore be extremely cost-effective—not least because the F-18, at $57 million per unit is markedly cheaper than any alternative.
Political Will
43. What will determine the success or failure of the recent UK–France Defence Accord/Porte-Avion Entente Cordiale is the political will of the governments of Britain and France.
44. The agreement—and the political statements accompanying it—glossed over, to a certain extent, the issue of political will but political will could have massive implications for the success of the arrangement even if the training, logistics, and operational issues could be sorted by aviation specialists from both navies, which is doubtful. The problem is straight forward; what will be the political fallout if, once the carrier sharing is up and running, either Britain or France refuses to allow its share of the force to be used in support of an action that the other deems of vital national interest? Not only would such a decision have potentially terminal implications for the political future of the other government, but it would also prove to be a devastating blow to the morale and confidence of the joint UK/France carrier force.
45. Unfortunately, there is little that can be done to strengthen political trust between Britain and France; it is a commodity that is based as much on the personalities of senior politicians as it is on shared interests or a proven ability to make the sharing concept work operationally. Even if trust can be manufactured at a political level to the point where either country will guarantee to allow its naval aviation forces to be used as required by the other, a change of government could undo months, years or decades of work. The agreement will succeed therefore, not on the amount of trust Britain or France has in each other’s governments, but whether they feel that they will be able to work with the next government, and the one after that. This is a truly massive undertaking.15
Summary
46. Short term/emergency cross decking is a useful and well-practised flight safety option for fighter aircraft conducting non-diversion flying operations at sea.
47. Sustained cross decking embarkations/detachments of a Carrier Air Group to another nation’s carrier that does not have a commonality of equipment, spares, ordnance, language and operational routines has not been practised in the past because it can raise very significant problems in terms of:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
48. Sustained cross decking embarkations/detachments of a British or French fixed wing Carrier Air Group to another nation’s carrier with a commonality of equipment, spares, ordnance, language and operational routines would be feasible if backed by sufficient political will to allow its operational use by the “host” nation.
Conclusion
49. Whilst the Anglo-French Accord represents a positive way ahead and may in principle pave the way for better Anglo-French relations in terms of broad defence policy within NATO and Europe, it is clear that the suggestion of sharing the use of each other’s aircraft carriers for other than short-term/emergency cross decking procedures would be neither cost-effective nor operationally sound. It will not provide the same global operational capability that is available from independent Carrier Battle Groups. The national sovereignty associated with Britain’s “political will” will be tainted.
March 2013
Annex E
DEFENCE AND OVERSEAS POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES OF 18 MAY 1982. (ATTACHED)
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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT |
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Copy No 15 |
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OD(SA)(82) 37th Meeting |
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CABINET |
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DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE SUB-COMMITTEE |
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ON THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND |
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MINUTES of a Meeting held at |
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PRESENT |
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The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP Prime Minister |
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The Rt Hon William Whitelaw MP |
The Rt Hon Francis Pym MP Secretary of State |
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The Rt Hon John Nott |
The Rt Hon Cecil Parkinson MP Chancellor of |
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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT |
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The Rt Hon Michael Havers QC MP |
Admiral of the Fleet |
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Admiral Sir Henry Leach |
General Sir Edwin Bramall |
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Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham Chief of |
Sir Antony Acland |
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Sir Michael Palliser |
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SECRETARIAT |
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Mr R L Wade-Gery |
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Item No |
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MILITARY ISSUES |
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DIPLOMATIC ISSUES |
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1. Military Issues
THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF briefed the Sub-Committee on the latest military situation.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Sub-Committee now faced a major political decision: whether to authorise the military repossession of the Falkland Islands, provided that this was militarily feasible and that no acceptable diplomatic settlement could be negotiated. The possibility of a peaceful settlement would be exhausted if Argentina had not accepted the final British proposals before the given deadline expired at 5 pm.
London time on 19 May. It was for the Chiefs of Staff to advise on military feasibility. At their military briefing before their meeting on 14 May the Sub-Committee had been informed of the Force Commander’s plans for a landing and subsequent repossession. Under this plan the landing could take place on the night of 20/21 May—or as soon thereafter as weather and other local factors permitted—provided that it was authorised by the Sub-Committee at their present meeting. The Sub-Committee now needed to have the professional military advice of the Chiefs of Staff on whether repossession of the Falklands was militarily feasible and whether the Force Commander’s plan was the best means of achieving it and had a good chance of success.
THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF said that the Chiefs of Staff had been providing the military options against which diplomatic efforts to obtain a negotiated settlement could continue. It now seemed that a satisfactory settlement could not be negotiated. The next option they recommended was a landing to repossess the Islands, in accordance with the Force Commander’s plan. They supported his view that a long blockade was not viable and they therefore recommended that the landing should go ahead as soon as practicable. Once British forces were ashore they should press ahead in order to achieve either satisfactory conditions for a ceasefire and withdrawal or the surrender of the Argentine garrison. There were of course risks; from the Argentinian fleet, including submarines, and especially from air attack. Attrition of Argentine forces had been less than had been hoped, because they had stayed in or close to their bases. But the Chiefs of Staff and the Force Commander believed that the risks were militarily acceptable, as were the losses which could reasonably be expected; and that once ashore the landing force would have a very good chance of success. They were therefore seeking political authority to proceed with the landing. If this were given at the present meeting, the latest moment at which it could be countermanded would be the afternoon (London time) of 20 May. Unless the weather imposed delays, the landing forces would by then be inside the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ); the ships involved would be heavily loaded for the landing, and if authority to proceed were suspended for any significant period at that stage they would need to withdraw and regroup.
THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF said that, in the absence of a negotiated Argentine withdrawal, military force had to be used. The Force Commander was clear that it would be difficult to sustain a long blockade. Therefore the only option was a landing. His major concern about a landing arose from the Argentine Air Force not having so far committed themselves in any strength. They had suffered losses, but they had certainly not been neutralised. They still had significant numbers of Skyhawk, Super Etendard and Mirage aircraft. They had overcome the problem of locating British ships on the move, to the extent that they had sunk one such ship and almost sunk another. Once the landing began their task would be easier; British ships would be within range and in known positions. If they launched an all-out air effort, as their commander had now publicly threatened to do, full air defence of British forces could not be guaranteed; some aircraft were likely to get through and more British ships could be lost. Since British ships would be at their most vulnerable during the landing phase, the Force Commander would need to minimise exposure time by taking maximum advantage of night, when the threat from the air would be much smaller. Once the landing forces were ashore and dispersed they would be less vulnerable, because air attack against them would be much harder to mount. The Argentines would also have difficulty in providing their own forces with close air support. He was therefore confident that the landing forces would achieve success.
But pockets of resistance could make total repossession protracted; and in that case British forces could have problems of attrition both on land and in enforcing the TEZ to prevent Argentine resupply. The point of decision had now been reached. Delay would be possible, but only at the risk of further losses. Although more softening up time would be an advantage, the Force Commander on balance advised against waiting. Risks would be involved, as with any military option; but they were risks which had to be taken. He believed that the landing should be authorised now, and the final timing left to the Force Commander.
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF said that he supported the Chief of the Defence Staff’s appreciation. British forces would face four threats. In ascending order of severity these were Argentine forces in the Islands; naval surface forces; submarines; and aircraft, both carrier-based and shore-based. He was confident that the first two threats could be neutralised effectively. The submarine threat was more elusive and the risk from it considerably greater. But British forces had extensive anti-submarine assets and in the light of the outline plan for their use he was confident of effective neutralisation of the submarine threat, albeit perhaps with some loss. Because air superiority had not yet really been established over the operating area (though this could change before the landing took place) some losses from air attack were likely. But in his judgement the level of this threat was an acceptable war risk, given the selected beach head, British anti-aircraft assets and their planned deployment, and sensible use of darkness. Two other factors were important. The longer British forces delayed the greater would be the attrition they suffered, not least from accidental causes. And if Britain hung back now, the erosion of her national standing, both in general and as regards negotiations in the present crisis, would be profound and long-term. He concluded that the advantages which Britain stood to gain outweighed the risks and likely losses involved and that the landing should proceed.
THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF said that he associated himself with the Chief of the Defence Staff’s comments. He believed that there was now no option but to mount a landing. The attrition of Argentine assets by air and other means was very important. Once this had been given full scope and allowed to take whatever toll it could, the sooner a landing took place the better. Given luck, which would certainly be needed, the operation to repossess the Islands could turn out to be a great success.
In that event, Britain’s status in the world, the respect shown to her and the strength and credibility of her own deterrent strategy would be that much more enhanced for years to come. Ultimately, whatever-happened, he believed that the British forces could win through. All the actions taken up to the present moment, from the sailing of the Task Force onwards, had been appropriate and correctly calculated. The final act of repossession did, in his judgement, produce larger risks, particularly in respect of the air threat and in the initial stages (ie the landing and build up before troops were firmly established ashore), than would normally have been considered appropriate in an operation of the present sort. Air superiority was, after all, one of the modern principles of war; and it had not yet been achieved. But he believed that in the circumstances, in the absence of any alternatives, those risks would have to be taken and any resulting casualties to troops and ships accepted. Once the decision was taken he had every confidence that the Force Commander’s plan, which reduced the risks to the minimum, would be pushed through by all ranks of the British Task Force with the greatest resolution, courage and skill. Once the troops were ashore, the risks would decrease markedly. At some stage it should be possible to use what was expected to become a formidable and secure presence ashore as a means of achieving British aims and getting a lasting settlement. He hoped that this could be done without necessarily involving either major bloodshed around Port Stanley or the permanent stationing of land and naval forces in what strategically he regarded as entirely the wrong part of the world.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL said that, since British territory was involved, the military operations now contemplated were legally compatible with the self defence provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and with Security Council Resolution no. 502. This compatibility would also extend to operations elsewhere provided they were in response to a serious threat to British forces.
In discussion, all the members of the Sub-Committee expressed their support for going ahead with the landing and repossession operations under consideration, unless by the afternoon of 20 May it was clear that an acceptable diplomatic settlement was available.
In further discussion, the following points were made:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the Sub-Committee were unanimous in authorising the landing and repossession operations envisaged in the plan put forward by the Force Commander-and endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff. The operations should therefore proceed, unless the Sub-Committee took a specific decision to the contrary not later than on the afternoon of 20 May. It would be for the Force Commander to decide, in the light of local considerations, whether the landing should be made on the night of 20/21 May or later. The proposal for broadcasting to the Argentine garrison was approved.
The Sub-Committee:
(1)
(2)
2. Diplomatic Issues
The Sub-Committee had before them notes by the Secretaries (OD(SA)(82) 53 and 54) setting out the text of the draft interim agreement which the British Representative at the United Nations, Sir Antony Parsons, had on 17 May handed to the United Nations Secretary General, Senor Perez de Cuellar; telegrams nos. 765–6 and 768 from Sir Antony Parsons reporting on the situation at the United Nations; Luxembourg telegram no. 149 reporting on the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council; and Foreign and Commonwealth Office telegram no. 56 to Luxembourg reporting on negotiations between Foreign Ministers of the European Community.
THE FOREIGN AND C0MMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that Senor Perez de Cuellar’s reaction to the British draft had been reasonably encouraging. He had also been given the British side letter spelling out the exclusion of South Georgia. Senor Perez de Cuellar had since seen the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister; but it was not entirely clear that he had handed over the text of the British document, and this was being urgently checked. In public ,Senor Perez de Cuellar had not revealed the existence of either the document or the deadline; this was welcome.
There would need to be further consultation with him about how he would proceed once the deadline had passed. So far the Argentines had not submitted any document of their own. Meanwhile the United States Secretary of State, Mr Haig, had indicated privately in Luxembourg that he could not envisage the United States acting alone to verify or guarantee an agreement; that he would consider further whether joint action with other countries, such as Brazil, Peru or France, might be possible; and that he was confident Argentina would not invade again if an agreement had once been reached.
THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that at their meeting that day the Cabinet would be shown the text of the British draft agreement; they would be told that Senor Perez de Cuellar expected Argentina’s reply to it not later than 19 May. In response to an approach from the Leader of the Opposition she would suggest a Parliamentary debate on the crisis on 20 May; this would focus on the British draft agreement, which should be tabled in Parliament earlier that day. She and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would be the principal speakers, and no answer would be given to questions about military operations. If the Argentines had not accepted the British document she would make clear to Parliament that the offer it contained had lapsed.
The Sub-Committee:
Took note.
Cabinet Office
18 May 1982
1 A classic case of this would be Belize, 1976—see Annex A.
2 Britain’s ownership of 100 non-carrier capable land-based Typhoon aircraft would arguably have virtually no deterrence value in circumstances such as this.
3 Programme cost up to 2011, £22 billion. Public Accounts Committee estimate of future expenditure, “at least £35 billion”.
4 See Annex A: successful interventions by Maritime force.
5 David Hobbs, Crail, 2011
6 From The Economist 16 July 2011. “The future of the Joint Strike Fighter”: Deliveries of operational aircraft were meant to begin in 2010.
7 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2012 BUDGET ESTIMATES. Page 58.
8 “The F-35 will be the first fighter to possess a satellite communications capability that integrates beyond line of sight communications throughout the spectrum of missions it is tasked to perform”. Lockheed’s own words.
9 Operationally this aircraft would become the QA-47.
10 See minutes of Defence Select Committee, 8 May 2002.
11 Savings would accrue in maintenance, training and spares which are plentiful as variants of the aircraft are operated by the USN, USMC, Canada, Australia – who are buying a customised F/A-18F variant http://www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/36-b/2007/Australia_07-13.pdf, Spain, Finland, Kuwait, Malaysia and Switzerland.
12
For further information on this program please go to:
http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/t45/index.htm
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/us-carrier-pilots-t45-training-system-updated-03022/ http://www.vectorsite.net/avhawk.html#m4
13 If the plan is to share our Carrier Battle Group resources and only have one carrier available for operations from both nations, then short term cross decking does not apply. If we are to have fully independent Carrier Battle Group resources, then our diverse national interests will probably dictate operations in separate parts of the world.
14 It would be politically and militarily naïve to ignore the possibility of posturing and even a second invasion in the South Atlantic. Like it or not, Britain has moral and legal obligations to protect the Islands and their British inhabitants. It should also be noted that the latent wealth of the Falkland Islands and our Antarctic overseas territories continues to increase—becoming a prize worth fighting for.
15 When Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac last launched an Anglo-French defence initiative in St Malo in 1998 it came unstuck when France refused to back the invasion of Iraq.